Roundtable - Rated R(epresentation): Violence in Romance Literatures and Cultures


Welcome to our second Working Papers roundtable discussion. In this issue our papers explore representations of violence and the violence of representation in literary media. The questions these papers propose, and the answers they venture, involve a complex nexus of issues. To what extent are textual practices violent acts? How are violent images deployed to undermine some identities and create others? What role does violence play in the proliferation of national, historical, ethnic, sexual and philosophical discourses? These are just a few of the problems under consideration in this issue.

In the space below, we have asked Emily Butterworth, Andrea Goulet, Crystal Hall and Craig Epplin a number of questions that address the problematic and suggestive relationship between violence and representation(s). Their varied responses indicates that there are numerous ways to approach the topic; in fact, when considered together, violence and representation are irreducible to one, singular interpretation or a stable interpretive model.

  • Emily Butterworth is a Lecturer in the French Department of King’s
    College London (UK). She is the author of a book on slander and
    subjectivity in the early modern period, Poisoned Words: Slander and
    Satire in Early Modern France
    , and of various articles on early modern
    invective, subjectivity, identity and linguistic propriety. She is
    currently working on a major project on concepts of gossip in
    sixteenth-century France. Her personal website can be found at the following address:
    http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/humanities/french/staff/butterworth.html

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  • Craig Epplin is a graduate student in Romance Languages at the University of Pennsylvania, currently working on his dissertation, "Relational Literatures: An Actor-Network of Latin American Writing."  In it, he crosses speculative readings of contemporary literary actors–writers such as Osvaldo Lamborghini, César Aira, Mario Bellatin, Daniel Link, and Alejandro López, and collective projects such as Eloísa Cartonera and Belleza y Felicidad–with a study of the material and institutional circumstances that govern their production. His general research interests include twentieth-century and contemporary literature, particularly in Argentina and Mexico; communicationes media and their relationship to the artistic sphere; and critical theory both in and out of Latin America.

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  • Andrea Goulet is Associate Professor of French at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where she is also a faculty affiliate of  the Unit for Criticism and Interpretive Theory.  She is the author of Optiques:  the Science of the Eye and the Birth of Modern French Fiction and has co-edited special issues of Yale French Studies (Crime Fictions) and Contemporary French Civilization (Visual Studies).  Her current book project studies spatiality in modern French crime fiction from the popular feuilletons of the 1860s to today’s cyberpunk and neo-noirs.

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  • Crystal Hall is a fourth-year graduate student in Romance Languages at the University of Pennsylvania. She is working on Italian science and literature in the late Renaissance and Early Modern periods. Her dissertation, entitled "The Hero in the Galilean Library," will be completed next spring. Crystal’s other research interests revolve around questions of authorial voice, particularly in women, and the occult in post-unification literature.  

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Are there intrinsic meanings to violence, or does it become meaningful only when narrated, aestheticized, or stylized?

Andrea Goulet: Meaning implies symbolic or representational significance. Does violence have extra-linguistic effects? Yes, of course. Does it have “meaning”? I’d say no – or at least not social meaning. An individual who inflicts or suffers violence certainly ideates about it, so I guess that’s already a certain meaning before communication.

Craig Epplin: “Meaning,” to me, suggests that a narration or some other sort of representation— “aestheticized,” “stylized,” or not—is already in place. So, no, I don’t think it makes sense to talk about intrinsic meanings to violence.

Crystal Hall: Perhaps I will take a naïve approach and say yes, violence does have an intrinsic meaning. Violence suggests a common understanding between author and audience and/or victim in order to be understood as violence. There could be no violation if both agressor and victim did not agree on the boundary or code being transgressed. Whether the violence occurs at the level of plot, is thematized, or even becomes the style of the work, the violent act ignores a convention, whether it be representational, moral, or other. Violence is inherently social according to this definition.

Emily Butterworth: The texts I have worked on most consistently are concerned with linguistic violence, so in a sense their relationship to violence is already metaphorical – insult and defamation are described (experienced?) as a wound, fatal or debilitating. Here, not only does violence have to pass through language to be described, but this type of violence is already necessarily linguistic. However, it is interesting to speculate on the sort of experience of linguistic violence that prompts these somatic metaphors – is it somehow visceral itself? Attempts to figure linguistic violence as physical violence point to a conception of physical violence as more primary than linguistic violence, perhaps. Here I found Judith Butler’s work on hate speech of great interest and useful application to the early modern period: if subjects are fundamentally constructed through language, then language can undo and harm them: slander can operate a meaningful violence on the subject because he or she is constructed through language.

The chiasmic relationship between representation and violence that we foreground in this issue begs the question of interpretation: how do we interpret violence?

Emily Butterworth: Interpretation was a crucial concern in the early modern period and somewhat paradoxically generated a vast textual production surrounding the problems and stakes involved. In the texts that I have read on slander, interpretation takes centre stage since slander is itself relational, or a question of position – actionable slur or unpalatable truth? And since linguistic violence itself interprets the subject in unrecognizable or painful ways, the battle ground (as it were) of social and intimate identity is fundamentally one of interpretation.

Crystal Hall: I would like to ask a series of questions to respond to this idea. How do we interpret peace? Charity? Passivity? Could our answers to the interpretation of violence be found in our analyses of other social phenomena? My final question is, why do we interpret violence?

Two ways of interpreting violence in the Italian context come to mind. The first is an economic give-take situation in twentieth-century novels where the violent acts steal something from the female protagonist (blood, tears) and as a whole suggest a failing project of gender equality in Italy. The second comes from the Orlando furioso, a sixteenth-century epic poem in which the title character’s fury, shocking for the period in its ghastly depictions, is generally discussed in terms of what it is not. Orlando’s violence is contrary to courtly decorum, contrary to the intellectual project of the poet, et cetera. In both cases, violence is not interpreted as a stand-alone quality, but in opposition to something else.

Is representation a violent act?

Craig Epplin: Perhaps, although there are many kinds of representations, which can be violent in varying degrees and manners. Besides, we have to distinguish representational violence from other sorts of violence, those that are not filtered through discourse—between the bullet or the knife or the whip and the flesh there is no discourse. Of course, these two classes of violence have often gone hand in hand, for instance in nineteenth-century Europe’s discursive domination of the “orient” that was coextensive with the physical domination of that region’s colonial subjects. Diamela Eltit, the great Chilean writer, explored this conjunction of discursive and bodily violence in her 1983 novel Lumpérica: she dramatized the dissolution of collective narratives during the Pinochet dictatorship by cutting her own arms as she read the novel in a Santiago brothel.

Emily Butterworth: Early modern conceptions of slander centered certainly on the violence of the (mis)representation. But could it not also be restorative? Thinking about the early modern texts I am familiar with, the desire to represent at least the injustice of violence done – to reputation, social standing, social prospects, and thus even to livelihood – could be explained at least in part as a desire to repair that unjust violence and to reformulate the defiled and deformed identity in terms recognizable (or at least acceptable) to the subject. However, this is admittedly the representation of a certain form of violence, which itself passes through language and so must perhaps be combated with the same means.

Andrea Goulet: Representation can work as a sublimating force, as with those cozy detective novels, which allow sweet grandmothers to enjoy reading about murderous acts they’d never tolerate in life. The classic detective genre (as opposed to noir, gothic, horror) seeks to contain the bodily, visceral effects of violence: Reason dominates Instinct, Order reclaims Disorder, and the bloody corpse becomes the “figure on the carpet” — an enigma to be analyzed, observed, and resolved. But on the other hand, the abstraction of the epistemological quest is always “pierced” by the sensationalism of the battered body or the atavistic brute. In a paper I did on bibliophilia in late 19th-century crime fictions, I used the Freudian notion of scoptophilia to link the detective’s scientific inquiry (his book-lust) to the violence he disavows (the blood-lust of the criminal). Curiosity is a passion that’s been troped as both ennobling and transgressive – and our own book-lust may well be fueled by the forces of blood-lust.

What role does the representation of violence play in the creation and iteration of national identities? Does gender difference complicate this question?

Emily Butterworth: The question of national identity is a very interesting one in the early modern period and one (in France at least) that, as well as being predicated on a necessary gesture of both inclusion and exclusion, does seem tied up with a certain representation of violence – that of the warrior class, the old aristocracy, to which the emerging bourgeoisie and new nobility had a somewhat ambivalent relationship. If French identity was predicated in mythic memory on valor on the battlefield, this had to be acknowledged while perhaps being replaced by a more civil – civilized? – version of Frenchness. The position of women in the debates does complicate the issue. If, on the one hand, the emerging ideal of national culture (in the seventeenth century at least) was sketched out in the female-run salons of the Old Regime, new models of masculine valor had to be found that were not overly (or even overtly) feminized. To return to the question of violence and representation, there is a sense in which women writing on the question of slander feel originally slandered (as it were) by a social model that constructs them as inferior and incapable.

Crystal Hall: My first thought about national identity comes from Italian film. The primary nation-building or identity-strong films of Italian cinema are based on revolution. Cabiria, 1860 and the Gattopardo were released at times when the ruling political body either needed to reinforce certain values such as victory, strength and superiority (e.g.: the associations between Cabiria and fascist values) or when directors wanted to highlight the violence done to their compatriots (1860 and the Gattopardo). Gender roles are certainly defined and reinforced in these cases, though I can’t say how they might complicate it.

Craig Epplin: I’ll mention a specific example. Throughout Latin America, from approximately the seventies through the nineties, a testimonial mode of literature became common. Its various incarnations responded to a range of circumstances, but a common theme among them was an attempt at restitution of some sort of violence. The first example of the genre was based on the testimony of an ex-slave in Cuba; others responded to recent forms of state violence such as the slaughter of indigenous communities in Guatemala or the crimes of the South American dictatorships. The ambition of these texts, it seems to me, was to reclaim a space within the national narrative, to allow what had been suppressed to be represented. Of course, the testimonial narrative contained its own internal dynamics, as the interactions between the “informant” and the writer reproduced an asymmetrical relationship of power-knowledge.

Andrea Goulet: On the morning of 9/11, I met with my Introduction to French Literature undergrads, some of whom had not yet heard of the attacks. We were reading France’s founding war-cries, the medieval epic poems La Chanson de Guillaume and La Chanson de Roland, and the students had been titillated by the gross-out descriptions of the Christians’ deaths at the hands of the Sarrazins (i.e. Muslims): riverbanks strewn with blood and brains, swords stuck into eyesockets, et cetera. I asked the class whether they wanted to discuss the reading or just have a conversation about the World Trade Center attacks and it quickly became clear that the themes were the same ones – martyrdom, religious nationalism, revenge, crusades, and killing. The whole history of patriotic wars is pretty man-centered, of course, but a recent New York Times Sunday Magazine article about women soldiers raped by their superiors in the U.S. Army reminds us of the interconnectedness of sexual and political violence.

Often, when one discusses violence in the media, the question of social responsibility and moral implications arises. Is this a tired issue, or one that requires our constant attention?

Crystal Hall: The recent events at Virginia Tech and the resulting media frenzy are particularly telling; they indicate to us that media coverage of violence requires our constant vigilance and a demand for non-violent representation of violent acts.

Andrea Goulet: Yes, of course we need to be aware of the moral implications of media representation. But journalism and art are two different things and it’s hard to know what to consider when judging the latter. Short of condoning snuff films, do we have the right to decide how representations of violence will and should be viewed – and by whom? Does the “ick” factor of the multiple torture-rapes in Robbe-Grillet’s Projet pour une révolution à New York mean it shouldn’t have been published? (Maybe!) I used to be against all censorship, but I have to admit that since having kids, I’ve become less dismissive of Tipper Gore… (Even at my age, I can’t watch The Shield without having nightmares – remember when Vic Mackey rams a guy’s face onto the hot coil of a stove burner? – so why would I want children to see that?)

Emily Butterworth: The question of identification with representations does require constant attention, I think, since it interrogates means of subject formation which appear naturalized but may be revealed as historically determined. In considering how we react to violent representations (and even how these reactions are themselves represented) we may uncover other mechanisms at work.

Is there a theory of violence?

Emily Butterworth: Theories? Surely we are back to the knotty issue of interpretation again – and a proliferation of ways of seeing. If the experience of violence itself seems irreducible and incommensurable, attempts to represent it may always be plural and provisional.

Roundtable: Wikidemia? Scholarly publishing on the World Wide Web

Welcome to the first Working Papers roundtable discussion. Our field of inquiry in the inaugural issue of our graduate journal is online publishing. A number of questions spring to mind when one considers the role of online publishing in academia. First, is it a relevant vehicle for academic writing? How will it affect the way we read, write and pursue our professional interests? Will current publishing practices become obsolete, and if so, when can we expect to read the last words of offline print culture?Indeed, our roundtable topic is not so far removed from the title of the current issue: “Last Words”, the selected proceeding from the annual graduate student conference hosted by the Graduate Romanic Association at the University of Pennsylvania. The issues we encounter as we consider the potential and realized effects of online publishing are pertinent to an issue where many of the papers engage with the notion of boundaries, genre, and new (textual, psychological, geographical, political) spaces.

In the space below, we have asked Reinaldo Laddaga, Michael Solomon, Gerald Prince, Charles Cooney and Glenn Roe a series of questions that touch on the changing cultural and textual landscape implicated in, and by, the Web.

Reinaldo Laddaga Michael Solomon Gerald Prince Charles Cooney and Glenn Roe
Reinaldo Laddaga Michael Solomon Gerald Prince Charles Cooney
& Glenn Roe

Reinaldo Laddaga

Reinaldo Laddaga is Associate Professor of Romance Languages in the Hispanic Studies Program at the University of Pennsylvania. His research focuses on contemporary Latin American literature and critical theory, and he is the author of Literaturas indigentes y placeres bajos, a study of the links between literature and ethics in the works of Felisberto Hernández, Virgilio Piñera, and Juan Rodofo Wilcock, and Estética de la emergencia: La formación de otra cultura de las artes, in which he examines new forms of collaborative production in the textual and visual arts. Professor Laddagga has also written a novel, entitled La euforia de Baltasar Brum.

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Michael Solomon

Michael Solomon is Associate Professor of Romance Languages in the Hispanic Studies Program at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of The Literature of Misogyny in Medieval Spain, a book on the interplay between the discourses of love, disease, and misogyny in the Middle Ages. He has also published The Mirror of Coitus: A Translation and Edition of the Fifteenth-Century. In his research he examines Spanish and Latin American film, and medieval media studies.

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Gerald Prince

Gerald Prince is Professor of Romance Languages in the French Studies Program at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of several books, including Métaphysique et technique dans l’œuvre romanesque de Sartre, A Dictionary of Narratology, Narrative as Theme, and Guide du roman de langue française (1901-1950) as well as many articles on narrative theory and on modern French literature. A co-editor of the “Parallax” series for the Johns Hopkins University Press and of the “Stages” series for the University of Nebraska Press, Professor Prince is editor of French Forum and a member of the editorial or advisory board of over a dozen journals. He is currently working on the second volume of his Guide du roman de langue française (1951-2000).

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Charles Cooney & Glenn Roe

Charles Cooney earned a doctorate in Comparative Literature from the University of Chicago. His academic research centers on connections between modern French and American poetry. He currently works as a
consultant on full-text database projects that use the PhiloLogic software
developed at ARTFL.

Glenn H. Roe is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Romance Languages and Literatures, Lecturer in the College and Project Manager at the ARTFL Project - University of Chicago. Aside from his interest at ARTFL in large textual databases from the French Enlightenment and 19th Century, Mr. Roe’s doctoral work is primarily concerned with the intersection of History and Literature in the work of the writer Charles Péguy and others associated with the early 20th Century Periodical “Les Cahiers de la quizaine.

The Project for American and French Research on the Treasury of the French
Language (ARTFL)
is a cooperative enterprise of Analyse et Traitement
Informatique de la Langue Francaise (ATILF)
of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), the Division of the Humanities, the
Division of the Social Sciences, and Electronic Text Services (ETS) of the
University of Chicago.

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First, a professional concern: is the Internet an effective medium for presenting research?

Reinaldo Laddaga: Absolutely. Actually, I don’t think that it would be particularly off the mark to anticipate that the Internet will become in the near future the main medium for the distribution of research papers and even academic books. The advantages are many: economy, velocity, ease of access. The only visible problem, at this point, is how to set up mechanisms of selection and presentation to replace the ones that have been more or less functional for a long time in the world of print.

Gerald Prince: The Internet can certainly be an effective medium for presenting
research. If the question indirectly refers to “career progress,” the answer must be more cautious: so far as I know, research in our discipline published in electronic journals does not have the same weight as that published in more “traditional” journals.

Glenn Roe & Charles Cooney: We believe that online technologies have, and will, continue to help scholars expand the scope of literary research, but the role of scholars as interpreters of ideas and as experts in particular fields of knowledge will not change fundamentally.

While the proliferation of blogs, wikis, and other communal Web interfaces have facilitated the exchange of ideas, we think that traditional modes of scholarly publishing, whether online or in print, will continue to serve as the standard for establishing academic credentials. Submitting work that passes through the editorial process of peer-reviewed journals, while not a perfect system, generally ensures that intellectual products meet at least certain minimum standards of academic rigor and quality control. Young scholars starting their careers cannot rely solely on subjective modes of electronic expression such as blogs to publish their ideas and research because the academic community in general considers their validity dubious. Within this context, we do agree that the Internet can be an effective medium for presenting, sharing and collaborating on research. For instance, we can imagine scholars posting articles on a private site, inviting comments from peers (the wiki model), and then editing and adapting their research accordingly. We can also imagine a time when traditional print journals publish exclusively online, employing hyperlinks from citations and notes to primary or secondary electronic resources.

Do you consider the Internet a community space? What role do you see the Internet playing in the academic community?

Michael Solomon: I am a bit surprised that you would formulate such a question in this day and age. Perhaps twenty years ago we could debate this, but today the role of the Internet has become completely embedded in our academic community. To question its status today would be tantamount to questioning the role that books played in an academic community twenty years ago. A more productive question would be to ask what would happen to our academic community if we no longer had access to the Internet.

No, the Internet is not a community space. I find the concept of “space” problematic even as a metaphor in this context. If you mean does the Internet make connections between like-minded people, absolutely. Does that mean we have a community? I guess so, but who cares?

Reinaldo Laddaga: I see the Internet as a space that includes a very large number of places where there are many diversified processes of community formation. It would be useful, however, to be aware that when we use the word “community” in this context, we are designating social realities that are very different from those human assemblages based on place (as in “the community of Philadelphia”) or profession (as in “the academic community”) that we tend to imagine when we hear the word. Digital technologies, inasmuch as they allow for social formations where the formation of durable links is separated from the imperative of spatial proximity or the presupposition of pre-existing identities, should incite us to rethink what it is that we want to say when we use each of these words. With regard to the more restricted question of the role that it plays among us, in universities and other associated institutions, there are almost too many to enumerate them.

How has the Internet affected our discipline thus far?

Reinaldo Laddaga: Not as much as it could have been anticipated a few years ago, perhaps, but still substantially. There are a few new online publications. There’s a much greater fluidity in the intellectual exchanges. There has been not as much theorization as could be expected, as far as I know, on the impact of the Internet on the objects that we study (literature, for example). Although even this is changing. But it is not impossible that the main impact of the Internet will be, say, indirect: that it will have to do with the fact that its mere existence makes possible the development of new imaginaries and, hopefully, new theoretical models.

Gerald Prince: The Internet has affected our discipline in many areas: bibliographical research, data gathering, stylistic analysis, etc.

Glenn Roe & Charles Cooney: Certain aspects of academic scholarship, such as the need for peer-reviewed journals, will not change, but research and research methodologies are already changing with new technologies. Full-text retrieval and analysis systems, for example PhiloLogic enable scholars to run queries on large corpora of literary and other texts quickly and with incredible ease. Scholars are already researching speech-acts and language-use by characters of different ethnicities and genders in databases of theatrical texts, applying data-mining techniques to the field of literary inquiry. These technologies are helping us to enhance traditional types of scholarship while allowing us to tackle problems that were previously too large to consider practically.

Online tools for textual analysis and research have expanded the scope of research but have not fundamentally changed the nature of scholarship. Communal authorship is good for establishing a certain consensus of knowledge, but it lacks the depth, breadth and intellectual pointedness of an individual scholar’s work. Wikipedia and other such community-informed sites are effective, like all encyclopedias, as repositories of general information, but cannot replace the expertise and knowledge of trained scholars.

Michael Solomon: This question is so broad that I hesitate to synthesize a response. To answer this, you have to ask a larger question about the nature of digital media, not just its mode of dissemination over the Internet. The single most important contribution that the Internet has made to scholarship is to give our work an increasing quality of at-hand-ness. This is an electronic re-fabrication of the Garden of Eden in which everything was always already there. The Internet creates a perpetual “here” and provides a new twist on Gertrude Stein’s observation that “there is no there, there. Like medieval monks, we can plant ourselves at our desks and at the same time go everywhere. Think of Eriugena’s oxymoron: “motus stabilis et status mobilis,” motion in rest and rest in motion. God. The motionless mover. That’s it, the Internet has given us all a messianic complex, exhilarating to be sure, but as mere humans, the weight of so much information and so little time becomes a tremendous burden and we long nostalgically, some in mourning, others with melancholy, for those golden years when all we needed to do was manage a few indispensable books.

Do the interface and new technologies of online publishing change reading practices? Do they change writing? What effects does online publishing have on authorship and the way we conceive of authorship?

Michael Solomon: The Internet allows us to gain quicker access to scholarly material and manipulate that material with greater ease. This has led to what we might call random-access reading; the ability to jump from alpha to omega and everywhere in between. Reading has become less linear and in this sense fulfills the technological advantages that the medieval scholars saw in book or codex over the rolls or scrolls.

We would like to assume that scholarly writing is primarily about the exchange of information. It’s not; it is about the scholar and his or her status in the academic community. The material culture of scholarship has been radically threatened by the Internet because it threatens the status of the author. Scholarly work on the Internet gets cut, pasted, modified, and destroyed much faster than material scholarship. It pushes us toward evolutionary collective scholarship rather than fossilized individual achievement. We like to think of our scholarly work as the product of our own ingenuity and knowledge. Paper journals confirm this by providing us with palpable and tangible objects that we can “cherish” as our own. The Internet, however, is not a touchy-feely medium. What we think is ours quickly belongs to everybody.

Reinaldo Laddaga: It all depends. Much of online publishing follows the model of print. In these cases (as when a paper is distributed in Word or PDF format), I don’t think that the difference in terms of practices of reading is particularly big. Of course, there are lots of productions for the Internet that can’t be read at all as if they were printed. There are objects in the Internet (I’m thinking of online games, for example) to which it would be unproductive and even absurd to relate as readers. Something similar could be said about the question of authorship: the Internet allows for the distribution of objects authored in a perfectly traditional way. It also allows for (one could even say that it is uniquely suited to) collaborative practices of various kinds, from the production of texts by large collectives (like the Italian collective Wu Ming to new ways of articulating complex fluxes of discourse and image coming from heterogeneous sources in some blogs.

Is online publishing a mere simulacrum of a book/journal/newspaper/magazine, or a different animal altogether? Or, is it something in between?

Reinaldo Laddaga: I suppose that I should repeat myself here: it all depends. There are online publications that imitate as much as possible the model of the printed narrative or essay, others that differ from this model as much as they can, and there are many hybrids in between.

Michael Solomon: This is the most pressing problem with electronic dissemination of scholarly material. It is difficult for scholars and university administrators to think outside the “book” or the literary journal. Paper journals, with their many limitations, have dominated scholarly exchange for many years. Scholars are reluctant to embrace alternatives to the canonical journal article such as shorter or longer pieces of scholarship with embedded links, images, and dedicated space for comments, queries, and debates. Personally, I like the idea of erudite blogs in which individual scholars publish their works and allow these works to be linked to other blogs.

The sooner we eliminate paper journals the better. Already university administrations are moving in this direction as they continue to eliminate funding for long-standing journals. This stance, of course, is highly hypocritical in that the very institutions that are withdrawing support from traditional journals still demand that young scholars publish in this format for tenure and promotion.

Glenn Roe & Charles Cooney: Large textual databases, like the ARTFL Project, remain book-centric, as they attempt to reproduce the codex in an electronic format. Electronic critical editions of books can change the relationship between book and reader by making paratextual resources such as commentaries, page images and textual variants easier to consult. Examples of this sort of online edition are the Montaigne Project– a full-text searchable version of the Essais with overlapping editions and large format page images; and the only online critical edition of Balzac’s Comédie humaine which incorporates scholarly commentary alongside the corrected text.

Without a doubt, technologies are enabling greater degrees of cooperation among scholars as well as facilitating the dissemination of new and old learning. Google Books, for example, will provide access to millions of documents. It will be the job of both individual scholars and scholarly collaborations to find ways to exploit this mass of data, developing new techniques that extend traditional scholarship and push literary studies in new directions.

Are there theorists and scholars who attend to these questions in their work? What are their perspectives on this topic?

Gerald Prince: Many theorists and scholars—e.g. Espen Aarseth, Terry Harpold (who
did his thesis at Penn and is now at the University of Florida), George Landow, Lev Manovich, Sherry Turkle—have attended to these and/or related questions. For starters, I recommend The New Media Reader, edited by Noah Wardrip-Fruin and Nick Montfort. Nick is now writing a thesis at Penn on interactive fiction and narratology.

Michael Solomon: A big problem facing productive scholarly use of the Internet is the current crisis in copyright and fair-use legislation. Check out Lawrence Lessig’s book, Free Culture and the Creative Commons Website.

Reinaldo Laddaga: There has been an explosion of publications in the last few years. Some of these publications deal with the question of the specific attributes of digital media (as The Language of Digital Media, by Lev Manovich, an excellent study that links new media to the tradition of film to establish their points of contact and divergence), some with the question of the relationship between literature as we have known it and digital textual objects (as Narrative as Virtual Reality, by Marie-Laure Ryan, or the writings of Katherine Hayles). I find particularly interesting the way that theorizations of artistic production in the Internet are producing new associations between disciplines: literary criticism and anthropology and economics. This propensity towards transdisciplinary theorization in Internet studies can be seen in edited volumes as Rishab Aiyer Ghosh’s CODE. Collaborative Ownership and the Digital Technology and First Person. New Media as Story, Performance and Game, edited by Noah Wardrip-Fruin and Pat Harrigan. Both of these books have been published by the MIT Press. And there are, of course, specialized online publications like Electronic Book Review and Game Studies, to mention just a couple.

When Last Words Become First Words: Transgressive Literacies and the Birth of Romance Textuality

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Anthony P. Espòsito
University of Pennsylvania

I. Last words Balkan style: Philology and the Bosnia Syndrome (1898).

Last words, the theme for this series of articles that comes out of last spring’s graduate conference of the same name, are somewhat disconcerting for a philologist. Philology’s traditional obsession has usually been with first words — those first and originary scribblings which initialize a culture’s, and a nation’s, textual history. Last words from a linguistic-philological perspective usually imply language death. In comparative Romance philology there is a famous instance of last words that all graduate students learn about; it is invariably told as a cautionary tale, and is meant to remind us of two things: (1) that we always must play the hand we are dealt, that is, often we have less than perfect data; and (2) that we must temper our conclusions in light of this less than ideal data. The setting is the Istrian peninsula at the end of the 19th century. The two characters are the Italian linguist, Matteo Giulio Bartoli, and his informant, Antuone Udaine. Bartoli was born in 1876 in Albona d’Istria and raised within the cultural and linguistic mosaic of pre-World War I Austria-Hungary in present day Croatia. He studied historical linguistics at the University of Vienna in a rigidly neogrammarian program and in 1907 assumed the chair of linguistics at the University of Turin, a position which he held until his death in 1946. Bartoli’s early scholarly interest was the Romance language known as Dalmatian, a bridge language between the north-eastern Italian and Istro-romance dialects to its west and the Romanian dialect group in the east. At the time of Bartoli’s writing, Dalmatian was thought to be extinct, having been replaced through several waves of immigration and subsequent language contact by the more Italian-like dialects of neighboring Venezia-Friuli-Giulia in the north and west and Croatian in the south.

In 1897, Bartoli was made known of a person who claimed to be a speaker of Vegliot, a northern dialect of Dalmatian, spoken in the island of Veglia, now called Krk in Croatian. Bartoli rushed back to Istria and met Antuone Udaine Burbur, and began interviewing him, recording his vocabulary, phonology, grammar, and stories of his life. Udaine provided Bartoli with much of the information that formed the basis for his famous study published in Vienna in 1906-1907, Das Dalmatische. Bartoli’s original notes written in Italian were lost during the Second World War, though a translation of the work into Italian finally appeared in 2002. Udaine, however, was a less than ideal informant for several reasons: it came to be known that (1) he was not really a native speaker when he revealed that he acquired the language unbeknownst to his parents, who used it as a concealment code (commonly a language used by parents when they do not want their children to understand); (2) he was away from Krk for several extended periods and upon returning eventually became the sacristan for the local church. In this role, he acquired some knowledge of Latin, somewhat devaluing him as the ideal naive informant. Additionally, much of his language appears to suggest significant contamination from other dialects, especially Venetian and other varieties of Istro-romance. At the time of his meeting Bartoli, he hadn’t spoken Vegliot in 20 years; (3) the Hapsburg dental plan being what it was, Udaine was toothless when Bartoli met him and his pronunciation reflects very poor dentition; (4) advanced in age, Udaine was considerably hard of hearing. In June of 1898, Tuone Udaine, a Croatian nationalist, met a very Balkan end: he was killed when he stepped on a land mine planted by a Bosnian-Turkish separatist. Despite his complicated subject position vis-à-vis Dalmatian, Tuone Udaine’s last words uttered to and recorded by Bartoli signaled the extinction of Dalmatian romance.

However, in a way the story does not end here; last words have a way of lingering. In 1925, based in large part on his foundational work on Dalmatian, Bartoli published his famous Introduzione alla neolinguistica. Neolinguistics was, as the name suggests, a new way of looking at language, specifically linguistic change. Heretofore, historical linguistics was dominated by the neogrammarians, a Germanic school that believed in the rigid regularity of language change and the inviolate nature of the sound laws that govern it .[1] Extremely formalist and positivist in their approach, the neogrammarians viewed all mechanisms for language change as internalized and endemic to the system itself; exceptions are invariably explained away either through analogy or entropy. Having learned the lessons taught by Tuone Udaine, Bartoli saw that external factors, especially contact between languages, play as much if not a greater role in linguistic evolution. The neolinguists, also called spatial linguists, realized that social and historical circumstances can effect linguistic change as much as any internal linguistic clock. Fabiana Woodfin succinctly describes this:

Most importantly, he [Bartoli] did not believe that linguistic changes arose through internal, spontaneous evolution (also known as “parthenogenesis”), as the neogrammarians believed, but rather through contact with other idioms and languages. How does one group truly conquer another? Bartoli asked his students. By armed coercion or by making itself received with fascino? Was the prestige of a dominant group’s language truly inseparable from the prestige enjoyed by that group’s culture, institutions and world view? It is those who “give things,” Bartoli argued, who can also “give words”. (9)

The pop psychology metaphor notwithstanding, neolinguistics was a coping mechanism of sorts for radical linguistic change. The neogrammarians believed in language’s organic nature: like all organisms, languages are born and they die. For Bartoli, however, Udaine’s death did not really signal the death of Dalmatian. Musing on the supposed last speakers of Dalmatian, Prussian, and Cornish, Giovanni Bonfante writes: “On the other hand, even after the death of that ‘last speaker’, each of these languages–allegedly dead, like rabbits—goes on living in a hundred devious, hidden and subtle ways in other languages now living; the Venetian and Slavic dialects of Dalmatia, the German of the Elbe, The English of the Cornwall” (357).

This new theory of language change, that linguistic phenomena are bound to social and historical circumstances and that contacts between language groups are rarely peaceful and usually the result of conflict and struggle, had a great impact on Bartoli’s most famous student at Turin, Antonio Gramsci. It is through Bartoli’s lectures on language and his constant reaffirmation of the centrality of conflict and history, mediated by cultural seduction, or in Bartoli’s own words, fascino, that Gramsci begins to formulate his theory of hegemony and domination as the constant interplay between consent and coercion: like language itself, culture either succumbs to the allure, the fascino, of the other, or to its weapons.

It would be specious to ascribe Gramsci’s theory of language and hegemony as articulated in his Notebook 29 to Tuone Udaine’s last words. However, it does give us cause to pause. Last words are not silenced but find echo and rearticulation, and when heard or relayed, they easily become the words of others.

Philology is instinctively uncomfortable with the notion of last words, for last words signal the end of something, often a tradition. In opposite fashion, our obsession is invariably with first words. Etymological and historical dictionaries, whose task is to record the lexical history of a language, consider the first attestation of a word to be an important event. Obsessed with national origins, the search for originary and primary textual material becomes the object of the philological paper chase. It will serve us well to heed Bartoli when he writes that those in a position to give things can thus give words; the things that philology is empowered to give are the very words themselves. And if they are first words, all the better, for in this way the philologist becomes the guarantor of the nation’s origin, or at the very least, its material, textual origins.

Beware though. When we examine these initializing monuments of Romance textual culture within the frame of their material context and not just as first words that have been neatly excised and anthologized, we get a very different sense of their meaning. Far from simply being the first words of a new cultural tradition, they also attest the end of an old order. Furthermore, as acts of writing, these initializing monuments often if not always appear as appendices, glosses, and marginalia. Not texts per se but rather paratexts, these first words are also the last words written on the material document.

II. Is it not Latin? It is Devo! Linguistic Deviance in a Pre-Modern World.

I should like to offer two examples as cases in point. The first deals with Codex LXXXIX of the Biblioteca Capitolare in Verona, Italy, established in 517 A.D. as the scriptorium for the cathedral of Verona. Brought to light in 1924 by the Italian textual critic, Luigi Schiaparelli, the manuscript is of certain Mozarabic origin and contains a sequence of devotional prayers and chants associated with the Mozarabic liturgical rite, the continuation of the older Visigothic rite in Islamic occupied Spain. The codex was written in al-Andalus some time during first three decades of the 8th century in a clearly Visigothic chancery hand. From Islamic Spain, the manuscript made its way to Sardinia, then to Pisa, and at the very end of the 8th or perhaps very early 9th century, ended up in Verona. However, the importance of Schiaparelli’s discovery had nothing to do with the Mozarabic orational per se—as a genre they are common enough. What brought the manuscript to the Italian paleographer’s attention was a marginal scribble above one of the manuscript’s illustrations. Written in a different hand, late 8th – early 9th century Veronese cathedral chancery, this marginalia, known as the Indovinello veronese or Veronese Riddle, appears to have nothing to do with the text itself:

Se pareba boves alba pratalia araba & albo versorio teneba & negro semen seminaba [2]

‘he was readying the oxen[,] he was plowing the white field & was holding the white plow & sowing the black seed’

Most scholars agree on its interpretation. The riddle is likely a pen-proof, something the scribe writes to test the quill point. Performatively, the Indovinello is self-referential to the act of writing itself: the oxen are the scribe’s fingers, the white field, the parchment, the white plow, the pen and the black seed, the ink. There is more disagreement, however, surrounding the language of the Indovinello. Clearly, the morphology is quite removed from classical Latin, let alone the riddle’s imagined phonology, and because of this, most scholars comfortably affirm this text as the first written attestation of an Italian vernacular. Nonetheless, some scholars are reluctant to take the plunge and call it Italian, instead opting to classify it as an example of late 8th-century spoken or vulgar Latin. If this be the case, then it is Latin’s swan’s song. Either way, the vexing question remains: is the gloss half empty or half full?

Naming the language of the Indovinello, however, only becomes urgent when it is severed from its material containment; excised, it lacks viability unless it is grafted onto another tradition that can culturally sustain it. Regardless of what we chose to call it, the end of Latin or the beginning of Italian, what is clear when we study the Indovinello in its material context is the appearance of two parallel literacies: the established medieval Latin literacy of the Mozarabic orational, and the emergent literacy of the Indovinello, in a different hand and employing a significantly different morphology. The last words scribbled on the Mozarabic orational become the first words of something new, albeit something not easily named.

The second example brings us back to the Iberian Peninsula, the place of origin of our earlier Mozarabic codex. The texts I should like to consider are the 10th century glosses produced in the monasteries of San Millán de la Cogolla and Santo Domingo de Silos in Northern Spain. These interlinear and marginal glosses, which serve to explain difficult passages in various Latin texts, share much with the Indovinello: their interlineal or marginal inclusion within the text are the last words written on the page and like the Indovinello to Italian, they are canonized as important first words in the history of Spanish. However, unlike the Indovinello, these acts of writing are intentionally bound in meaning to the texts they seek to comment. And as acts of writing they are polyvalent, they gloss both through Latin synonymy and through translation into a quite recognizable form of primitive Spanish, or in two instances, into Basque, for whose tradition they are also first words.[3] In several cases, the glosses go beyond translatio and approach amplificatio, expanding and commenting in the vernacular on the original Latin texts. It would be worth commenting that modern editions of the glosses never do them justice as we are forced to read them in linear fashion rather than as the interlinear or marginal hypertexts that they actually are.

Why do these texts emerge when they do and take the form that they do? It is curious that I have not mentioned a French text here, purposely skirting the issue until now. When compared to Spain and Italy, writing in the vernacular in France, both in the South and in the North emerges, if you pardon the metaphor, like a baby born with a full set of teeth. The earliest examples of writing in French appear as mature texts with a clear pragmatic context. The intrusive marginality which defines both the Indovinello and the Glosas is replaced in France by a narratively sequential rendition of a treaty sworn in a French (and German) vernacular, neatly contained and introduced within the context of a Latin chronicle – the Serments de Strassbourg.[4] And there is a reason for this.

If we follow Roger Wright’s argument, the emergence of a vernacular Romance literacy is dependent on the insufficiency of the Medieval Latin writing system to represent the spoken vernaculars. According to Wright, the Medieval Latin signary, that peculiar combination of alphabetic and syllabic signs employed by early Medieval Latin scribes, came to represent two different phonological realities–one way of writing, Latin, for two ways of speaking, Latin and the vernacular. For the Spanish and Italian reader-writer at this time, the sounds that the written signs represented were far closer to his or her way of speaking than they were to anything that Cicero may have imagined. The situation in France, especially in the north, was radically different.

The need for a new way of writing, a new literacy, came with the Carolingian reforms of the 8th and 9th century. Charlemagne’s notion of the translatio imperii extended to even the linguistic realm and he saw in a recodified and reunified Latinity the single most important administrative resource available to him for the establishment of the new Rome. These spelling and pronunciation reforms, instigated by Alcuin of York, had their greatest impact in France. Because it was the center of Carolingian power, the reforms radiated from northeastern France to the periphery of the empire; and France itself was the area first foremost affected by the new linguistic reforms. This change in Latin quickly gave rise to a new linguistic consciousness. Writers throughout the Romance-speaking world realized that this new Latin, which was in essence Latin restored to its classical norms, had little to do with the language they spoke. Nowhere was this more evident than in France, where, because of early and radical diphthongization and the wide-spread loss of final unstressed syllables (not to mention a very strong Germanic presence), the spoken vernaculars were furthest removed from Alcuin’s retro-Latin.

In fact, it is likely that apocope, the loss of Latin final syllables, is the single most important reason for the need for a new way of writing in France. In Latin, most of the grammatical information of a word is contained in this final syllable. Medieval Latin scribes developed a complicated system of abbreviations that they used to represent the different suffixes of the nominal declension system and the verbal paradigm. This way of writing Latin was no doubt most incompatible for representing the vernacular in France, where, when compared to the comparatively conservative morphology of Iberian and Italian Romance, a final syllable usually looked nothing like its Latin reflex.

Vernacular literacy emerges quickly centered in France. If there are situations of competing emerging literacies in France analogous to those that I have articulated for Spain and Italy, they are between Gallo-Romance and Germanic speakers, not between French and Latin. Reflecting the Franco-Germanic bilingualism of the Carolingian center, almost all cases of vernacular glossing that incorporate French examples have a Germanic context. The Reichenau glosses produced around Lake Constance between Germany and Switzerland and the Kassel glosses written around Cologne are the most well known and studied.

III. Conclusion

I should like us to ask ourselves what is the allure, the fascino, of these last words and their relationship to this emerging vernacular literacy? Or, conversely, how does this new way of writing coerce? For me, the answer lies in its transgression. These last words on the nuclear text written by an other’s hand self-consciously celebrate their difference. As writing, they are decentered, appearing in the margins. They reject the linear structure of their Latin frame, and intrude between the lines. By virtue of their very interlinearity, they are interruptive, always reminding us that this is a new way of writing; yet, as we see in the case of the glosses, by their shared semantism, they are connective, as they join this new way of writing to the old. These last words are heterophonic, using old symbols for new sounds as they record in writing what was before just a way of saying.

Despite differences in our national languages, periods, critical dispositions, we are essentially all philologists. And as lovers of logos, we should perhaps reconsider our unease with last words. Last words have a way of both alluring and coercing us to explore new ways of writing, new ways of saying, and new ways of reading. They allure us when they remind us of the excesses and openness of language and textuality. They coerce us when by their very difference they invite us to excise them from their material context, thus effectively undoing their lastness, and instead to reorder them as those celebrated first words in a new textual imaginary.

Notes

1. The term “blind necessity” is often used to describe the neogrammarian’s inviolate view of sound laws: “Phonetic laws, the neogrammarians dogmatically proclaim, operate with blind necessity” (Bonfante 346).

2. I cite both the text and its tradition as found in Castellani (13). Castellani faithfully follows Schiaparelli’s own transcription except for its division into words.

3. I offer an example of each type of gloss. All citations follow Menéndez Pidal (3-9). (1) Latin-Latin synonymy: adulterium [fornicatjonem] ‘adultery [fornication]’; (2) Latin-Romance translation: talia plura conmittunt [tales muitos fazen] ‘so many undertake it’; (3) Latin-Basque-Romance translation: precipitemur [guec ajutuezdugu] [nos nonkaigamus] ‘so that we not fall’; (4) ampliifcation and clarification: Et tertius ueniens [elo terzero diabolo uenot] ‘and the third having come [and the third devil came]’.

4. The Serments de Strassbourg are contained in Nithard’s Latin History of the Sons of Louis the Pious (III, 5). In his chronicle, Nithard reproduces the oaths as sworn by Louis the German and Charles the Bald in French and Old High German respectively at the Treaty of Verdun (842-843). He introduces and contextualizes them by clearly announcing the shift in speaker and in language: “Lodhuvicus, quoniam maior natu erat, prior haec deinde se servaturum testatus est…” ‘Louis, being the oldest, was thus the first to swear…’ [translation mine]. Each brother then swears in the other’s language, either in ‘Romana lingua’ or in ‘Theodisca lingua’, giving French a very different type of initializing moment.

WORKS CITED

Bartoli, Matteo Giulio. Das Dalmatische: altromanische Sprachreste von Veglia bis Ragusa und ihre Stellung in der Apennino-Balkanischen Romania. 2 vols. Vienna: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1906; 2 vols. in 1. Nendeln (Lichtenstein): Kraus Reprint, 2005.

—. Introduzione alla neolinguistica. Geneva: Archivium Romanicum, 1925.

Bonfante, Giuliano. “The Neolinguistic Position (A Reply to Hall’s Criticism of Neolinguistics).” Language 23(1947): 344-375.

Castellani, Arrigo. I più antichi testi italiani. 2nd ed. Bologna: Pàtron, 1976.

Gramsci, Antonio. Prison Notebooks. Trans. J. A. Buttigieg & A. Callari. Ed. J. A. Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Hall, Robert. “Bartoli’s ‘Neolinguistica’.” Language 22 (1946): 273-283.

Menéndez Pidal, Ramón. Orígenes del español. 3rd ed. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1950.

Nithard. Histoire des fils de Louis le Pieux. Ed. Philippe Lauer. Paris: H. Champion, 1926.

Schiaparelli, Luigi. “Sulla data e provinenza del cod. LXXXIX Della Biblioteca di Verona (l’Orazionale Mozarabico).” Archivio Storico Italiano 7th ser. 1 (1924): 106-117.

Woodfin, Fabiana. “Lost in Translation: Recovering the Critical in Gramsci’s Philosophy of Praxis.” MA Thesis Boise State U, 2005.
Wright, Roger. Late Latin and Early Romance in Spain and Carolingian France. Liverpool: F. Cairns, 1982.

—. A Sociophilological Study of Late Latin. Turnhout: Brepols, 2003.

La Huella Psicológica del Franquismo en el Cine Español de los Noventa

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Joaquin Florido Berrocal
The Johns Hopkins University

El cine español ha sufrido durante las últimas décadas cambios generacionales que se han dejado notar en el producto final de muchos directores. Estos directores a los que aludo son un grupo bastante nutrido al cual haré referencia más adelante que han trabajado en la elaboración de un cine que, tras unos años de búsqueda direccional marcados por el fin de la dictadura y el comienzo de la transición democrática, parece haber encontrado un camino con personalidad que lo diferencia de otros cines por la variedad de estilo y de técnicas dentro de su consonancia, y que le ha valido para dar el salto definitivo al reconocimiento internacional.

La consecución de éste éxito conllevó un largo camino: la España cinematográfica tenía que aceptar su pasado y vivir con los restos de éste, y sin duda el pasado inmediato más traumático ha sido la losa de la dictadura franquista que asoló el país por casi cuarenta años. El cine fue sometido a una censura que curiosamente se hizo más fuerte al final del periodo dictatorial. Así las únicas películas que afrontaban de algún modo con una mirada crítica la situación del país lo hacían desde lo que fue el cine de autor encuadrado dentro del “Nuevo Cine Español”, desde Nueve Cartas a Berta (Basilio Martín Patino, 1966) a El Espíritu de la Colmena (Víctor Erice, 1973) o Cría Cuervos (Carlos Saura, 1975). La década de los ochenta no dio lugar a un cine que absorbiera al espectador, y aunque directores como Pedro Almodóvar despuntaran tanto dentro como fuera de España, todavía el recelo del espectador español a afrontar su propio cine se dejaba notar y pocas películas superaban el millón de espectadores por aquellas fechas con un mínimo de calidad fílmica. El primer intento de reestructurar el cine español desde un punto de vista gubernamental después de la dictadura vino con el Real Decreto 3.304/1983 de 28 de diciembre sobre protección a la cinematografía española, más conocido como la Ley Miró. No funcionó como se preveía y acabó con un resultado que, sin desmerecer la calidad de algunos de estos filmes, no era de ningún modo el esperado. Fue al fin en el cine realizado durante la década de los años noventa donde se empezó a aceptar el pasado como pasado y no como una carga psicológica y social.

Entre las aportaciones que se hicieron en la década de los noventa encontramos en principio el extenso número de directores noveles que estrenan sus obras. Carlos F. Heredero menciona un total de 140 directores que debutan entre el 1 de enero de 1990 y el 30 de junio de 1997 (24). Esto trajo al panorama cinematográfico una gama diferente y nueva de hacer cine. De estos 140 directores ahora mismo nos encontramos con nombres consagrados dentro y fuera de las fronteras españolas como: Alejandro Amenábar, Julio Medem, Álex de la Iglesia, David Trueba, Fernando León de Aranoa, Icíar Bollaín, Juanma Bajo Ulloa o Manuel Gómez Pereira por mencionar a algunos y a los que debo añadir por un lado los nombres de Benito Zambrano y por otro (en diferente medida) los de Javier Fesser y Santiago Segura. Benito Zambrano destaca por un cine personal, un cine encuadrado dentro del llamado cine social que ha traspasado fronteras gracias a su calidad. Por otro lado el primer largo de Javier Fesser El Milagro de P. Tinto (1998) no sólo superó con creces el millón de espectadores en España, sino que fue exhibida fuera de concurso junto con Barrio (Fernando León, 1998) en el festival de cine independiente Sundance en 1999 con una buena aceptación. Y qué decir de Santiago Segura, que con su trilogía del policía más políticamente incorrecto de España, Torrente ha roto récords de audiencia precisamente haciendo españoladas como parodias de españoladas para ponerlas en un nivel totalmente diferente al de las originales. Estos dos últimos además han continuado rompiendo récords de asistencia a las salas de proyección en los últimos años con películas del mismo estilo que las anteriores.

Las películas de los años noventa han sido películas que por supuesto no contaban con la censura de la dictadura, que escapaban de la etiqueta de españolada que alcanzó a muchas películas de los años 80 y que sobre todo podían tratar, criticar y descubrir fantasmas del pasado dictatorial español y de ese modo mostrar las secuelas de éste, sin dar la impresión de un permanente trauma. Además estas películas, no hacen de estos fantasmas el tema central, sino simplemente lo que son: la huella que los años del franquismo dejaron en la sociedad española. Señalar a los culpables, cuando todo el mundo los conoce, ya no es el objetivo, el objetivo es identificar los problemas, a la vez que se hace un cine de calidad al cual el espectador no tema ir por el motivo que sea. Mi intención será entonces descubrir estas huellas en este cine, al que se le ha acusado equivocadamente de haberse alejado históricamente del espectro franquista y compararlas con el tratamiento del franquismo dado en el cine en los últimos años del periodo dictatorial. El corpus de películas de los noventa que voy a utilizar se limita a cuatro: Acción Mutante (1992) y La Comunidad (2000) de Álex de la Iglesia; Días Contados (1994) de Imanol Uribe y Solas (1999) de Benito Zambrano. En contraste a la huella franquista de los noventa analizaremos Cría Cuervos (1975) de Carlos Saura y el estilo utilizado en ésta para hablar del franquismo.

El concepto de huella aquí trazado no es el desarrollado por el psicoanálisis freudiano, no es por lo tanto esa huella mnémica (Erinnerunsspur) que inspira el deseo en el ser humano. No es ésta pues, la huella en la que Lacan basó su concepto de demanda. Sería casi paradójico a mi parecer tomar el concepto de huella desde el punto de vista psicoanalítico para explicar la huella del franquismo en la sociedad española y en el cine español a finales del siglo XX. De hecho esta huella a la que yo me refiero no evoca precisamente un deseo, esta huella se presenta como una marca transmitida de generación en generación y que toma una función activa sólo en el momento en el que comprendemos el porqué de muchas de las cosas que rodean al ciudadano español. Por poner un ejemplo claro, nos encontramos hoy en día con el rechazo generalizado y o al menos la falta de afecto hacia un símbolo nacional como es la bandera española en la sociedad democrática. Este rechazo se tiene que comprender y se reconoce desde una perspectiva temporal. El efecto del franquismo es el que solidificó y enrareció el concepto de bandera en España. La bandera con los colores actuales roja y gualda, sustituyó al rojo, amarillo y morado representativo de la Segunda República. Los colores de la bandera española, durante la dictadura militar con un águila imperial a modo de escudo, se convirtieron en un símbolo franquista en directa oposición a la tricolor republicana. La bandera en vez de ser un símbolo unitario como está llamado a ser, se convirtió en España en todo lo contrario. Se convirtió en un símbolo separacionista de carácter político. En los primeros años de la democracia se asoció con la ultra derecha en contra del resto de la sociedad. Con el tiempo se le añadió el sector monárquico y hoy en día con el crecimiento de los nacionalismos dentro del territorio español, el sector que en principio solo englobaba a la ultraderecha ha pasado a absorber a monárquicos y detractores de una España de tendencia federalista. Ésta es la huella que se puede encontrar en la sociedad española y es esta huella sobre la que voy a basar mi trabajo.
Carlos F. Heredero en la introducción a su libro Espejo de Miradas dice:

A diferencia de lo que ocurría en el cine de la transición política y de la reforma, los cineastas de los noventa no parecen sentir sobre sus espaldas el peso de la historia política. Para ellos, o para su imaginario creador, apenas existe el pasado. Han crecido como directores con la libertad ya conquistada, y no sienten necesidad de ajustar cuentas con el pretérito, de tal forma que la reflexión sobre la historia ha desaparecido prácticamente de las imágenes de sus películas. (64)

Sin querer del todo rebatir este comentario, habría que matizarlo sin embargo, ya que creo que se le está dando un tratamiento diferente, para un nuevo público y dirigido en parte a generaciones más jóvenes que aquellas que trataron el franquismo desde los últimos años de la vida del caudillo hasta los primeros años de la democracia. El peso de la historia política que estos directores afrontan es el de la historia actual, los gobiernos son democráticos y por lo tanto la crítica política deja de tener un peso específico igual al que tenía durante la dictadura. La crítica política se manifiesta a través de la crítica social, sin dejar por ello de expresar una tendencia ideológica. La reflexión sobre la historia es dejada al público como veremos más adelante. Una obra de arte como es Cría Cuervos (1975), metáfora del periplo franquista como vamos a ver, perdería gran parte de su valor si se hubiese hecho en los noventa u hoy día, de hecho no creo que Carlos Saura la hubiese hecho de la misma forma en nuestros días.

Cría Cuervos cuenta la historia de Ana, o mejor dicho las memorias de Ana. Las memorias de una mujer de unos 27 años desde un futuro que se sitúa en 1995. Ana cuenta la historia de un verano justo después de la muerte de su padre donde se entrelazan evocaciones de su madre muerta y de la vida de sufrimiento que soporta junto a su marido. De ahí que la historia sea un devenir de flashbacks y flashforwards muchas veces mezclados entre sí dentro de los recuerdos de Ana. Y es que, como escribió Gilles Deleuze en relación al funcionamiento de la memoria: “The past is not to be confused with the mental existence of recollection-images which actualize it in us” (Deleuze 1989, 98)

Ana sin embargo parece confundirlo, su pasado es ése que ella recuerda en imágenes que se suceden con un orden que para ella tiene sentido, así vemos que al comienzo de la película tras el descubrimiento de su padre muerto, Ana aparece en la cocina donde su madre la riñe por estar levantada tan tarde. Poco después descubrimos que su madre estaba muerta, y según lo recuerda Ana es justo a la mañana siguiente cuando Rosa, la criada, está peinando y arreglando a Ana y a sus dos hermanas y su tía les da las instrucciones para el último adiós a su difunto padre. Evidentemente, si seguimos el hilo conductor de los pensamientos de Ana, sería imposible que todo se hubiese desarrollado tan rápido, ya que Ana ni siquiera ha avisado a nadie antes de irse a dormir de la muerte de su padre o de la amante de éste que vio salir justo antes de avistar el cadáver. Está claro que este hilo conductor no coincide con el orden cronológico. Desde ese momento el espectador puede deducir que la película va a estar basada en la recolección de imágenes, en los recuerdos de Ana tal y como ella los ordena en su mente. Esto se confirmará poco después cuando Ana ya de mujer, aparece en pantalla interpretada por Geraldine Chaplin. Estas imágenes nos pintaran el retrato de una clásica familia militar franquista, con un padre autoritario y mujeriego y una madre abandonada en el hogar al cuidado de sus hijas y que debilitada y enferma muere dejando a sus hijas al cuidado de su padre. Éste sin embargo muere también mientras hacía el amor con una de sus amantes y las tres niñas quedan al cuidado de la estricta y fría tía Paulina. A partir de ahí, Ana, a su manera, nos cuenta el recuerdo de ese verano.

La película se puede interpretar alegóricamente como una visión de los últimos años de la dictadura. El mismo Saura da pie a ello cuando en una entrevista con Ángel S. Harguindey comenta:

… la verdad es que no me preocupa demasiado el que me digan que hago un cine metafórico, parabólico o hiperbólico. Me da igual. Lo que sí es verdad es que las peculiares condiciones de nuestro país, las dificultades prácticamente insalvables de contar las cosas directamente, a un primer nivel como dicen los franceses, nos ha, o me han, obligado a buscar otros sistemas de narración más indirectos y naturalmente, como resultado de tener que dar la vuelta para contar lo que se quiere contar, pues surgen dobles o terceras intenciones, que a mi juicio en mi caso, me han servido para estrujarme la cabeza en una gimnasia mental que me ha sido bastante útil. (Saura 121)

Así no sería difícil asociar a Anselmo, el padre de Ana, con Franco. Anselmo es un militar autoritario que traiciona a su mujer Ana que representaría a España, una España frustrada y en decadencia que tendría su renovación en la pequeña Ana, la juventud que no se somete a la autoridad del caudillo y que incluso planea su muerte (que a pesar de ello, viene por causas naturales). “Aunque la película se concibió en 1974 y fue rodada en 1975, con Franco todavía vivo, Saura estaba convencido cuando la hizo de que ‘el franquismo estaba muerto antes de la muerte de Franco’”(Hopewell 248).

Podemos ver entonces que Saura no tiene claro el futuro de España, de hecho, la sustituta de los difuntos padres (la tía Paulina) es una mezcla de un carácter autoritario cercano a lo militar, como lo demuestra su personalidad y su relación con Nicolás (claro que Nicolás ha sido traicionado por “Franco-Anselmo” también) y de algún modo cercana al pueblo español, ya que es la hermana de Ana-madre. Pero si poco sabemos del futuro inmediato, menos nos enseña Saura de un supuesto futuro veinte años después, del cual sólo podemos ver la casi inexpresiva cara de Ana-hija en un decorado y vestuario monótono, grisáceo, que parece decirnos que Saura no es capaz de ver todavía una España distinta en los años noventa. Tanto es así que Ana-hija en el futuro y Ana-madre están interpretadas como ya dijimos por la misma actriz.

El resto de los personajes secundarios podrían ser interpretados dentro de este encuadre sin problema alguno: las hermanas de Ana, como una juventud conformista; la abuela como una generación que cansada de esperar un cambio ya no tiene ninguna ilusión; Rosa la criada y Amelia, la mujer de Nicolás, amante de Anselmo representan a dos capas de la sociedad que han estado al lado del poder sin compartir realmente su política. Por lo tanto, el fin de Anselmo abre las puertas a la destrucción. Rosa no deja de criticar la actitud de Anselmo una vez que ha muerto, ayudando a destruir su imagen, aunque cuando estaba vivo lo complaciera sin queja aparente. Amelia vive en un proceso de destrucción de uno de los valores intocables de las ideas franquistas, el matrimonio. Esto nos lleva a deducir que el origen de la destrucción no es otro que Anselmo. Directa o indirectamente Anselmo crea destrucción, provoca sentimientos de ese tipo tanto a su favor como en su contra (destrucción de su matrimonio, el matrimonio de su amigo Nicolás, su esposa, su madre y como no su propia destrucción), confirmando así las palabras de Carlos Saura: “Cría Cuervos es un film sobre ese proceso, proceso de destrucción y de muerte” (125).

A todo esto, hay que recordar que lo que aparece en la película no es otra cosa que la huella impregnada en la memoria de Ana. Es el recuerdo veinte años después. No es más que una mezcla de las capas a las que hace referencia Deleuze.

Time simultaneously makes the present pass and preserves the past in itself. There are therefore, already, two possible time-images, one grounded in the past, the other in the present. Each is complex and is valid for time as a whole. (Deleuze 1989, 98)

Esto nos lleva a lo que Deleuze llama cronosignos. De las dos categorías en las que los divide a nosotros nos interesa la concerniente al orden del tiempo, la cual podemos aplicar perfectamente al montaje de la película. Como observa Ronald Bogue:

Deleuze divides [the chronosigns] into two categories –those that concern the order of time, and those that concern time as series. The chronosigns of the order of time make visible either coexisting “sheets of the past” or mutually exclusive simultaneous “points of the present.” (6)

En la película Saura utiliza los recuerdos de Ana como capas en los que se almacenan recuerdos del pasado y mediante un montaje continuo muchas veces engarza momentos temporalmente espaciados, pero unidos por una asociación producida por la psiquis de Ana. Una psiquis alterada por los hechos traumáticos ocurridos durante su infancia, que ni siquiera en el presente acaba de comprender, pero que a nivel metafórico no dejan lugar a dudas sobre qué es lo que ha producido esos trastornos en la memoria de la protagonista: es la traducción del legado franquista almacenado en los ciudadanos españoles representado en la película por el legado de Anselmo. Un legado que se ha ido transmitiendo de generación en generación, debilitándose, pero sin ninguna duda alcanzando incluso a generaciones que ni siquiera habían nacido antes de la muerte del dictador, es la huella psicológica presente en España. Como dice Hopewell, “La tesis política planteada por Saura en esta película es que el franquismo, en calidad de régimen político, desaparecería, como desaparecieron los padres de la protagonista, pero sus legados psicológicos no” (249).

Estos legados psicológicos conforman la huella del franquismo, que podemos ver en el cine de los años subsiguientes, los años de la transición y sin duda alguna los años noventa y hasta nuestros días. Aunque el cine de los noventa sobre todo haya sido visto desde algunos sectores como un cine nuevo sin resquicios del pasado, la herencia psicológica sigue presente en mayor o menor grado en muchos de los directores que hemos mencionado anteriormente. La excepción más evidente entre todos ellos la presenta sin duda Alejandro Amenábar, por otra parte el más joven y por sus antecedentes familiares el más alejado del ambiente enrarecido que vivió España hasta 1975.

El resto de los directores en mayor o menor medida ha dejado entrever ese legado psicológico de una u otra manera desde los puntos de vista más dispares que se pudieran imaginar y cada uno con una fuerza personal que es lo que les ha otorgado el merecido nivel que han alcanzado. Voy a centrarme en tres directores que probablemente no tienen mucho en común excepto que realizaron películas fundamentales para la filmografía española durante los años noventa. Estos son Álex de la Iglesia, Benito Zambrano y por último Imanol Uribe, que aunque técnicamente no pertenece a la misma generación que los dos anteriores, hace un cine muy en concordancia con el cine hecho en España durante los últimos años. Mi elección de estos tres directores tan dispares es precisamente el demostrar ese legado psicológico en sus obras, que fuera de ser obras políticas en su base central no dejan de tener una lectura política con un origen de marca dictatorial. Al fin y al cabo, como dice Jameson en The Political Unconscious, la perspectiva política puede ser tomada como horizonte de todas las lecturas y todas las interpretaciones.

El caso de Álex de la Iglesia (Bilbao, 1965) es un caso muy particular. De la Iglesia demuestra que sin fuertes influencias políticas y con una pasión demostrada por el cine comercial y el mundo del cómic, todavía varias de sus obras nos muestran un fuerte influjo a la hora de reconocer el legado imborrable de los años franquistas. La parodia, la ironía y la frivolidad con la que lo representa se combinan dentro de una estética que podríamos encuadrar dentro del camp en varias ocasiones. Su ópera prima, Acción Mutante (1992) es una obra que básicamente inaugura el género de la ciencia ficción en España. En ella, un grupo terrorista de mutantes que actúa contra la “gente guapa,” secuestra a la hija de un empresario, Orujo, por la que piden un rescate. Ésta sufre del síndrome de Estocolmo y acaba enamorándose del líder de la banda terrorista.

Las imágenes dejan claro que la estética del grupo terrorista sigue al modelo de ETA. La televisión muestra el logotipo y la foto típica de los telediarios de los años ochenta en España que mostraban este tipo de fotografías normalmente remitidas por la banda al diario Egin. También el modus operandi de Acción Mutante, es una parodia de los métodos etarras, es decir, el rapto de empresarios o familiares de empresarios para pedir un rescate por ellos. ETA, como sabemos se creó para conseguir la independencia del pueblo vasco y combatir la política antinacionalista que creó Franco prohibiendo todas las expresiones del nacionalismo vasco, incluyendo la bandera vasca, el uso del euskera en público y su enseñanza en las escuelas o incluso el bautizo de bebés con nombres vascos entre otras cosas. Estamos ante una clara metáfora del País Vasco, dónde la policía (influida poderosamente en su estética, junto con los decorados y localizaciones de exterior sin lugar, a dudas por una de las estrellas del cómic de culto de ciencia ficción británico publicado por 2000 AD, Judge Dredd) actúa con una violencia inusitada no sólo contra los terroristas sino también contra la población (es de mencionar que una de las actuaciones de la policía está dirigida contra un joven que intenta realizar un graffiti en la pared. Las pintadas reivindicativas son una de las tácticas usadas por ETA y grupos afines juveniles como Jarrai y Haika para amenazas o captación de adeptos). Esta policía, pese a que en la película nunca se menciona el nombre del país (o planeta) donde actúan se asocia rápidamente con la policía española gracias a las hombreras rojas y gualdas en los uniformes, lo cual no deja de ser significativo, ya que no es una representación de la ertzaintza, que no asumiría competencias plenas hasta los años ochenta, sino una referencia a la policía nacional y sus métodos usados durante el franquismo.

Entre los terroristas cabe mencionar por su especial interés en este trabajo a dos de ellos, por un lado el líder Ramón Yarritu, interpretado por Antonio Resines, al que por ser el líder le corresponde un nombre vasco y por lo tanto resonante del movimiento abertzale y por otro lado José Montero “El Chepa” (Ion Gabella) el terrorista que representa la “pesadilla” de Franco, un “enano jorobado, judío, masón, comunista y presuntamente homosexual”, lo que nos lleva al contubernio judeo-masónico-izquierdista que según el caudillo era el responsable de todos los males que azotaban España en aquella época.

La hija del empresario Orujo, su prometido y el ambiente que rodea a todos ellos, es retratado como una jet-set asociada al sector más conservador de la sociedad española y el hecho de que los periódicos que se hacen eco del secuestro sean El Caso, El Mundo y sobre todo ABC (cuando normalmente en las películas de Álex de la Iglesia el periódico usado es El País y utiliza el ABC sólo para un determinado tipo de personaje) lleva a todos ellos a una imagen muy cercana al entorno franquista.

Le siguen a esta película El Día de la Bestia (1995), el encargo para llevar a la pantalla la novela de Barry Gifford 59º and Raining: The Story of Perdita Durango (1997) y Muertos de Risa (1999). Perdita Durango fue una adaptación de una novela extranjera y con producción americana donde de la Iglesia decide no reflejar la psicología española. En El Día de la Bestia y Muertos de Risa volvemos a encontrar numerosas referencias a todo el entramado de la huella dictatorial. En la primera, sin ir más lejos el grupo “Limpia Madrid”, reencarnación del mal, está formado por unos personajes de clase aparentemente media alta que hacen reverberar ecos del fascismo como la violencia racial y social. Su caracterización, “con el pelo engominado y sus ropas tradicionales, recuerda al espectador que los rastros de lo franquista no han desaparecido, simplemente se han instalado en la lógica de la nueva sociedad de consumo” (Martín-Cabrera, 89). De la segunda podemos decir que es un acceso constante a esta huella, ya que la historia comienza en la época franquista y avanza prácticamente hasta principios de los noventa.

En La Comunidad (2000), Álex de la Iglesia recurre a un cine en el que predominan los interiores. Al igual que Saura en Cría Cuervos, los exteriores representan un universo diferente. En esta última, Ana-hija sólo recuerda dos salidas de la casa, la segunda representa el final de sus memorias, el final del verano y de la película. La primera, que relata un día en el que toda la familia va a visitar a Nicolás y Amelia a la casa de campo de estos, representa un recuerdo alegórico más elaborado. Ana-mujer aparece ante la cámara como otras veces y dice:

De las cosas que recuerdo con agrado, pocas pueden compararse con aquel fin de semana. El caso es que no encuentro razones que expliquen el porqué…; no sé, me sentía libre, nueva, distinta… Hay imágenes que permanecen en nosotros con misteriosa persistencia.” (Saura 74)

Resulta extraño que uno de los recuerdos más agradables de Ana incluya la prueba más fehaciente de la traición de su padre, ya que Anselmo y Amelia son pillados in fraganti por la pequeña cuando su madre, sospechando de su marido, la manda a buscarlos para intentar interrumpir la intimidad entre los dos. También resulta llamativo que la niña cuando encuentra a los amantes besándose apasionadamente observe la situación sin una actitud sorpresiva, más bien con interés o curiosidad.
La juventud española comprometida conocía la situación político-social de España, pero era realmente difícil observar el panorama desde el interior. La salida de la casa, el entorno y habitáculo primordial de Ana-madre, que como mencioné anteriormente podía ser asociada con España, permite una observación más objetiva de la situación en la que se encontraba el país. Es decir, la propia salida de la casa haría referencia a la visión que sobre el franquismo se podía formar cualquier persona que lo observara desde fuera del país.

En el largo de Álex de la Iglesia una comunidad de vecinos vigila constantemente a un anciano para apoderarse de los 300 millones de pesetas que ganó años atrás en una quiniela de fútbol, pero resulta que cuando el pobre viejo aparece muerto en su apartamento, la que descubre el dinero no es alguien dentro de la comunidad sino una corredora de pisos que consiguió el trabajo gracias a una empresa de trabajo temporal y que de buenas a primeras se convierte en millonaria. A partir de aquí su vida se convierte en una película de horror.

La comunidad de vecinos que habita ese edificio un poco siniestro de Madrid representa una micro sociedad estancada en una idea/ideología del pasado, una obsesión que los ha transformado a todos en auténticos monstruos sin escrúpulos. Muchas de estas figuras se hacen eco del periodo franquista y configuran un endriago de la época fascista.

El trabajo de vestuario realizado por Francisco Delgado, que fue nominado para los Goya, nos delinea unos personajes muy fieles a su idiosincrasia. En la fiesta que Oswaldo (Roberto Perdomo) organiza para toda la comunidad el vestuario los sitúa a todos atrapados en un pasado relacionado con su idea/ideología. Cuando aparece por primera vez, el polo que viste el administrador Emilio (Emilio Gutiérrez Caba) con la bandera de España en el cuello lo define automáticamente como cercano al entorno derechista más aferrado, y debemos recordar que él es el líder aceptado por todos, aunque también tenga sus detractores a sus espaldas, encabezados por Castro (Sancho Gracia) y Ramona (Terele Pávez). Estos dos, son de nuevo personajes violentos del mismo arquetipo de los que hemos ido describiendo en anteriores películas de Álex de la Iglesia. Son también dos personajes con una idea fija y una obsesión por conseguir el dinero por el que han estado esperando tantos años. Es esta obsesión la que se impone al resto de sus sentimientos. Castro repudia a su mujer, olvidando incluso su canción favorita que se escucha en la fiesta (de nuevo otro elemento que nos establece temporalmente en la dictadura, ya que la fiesta es un guateque, un tipo de fiesta que sólo existe ahora como motivo retro). Además, la tensión sexual que podría existir entre Ramona y Castro nunca es alcanzada y de hecho esta tensión es deshecha por la propia Ramona cuando dispara a Castro en el tejado del edificio, en una especie de desquite provocado por la obcecación hacia el dinero y quizás el que el propio Castro anteponga el dinero a todo lo demás incluido ella. A partir de entonces es Ramona la que, actuando como los buitres a los que hacía referencia la televisión cuando Julia y su marido se encuentran en el apartamento al principio de la película, toma los mandos de la persecución con un salto a lo Laurence Fishbourne/ Keanu Reeves entre los tejados de los edificios madrileños al más puro estilo The Matrix.

Castro, en su papel, incluso tiene una frase que es muy apropiada para un personaje anclado dentro del fascismo español de posguerra. Al comienzo de la persecución final por los tejados del edificio en un intento de facilitar la huida de Julia, Charly, en su uniforme de “Darth Vader” se enfrenta a los propietarios que la persiguen, encabezados por Castro, diciéndoles: “¡Demasiado tarde! La princesa ha huido, ¡la revolución triunfará! ¡Viva la República!” a lo que Oswaldo responde con un puñetazo que tira al suelo al pobre Charly. En el siguiente plano mientras Oswaldo y Castro lo patean, este último le grita “¡República, qué cojones de República!” Castro destruye al “representante de la (Segunda) República” que quiere hacer frente a su autocracia.

Esta forma de gobierno impuesta se muestra en esencia débil en sus cimientos ya que está construida por la fuerza, sin un consentimiento mayoritario y sin libertades. Desde este punto sólo funciona entonces cuando el orden estricto se mantiene sin cambios, bajo el mayor conservadurismo posible, sin posibles vías de escape o aperturismo. La comunidad de vecinos funciona así, dentro de un entorno que se mantiene igual año tras año, que no evoluciona y que ante cualquier intento de sublevación corta por lo sano sin contemplaciones, como fue el caso del arquitecto que vivía en el apartamento que ocupa Julia. Su negación a seguir las reglas de la comunidad le costó la vida.
Para la comunidad el exterior es inhóspito, temible, inaudito. Para Julia el exterior es la salvación una vez ha encontrado el secreto de la comunidad, pero nadie la va a ayudar desde fuera, su única ayuda solo puede venir desde dentro de la comunidad y esta ayuda la representa Charly. Los exteriores se presentan siempre bajo la lluvia, es decir una vez que se ha entrado en la comunidad no se puede salir a la calle, no se puede escapar de ella. Cuando la vía de escape es descubierta, el sol vuelve a brillar en el exterior, siendo de hecho la primera vez que vemos al grupo que conforman la comunidad fuera de su hábitat. Ahí, el círculo se rompe y la comunidad se descompone. Su líder ha muerto y todo el orden se ha alterado creándose de ese modo un cisma jerárquico que los destruirá finalmente a todos en el clímax de la película. Los miembros de la comunidad dejan de ser un conjunto unido, cada uno busca su presa sin pensar en los demás. Así caen uno tras otro, Oswaldo, Castro, Ramona y por último el resto, aniquilándose los unos a los otros por un dinero que no existe bajo un instinto inhumano, animal, intensificado por los efectos de sonido no diegético en los que se escuchan gruñidos de cerdo en la disputa por la maleta que quitan de los brazos de Ramona que, inerte, es dejada de lado.

Hasta aquí hemos visto un cine nuevo cargado de influencias que ayudan a su director a presentar un sentido metafórico, en realidad muy de autor, pero en una línea muy diferente a la que define este género, como los temas tratados, el tempo utilizado y sobre todo el uso del humor. Cosa que le ha dado el reconocimiento general que se merece. El cine de Álex de la Iglesia es sin duda la culminación de una visión muy cinematográfica de la sociedad española sin llegar a ser cine social, debido a que su intención no se queda en la muestra de los problemas de esta, sino que está cargado también de ideología política que se nos muestra en un papel secundario. Su tendencia a la mezcla no se lo permite y sus películas se convierten en collages de diferentes géneros en los que predomina sin duda la comedia, y en los que estos problemas, fobias, costumbres, política y conducta de la sociedad son filtrados para acabar en películas que son inclasificables dentro de un género preciso tal y como los conocemos.
Nos encontramos con un caso totalmente opuesto en el cine de Benito Zambrano. El director sevillano hace un cine directo, sin motivos superfluos, muy cercano a los sentimientos y a las circunstancias actuales de la sociedad. Es un claro ejemplo de lo que se conoce como cine social.

Solas (1999) relata la historia de dos mujeres, madre e hija, que comparten en la gran ciudad varios días mientras que el abusivo marido y padre se recupera en un hospital de lo que parece haber sido un infarto. Durante estos días Rosa (María Galiana), la madre de María (Ana Fernández) se enfrenta a la vida en una ciudad que le es ajena. Rosa ha vivido toda su vida en el pueblo, anclada en las costumbres del pasado, presa de la institución matrimonial, aceptando a un marido abusivo que ejerce de dictador en una tradición que le da el poder absoluto sobre ella que, al no conocer otra vida diferente se ve resignada a acatar su destino. De nuevo la figura del padre de familia déspota en alusión a Franco se repite al igual que en Cría Cuervos. En los suburbios de Sevilla, Rosa conoce a Emilio un hombre retirado viudo que vive con su perro Aquiles en el mismo bloque de apartamentos que María. Rosa y Emilio establecen una relación de vecinos que en los pocos días que Rosa permanece con su hija crece, visiblemente por parte de Emilio, hacia algo más que simple afecto. Rosa por su parte, impedida por sus creencias en la sociedad en la que ha crecido, se auto impone la manutención de su estatus. María por su parte se encuentra con un embarazo indeseado a los 35 años de edad. El padre del bebé es un camionero que no está interesado en María y que rechaza la posibilidad de criar al bebé. María con problemas económicos y con problemas con la bebida reúne las fuerzas necesarias para abandonar a su novio, pero todavía tiene que afrontar un aborto por sí sola, ya que su madre no sabe nada del asunto. Cuando su padre se recupera y vuelve al campo acompañado de su mujer, Emilio se queda muy triste con la esperanza de volver a ver a Rosa algún día, pero sin saber que precisamente Rosa será el enlace entre él y María que iniciaran una nueva vida totalmente inesperada.

Como dije antes el cine de Zambrano es directo, no hace uso de demasiadas metáforas o referencias a otras obras. De todas formas la huella psicológica sigue presente. Rosa vive con su marido en una dictadura social, anclada en el pasado, la cual todos relacionamos con las costumbres mantenidas mayormente en los pueblos durante el franquismo. Pero la otra vuelta de tuerca la da Benito Zambrano al final del largometraje con una visión nueva de la vuelta al campo. Las películas cercanas al franquismo representaron, cuando la emigración hacia las grandes ciudades era un hecho masivo, los peligros de la ciudad para la gente que no pertenecía a ella y como la vuelta al campo y al pueblo representaba la solución de sus problemas y el lugar de redención, como en la emblemática Surcos (José Antonio Nieves Conde, 1951), donde una familia entera prueba suerte en la ciudad para acabar resignándose con la vuelta al pueblo haciendo una apología de la vida rural. Años más tarde pero claramente con otra intención, Pedro Almodóvar utilizará el mismo motivo en películas como ¿Qué he hecho yo para merecer esto! (1983). Benito Zambrano sin embargo rehuye de esta apología y el pueblo aparece en principio como el guardián de las tradiciones, el celador de las costumbres, en definitiva el censor de cualquier cambio hacia una vida mejor y con más libertades. De hecho, Rosa muere en el pueblo y es enterrada junto a su marido, en una prisión creada por la única vida que ha conocido, una vida bajo la tiranía. Esto último es lo que Benito Zambrano rechaza de manera fulminante con el final de Rosa. Como parece indicar su última aparición en un plano medio corto sentada en su butaca, Rosa muere esbozando una leve sonrisa de paz y sosiego habiendo conseguido retomar el cariño de su hija y augurar un futuro feliz para ella, aceptando esto como su único triunfo ante la imposibilidad de poder volverse a reunir con ella y con Emilio.

Además, para dejar claro que su postura no es de rechazo al pueblo o al campo, sino más bien a la tiranía y lo que ella representaba, deja abierta la posibilidad para María y Emilio de la vuelta a la casa de los padres, pero esta vez no por obligación o redención, sino con la oportunidad y la independencia para probar algo distinto. La salvación no está entonces ni en la ciudad ni en el pueblo, la salvación reside en la libertad.

Esta huella psicológica de la que he estado hablando en las películas de Álex de la Iglesia y Benito Zambrano prueba que no existe una falta de implicación política de los directores en el tema de la dictadura. Simplemente estas producciones no entran dentro de ese grupo determinado. No es un cine con un objetivo político lo que estamos viendo, ya no se lucha directamente o indirectamente contra un gobierno opresor no elegido democráticamente. No existe entonces la necesidad social de hacer frente a los fantasmas del pasado. Sin embargo, los directores de esta generación nos muestran esa marca profunda que existe en la sociedad y que, muy a menudo, aparece en la pantalla al igual que en la vida de la mayoría de los españoles y que sin duda tiene trazas políticas. Y esta forma de representarla, es decir, de una forma indirecta, referencial a la propia huella psicológica y no a la causa de ésta, se produce porque es precisamente la manera en la que se encuentra dentro del ciudadano español. Así es como se ocasiona y analizándola es como se puede ser consciente de ella. Y eso es precisamente de lo que estos directores son conscientes, de esa huella que permanece en la sociedad española y de cuál es su origen, cosa que por otro lado parte de la sociedad en España parece empezar a olvidar.

Y no son sólo los directores de esta generación los que introducen estas marcas en sus largometrajes sin dejar de contar una historia de uno u otro tipo. En nuestro último análisis vamos a ver Días Contados (Imanol Uribe, 1994). El director vasco es un claro ejemplo de evolución política cinematográfica. Su primer largo fue El Proceso de Burgos (1979), documental con entrevistas donde aparecen entrevistas con los acusados de dicho proceso. A ésta le sigue La Fuga de Segovia (1981) sobre la evasión de presos políticos vascos de la cárcel de Segovia durante los últimos años de la dictadura franquista y La Muerte de Mikel (1984) en la que la muerte de un farmacéutico gay perteneciente a un partido abertzale es aprovechada como propaganda política. Desde aquí Uribe se embarca en un periplo que dura una década en la que la realidad política vasca no es el centro de sus películas, hasta que llegamos a Días Contados, donde el protagonista Antonio (Carmelo Gómez) es un miembro del comando Madrid que prepara junto a otros dos miembros de ETA un ataque a una comisaría de policía en la capital. Hasta aquí llega el entorno político del argumento, ya que éste gira en torno a la relación amorosa que se establece entre Antonio y Charo (Ruth Gabriel) una prostituta yonqui vecina de Antonio, que se enfrenta a problemas con su marido, recién salido de la cárcel y su chulo Lisardo, interpretado de manera magistral por Javier Bardem. La película recibió muchas críticas por parte del ambiente abertzale debido a la caracterización de Antonio, la que tachaban de irreal para un miembro de ETA entre otras cosas, pero como decía Mirito Torreiro en su artículo de El País, “A nadie se le ocurriría, por poner un ejemplo, reprochar a Hitchcock la forma tan poco realista como muestra las actividades de los espías soviéticos en Con la Muerte en los Talones.” En Días Contados Imanol Uribe cuenta una historia en la que la condición de terrorista etarra de Antonio no cuenta con un peso específico para la historia de amor que desarrolla la trama de la película y por lo tanto su identificación con la realidad no debería de ser centro de ninguna crítica, aunque después de todo ¿quién dice que un terrorista de ETA no se pueda enamorar de una yonqui prostituta?

Lo que sí nos interesa en esta película es de nuevo la huella del franquismo. De hecho, mediante la representación de un etarra con sentimientos humanos de alguna manera nos acerca a la formación de ETA y su lucha contra el franquismo. Recordemos que no fue hasta la III Asamblea en 1964 cuando se tomó la decisión de que la lucha armada sería el mejor modo de conseguir los fines propuestos y no fue hasta 1968 cuando la banda armada reivindicó su primer asesinato. Más tarde esto se refrendaría en la IV y V Asamblea. Tanto es así que durante la VI Asamblea (1970) se produce un proceso separatista interno en el cual al tratar de convertir a ETA en el partido de los trabajadores vascos y […] “el intento fracasa. Fracasa paralelamente al crecimiento e implantación de ETA-V, a quien ETA-VI desprecia olímpicamente, considerándola como un pequeño reducto nacionalista militarista, sin concederle ningún tipo de posibilidades de futuro. Pocos años después, sin embargo, ETA-V o “los milis” serán ETA, a secas.” (Garmendia 380)

Es de reseñar que una película en la que el protagonista es un miembro activo de ETA, deje de un lado la política. No hay referencias directas a ideologías o nacionalismos, aunque el simple hecho de que ETA sea la organización terrorista a la cual pertenece Antonio crea ya una clara referencia a los fantasmas del pasado. Esto se intensifica con el papel desempeñado por Karra Elejalde, interpretando al comisario de policía Rafa, un personaje que destapa el lado más oscuro del franquismo en un policía corrupto, racista y vengativo que se presenta como el papel que más asusta en la película, ya que no muestra nada más que su carácter autoritario y vengativo. Un papel que hemos visto repetido una y otra vez basado tristemente en representantes de la autoridad durante el régimen franquista.

Por último, habría que destacar el proceso de “exotización” nacional que revierte en la historia de amor entre Antonio y Charo. La relación entre los dos personajes se desarrolla en términos platónicos a pesar del carácter libertino y desenfrenado de ésta última y el frío y solitario del primero. El clímax de la historia alcanza cotas sorprendentes mediante la idealización del encuentro amoroso. Charo requiere que Antonio la lleve a Granada para hacer por primera vez el amor con él y éste último (¡terrorista perseguido que acaba de cometer un crimen!) accede a su petición. La pasión española en su máximo exponente es traída a escena con el viaje hacia el sur, el escape de los suburbios de la gran urbe hacia un territorio con extravagancia natural, atardeceres con vistas de la Alhambra, el exotismo árabe de una ciudad andaluza, el misterio español. Toda esta especie de redención y la huida de la ciudad, que como ya hemos visto en el análisis de Solas, en las películas franquistas representaban la solución a los problemas que acosaban a los españoles en las grandes ciudades, es destruida por Imanol Uribe. El director vasco desencadena una caída libre para ambos cuando el amor entre Antonio y Charo deja de ser platónico e idealista para pasar a ser crudo y realista con el descubrimiento de la verdadera identidad de Antonio en las noticias. A partir de aquí se puede ver como la realidad con la que se nos ha querido engañar se desmorona en su base despótica y acabará con la destrucción de ambos.

Incluso una película como Días Contados, de la que Imanol Uribe nos dice explícitamente que su intención siempre fue el contar una historia de amor, la huella del franquismo vuelve a hacer su aparición. La fuerte influencia de ésta se deja notar en aspectos tanto sociológicos como ideológicos. La construcción de los personajes y la puesta en escena de por sí nos sitúa en un ámbito ideológico que en cierta medida es compartido por los tres directores de los que hemos analizado obras en este trabajo y a la vez el encuadre social es relativamente parecido, variando sin mucho margen entre la clase media baja en la mayoría de los casos. En todas ellas, los protagonistas asumen unos papeles que nos hacen descubrir la fuerza de la huella mencionada, muchas veces por su oposición, otras por su asociación y en algunos casos menos relevantes incluso por la ignorancia de ésta. En cualquier caso ésta es la visión actual de un grupo nutrido de directores que reflejan la sociedad española con todos sus problemas y defectos, y que ellos se encargan de trasladar a la pantalla, desarrollándolos con un punto de vista personal cada uno de ellos.

En este desarrollo hemos visto como la sociedad española mantiene una marca todavía visible del periodo que asoló España bajo la dictadura franquista y sus efectos inmediatos en la sociedad. Una huella psicológica apreciable no solo en la sociedad, sino también en las artes, como en el cine español, o cualquier otro aspecto de la vida en España. Muchas de estas huellas son estereotipos formados a los que ya no se les busca un origen, pero que un mínimo análisis los sitúa dentro del imaginario franquista que todavía persigue a la población española allá donde vaya y del cual muchos directores y guionistas que trabajan hoy en día en España mantienen una conciencia necesaria para que no se olvide. Sin duda el imaginario ideológico de estos directores se aleja del sector franquista, pero sin alusiones directas al sector político se convierten en armas necesarias para comprender una época terrible que asoló España no mucho tiempo atrás.

Notas

En el artículo “History and Hauntology; or, What Does One Do with the Ghosts of the Past? Reflections on Spanish Film and Fiction of the Post-Franco Period” recogido en Dismembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the Spanish Trasition to Democracy, Jo Labanyi hace una distinción de como ver los fantasmas del pasado según Freud, que resulta en una negación del pasado a través de la melancolía y el duelo, y el hecho de aceptar el pasado como pasado desde una perspectiva influida por Derrida reconociendo la historia y permitiéndonos de ese modo vivir con restos de ésta.

De hecho, de las siete películas que Pedro Almodóvar dirigió en los años 80, sólo Mujeres al Borde de un Ataque de Nervios, 1988 eso sí, con 3.344.840 espectadores, superó el millón.

Para ver un análisis más detallado del impacto de la Ley Miró en España me remito al libro de Nuria Triana-Toribio, Spanish National Cinema, pp. 111-132.

Torrente 2: Misión en Marbella (2001); La Gran Aventura de Mortadelo y Filemón (2003); Torrente 3: El Protector (2005).

Se sabe que Saura estuvo bastante influenciado por el psicoanálisis, así, el hecho de que Ana (mujer) y su propia madre estén interpretadas por la misma actriz podrían traer preguntas como ¿ha superado Ana la fase del espejo antes de la muerte de su madre? o algo un poco más arriesgado, ya que Saura en ciertos aspectos parece estar de acuerdo con la teoría psicoanalítica ¿es esta visión de Saura una muestra del Anti-Edipo de Deleuze y Guattari, en un intento de derrocar la supremacía paternal y en un paso más allá, el orden occidental establecido y representado en este caso por la dictadura franquista?

Nacido en Santiago de Chile en 1972 de padre chileno y madre española emigrada durante la Guerra Civil, su familia no se trasladaría a España hasta finales de 1973, previendo los hechos que se desencadenarían tras el casi anticipado asesinato del presidente electo Salvador Allende.

Para un análisis detallado sobre el camp en España ver el libro de Alejandro Yarza, Un Caníbal en Madrid: la Sensibilidad Camp y el Reciclaje de la Historia en el Cine de Pedro Almodóvar. Para una visión más general el capítulo “Uses of Camp” en No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture de Andrew Ross.

Judge Dredd fue creado por el escritor británico John Wagner y el dibujante español Carlos Ezquerro en 1977. Representa un futuro donde los Jueces tienen el poder policial, judicial y gubernamental en sus manos y la ventaja de poder administrar este poder en el momento y lugar del crimen sin tener que dar explicaciones a nadie y con el derecho a ejercer toda la violencia que estos crean necesaria.

En La Comunidad (2000), el marido de la segunda pareja que viene a ver el piso lleva bajo el brazo un ejemplar de ABC, denotando así tanto una ideología política de derechas y además un posible estatus económico más elevado que por ejemplo la primera pareja que visita el piso, la cual sale asustada cuando conocen el precio del apartamento. A Castro, lo vemos con La Voz de Galicia, otro periódico de corte conservador. Por otro lado los héroes de la película son partidarios de El País. Julia (Carmen Maura) lo lee en el bar donde conoce a Charly (Eduardo Antuña), y este último lo utiliza para buscar a Julia al final de la película, el mismo periódico en el que Alex de la Iglesia nos presenta la noticia del desenlace final.

La fiesta nos recuerda profundamente al clásico de terror Rosemary’s Baby (La Semilla del Diablo). Alex de la Iglesia admite en un artículo publicado por Elsa Fernández-Santos que “Somos cocteleros que con mayor o menor inteligencia preparamos una nueva y refrescante bebida. Pero el ron y la ginebra ya existen.” El director bilbaíno describe de manera excelente los ingredientes de sus guiones y las referencias a otras películas que suelen aparecer en sus trabajos.

Un documental en la televisión nos dice mientras Julia y su marido duermen en el apartamento: “El buitre, sepulturero de la naturaleza, devora a los muertos. Tan pronto como un buitre localiza a un animal muerto otros veinte descienden a compartir la presa. Un voraz chacal se une a ellos y el sombrío festín continua hasta que ya no queda más.” Evidentemente el documental por sí mismo es el resumen de la película, con los vecinos en forma de buitres y Julia como la voraz chacal que se une a ellos.

En una reseña de Habana Blues, (2005) publicada en El País (16-03-2005) el director andaluz dice en la presentación de su última película: “Si mi película no tiene un componente político, no sería mía. Allá donde hay vida, hay un soporte político.”

Tanto Álex de la Iglesia como Benito Zambrano nacieron en 1965.

Imanol Uribe nació en San Salvador, El Salvador en 1950. Aún así, es considerado y se considera un director vasco.

Hay que destacar que en la novela Días Contados del escritor malagueño Juan Madrid no se hace referencia en absoluto a ETA. El protagonista es fotógrafo de profesión.

En diversas entrevistas que aparecen en los extras de la edición comercializada en DVD.

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The story never ends: Rachid Mimouni’s Le Printemps n’en sera que plus beau and the production of counter-discourse in Algerian state-sponsored literature

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Alexandra Gueydan-Turek
Yale University

In the process of post-colonial nation-building, the State often attempts to impose its own discourse as the sole source of national identity in order to homogenize the nation. In his influential work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Benedict Anderson notes the discrepancy between ‘official’ discourse, which supports the conception of a unified State, and the reality of a diverse people artificially grouped within the same political entity. To account for their disparity, Anderson argues that the nation is primarily a discursive phenomenon, i.e. a fiction supported by narratives. Based on his concept of imagined communities, literary works come to light as essential tools for nation-building, and writers emerge as key figures called upon to embrace the official model of the nationalist narrative. A new nation’s literary production can rely on heavily codified structures of the novel to promote and preserve the fiction of a homogeneous national identity, defined here as an imagined community that shares the same collective values, a common understanding of History, and a profound commitment to the State. Such a propaganda-oriented mindset led Rachid Mimouni to challenge nationalist narrative in his first novel, Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau. This text, all too often disregarded as an early work that shows less aesthetic maturity than Mimouni’s later writing, merits further analysis as an initial attempt to challenge national narrative. In its closing lines, Mimouni contests not only the attempt to fix literary boundaries, but also the official discourse used in nationalist texts.

When discussing Anderson’s concept of imagined communities , Homi K. Bhabha suggests that nationalist texts differ from common literature by the stress that they place on boundaries, whether spatial or discursive, which are used to establish the limits of the nation. According to Bhabha, imagined communities are granted “essentialist identities” through the “ totalizing boundaries—both actual and conceptual” found in nationalist literature. Bhabha further maintains that “counter-narratives of the nation […] continually evoke and erase its totalizing boundaries” (300). The end of narratives, then, can be used as strategic places where identity archetypes are built and ideology implemented. They are an ideal site to forge the model of national heroes and to instill patriotism in the readership of a new nation. Yet, their employment towards this aim makes them an equally ideal site for dissident writing that draws national heroes and patriotism into question, while appearing to promote them.

In the case of Algeria, where Mimouni first lived and published, the standardized form of textual boundaries was particularly codified in both content and narrative structure between 1965 and 1982, a period during which the newly independent state controlled its literature through a national publishing house and editorial censorship. Algerian authors long struggled against these constraints before post-national concerns came into play. Mimouni’s refusal to conclude Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau with a heroic ending that would respect the codes of nationalist Algerian texts draws into question the homogenous national identity that the state hoped to impress on its population during that period. Although the possibility of finishing a narrative is disputed throughout Mimouni’s oeuvre, as Khalid Zekri has already suggested, I would argue that the author first conceived of the ending as a strategic place to erase totalizing boundaries in this novel.

One nation, one book, one ending
During the initial period of nation-building in Algeria, writers were strongly encouraged to glorify independence not only by celebrating an anti-colonial national identity, but also by justifying the new socialist regime. As Réda Bensmaïa emphasizes: “To write (the fiction) of Algeria was to write Algeria” (23). According to Bensmaïa, Algerian writers were perceived as key participants in the nation-building process, allowing their books to have an immediate and concrete impact on the emerging nation. Yet, as a result, they found themselves increasingly responsible for articulating a political agenda, often to the detriment of their own aesthetic goals. For writers publishing within Algeria, this situation left little room for artistic creativity and often led writers to reproduce state-ideology, rather than create their own discourse.

When the Algerian government created the state-run publishing company SNED (Société Nationale d’Édition et de Diffusion), its intent was to promote local literary production, counter French editorial hegemony and, above all, establish a monopoly on imports and distribution. By the mid-1970s, the state controlled every detail of the cultural landscape. Through editorial censorship, reading committees codified the literary canon and established its guidelines. Most writers were forced to conform to the constraints placed on them by the state company, with the notable exception of those who had already published in France during the War of Liberation and could continue to reach an audience outside Algeria.

It is not surprising that novels published in this editorial context tended to reproduce a nationalist agenda rather than reflect the writer’s subjective world-view. A thorough study of the literature published by the SNED between 1962 and 1980 brings us to conclude that simplistic combat novels predominate, glorifying the revolution as the origin of the nation. The only novels approved by the national publishing press were epics praising the heroic struggle of freedom fighters, known as moudjahid, during the War of Liberation. In these texts, the exemplary figure of the brave Algerian is generally pitted against antagonistic French figures, such as the bloodthirsty soldier or the pieds-noir exploiter.

Although the narrative treatment of struggle differs from one text to another, the ending often remains the same. As the narration culminates in the hero’s death, the freedom fighter becomes a martyr who sacrificed his life to free his homeland. Martyrdom serves as the only suitable ending in the state-sponsored literature: it commemorates the struggle of Algerians during the War of Liberation, while acknowledging that the birth of the nation required the symbolic disappearance of the individual for the benefit of the community. The reader is brought to identify with the moudjahid and encouraged to emulate his gesture of self-sacrifice for the nation.

This climactic closure is generally reinforced through the fixed structure of the narration, which involves a linear narrative, presented by an omniscient narrator whose interpretation favors a closed ideological reading of the world. This structure implies an ability to streamline historical narrative, organize the chaos of war, and build a single cohesive national identity. We are encouraged to see the text as exhibiting similar transparency and closure. “When the text presents itself as a closed and complete totality, ” Guy Larroux argues, “the closure of the text manifests the closure of the meaning [la clôture du texte renvoie à la clôture du sens si le texte considéré se présente comme une totalité fermée, complète] ” (Larroux, 42). Hence, beyond this normative understanding of literature lies the idealistic conception of a closed, fixed and transparent Algerian identity.

This fixed form leads me to believe that resistance to the closure of the official discourse would also manifest itself within the state-codified ending. If Bhabha characterizes state-promoted narratives by their “totalizing boundaries,” then counter-narratives of the nation can be defined by their continual erasure of these totalizing boundaries. It is this “subversion from within” that I intend to study in Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau.

The story is not finished, the story never ends:
Having outlined the normative ending that novels published in Algeria were expected to reproduce, let us turn to Mimouni’s text. His first novel, Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau, published by the SNED in 1978, is considered by most critics to be the least important piece of his career. Among other criticisms, one might consider the following comment from Farida Abu-Haidar:

That writers feel more liberated when writing works for an international rather than a national readership is evident in the work of the late Rachid Mimouni. His first novel, Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau, […] glorifying the Algerian national struggle (1954-1962), is a far cry from the daring exposés angrily voiced in some of his later novels. (15)

Haidar rightfully claims that maghrebi writers who have an international audience have more freedom in discussing subversive topics and using various aesthetics, because those writers are less likely to be censored and can appeal to a more diverse audience. However, the example she uses to illustrate her claim is not suited to this point. Faced with the generic hybridity of this literary work, other critics such as Charles Bonn were too often content to blame its inconsistencies on the lack of experience of a young writer who could not decide which genre to adopt. In their hasty judgment, they neglected two important aspects of the work: the role of theater conventions in denouncing nationalist narratives and, more importantly, the specificity of the theatrical form to which Mimouni resorted.

Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau recounts the struggle between colonial forces and a young couple, Djamila and Hamid, both fighters. Because of her beauty, Djamila has drawn both the attention and suspicion of a French captain, who believes she may belong to the resistance. To avoid capture of the entire group by the French army, her comrades decide to sacrifice her. Hamid, her fiancé, is the chosen executioner. As he shoots her to death, he is also murdered. The epilogue describes the defeat of the French army, and the resignation of the French captain who pursued the resistance group.

At first glance, Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau seems to conform to the normative code of the SNED epic, although it is more complicated than the typical nationalist text. As expected, its plot is situated within the War of Liberation and is sympathetic to the anti-colonial struggle, while the protagonists demonstrate the expected binary opposition between the colonizer and the colonized. All Algerian protagonists represented in the text are part of the resistance, whereas all of their French counterparts belong to the army. Furthermore, by devoting its epilogue to the defeat of the colonizer, the work ultimately proclaims the triumph of the colonized over the colonizer: “Aujourd’hui, un peuple en liesse est descendu dans les rues fêter sa liberté enfin retrouvée. [Today, a people in jubilation went down in the streets to celebrate its freedom, finally recovered]” (Mimouni 197).

We expect that the novel’s ending will be predictably in line with the SNED codified canon as well: the title of the book announces the arrival of spring, a season that often serves as a metaphor for independence recovered after the war. It seems like Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau will be entirely geared toward the realization of its title and, thus, toward a conclusive victory in the War of Liberation. The narrative structure of the novel works, however, towards an entirely different end. In a simple heroic narrative, we might expect a linear narration, where emphasis is placed throughout the book on the trajectory towards freedom. Instead, the reader foresees the (tragic) end of the story near the beginning of the book, when the final meeting of the lovers is duplicated almost word for word in the fourth chapter (28-29; 160-161). Blurring the traditional separation between these parts of the narrative, Mimouni invites the reader to consider this narrative episode more carefully.

One of the protagonists even explicitly questions the traditional celebratory ending in the last chapter of the book. Despite victory over colonization, the chief freedom fighter describes himself as “definitively removed from [his] roots [définitivement coupé de toutes [s]es racines]” (Mimouni 196). Whereas readers might expect him to rejoice over his triumph, he deplores the deaths required to succeed in the resistance struggle. Finally, he realizes that his quest for ‘authentic identity’ will remain unattainable in post-independence Algeria, since no identity is more ‘authentic’ than another. Moreover, the fighters’ deaths are not portrayed as glorious sacrifices, but as assassinations perpetrated in the name of the nation and orchestrated by the chief freedom fighter himself. By depicting the traditional heroic death as a murder, the ending casts Djamila as a victim of the deceitful leader of the moudjahidines rather than the colonial power, and undermines the moral superiority of the revolutionaries over the French army. Mimouni thus invites readers to reflect upon the contradictions of a country battling with itself as much as with its colonial past.

In addition, the lovers’ deaths are not inscribed within the community even though they serve the struggle against the colonizers. The reunion of the couple after a long separation, which is followed by Djamila’s profession of love, instead places the episode within the realm of intimacy; the final message takes on greater personal than ideological significance. This point is accentuated when the main protagonist defies the expected resolution of the plot and refuses his heroic martyrdom. After being killed, Hamid returns to life, stands up and call out to the reader:

Non, non, je refuse…J’ai encore quelque chose à dire aux gens qui sont venus ce soir pour nous voir jouer cette lamentable histoire …Aujourd’hui on me fait tuer Djamila, et on me demande de la retuer chaque soir avant que le rideau ne tombe, pour finir l’histoire et quêter vos applaudissements. Mais je ne marche plus, l’histoire n’est pas finie, l’histoire n’en finit pas. (Mimouni 190-191, emphasis mine)

No, no, I refuse…I still have something to say to people who came tonight to see me play out this pitiful story…Today they made me kill Djamila, and every night they ask me to kill her over and over again before the curtain falls, in order to finish the story and seek your applause. But I am not falling for it anymore, the story/History is not finished, the story/History never ends.

If Hamid refuses to perform the traditional ending announced in chapter four, it is not only because of the injustice and arbitrary nature of the lovers’ deaths, but also because of the ontological consequences of ending the story. If “the story never ends,” it is presumably because History itself cannot be fixed in a specific meaning or annexed by official discourse: it must remain open. This rejection of ideological determinism is mirrored in the open-endedness of the narration as the original text concludes:

Est-ce ainsi que se termine une histoire séculaire?
Mais le point final est mis, et le conteur n’a plus qu’à se taire.

Is this the way that a secular story ends?
Yet, the period is typed, and the storyteller has only to fall silent. (197)

This passage appears to close the text through a series of marks: the adverb “thus” launches the conclusion of the story, followed by the verb “to end,” reiterated in the following line by the expression “mettre un point final à [to put an end to].” As shown in the above translation, this expression means on a more literal level “to put a period at the end of a sentence.” And yet, the interrogative mode of the first affirmation places emphasis on the questioning of the appropriateness of the story’s ending, thus directly pointing out the subversive potential of the last scene, and leaving this novel indefinitely unfinished.

Furthermore, the abrupt passage from linear narration to theatrical form in the work’s last pages represents the ultimate subversion in the rewriting of the final death scene. Presenting the couple’s deaths as a staged tragedy shatters literary illusion. It suggests that the traditional nationalist ending would be an impossible performance, split from the reality of the characters. The narrative rupture not only allows Hamid to denounce the traditional ending, but also permits the author to insert a self-reflexive movement within the text. As highlighted by the play on words with “histoire” – meaning both “story” and “history” in French – the text condemns the process of staging History in state-promoted literature for what it is: a mere fiction. As Hamid declares in his last words: “Les spectateurs le savent maintenant, cette histoire n’a aucun lien avec la réalité. [Spectators now know that this story has nothing to do with reality]” (192).

The most intriguing aspect of Hamid’s dramatic aside is its use to bring in a new character: the Poet. This figure, whose main role is to comment on the play, seems to correspond to the storyteller, or goual, in traditional popular theater called halqa. In this type of street theater, a storyteller interprets tales through mime while occasionally addressing spectators directly and asking them to participate via improvisation. This genre differs from traditional European theater to the degree in which it distances performance from reality. Hence, halqa provides a good source of analogy for literary devices used by the Poet at the close of Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau: like a goual, he invites his readers to recognize their role in narrating the “story” as well as “history.” By reminding them of their role as creative interpreters of the text, he prevents them from passively subscribing to nationalist fiction.

A new subversive strategy emerges from the use of theatrical performance. Mimouni’s heterogeneous fictional model deconstructs the homogeneity of state-sponsored literature through its ending, the very part of the text typically most crucial to supporting official nation-building discourse. Even while working within imposed constraints, Mimouni exposes the impracticality of the monolithic identity promoted by the Algerian government, and to which state-sponsored literature would correspond. He suggests that a rebirth of Algerian culture cannot involve a monolithic interpretation of History.

Indeed, Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau subverts the traditional SNED ending by (1) reworking the representation of the War of Liberation and problematizing post-independence history through the juxtaposition of conflicting narrative events and antagonistic images; (2) disturbing the established closure of the narration and, thus, revealing an awareness of the ideological pitfalls of nationalist literature; and (3) promoting a modern narrative technique by which traditional literary forms such as halqa are invested with a subversive role. The use of this literary form issued from folklore allows Mimouni to go beyond a simplistic dissident stand: instead, he challenges the reductive interpretation of nationalist texts as necessarily presenting an apology of the contemporary regime. Ultimately, Mimouni implies that a reconfiguration of literary form is a prerequisite to a liberated representation of the past.

Notes

Benedict Anderson defines officialdiscourse as “emanating from the state, and serving the interests of the state first and foremost” (159). For his discussion of national narratives, see in particular his final chapter “Memory and Forgetting,” pp. 187-206.

Rachid Mimouni, Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau. Alger: SNED, 1978. Paris: Stock, 1995.

Starting in 1983, the government allowed the creation of competing publishing houses. However, this did not end the government’s control of the literary field. For example, in his study of censorship, Hafid Gafaïti mentions the case of Kateb Yacine’s biography, written in 1986 (Kateb Yacine: Un homme, un livre, une oeuvre). Although it was published at the time in an independent publishing house, Laphomic – thus theoretically escaping from the control of the State – the Algerian secret police confiscated all copies of this book and arrested its publisher (Gafaiti 71).
More recently, Malika Mokeddem intended to get her last novel Mes Hommes, already published in France in 2005, re-published in the French and then translated into Arabic by a small Algerian publisher (Sédia Editions, 2006). This project was meant to promote Algerian Francophone writers in their native country, and allow lower-income readers to buy books which may have been too expensive for them when published abroad. However, this project was partly sponsored by the Ministry of Culture which refused to grant permission for the translation of this book into Arabic, under the false pretense that it was not Mokeddem’s best book. (Conference “Un auteur, un livre,” at the Centre Culturel Français of Algiers, September 12th 2006).

The SNED would later be called ENAL (Entreprise Nationale du Livre) when the publishing market opened up in the early 1980s.

According to Charles Bonn, only two francophone novels published by the SNED between 1962 and 1980 fail to situate their plot at least partially within the framework of the War of Liberation: Jamal Ali-Khodja’s La mante religieuse and Chabane Ouahioune’s Les conquérants au parc rouge (Bonn 10).

All translations are mine.

Among other SNED works’ titles, one can find Quand le soleil se lèvera, Les cinq doigts du jour, Rouge l’aube, and Les enfants des jours sombres which all emphasize the advent of day, of light, and of the future as an allegory to the end of colonization.

In Arabic, halqa means circle and refers to the circle formed by the crowd around the representation. Although, as its name indicates, halqa is originally an Arabic theatrical form, it was later adopted in the popular tradition by Berbers. I am indebted to Khalid Zekri for the reference to this genre in his study of Mimouni’s oeuvre.

Although the concept of distanciation, working to distance the audience from the illusion of reality, has been implemented in twentieth-century European theater by Brecht and others, the sources of that theater are found in non-European thought.

The choice of a minor genre, taken from folklore to subvert the nationalist closure of the narration, is not an isolated case. Mimouni’s recourse to a different genre in order to unsettle the traditional closure of the nationalist discourse is mirrored in other texts, such as Yamina Mechakra’s extensive use of poetry at the end of La grotte éclatée. Other writers outside Algeria have also used the halqa extensively such as Tahar Ben Jelloun in L’enfant de sable and La nuit sacrée.

 

WORKS CITED

Abu-Haidar, Farida. “Inscribing a Maghrebian Identity in French.” Maghrebian mosaic. Ed. Mildred Mortimer. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. 13-24.

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 2nd ed. New York: Verso, 1991.

Bensmaïa, Réda. Experimental nations, or the invention of the Maghreb. Trans. Alyson Waters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Bhabha, Homi K. “DissemiNation.” Nation and Narration. Ed. Homi K. Bhabha. London: Routledge, 1990. 291-322.

Bonn, Charles. “Clichés et métaphores dans la littérature de commande idéologique.” http://www.limag.refer.org/Textes/Bonn/ClichesRothe.htm

Gafaiti, Hafid. “Between God and the President.” Diacritics 27.2 (1997): 59-84.

Larroux, Guy. Le mot de la fin. Paris: Nathan, 1995.

Mechakra, Yamina. La grotte éclatée. Alger: SNED, 1979.

Mimouni, Rachid. Le printemps n’en sera que plus beau. Alger: SNED, 1978. Paris: Stock, 1995.

Zekri, Khalid. “Étude des incipit et des clausules dans l’œuvre romanesque de Rachid Mimouni et celle de Jean-Marie Gustave Le Clezio. ” Diss. U Paris XIII, 1998.

Memories in Orbit: Loss in Sergio Chejfec’s Los planetas

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Noble Novitzki
University of Pennsylvania

The protagonist of Sergio Chejfec’s 1999 novel Los Planetas (known only by the initial S.), claims to have made the decision to become a writer only because of the disappearance of his friend from adolescence (known by the initial M.) who he declares was much more apt than he at telling stories. The stories, says S., “took on ample and diffuse subjects … that came to him from who knows where, acquiring a new dimension through his voice” (104). S. the writer, by contrast, is uncomfortable with his own voice, and with “[his] inclination towards the replacement, the substitute.” In other words, S. is torn between the desire for conserving and the fear of converting, and of symbolizing.

Throughout the novel, on a personal level, S. continues to experience that tension. He has achieved (and suffered the loss of) a beautiful affective bond with M., a joy and a grief that cry out to be sung, and yet he recognizes that his voice is not M.’s voice, that the authorial text is not and can never be the adolescent’s oral tale. The brilliance of Chejfec’s novel is that it makes S.’s experience a part of the reader’s experience as well. With its few temporal references and frequent jumping in time (along with the feeling timelessness inherently suggested by tales of adolescent adventure), Los Plantas confers a feeling of being outside-of-time while simultaneously lamenting the passing of time and distancing of its narrator and spokesman from the most important person in his life.

The ideas of the memory-in-ruin and the memory that can never be told in its own voice run parallel in this novel. By dint of its internally-defined set-up (S. is in his thirties or fourties and lives in a foreign Latin American capital) it necessarily asks the question of what is to be done with other painful Argentine memories of the seventies. That is to say, in both a spatial and temporal self, it frames itself as an allegory for the country’s political and social breakdown. Los planetas asks the reader to contemplate Argentina’s past both from up close (as per the intensity of the personal connection with M. and the love affair that both characters maintain with the geography of Buenos Aires) and from afar — via the prism of the narrator’s troubled relationship with his own memory (he forgets some details of importance even as he remembers other seemingly insignificant moments).

In his grief and his struggle to remember, S. strives literally to become his dead friend M., to reanimate him by coming to know him through what M. (while living) was wont to call the “intermittences” of personal experience (105). “With M. I achieved solidarity,” he writes, “an effective bond within which our intermittences were able to unwind themselves not only without pressure or force, but also by a glint of mutual understanding.”

“Mutual understanding” is a translation of the Spanish term compenetración, or co-penetration, a beautiful synonym for the will-to-solidarity similar to the German term einfühlung as employed by Freud to describe the putting of oneself in the place of another. What concerns S. here is precisely his own ability to remain “in feeling,” that is, to stay temporally close to all the beautiful memories of M. conjured up at the moment of his loss. Towards the end of the novel, in his most extreme act of self-denial, S. even attempts to take out an identity card in M.’s name. By such an act, S. seems willing to not only take on the mantle of M.’s identity as a thinker, writing stories according to what he imagines to be M.’s perspective, but also to experience the end of his own name, the renouncing of his own experience, and the forced distancing from his own family – in essence to declare his solidarity with the experience of death itself.

S. declares that when he writes, he will be less himself. And, he specifies, in order to invoke his own identity and M.’s memory, he must ignore “when we are” (cuándo somos), the temporal aspect of being (105). His embrace of the “intermittent” quality of memory is a challenge to the mnemonic and affective erasure inherent in the march of time. And it is also a challenge to what Sergio Villalobos-Ruminott has called the “’sin of archival,’ or the surrendering of the painful past to the so-called ’cartographical’ logic of the archivist … that is to say, to a particular text genre such as “memoirs” or “post-dictatorship studies” (73). “The indifferentiation of the tone, the calligraphy and the stroke,” he charges, “make of texts small milestones that circulate and sell in the post-dictatorial archive, exhausting their reserve in the exchange, in the sustained pragmatic utility inherent in reading them as referential monuments to a certain problematic” (73-4, my translation). “The old difference between use-value and exchange-value,” he concludes, “also would reach its end” (74).

Los planetas – like Ricardo Piglia’s Respiración artificial, Diamela Eltit’s Lumpérica, and Roberto Bolaño’s Estrella distante – takes on the difficult task of remembering an allegorically-rendered tragic past event while simultaneously struggling to avoid commemorating it, that is to say unwittingly declaring an end to the violent events and proscribing its continuing reverberations in the present. Indeed, the danger is that as a kind of monument or a milestone literature can serve as a bandage, but not a true suture, acting as a substitutive symbol that concludes public reflection without recognizing continuing private and systemic hemorrhaging of feeling, so to speak.
When a commemoration allows the book to be closed on active remembering, or when “post-dictatorship” writings are relegated to their own genre and place on the shelf, pain naturally becomes anger and the writing of the history of a tragedy, although important, naturally seems a puny milestone.

In S.’s case, the violence in question is the unexplained disappearance of M. just days before news of a mysterious explosion makes headlines in Argentina and just after the return of Juan Domingo Perón to the country. His invocation of M.’s life, through a series of shared episodes of city life in Buenos Aires is then an attempt to manifest a pain that remains lived in the present, a continued experience of suffering which seems to be representative of other experiences of loss during the Argentine dictatorship (although the dictatorship itself is rarely, and only tangentially, mentioned).

As Idelber Avelar has skillfully illustrated in his book The Untimely Present, novels such as Los planetas demonstrate a use of allegory in the Benjaminian sense – as a belated contemplation of urban “ruins” that signal a specific historical ground zero “before the fall.” The exercise in writing serves, then, not only to call attention to the censorship of other tragic stories with nameless victims but also to the way in which both the conceptual and physical structures of the city try – but fail – to mask the effects of the violence that made the contemporary economic and governmental status quo possible (3). For Avelar, this “resignification” of urban space means that post-dictatorial fiction “maintains an estranged, denaturalized relation with its present” (10). He mentions, by way of anecdotal example, Ricardo Piglia’s observation that in the late ‘70s Argentine bus stops had been renamed “zones of detention” (zonas de detención). “Whereas the symbol privileges timeless, eternalized images,” Avelar writes, “allegory, by virtue of being a ruin, is necessarily a temporalized trope, bearing within itself the marks of its time of production. If mourning is in a fundamental sense a confrontation with time and its passing, allegory, as the trope that voices mourning, cannot but bear in itself unmistakable temporal marks” (4).

Considering Avelar’s profound thesis, isn’t it curious to think how Sergio Chejfec manages to compose a rememberance that is fundamentally disconnected from time (writing outside the cuándo somos) and yet still achieves the “unmistakable marks” of allegory? In fact, all of the episodes that S. recounts through M.’s perspective involve confusion: he’s not sure which episode came first, nor what street M. and S. were on, nor if what happened was real or a dream. M., in fact, is described as the type of person who knew nothing of geography, who loved the city and was yet fundamentally unable to navigate it, a person who (according to S.) would not even have recognized his own home from a train window.

The tricky relationship that S. forges with time makes his episodic narration an allegory, as described by Avelar, precisely because M.’s fuzzy geographical orientation in the city means that the two friends constantly re-trace their steps when walking; that is, they constantly revisit places without meaning to, provoking the exercise of memory. They also find themselves accidentally in some of Buenos Aires’s less frequented neighborhoods, bearing witness to the messiness of everyday life and contemplating what we might call – in a Benjaminian sense – the ruins of the city. In other words, they develop their own common places that reawaken their consciousness of that which might be easily overlooked.

In one series of narrations, they wander the city with S.’s father, searching for his car that has been stolen, when they witness a wreck between two cars backing out of their driveways. Strangely, the group of three pauses there before the wreck because they sense what is about to happen. They are “engrossed by the danger and taken to abstraction, forgetting even themselves” (168). As a result of the impact, the trunk of one of the cars opens, revealing a cluster of vicious rats. The driver of the car then asks the three to close the trunk, as he cannot bear to look at the rats. M., S., and his father remain frozen, not wanting to be bit by a rat, yet knowing that they should help the man. It is at this point that S. sees the man’s face as that of a rat, and begins to ruminate on the nature of rats, humans, tortoises, and indeed all species. He finds it strange that as a species everyone is predictable, yet individual, theoretically able to act of his own will. “Meaning consists of this,” he thinks, “in seeing each animal as an emblem of a group” (169).

It is in this way that the city renders up enigmatic meaning for S. and M., leading them to both recognition and abstraction, allowing them to find familiarity and strangeness in everything. Events are predictable, yet surprising, such that the reader cannot determine whether they are happening for S. or for M., in the present or in memory. Earlier in the novel, when the two friends share their thoughts on trains, S. comments that “These themes [referring to their philosophical conversations about life] assured their continuity because of the fact that we each lived with the reality of trains, and also thanks to the monotony of our lives, a custom to which little by little we obediently resigned ourselves. I would mention certain things that I had seen, and M. in turn referenced others” (29). Life is repetitive for these two friends, and time is irrelevant, yet each experience and each return becomes new as it is examined for fresh detail or remembered in a different way.

Clearly, the reader might say, S. stands for Sergio, and M. stands for Muerte [death] or Memoria [memory], yet the character of M. clearly also stands for more than that. He is a way-of-being, an innocence that was interrupted both by real violence of the state and by the organization of a post-dictatorship society in which his peculiar artistic way of being would likely be less welcome. There is a trick in implying (through the positioning of the novel’s one temporal event, Perón’s return to Argentina) that M.’s death is not actually related to the dictatorship itself, having necessarily taken place before. Allegorically speaking, however, his loss and the loss of his perspective and ideals certainly is related to the concrete costs of military rule.

In parallel fashion, the end of the friendship between S. and M., caused by violent death, is also representative of the end of an idealized childhood when time seemed infinite and there were unlimited opportunities to wander the city alone and together. As a result, a broad experience of general loss – of childhood, of friendship, of the city the way it was – becomes allegorical of this one violent loss of M. Everyday experiences force the remembrance of something specific; their repetition acts as a refusal to close the book on that particular tragedy. All experiences of “how things were before,” in general, become experiences of “how things were before this horrible loss took place.” M.’s “intermittences,” we might say, are precisely this kind of irruption of the past into the present.

Thinking in terms of this “before”, I would add to Piglia’s anecdote about the Argentine bus stops such ambiguous changes in the city as the kinds of public works often pursued by dictatorships in general, and certainly favored by the generals of the Operation Condor governments of South America and their acolytes, whether they be the Chicago Boys in Chile or former Economy Minister Martínez de Hoz in Argentina: the expansion of urban infrastructure, the increased technological sophistication of media conglomerates, the new apartment buildings and commercial spaces, et cetera. The ambiguous nature of progress which became especially evident during the Argentine peso crash of December 2001 is also evident, allegorically, in the beautiful yet seemingly passé attitude that the character M. expresses vis-à-vis the city: in one extended scene he marvels at the organization of city streets, “entelechies defined by what they are not,” in his words. He reacts with exclamation at the idea that they can change names, or be represented by the number of a bus line (102-3).

In Chile, the sociologist Tomás Moulián has expertly explored the idea that tragedy can be written upon the geography of a city in his book Chile: Anatomía de un Mito. There, citing new Chilean malls and other public spaces, he explores the notion that the current economic reality – brought about by the borrowing and infrastructure rebuilding of the Pinochet regime – allows the present to operate on the basis of its own creation myth, attempting to erase the connection between past suffering and the present way-of-life. A reference point that serves to illustrate Chejfec’s recognition of this and his resulting treatment of the temporal – especially in opposition to the symbol (defined by Alvelar as eternal or epic and by Villalobos-Ruminott as substitutive) – is the character S.’s relationship to the printed press (one of the “texts” that appears in Los planetas with a degree of emotional intensity for the narrator).

Idelber Avelar writes that postdictatorial texts overcome the predicament described by Villalobos-Ruminott by “display[ing] the pressing awareness of time proper to allegory. As opposed to the market’s perpetual present,” he says, “where the past must incessantly be turned into a tabula rasa to be replaced and discarded with the arrival of new commodities, the allegorical temporality of mourning clings to the past in order to save it” (4). Villalobos-Ruminott, for his part, speaks of a “golpe a la lengua” (a coup d’état of the tongue), “a coup that paralyzes the recourse to history, in the sense of the history of feeling, the place of the hiding of the truth, the tradition, and the reasons for the present” (76). It has been my sense that a key product of the “perpetual present” that participates in the daily re-invention of the tabula rasa of memory is journalistic text.

At the beginning of Los planetas, S. confronts the journalistic product directly. Reading the news of the explosion in a newspaper, he gets the impression that changes in nature do not last: “even if they are brutal or violent their effects dissipate rapidly, folding themselves into the general landscape … and the silence returns” (17). Still, he expects that the news he is about to read (of the explosion) will leave a lasting change. And he suspects that the open-and-closed nature of the news story serves to mask wider changes taking place. The article, he says, speaks of human remains in the countryside without taking into account the permanent threat that exists there before and after: “The macabre thing disguised itself as senselessness or innocence, and also banal, replacing the true face of terror.” He also notes how the remains of the explosion are found little-by-little, both close to and far away from the epicenter of the explosion, in such a way that they are “separated into disperse traces,” much, one might say, as each individual news topic or story parses out a larger reality into discrete bits, like milestones or mojones.

S.’s desire to write by re-living the “intermittent” experiences of his own memory and M.’s is also an embrace of a different kind of episodic story-telling than that which takes place in the press. In Los planetas, S. places himself between the temporal and the intemporal and makes of the city a different kind of geography that allows him to remain in einfühlung or “in feeling.”

In addition to S.’s experience of “intermittent” memories through the re-tracing of his steps in the geographical space of the city, Chejfec offers the reader an additional perspective on the functioning of visual memory through a mysterious character by the name of Grino. Grino, who only appears at the beginning and the end of the novel, has an unclear (really, a non-existent) relationship to the other characters. His initial appearance in the novel’s first page precedes S.’s reading of the newspaper article, and momentarily confuses the reader into thinking that Grino will be the main character. His second appearance, towards the end, precedes the incident in which S. tries to take out an identity card in M.’s name (see note 1). Since each appearance is linked, by juxtaposition, to some form of archival photography (the newspaper in the first instance, a school photo in the second), it is not surprising that he should comment on the nature of photographs, albeit in a different context.

Grino is a person who picks through photos of people he does not know, specifically (we learn in the first instance) of a preadolescent ballerina. He may be a journalist, or simply a twin soul to S., one who is frustrated in his attempts to read the past through its remains. Though Grino recognizes the humanity of the photograph’s subject (whom he names Sela), his seeing her is complicated, he says, by his thoughts and dreams, which lead him to imagine a story for her — past and future — as well as to compare her with photographs of swimmers he had once seen in a magazine in his youth. Ultimately, although we are to believe that he is conflicted about his reaction, Grino experiences a “scandalous attraction” and eventually masturbates (his bottle has been filled with “liberated semen”) (15, 212). This troubling event, this dream and release, this little explosion, makes a strange companion to the caption below the photos of the swimmers, “The girls are thankful for their healthy development” (16).
Grino himself makes a comparison between this photo and all photos when he considers another image, a so-called “snapshot of plenty” that depicts a beach and a row of waves that are on the point of collapse (211). When something natural (the sea) visually demonstrates its artificiality (the temporal freezing of the waves), what becomes evident is an external mechanism: not only the machine of the camera but a general “second nature,” a mechanical system that allows for the multiple uses of something which appears to be simple and pure. In the final line in his second narrative section, Grino concludes, “The machine that moved the waves was the same that fabricated the photos and directed the planets and the people” (212).

Like a commemorative text or a commemorative holiday, an image (especially photographic) therefore constitutes a troubling symbol. It tends to reveal less about the subject than about whatever the onlooker might imagine or associate with the subject, and — paradoxically — it reveals more about the artificiality of its creation than about the actual thing seen. In fact, Grino’s relationship to the image helps to resolve the difference between an “intermittence” and a “milestone.” Whereas intermittent images are difficult to see and nearly impossible to re-visit except by the accidental re-tracing of the steps of an emotional event (such as a conversation had while strolling Buenos Aires), milestones or records or photographic images are easy to obtain, the result of our deliberate looking, our most ready and least creative access to the past. As such, the intermittent reveals the real (the allegorical) at least in glimpses, where as the milestone reveals the irreal, the one dimensional, the supernatural to use Grino’s word (the symbolic). The intermittent leaves us frustrated with its incompleteness, desiring a further taste of the real; the archive or the milestone actually invites us to lean upon the easy associations of our dreams (as Grino has done), and leads us to satisfaction, a full but false feeling, even a climax.

The intermittences and the milestones are indeed like two different planetary orbits, two different kinds of paths around the sun. (Grino also compares his experience to a solar eclipse in reverse, a moment of light that draws attention to the darkness and the impossibility of dawn.) S. echoes this sentiment in another portion of the novel when he struggles with his mental images of different parts of Buenos Aires, worrying that they may not be pure, that they may become mixed with other memories. Images, he says, are like sounds, occupying fugitive places and replacing themselves constantly (140). He also talks about the troubles he has with his one photo of S., and says that he tries not to look at it too much for fear that it will interfere with the complexities of his memory.

This combined with Grino’s story indicates a general suspicion of the eye’s ability to betray memory, as though it were an organ somehow detached from the soul. In one scene earlier in the novel, S. and M. encounter a disembodied eye along the side of the railroad tracks; M. is afraid of the eye and of its potential power, as it indicates a “perspective without background” (Span. lontonanza, as in the background of a painting), an eye that does not reveal the seer (much as a photograph does not reveal its taker).

Ronald Kay, writing about the Chilean Eugenio Dittborn’s “Cuadros de horror” (portraits of supposed criminals made using their I.D. photos), claims that the eye behind the camera converts a person into a limited interpretation of him- or herself, many times a negative one. The established order [of the photo] returns to the subject a mortgaged individuality, in a denigrated form, and restores him to the condition of subjectivity in the pejorative sense of the word (’several subjects were apprehended by officials of the Homicide Division …’) such that he has supposedly or effectively broken the law (34, my translation). Although S. is surprised by not having found a mention of M. anywhere in the press, he celebrates that it has not happened, because “M.’s name was isolated by silence and in that way returned to a state of pure enchantment, in which any name floats until we rescue it with its use, aligning it to an individual. And, as it is known, it is a short step from there to sorcery” (42). In other words, he is happy that M. has not been converted into an archive or official archive, as happened to Dittborn’s criminalized subjects. As Kay writes, “By way of the regulatory and formalized intervention of the mechanical eye, in the quadrilateral of the identity photo, there is instituted an exchange space where desire for the intimate and the dream of the singular are ceded to the stereotype” (my emphasis).

Willy Thayer, in a brilliantly poetic essay, “El xenotafio de luz,” takes up the same issue of the photograph, but in a different fashion. Photographs reproduced from other photographs such as those head shots typically re-printed for a person who has died (whether for the newspaper, for family members, or for a funeral), are — according to Thayer — also places where light itself dies. The original light cast upon the subject, perhaps itself an artificial flash, is then “embalmed in a photo that becomes a negative from which to reproduce copies (173).

Looking at the photo and circulating it then becomes an act of “exhuming the remains of light,” or “immortalizing the solar cadaver,” an act of dehumanization that leads eventually to a “definitive disappearance in circulation” (174). Echoing Sergio Villalobos-Ruminott, we might call this a “golpe al óculo,” an ocular coup, the other way in which the symbol paralyzes the recourse to history, by repeating it in a way that makes it less brilliant. (Photos offer a “nonexistent intimacy,” says Thayer, their only depth are the thoughts we cast on their surface.)

This reproduction or photocopying is not the same kind of repetition that Villalobos-Ruminott counsels, nor to which S. and M. aspire. In their case, the goal is to remain in memory in a way that challenges or resists the new era, the “perpetual present.” “The being, the identity, the truth that shows itself and perpetuates itself in intermittences” (Los planetas 224) …”the calligraphy of the stroke” (V-R 73) … ruins … these things resist consumption by the newspaper and the archive and ultimately also resist, in Thayer’s words, “the future in an era when there will no longer be stories, lives, landscapes, nor lights to photograph or write about.” Reproductions of reproductions formalize and reduce experience, in the same way that bus routes re-create a city’s map by numbers. “Photography,” writes Thayer, “like writing, reveals but also erases its parcel.”

It is certainly for this reason that Chejfec refuses to name either of his two victims, S. or M., even if one of the names is his own. And, as Thayer has signaled, it is the tendency toward erasure (historical as well as symbolic) of both the reproduced photograph and reproduced text that moves the language of this memoir necessarily into the poetic and apocryphal realms, into the territory of planets in orbit, mysterious photo developers, severed eyeballs, car-invading rodents, and unnamed pilgrims. Only the depiction of an alternative cosmos of experience, an orbit of interlocking experiences not bound in expected ways, could move us out of the “second nature” of which Grino speaks (formalized, controlled by systems, exchange-oriented, and manipulative of the emotions), back into our primary nature, into our quiet and intermittent experience of real things lost.

S. writes, “Since the absence of M not only I, but also several others, live in a flat present, desegregated from reality, within a territory whose boundaries are imprecise if they exist at all, and depend on our movements, and where nevertheless stillness is the only adequate alternative” (231).

When S. moves through the geography of the perpetual present, he senses his (as well as the collective Argentine) history in ruins, allegorically. When someone’s hand blocks S.’s view of the sun late in this novel, he remembers the bright light that ringed M’s profile in one of his memories (173, 171). Memory comes, powerfully and intermittently, in the blinking of an eye, in that obscure place where we see what we are not seeing. Like during an eclipse.

The Argentine poet Juan Gelman, writing of his lost son in the poem “XXXII”, seems to capture the allegorical sense of the cosmos that informs Chejfec:

eternamente perseguido por ti
o persigiéndote paso
los días malos y los buenos contemplo

el bello cielo sé
que no cesarán los astros ni
las aventuras con los astros después
que mis ojos se apaguen y

ya no se oigan los ruidos de tu cuerpo
y la Revolución siga avanzando
y retrocediendo
exactamente como

nosotros nuestro amor
y todo haya terminado menos
el sol el mal el bien otros amores y
lo que fue de nosotros

The cosmos offer an intermittent glimpse at a movement that is endless and represents, for Gelman, an eternal movement of love that continues even when the eyes are not there to see it, when the ears can no longer hear the “noises of your body.” The “revolution” of a planet, the “advancing” and “going back” is a movement that continuously returns the celestial body to its formal position, but never in quite the same way. The relative position of stars and planets is always changing, but the movement itself indicates their presence, even those celestial bodies that are invisible.

At the end of Los planetas, S. describes his merging with M. as a repeating voyage, as a “symmetry” (232). As he looks out the window of a train, he imagines that he is on one more adventure with M., even though he quickly realizes that his is pulling into a different station. No matter; S. anticipates the noises of the birds, the trees on the platform, the sounds of the train’s slowing, and realizes the stopped train as the promise of another voyage. The feeling of reaching the station is a temporal marker of what has been lost, in Idelber Avelar’s terms, and thus does not stand as a symbol but rather as an allegorical revisiting, an intermittent experience of einfühlung. It is an experience that defies permanent symbolic monuments and commemorations in text; it cannot be avoided nor sought out, for it is orbital, revolutionary.

How do we remember those we have lost? Is it by their last words? Is it through their photographs and their mortal remains? Or, like S., do we recognize that such commemorations of tragedy become substitutive labels? Is it possible instead to look beyond the geographic, journalistic textual and photographic products of the perpetual present, to honor someone by revisiting him through the kinds of ruins that truly elucidate memories of the kind of person he was, the way he thought, and the way he represents the way things were before the violence came? It seems that Chejfec does in fact epitomize Avelar’s Benjaminian reading of allegory in Los planetas precisely because in order for memory to have use for a mourner, as a recourse to einfühlung, it must reject its exchange value, its parceling into mojones. Memories must continue to be difficult to pin down – in orbit – written so as not to be substitutive, but rather to be as fleeting and frustrating an experience as the passage of time itself.

Notes

The term was originally coined by Robert Vischer and used by Freud and Freudians to refer to both the projection of emotions and the study of the aesthetic response to human beings.

When S. fails in his initial efforts to change his name, the government employee at the desk recommends that he might try writing a book under the new name, to give more credibility to his application.

The Spanish word for “milestones” here is mojones, and can also be translated roughly as “little shits.” It is likely that Villalobos-Ruminott, when making reference to marketable dictatorship memoirs of all genres, intends this second meaning as much as the first.

From the Greek: entelecheia, “A thing having its end within itself.”

It remains unclear whether there is merit in exploring Grino’s name. It is a relatively common last name, and yet any name in this relatively name-free novel must be considered significant. Perhaps it is meant to sound like grano (Eng: grain) a miniscule element of sand, or a unit of measurement for a small amount of light. It also sounds like grito (Eng: a cry, a scream) and may suggest the idea of interjection. Another possibility is that it reads like an abbreviation of peregrino (Eng: pilgrim), which would seem to reference the story (embedded in this novel) of two natives of the town of Formosa, Argentina who leave home on a pilgrimage seeking a new identity. In any case, I feel drawn to this idea of Grino as someone who represents a consideration of the minute and the transitory.

Eternally persued by you
or persuing you I spend
the bad days and the good ones I contemplate

the beautiful heavens I know
that the stars will not cease
the adventurers with the stars after
my eyes extinguish

the noises of your body are no longer heard
and the Revolution continues advancing
and retreating
just like

we our love
and all that is done except
the sun the bad the other good loves and
what came of us

(my translation)

WORKS CITED

Avelar, Idelber. The Untimely Present: Postdictatorial Latin
American Fiction and the Task of Mourning. Durham: Duke
University Press, 1999.

Chejfec, Sergio. Los planetas. Buenos Aires: Alfaguara, 1999.

Gelman, Juan. “XXXII.” In Com/posiciones. Barcelona:
Ediciones del Mall, 1986. 50.

Kay, Ronald. “Cuadros de Horror.” Del espacio de acá.
Santiago de Chile: Editores asociados, 1980. 33-37.

Moulian, Tomás. Chile Actual: Anatomía de un mito. Santiago
de Chile: ARCIS, 1998.

Thayer, Willy. “El xenotafio de luz.” In Richard, Nelly, ed.
Políticas y estéticas de la memoria. Santiago: Editorial
Cuarto Propio, 2000. 173-174.

Villalobos-Ruminott, Sergio. “Fin de la dictadura y destrabajo
del pensar: Repetición y catástrofe en post-dictadura.”
Richard, Nelly & Alberto Moreiras, eds. Pensar en/la
dictadura. Santiago: Editorial Cuarto Propio, 2001.
71-101.

On Joy, Death, and Writing: From Autobiography to Autothanatography in Clarice Lispector’s Works

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Elena Deanda
Vanderbilt University

How does one state in words the impossibility of writing? How does one translate an author who has depicted herself as silent in the very text? The Brazilian writer Clarice Lispector dares to do so. From Agua viva, oneof her first novels, to Un soplo de vida, her posthumous work, Lispector enters into an egotistic self-referential movement. She dares to speak from her work, from herself, from art, and from literature, thus mixing realities of different dimensions and erasing borders between life and letter. In Agua viva Lispector interrogates the causes and effects of the writing process in order to know it, to govern it. There, she begins to experience revelatory and joyful epiphanies that later, in Un soplo de vida, become mystical. However, the tone of this later text is quite different. There, her writing presages a forthcoming silence, and because of that the illusion of apprehending knowledge by language fades as it becomes certain of the impossible.

In what follows I will try to provide an understanding of two stages concerning the life and literature of Lispector: one belonging to her renaissance, the other to her decadence; one through a joyful autobiography, the other through an agonistic autothanatography (thanatos meaning death). As the study of the autobiographical genre enjoys a certain boom in academic work, so does Clarice Lispector. French deconstructionism and American postmodernism have found in the work of the Brazilian writer a rich land full of philosophy and literature to explore, with the French critic Hélène Cixous being the pioneer in inserting Lispector at the crossroads of deconstruction and literature. With “L’approche de Claris Lispector” (1979) and L’heure de Clarice Lispector, Cixous exorcized her own writing ghosts. Cixous named her écriture féminine after Lispector’s work, and defined it—through the lens of the psychoanalysis—as a space of linguistic realization, an incestuous, homosexual, autoerotic, symbiotic mother who first must satisfy herself in order to find her own voice. Undoubtedly some critics have pointed out a lesbic-literary mirroring. But what concerns me here is Cixoux’s belief that Lispector’s writing (and l’écriture feminine by implication) is diametrically opposed to what she calls the Derridean “essentialism”. What is she referring to when she speaks of “essentialism”? Is it perhaps an analytical feature more philosophical (i.e. phenomenological, epistemological, metaphysical) than the psychoanalytic one? Evident in Cixous’s work on Clarice Lispector’s literature is the privileging of the psychoanalytic over the philosophical reading. Yet, it is hard to detach one from the other. While employing philosophical rather than psychoanalytic terms, I seek to show a way in which Lispector’s texts can be said to articulate and justify their own epistemology, that is, their own way of accessing knowledge; as well as the manner in which they sketch their own metaphysics, by which I mean the search for transcendental features such as the nature of phenomena. I want to explore in the manner in which Derrida’s phenomenological philosophy and that of his colleagues—Paul de Man or Maurice Blanchot, among others, all of whom I am referring to when I use the term “essentialist”—can be intertwined in Lispector’s literature; all through her écriture, considering it feminine or not. In these pages I will contemplate the autobiographical genre as the result of a celebratory moment of life, as shown in Agua viva. At the same time, I want to highlight the usefulness of the term “autothanatography.” Formulated by Derrida, this term can be applied to Un soplo de vida, which—among a number of rare discourses— is an attempt to write one’s own death (or better, an author’s two deaths: that of the writer and that of his text).

Two novels

Agua viva waspublished in 1973, shortly after Clarice Lispector’s first divorce. She spent almost all her life with a Brazilian diplomat traveling around the world and by the time she wrote this text, she already had a public name. The story is about a recently divorced or separated woman who writes to her ex-lover an extended letter in which she explains her new single state. She is a painter starting to write. Her recently discovered activity produces a daily preoccupation about the possibilities of this new art. She wants to exceed language as she thinks she has exceeded the image. Therefore, throughout the text she maintains an optimistic attitude towards knowledge and language. Her argument is: if I write, I can simultaneously apprehend both moment and language. This argument shows a certain confidence in her epistemological potential, as well as the belief that if we can attain certain phenomenological knowledge and say it in words, we can, regarding literature, comprehend the act of writing, govern it, and wrestle its troubled nature. It is no coincidence that this text came after her divorce; becoming detached from her husband allowed her to develop a new life as a professional writer. That positive perspective leads us to conceive Agua viva like a life celebration, the testimony of a rebirth. The very title emphasizes the festive tone and adds to it a touch of religiosity. Live water runs strongly through the pages as it once did in the Bible to satiate the thirst of Moses and the Samaritan.

Un soplo de vida is quite different. Here we witness the last breath of an author. This time the narrator is a man. Not wanting to be alone, he invents a character to talk to, Angela. Both get entangled in absurd and endless dialogues or worse, autistic monologues. Two themes are constantly brought to the forefront throughout the text: writing and life. The author analyzes his two voices (his and Angela’s) while his newborn character enjoys life and tries to get independence from her creator. They discuss at length the illusion of feeling empowered through the act of creation and free will. Their interest in writing and living shares the same importance. The narrator believes that by using metalanguage one can better understand language itself. Angela believes that she can be free just by existing, that she can escape the page’s border. Sadly, there is no way to avoid the end of a posthumous novel as we cannot avoid finishing any book: as the text advances “life” gives way to “death” and the consequences are foreseen: after the writing process Angela will stop talking, experiencing and will live fixed and enclosed in a finished volume. The author will have a similar end, perhaps more drastic: he (she) will die. Un soplo de vida was not published by Clarice Lispector, it came out after her death. Thus, it is a book published from the grave and in a way, by a dead person.

We have two moments in the life of an author and her écriture. In the former there is hope, in the latter despair. Agua viva finishes: “What I’m writing to you continues and I am fascinated” (100). Whereas Un soplo de vida sighs: “…no. I cannot finish. I think that…” (154). The “linguistic well-being” of the earlier text gets transformed in the second with the author’s resistance to finish a sentence, even to use a full stop. The attitude towards literature shifts from playfulness to apprehension. But if both texts are so different what are the bridges that get them linked to the life and work of Lispector? I considered, among others, the self-referential writing, the search for apprehending phenomena, language, or l’écriture; as well as the presence of epistemological “epiphanies” and their evident autobiographical nature. Both of them, as the whole production of the Brazilian writer, turn out to be a matter or life/death and writing, subjects that haunted Lispector in each of her literary enterprises.

Phenomenon, Language, Epiphany, and Epistemology: the Joy of Autobiography

Agua viva and Un soplo de vida seek to apprehend the moment; in both texts, the narrators believed they can articulate a phenomenological knowledge by translating into words all that is manifest. Agua viva says: “Now is an instant. Now is another. And another. My effort: to bring the future now” (32, my translation). The female narrator believes that she can apprehend time in words; that she can know phenomenon just by saying it; and by consequence, that she can have a certain power over it. By contrast, in Un soplo de vida the male narrator says: “Never before life has been so actual as right now. Time for me is the disintegration of matter. It is organic putrefaction, as if time will be a worm inside a fruit taking from it all its flesh. Time does not exist. What we call time is the evolutionary movement of things, but it does not exist” (14). The reflection about time as a sensuous feature brings to both narrators the perception of experiencing everything in space. But whereas the first author flatters herself of being in and writing of the phenomenon (and by implication of knowing it and governing it), the latter believes that reality implies the notion of no reality, that is to say, that time is as inconsistent as disintegrated matter must be. Since the author acknowledges an impossible nature, he stops seeking and capturing frozen moments in sentences as his predecessor once did. For him, there is but one undermined reality made of time, matter, and energy as a presence eternally running away.

Language is for both texts the instrument to attain certain truths; language, and the act of writing as an intellectual and artistic miraculum. Both texts interrogate the writing process in the process itself through metalanguage, that is, writing about language in a partial philosophical, partial poetic fashion (and what is philosophy but poetry itself?). They look for a definition that will help them to figure out clearly their enterprise and govern it without the feeling of being constantly outside of words. Agua viva says: “Does writing exists by itself? No. It is just the reflection of something asking for… Writing is a question. It is just like this: ?”; whereas Un soplo de vida affirms: “Writing is a stone dropped in an empty water well” (16; 14). In the former text, writing is a question without an answer, in the latter there is a reply: writing is but the echo that a rock will make at the end of an empty water well; is an echo and not the noise, it is to throw and not to pick, it is empty and not fulfilling. Writing then seems as transient as life is. Here, again, we see two moments: the first hopeful, the second embedded in a somehow bitterer atmosphere; the former with a confidence in life and literature, the latter foreseeing the imperative of death and silence. They both seek to apprehend phenomenon by language and inversely, language by phenomenon, through the act of writing. But neither knowledge nor language can reveal themselves in their entirety, their limitations can be symbolized as the walls of the water well.

Yet, the two narrators justify their knowledge by a somewhat naïve strategy, that is to say, an epiphany. In Agua viva the narrator explains that her knowledge comes from the belief that “… we really exist and the world exists. In this state [the grace state]… there is a lucidity which does not need to guess: it knows. Just like this, it knows. Do not ask me why, because I can only answer in the same way; it knows” (92). Later on, she continues talking about this state of grace: “What is happening to me is the Grace? Because I do not feel my body, it is weightless, it is desireless, the spirit does not struggle with itself or look for anything, I am surrounded by a luminous and silent aura: I exist in the air, out of time but within the instant, without a before or an after. I received myself and the world does not touch me” (123).

Undoubtedly, the narration of this state pervades the book with a mystical atmosphere that yet in Agua viva is not explored at length. On the contrary, in Un soplo de vida, the epiphany is totally rooted in a religious frame. For the male narrator, the grace is to see God, an “unspeakable, scarcely supportable beauty… pain and beauty get confused and blend with an apocalyptic happiness” (141). The former state of happiness becomes apocalyptic; the unexplainable knowledge entails the painful and the beautiful at once. Those epiphanies are for both narrators the authorities to claim the truths they dare to know. They say “to know something” but they do not specify what; leaving their revelation enclosed between the sentences of the texts.

The knowledge they claim to know is a primary knowledge, intuition, premeditation; all opposed to Kantian reason. Un soplo de vida says: “This is my thought, with the utterances that mentally are brought out, without speaking or writing before or after; prior to my wordy thought, it arises an instantaneous vision, without words or thoughts. Later, with the minimum difference of a millimeter, it comes the word” (18). Intuition can be a synonym of premeditation as Lispector understands it, insofar as it allows knowledge before language. About another synonym, prediction, Un soplo de vida continues: “Sometimes I see before seeing. I predict the following instant and rhythmically my breath accompanies time. I feel before feeling. Harmony is to predict next phrase, next sound, and next vision” (144). Once again, the narrator justifies his knowledge by one of the most primary ones: intuition, premeditation, prediction. According to this, we can agree with Hélène Cixous by saying that Lispector’s writing contests the Derridean “essentialism,” if we understand it as a coherent system of ideas firmly rooted in logic and reason. However, if we read differently Lispector’s rhetoric we find that beyond this “instinctive” approach she is rationalizing knowledge. Un soplo de vida states: “Premeditation is the immediate past of the instant. Meditation is concretion, materialization of what was foreseen. Actually, what really guides us is premeditation, linked so strongly to our soundless consciousness. Premeditation is not rational. It is virginal” (18). If the male narrator privileges an a priori knowledge, he does not forget to warn his reader about what he considers to be the nature of rational knowledge. Moreover, in this lyrical paragraph we attend to a philosophical speculation more than to a loose, instinctive affirmation. Nonetheless, he is not able to acknowledge the pervasive rationality in his discourse; solely based in his epiphanies, considered as epitomes of experience, the narrator wants to furnish his readers with enough satisfactory proof of their aprioristic knowledge.

But what is this knowledge about, to be precise? Plainly, I will say that Agua viva knows about life while Un soplo de vida knows about death. Agua viva is in my understanding the celebration of life for a newly-divorced woman. Even with the intrusion of fiction, with the creation of a painter starting the art of writing, the text cannot help itself from being autobiographical. We read Clarice Lispector within Agua viva as a new writer reentering the world, renaming it or re-cognizing it. To read this in such a fashion, we are required to sign the autobiographical contract, as Derrida and De Man named it, one which demands of its reader his/her acknowledgement. Paul de Man refers to the autobiography as:

a figure of reading or of understanding that occurs, to some degree, in all texts. The autobiographical moment happens as an alignment between the two subjects involved in the process of reading in which they determine each other by mutual reflexive substitution. The structure implies differentiation as well as similarity, since both depend on a substitutive exchange that constitutes the subject. This specular structure is interiorized in a text in which the author declares himself the subject of his own understanding… This amounts to saying that any book with a readable title-page is, to some extent, autobiographical. (922)

Jacques Derrida has extensively analyzed the autobiographical genre in a provocative book named Otobiographies in which, by focusing in the exordium of Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo,he exposes the blurred borderline between (literary, philosophical) texts and the autobiography. Derrida proposes that the autobiographical genre is an egotistic affirmation of knowledge about anything and especially about oneself. Analyzing Nietzsche’s exordium he explains that there was a time when Nietzsche looked pleasingly at the life left behind and the one to come. Thus, he wanted to celebrate, and he did it by writing: “I love what I am living and I want it eternally coming, I want what is happening eternally returning” (120), explains Derrida. This phenomenon occurs, according to the French philosopher, in a rounded movement from the mouth to the ear, for what he has called oto (ear) –biography: “it is the need of not just passing through the ear, but through all autobiographical-implied-ear, always listening to its own talking (I narrate my own story to myself, that means that I am listening to myself speaking, right?)” (70). Lispector explains this self-referential moment in a different scope using a paradox in Agua viva: “What I am saying is that a man’s thought and his knowing-feeling can arrive to an extreme degree of incomprehensibility in which, without sophism or paradox is, at once, the most communicative moment. He communicates with himself” (95). In view of that, Lispector echoes what Derrida said about the autobiographical moment: it is the self communicating with him/herself in a harmonic, aesthetic, comprehensible manner. It is egotistic, yes, but also conciliatory. Just like Nietzsche in Ecce Homo, in Agua viva Lispector felt pleased with both her past and future self, and decided to celebrate it, to return to herself the opportunity of a new start in life and writing. There is in Lispector, the Nietzschean, solipsistic and narcissistic eternal return, but also the view of discourse as a written gift that runs from her own thoughts to the page.

Auto-thanato-graphy, or the Writing of One’s Own Death
Nonetheless, as we cannot apprehend the moment, we cannot apprehend fully both knowledge and language. And here is when we enter into the “impossible” domain. Derrida discusses the notion of knowing oneself by commenting a witty anecdote. In the preface of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche narrates how traveling in Saint Moritz, Switzerland, he asked a young intellectual if he knew a certain Friederich Nietzsche; the young intellectual confessed never had heard that name before. Afterwards Nietzsche realized he was totally unknown in Saint Moritz, and pointed out a proposition: “the fact that I live is but a prejudgment” (47). This sentence is largely elucidated by Derrida who glosses the argument saying “my life, that what ‘I live’, the ‘I live’ in the present is but a prejudgment, a sentence, a precipitation, a risky anticipation: it just can be verified until the subject, he who calls himself alive, is dead” (48). Following this idea we can conclude that life is but a prejudgment while it is not confirmed by death, in other words, only after dying we could say that we have lived. Again, as in the search of apprehending phenomena, knowledge, or language, we face the dynamic of the impossible. Claude Levesque, in the Montreal’s round tables organized after the publication of Otobiographies, discussed with Derrida and underlined that “he who wants to ‘talk about himself with truth’ is but entering in a dimension in which he inevitably finds (fading) the impossible. But this knowledge is a positive knowledge, an affirmative knowledge that has as its origin its own impossibility” (100).

That impossibility is perpetual and finally it seems that silence is the only alternative that would end that circular movement between desire to know and frustration, between the speakable and the unspeakable, between the being and the non-being. Regarding also the autobiographical genre and its implicit silence, Levesque comments that “there is something you cannot say, it is not scandalous, it is perhaps more than trivial, a void, a lightless region because its nature is not to be enlighten: it is a secret without any secret which broken seal is silence” (101). Silence, finally, represents in the writing process and in the search of knowledge, what death represents in life. Maurice Blanchot, analyzing the autobiography’s silence, interrogates: “Is it silence the proof that any autobiographical text has respected the truth around which it is composed? He who goes to the end of his own book has not gone to the end of himself” (151-152). It will help us to understand why in Un soplo de vida Lispector does not want to use a closing period, knowing perfectly that any text cannot be fully done, fully ended. Moreover, this posthumous novel seemed to have been therapeutic for Lispector’s own existence, her last great enterprise before leaving. She says in Un soplo de vida:
When you would finish this book, cry for me and sing a Hallelujah. When you would close the last pages of this badly done, impertinent and playful book, just forget me. Then God will bless you and this book will end well. I will rest in peace. Peace I leave with you, between you and me. Am I falling in rhetoric? Forgive me, temple faithfuls: by writing I can release me of myself and finally go to rest. (21)

Death and life imbricate each other in Lispector’s narrative as in Nietzsche’s and Derrida’s philosophy. Derrida affirms: for any writing about life, a writing about death is needed. The French philosopher recognizes that any “bios” intrinsically implies a “thanatos” as counterbalance. Therefore, if there is a biography, there must be a thanatography; if there is an autobiography, there must be an autothanatography. Derrida seeks to reformulate the biographical and thanatographical genre from the analysis of the exordium and the preface of Ecce Homo. However, the French philosopher does not take into account that Nietzsche’s textis a celebration of life, it does not speak about death and for that reason it cannot be an auto-thanatography. By consequence, this genre remains in search of examples. I would like to propose that Lispector’s Un soplo de vida deserves being named an autothanatography, or worse, an oto-thanato-graphy (implying the ear of an author writing his/her own death, the ear of a text—if such thing could exist—writing its own silence). If the condition is, as Derrida says, to talk about one self’s death, this posthumous text agonizes. It was the last chance for Lispector to say “I lived.” And its strength resides, in my opinion, in that challenge. The struggle with Angela, the character, is the final battle the author will fight in literature; his words, the last. That is why the narrator obliges himself to take the task seriously and to not leave anything to chance. He knows that life is disintegrating and that he’d better hurry up; he knows that every word will be but a distant echo (with no return) that will fall irretrievably to the bottom of the well; he knows he probably will be the only one to hear it falling. He knows all this through beautiful and painful epiphanies, so he strives to bring a revelation in every sentence, to bring all final fears, all great ideas, and all final words with urgency in the last minutes. Is proximity to death the agent of this perfection? Is maturity in both life and profession? I will say closeness. But there are no answers to such big questions; any and all—if they exist—will be shown to us in our very moment of death.

 

Notes

Autobiography and autothanatography, in this fashion, are considered diametrically opposed. The first, following Derrida’s philosophy, and for the reasons of this work, will be considered as the narration of one’s life in the most primary definition, whereas the autho-thanato-graphy will be considered like the narration of one’s own death.

Cixous’s fundamental documents about Clarice Lispector are: The Poetics of Blanchot, Joyce, Kafka, Lispector, Tsvetaeva. (Seminars 1982-1984) Trans. Verena Conley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992; “Reaching the Point of Wheat, or a Portrait of the Artist as a Maturing Woman.” Remate de Males 9 (1989): 39-54; L’Heure de Clarice. Paris: Des Femmes, 1988; “Extrême Fidélité.” Travessia 14 (1987): 11-45; Entre l’Écriture. Paris: Des Femmes, 1986; Vivre l’Orange, to Live the Orange. Paris: Des Femmes, 1979; “L’Approche de Clarice Lispector.” Poétique; Revue de Théorie e d’Analyse Litteraires 40 (1979): 408-19.

In the American academy, one of the most important critics of Clarice Lispector’s works is Earl Fitz: Sexuality and Being in the Poststructuralist Universe of Clarice Lispector. The Differance of Desire. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001; “O Lugar de Clarice Lispector na História da Literatura Ocidental: uma Avaliação Comparativa.” Remate de Males 9 (1989): 31-37; “Caracterização e Visão Fenomenológica nos Romances de Clarice Lispector e Djuna Barnes.” Travessia 14 (1987): 136-47; “Bibliografia de e sobre Clarice Lispector.” Travessia 14 (1987): 180-205; Clarice Lispector. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1985; “Point of View in Clarice Lispector’s A Hora da Estrela.Luso-Brasilian Review 19.2 (1982): 195-208; “The Leitmotif of Darkness in Seven Novels by Clarice Lispector.” Chasqui, Revista de Literatura Latinoamericana 7, (1978):18-28; “Clarice Lispector and the Lyrical Novel: a Re-examination of A Maçã no Escuro.Luso-Brasilian Review 2, (1977): 153-60; Clarice Lispector: the Nature and Form of the Lyrical Novel. New York: Diss. CUNY, 1977. In the Brazilian tradition I would like to highlight the work of Solange Ribeiro de Oliveira: “Rumo à Eva do Futuro: A Mulher no Romance de Clarice Lispector.” Remate de Males 9 (1989): 95-105; “A Transcendência do Regional no Romance de Clarice Lispector.” Travessia 14 (1988): 96-116; “O Seco e o Molhado: a Transubstanciação no Romance de Clarice Lispector.” Travessia 14 (1987): 96-117. A Barata e a Crisálida. O romance de Clarice Lispector. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1985; “Um Exemplo de Mudança de Código no Romance de Clarice Lispector.” O Eixo e a Roda 2.4 (1985): 13-29; “Aspectos do Barroco no Romance de Clarice Lispector.” O Eixo e a Roda 2 (1984): 113-23.

In order to simplify the fluency of this paper, I have translated Lispector’s, Derrida’s, Levesque’s, and Blanchot’s texts.

I want to acknowledge extensively the generous help of Professor Cristina Karageorgou-Bastea as well as of Professor Jonathan Neufeld, from the Spanish Department and the Philosophy Department at Vanderbilt University, respectively. Thank you David Richter and Forrest Perry. This publication was financed by Fondo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes (FONCA-Mexico) through “El programa para estudios en el extranjero 2005”, as well as by the Government of the State of Veracruz

WORKS CITED

Blanchot, Maurice. La amitié. Paris: Gallimard, 1971.

Derrida, Jacques. Otobiographies: L’enseignement de Nietzche et la politique du nom propre. Paris: Galilée, 1984.

Lévesque, Claude y Christie V. McDonald (eds.). L’oreille de l’autre: otobiographies, transferts, traductions. Textes et débats avec Jacques Derrida. Québec: VLB Editeur, 1982.

Lispector, Clarice. Agua viva. Trans. Elena Losada. Madrid: Siruela, 2004.

. Un soplo de vida. Trans. Mario Merlino. Madrid: Siruela, 1999.

Antonin Artaud et l’essouflement du lógos

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Nicolas Valazza
The Johns Hopkins University

Au cours du mois de novembre 1947, Fernand Pouey, le directeur des émissions littéraires de la Radiodiffusion française, sollicite Antonin Artaud – revenu à Paris en mai 1946 après une période d’internement psychiatrique de neuf ans à l’asile de Rodez – pour qu’il prépare une performance radiophonique en vue d’une émission pour le cycle La Voix des poètes, prévue le 2 février 1948. Le choix des textes et des acteurs est laissé à la discrétion de l’auteur. Artaud accepte la proposition : il collecte quelques fragments dans un recueil qu’il intitule Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu, et convoque Maria Casarès, Roger Blin et Paule Thévenin pour les réciter. L’annonce de l’émission provoque un tapage médiatique qui conduira le directeur général de la radio Wladimir Porché à en interdire la diffusion. Cette décision suscite un vif débat dans la presse et dans le monde intellectuel parisien ; cependant l’interdiction est maintenue et la performance ne passera sur les ondes que vingt ans plus tard, en mai 1968.[1]

Depuis lors, l’enregistrement de l’émission a connu une large diffusion médiatique, et le texte une riche postérité éditoriale.[2] Son étrangeté n’en demeure pas moins intacte, même aux yeux avertis du lecteur contemporain, qui se demande toujours s’il a affaire à une parole délirante d’un aliéné, ou à un message prophétique d’un visionnaire. Cette alternative, faisant pourtant appel au bon sens, ne saurait guère nous satisfaire : les fragments textuels de Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu proviennent de loin, émanant d’une voix qui n’a pas hésité à se jouer des limites que la société lui a imposées. Pour tâcher de la saisir dans sa singularité, il est nécessaire de la sonder en profondeur. À défaut d’autres moyens (cliniques ou pythiques), il ne me reste qu’à mettre ces quelques fragments à l’épreuve d’une lecture stylistique, dictée par ce lógos qu’ils mettent en cause, et qui définit notre propre limite discursive.

L’écriture et la diction

Parmi les fragments réunis par Artaud, certains ont été rédigés spécialement en vue de l’émission (c’est le cas du texte d’ouverture « J’ai appris hier… », de « La recherche de la fécalité », du « Théâtre de la Cruauté » et de la « Conclusion »), d’autres sont antérieurs au projet de l’émission : comme les poèmes « Tutuguri » et « La question se pose de… », rédigés quelques mois plus tôt en cette même année 1947.

Tous les textes de Pour en finir… ont probablement été écrits en vue de leur récitation. Néanmoins, Artaud semble s’être fort soucié de leur dimension écrite : lors des séances de préparation aux enregistrements, il a ponctué la dictée de ses textes de toutes sortes de remarques sur la mise en page, la ponctuation et les majuscules de certains mots. Ce soin particulier témoigne bien sûr d’une sensibilité aiguë à l’égard de la dimension typographique du texte et, partant, de l’importance que revêt l’écriture aux yeux d’Artaud. Une hiérarchie et un rapport de succession s’établissent entre la dimension écrite et la récitation du texte artaldien : l’écriture précède toujours la performance orale, même si celle-ci pourra ensuite influencer rétroactivement celle-là, comme le prouve le travail de révision auquel Artaud a soumis son texte à l’issue de l’enregistrement et en vue d’une publication. Il est donc nécessaire que l’analyse de Pour en finir… tienne compte de la double dimension écrite et orale du texte : de son écriture et de sa diction.

En ce qui concerne l’écriture, tous les textes qui composent Pour en finir… sont rédigés dans une forme située à la charnière entre la prose et la poésie. Cette écriture ne peut toutefois être définie comme une prose poétique, laquelle présuppose le respect des contraintes formelles de la prose, alors que le texte artaldien transgresse les normes de la ponctuation, prend des libertés à l’égard des passages à la ligne et se dispose librement à l’intérieur de la page ; par ailleurs, dans certaines portions du texte, il est possible de relever des structures métriques sous-jacentes.[3] Il n’empêche que le discours garde l’allure de la prose, grâce à la prédominance de l’argumentation – surtout dans le texte d’ouverture et la « Recherche de la fécalité » –, mais d’une prose qui par moments est bien malmenée, et qui ne redoute pas les coupures discursives provoquées par les glossolalies ; mais j’y reviendrai.

Il semble bien que les passages à la ligne, la disposition du texte à l’intérieur de la page et les mots en caractères capitaux soient fonctionnels à la diction du texte. L’audition de l’enregistrement avec le texte sous les yeux démontre une certaine correspondance entre les choix typographiques et la récitation.[4] Bien que les passages à la ligne ne rythment pas toujours le débit de parole, les mots isolés à l’intérieur de la ligne, eux, sont systématiquement mis en relief lors de la récitation, au même titre que les mots en italique ou les mots en caractères capitaux. Ainsi, dans « Tutuguri » la récitation atteint son apogée dramatique au syntagme « L’ABOLITION DE LA CROIX » (79), le seul qui soit noté en majuscules à l’intérieur du poème. Dans « La recherche de la fécalité », « LE CACA » (83) et le « JUGEMENT DE DIEU » (87) sont suivis par des cris, comme les glossolalies au centre du texte (cf. 84). Enfin, la récitation de « La question se pose de… » met en évidence deux mots en majuscules : « SORTIR » (95) et « NON » (96), et suit un crescendo dans la progression du texte jusqu’à la dernière phrase notée en caractères gras.

D’une manière générale, la récitation des comédiens n’est pas animée par une tension dramatique particulièrement accentuée – le texte, d’ailleurs, ne s’y prête pas vraiment –, mais plutôt par un souci de fidélité à la lettre imprimée. Ce qui prime, chez Artaud, c’est le mot, envisagé comme un corps qui abrite potentiellement le souffle de la voix. La fluidité du discours s’en trouve affectée : la diction artaldienne est volontairement saccadée et arythmique, au risque de s’essouffler. La voix d’Artaud possède un charme inquiétant : elle butte sur des mots en mettant en scène une parole claudicante qui oblige l’auditeur à se laisser envahir par son pouvoir incantatoire.

L’énonciation mise en péril

La question de l’énonciation est incluse dans la problématique des genres littéraires. Or, est-il possible d’attribuer une catégorie générique à l’ensemble des textes qui composent Pour en finir…? Pour une large part, le discours d’Artaud est dominé par l’argumentation ; le titre Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu, qui énonce une thèse, suggère d’ailleurs cette lecture. Le type de discours argumentatif implique de la part de l’énonciateur qu’il parle en son nom et, partant, qu’il assume sa propre énonciation. Le texte d’ouverture de l’émission remplit ce postulat. Le syntagme situé en tête du texte – « j’ai appris hier » – contient trois embrayeurs qui focalisent le discours sur l’énonciateur : la marque du sujet « je », le passé composé du verbe « apprendre » et le déictique temporel « hier ». La suite du texte présente une structure rhétorique construite dans les règles : avec une narration, qui expose la pratique du prélèvement du sperme dans les écoles américaines, une confirmation, qui tire de cette pratique les conséquences pour l’avenir, à savoir l’entrée dans l’ère du synthétique et le déclenchement probable d’une guerre, et enfin une péroraison, dans laquelle l’énonciateur prend parti pour les Tharahumaras « mangeant le Peyotl à même le sol » (74). Drôle de discours que ce pamphlet rédigé à partir d’un prétendu fait d’actualité, et récité sur le mode dramatique par son auteur lors d’une émission radiophonique consacrée à la poésie.[5] Le texte ne colle pas vraiment à son contexte d’énonciation. Les dernières phrases du discours sont d’ailleurs surprenantes : l’énonciateur quitte le contexte plus ou moins réaliste auquel il s’est référé jusque-là pour entrer dans une phase hallucinatoire provoquée par l’allusion au Peyotl « qui tue le soleil pour installer le royaume de la nuit noire, et qui crève la croix afin que les espaces de l’espace ne puissent plus jamais se rencontrer ni se croiser » (74). L’énonciation devient performative au premier degré : la mention du Peyotl suffit à en produire les effets psychotropes sur l’énonciateur et à brouiller ses repères énonciatifs.

« Tutuguri », le deuxième texte qui figure dans Pour en finir…, s’enchaîne sur ce brouillage référentiel. Dans quelle catégorie doit-on classer ce texte ? La dernière phrase de la section précédente nous annonce une « danse » qu’il faudrait « entendre ». Toutes les marques de l’énonciation que j’avais relevées dans « J’ai appris hier… » ont disparu. Le discours change de type : de l’argumentation on passe à la narration impersonnelle. Cependant, il s’agit d’une narration bien particulière, puisque son temps est le présent et que son univers de référence n’est, selon toute apparence, pas de ce monde. Dans le sous-titre et vers la fin du texte, on trouve une allusion à un « Rite » dont « L’ABOLITION DE LA CROIX » serait « le ton majeur » (78). L’énonciation a quitté le domaine du réel sans pour autant plonger dans celui de la fiction, lequel impliquerait aussi bien une référence à un monde possible. Il nous faut trouver une nouvelle catégorie pour classer ce type d’énonciation qui instaure un nouveau monde par le seul fait de l’énoncer : je propose l’étiquette d’énonciation performative, et je regroupe dans cette catégorie les situations d’énonciation qui caractérisent les rites et les états hallucinatoires.[6]

Le troisième texte de Pour en finir… marque le retour à un type de discours argumentatif. Le titre « La recherche de la fécalité » a une double valence : d’une part méta-textuelle, en inscrivant le texte dans le genre de l’essai, d’autre part thématique, puisqu’il annonce – au moyen d’un néologisme – le sujet que le discours va ensuite développer. Le texte semble bien répondre au projet énoncé clairement par le titre et formulé dans le premier paragraphe.[7] Les contraintes énonciatives de l’argumentation ne sont guère transgressées pendant toute la première moitié du texte, jusqu’à ce qu’un énoncé glossolalique vienne court-circuiter le discours, qui s’enchaîne ensuite sur une courte séquence narrative. Plus loin l’exposé des arguments est interrompu par cette question adressée à l’auteur par un interlocuteur fictif : « Vous êtes fou, monsieur Artaud, et la messe ? » (86). À partir de là, le texte prend l’allure de l’entretien, ce qui permet à l’auteur de figurer comme un pôle d’une structure dialogique où il assume une attitude polémique : « Je renie le baptême et la messe » (86).

On retrouve une structure similaire de pseudo-entretien dans la « Conclusion », même si dans ce texte les repères énonciatifs vont se brouiller complètement. La construction dialogique du discours est établie au moyen d’une distribution des répliques entre deux personnages : l’auteur et son interlocuteur. Ce dernier est bien sûr fictif, et les questions qu’il pose sont décalées par rapport au temps et au lieu de la performance, puisqu’elles présupposent que l’émission ait déjà été diffusée : « – Et à quoi vous a servi, monsieur Artaud, cette Radio-Diffusion ? » (101). L’auteur décide de répondre à la question de son pseudo-interlocuteur en structurant sa réponse en huit points, selon les normes rhétoriques de la dispositio. Mais, à partir du troisième point, l’exposition des « saletés sociales officiellement consacrées et reconnues » (101) que l’auteur a voulu dénoncer se trouve parasitée par le discours du pseudo-interlocuteur, qui interrompt la parole de l’auteur sans pour autant interrompre le décompte des points devant structurer sa réponse. Dès cet instant, chaque point signale l’alternance de parole entre l’auteur et le pseudo-interlocuteur, dans un mélange des voix qui dissout l’intention communicative de l’auteur. Le texte ne respecte plus les formes du discours argumentatif, ni même celles de l’entretien : il est contaminé par des marques d’énonciations divergentes.

Dans l’ensemble, l’énonciation de Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu est parcourue par deux courants divergents qui en définissent la singularité. D’une part, le fondement de l’écriture d’Artaud repose sur l’argumentation, envisagée comme un type de discours qui tend à la neutralité stylistique tout en étant lié à l’univers de croyances de l’énonciateur : en cela, le texte artaldien témoigne d’une certaine conformité à la rhétorique argumentative. D’autre part, cette argumentation est constamment menacée par l’incursion des voix étrangères, comme la glossolalie – qui est une parole étrangère au code linguistique –, la parole rituelle – qui crée son propre univers de référence en dehors de la sphère du sujet et du monde –, ou encore la parole d’un interlocuteur fictif, dont les répliques sont importunes. Le style d’Artaud oscille entre la rationalité d’une argumentation personnelle et la folie illustrée par la confusion des voix.

Lógos, skato-lógos, glôssa-laliá

Or, c’est précisément à la structure du texte argumentatif que cette confusion des voix intente un procès. La présence de Dieu dans le monde « civilisé » est essentiellement une présence verbale ; bien plus, c’est une présence argumentée, la notion de ‘jugement’ est là pour le rappeler. Pour combattre le Dieu du jugement, relayé par la rhétorique qui en constitue l’avatar humain, il s’agit pour Artaud d’éradiquer de sa personne le lógos qui lui a été transmis par la tradition judéo-chrétienne, pour adopter une nouvelle parole, puisée en l’occurrence dans les rites des Tharahumaras, les « mangeurs de Peyotl. »[8] Le combat contre le jugement de Dieu est avant tout un combat verbal que se livrent les instances intérieures au sujet.

« La recherche de la fécalité » marque le retour du texte argumentatif. Cependant, le registre du discours change : la polémique au sujet de la suprématie industrielle et militaire de l’Amérique cède la place à la réflexion ontologique. Il s’agit toutefois d’une ontologie bien particulière, puisqu’elle associe la question métaphysique de l’être à la question physique – s’il en est – de l’excrétion. Le discours s’ouvre sur cet énoncé sulfureux : « Là où ça sent la merde / ça sent l’être » (83). Ces deux questions, que la tradition philosophique a situées aux deux extrémités de l’échelle axiologique, sont mises sur le même plan par Artaud. Bien plus, elles se réduisent à une seule : l’« être » et la « merde » ne font qu’un, puisqu’ils ont la même senteur. On remarquera, par ailleurs, qu’à un trait phonétique près, le signifiant [être] est l’hypogramme[9] du signifiant [merde]. De même que l’être est subordonné à la merde, de même la réflexion métaphysique est subordonnée aux besoins physiologiques. La suite du discours tâchera de développer cette thèse subversive d’un point de vue philosophique, notamment en relation avec la vie de l’homme.

À l’instar de la pensée existentialiste qui se développe à la même époque, Artaud considère que l’existence précède l’essence, c’est-à-dire l’être ; cependant, contrairement à la théorie heideggerienne de la déréliction (Geworfenheit)[10], l’existence selon Artaud découle d’un choix, et ce choix présuppose ce dilemme à la Hamlet : « chier ou ne pas chier ». Or l’homme « a choisi de chier / comme il aurait choisi de vivre » (83) ; l’être de l’homme est donc marqué par ce choix fondamental, ou plutôt par cette souillure. Dès lors, l’existence est une « abjection de saleté » (84) qui relie la « viande » à la « merde » et se résume à un effort de digestion. C’est que l’homme a faim ; il est dominé par un instinct physiologique qui fait dire à Artaud que l’homme « a désiré la merde / et, pour cela, sacrifié le sang » (84).

Mais comment comprendre le choix énoncé par Artaud ? Et où le situer par rapport à l’homme ? Selon Freud[11], le dilemme hamletien que je viens d’énoncer s’impose à l’enfant à un âge situé entre deux et quatre ans, lors du stade sadique-anal. Pendant cette phase, l’érotisme de l’enfant se concentre exclusivement autour de l’anus, et s’exerce à travers la rétention de la matière fécale. Le stade sadique-anal est destiné à être dépassé par le stade phallique, lors duquel l’enfant s’identifie à son pénis, et enfin par le complexe de castration, qui inaugure la période de latence pré-pubérale qui permettra aux différentes instances psychiques de se structurer pour former le sujet adulte. C’est pendant cette dernière phase que l’enfant s’identifie à son père et en accepte la Loi. Étant menacé par l’instance castratrice, il sublime son auto-érotisme infantile dans la re-présentation du phallus. Cette phase marque l’accès de l’enfant à l’ordre du symbolique, qui désigne l’absence, c’est-à-dire le renoncement au réel et à l’imaginaire. Le lógos, la Loi, l’autorité paternelle et la reconnaissance de l’Autre sont les différentes facettes de cette re-présentation du phallus qui introduit l’enfant à l’âge adulte.[12]

Ce sont précisément toutes ces instances rattachées à l’ordre symbolique qu’Artaud renie[13] pour proclamer sa nostalgie d’un âge pré-phallique, où l’homme pouvait jouir librement de la matière de son propre corps, sans être forcé de la céder. La parole pour Artaud est une perte du moi dans la mesure où c’est une concession faite à l’Autre (Dieu)[14], au même titre que la défécation est une perte du corps. À partir de là, on conçoit bien que, dans sa phase régressive, la parole en vienne à s’identifier au « CACA » (83), et que le lógos se réduise donc à un skato-lógos.

Il est un autre type de parole que le texte d’Artaud met en scène et dont l’hétérogénéité avec le lógos est encore plus radicale. Il s’agit de la glossolalie[15], dont l’intrusion au milieu de « La recherche de la fécalité » rompt la progression argumentative du discours :

o reche modo

to edire

di za

tau dari

do padera coco (84).

La glossolalie est une fissure dans l’ordre symbolique, elle est foncièrement étrangère au lógos, dont elle constitue en quelque sorte le reste.[16] En cela, elle signale l’irruption du réel au cœur de cette absence instaurée par le signifiant, ou encore le retour du corps dans la parole. Cependant, ce corps dont la glossolalie porte l’empreinte a une structure bien particulière, puisqu’il a rompu toute attache avec le moi. La parole glossolalique abolit tous les repères énonciatifs du discours : ce n’est plus « moi » – fût-ce « mon corps » – qui parle, mais ça parle.[17]

Mais si d’une part la glossolalie mine le lógos, d’autre part elle s’en porte également garante. Car la glossolalie prouve bien l’existence d’une parole en dépit de l’absence du sujet ; en fait, la glossolalie est la parole de l’Autre, et Antoine Compagnon a raison d’affirmer qu’« il n’y a pas de glossolalie athée. »[18] Elle constitue le fondement du lógos, tout en le remettant constamment en cause. La glossolalie est une situation de crise de parole qui appelle un renouvellement du lógos ; loin de nier l’existence de Dieu, elle en constituerait au contraire la preuve. C’est pourquoi « la glossolalie n’existe pas sans les discours qui l’interprètent »[19], et ces discours font la substance de « l’histoire [qui] est celle des dépassements de la glossolalie, des résolutions des apories dont la glossolalie est après coup le nom de l’absence d’issue. »[20]

Qu’on ne s’y trompe pas, le texte d’Artaud ne vise pas à nier l’existence de Dieu – en fait, cette question ne l’intéresse pas vraiment –, mais bien d’abolir le « JUGEMENT DE DIEU » (87) relayé par les hommes. Artaud s’attaque à l’instance du lógos, mais sans abjurer le pouvoir de la parole, dont il réaffirme la souveraineté.

On ne saurait toutefois se débarrasser si aisément de la glossolalie artaldienne, en la rejetant a priori hors du code linguistique et la privant ainsi de sa faculté signifiante. Les glossolalies d’Artaud possèdent une particularité qui les distingue des glossolalies traditionnelles : elles sont intégrées dans l’écriture, tandis que le phénomène glossolalique est historiquement lié à l’oralité[21]. L’écriture retranche la parole du souffle (divin ?) qui l’a fait naître pour lui conférer une dimension textuelle ; l’enthousiasme[22] qui détermine l’énonciation glossolalique s’en trouve dès lors réduit à néant. Aussi la nature textuelle de la glossolalie artaldienne doit-elle être envisagée d’un point de vue contextuel[23], afin d’être interprétée.

Le fragment glossolalique contenu dans « La recherche de la fécalité » présente un certain nombre de résonances latines. Le groupe intonatif « o reche modo » (la lecture de Roger Blin élide le e muet) associe l’adverbe latin « modo », indiquant l’exclusivité (= seulement) et l’immédiateté (= maintenant) du phénomène, à la forme « reche », qui exprime une idée de rudesse et se trouve, par ailleurs, dans un rapport d’assonance avec les deux mots thématiques du texte : « être » et « merde ». Il est également possible d’y voir une allusion au rectum. Dans le deuxième groupe intonatif, la forme « edire » renvoie – au prix d’une métaphonie de la voyelle post-tonique – au verbe latin édere, qui signifie, dans sa conjugaison la plus courante, ‘manger’, mais aussi, sous une autre forme, ‘évacuer’, ‘engendrer’ ou encore ‘énoncer’. Ce verbe est précédé par la forme « to », qui pourrait renvoyer à la forme poétique du pronom démonstratif grec Ó (= ceci). « Di za » est une locution adverbiale du nord de l’Italie comparable au français ‘déjà’, ou encore une transcription phonétique de l’impératif suivi d’un déictique ‘dis ça’. « Tau dari » associe à nouveau le verbe latin dáre, dont la valeur sémantique est proche de celle que revêt la deuxième conjugaison du verbe édere, à la forme « tau » qui, d’une part, désigne la lettre grecque dont se servent les pères de l’Église pour indiquer la croix, d’autre part pourrait renvoyer à une variante celtique du mot tábum (= pourriture, peste). Enfin, dans « do padera coco » on retrouve le verbe dáre conjugué avec le verbe cócere à la première personne du présent. Entre ces deux formes d’apparence verbale (même si « coco » pourrait très bien être l’onomatopée qui désigne le cri de la poule), la forme « padera » semble renvoyer au substantif grec paidšroj (= pédéraste), qui en soi n’a aucune connotation péjorative, mais qui est très proche du substantif latin páedor (= saleté).

Artaud s’est fait sa propre cuisine verbale : il a sélectionné une série de verbes du vocabulaire latin en modifiant leur forme pour les extraire du code linguistique. La glossolalie constitue une énigme qu’il est possible de décrypter grâce à l’étymologie. Il est sans doute vain de chercher une signification univoque à une parole étrangère au code linguistique ; cependant, le contexte nous aide à formuler des hypothèses plausibles. Ainsi la sémantique des verbes que la glossolalie contrefait est toujours liée à un mouvement d’extériorisation (é-nonciation, é-vacuation, ex-pulsion) mis en tension par un mouvement d’intériorisation suggéré par les verbes édo (= manger) et cóco (= cuisiner, mais aussi digérer et méditer.)[24] D’autres formes qui apparaissent dans le fragment sont liées à l’analité (« reche », « padera ») ou à la souillure (« tau », « padera »). La forme « tau » est un signe iconique qui désigne la croix. Enfin, les formes adverbiales signalent l’actualité et le caractère exclusif de l’événement.

C’est comme si le fragment glossolalique concentrait dans sa forme hermétique toute la richesse sémantique du texte. Par ailleurs, le rythme incantatoire de cette parole lui confère une dimension événementielle qui la rapproche de l’énonciation performative du rite, telle que je l’ai caractérisée précédemment. En effet, le fragment est suivi par une séquence narrative introduite par un connecteur adverbial : « Là, l’homme s’est retiré et il a fui » (84). La glossolalie met en scène l’événement archétypique qui précède l’avènement du lógos, tout en le préfigurant : elle est genèse du lógos.

La langue Artaud

On l’a vu, les textes de Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu se situent à la frontière du lógos. Peut-on pour autant affirmer qu’ils sont l’occasion d’une invention linguistique originale, qu’ils forgent cette langue nouvelle qu’on a souvent désignée du nom de « langue de Rodez » ?[25] Pour répondre à cette question, je tâcherai d’élaborer une synthèse des éléments d’analyses que j’ai dégagés au cours de ma lecture.

Partons de l’écriture. L’auteur voue un soin particulier à la forme écrite de ses textes. Cependant, les choix typographiques opérés par Artaud sont toujours fonctionnels à la diction du texte. La récitation prend donc le pas sur l’écriture du texte, en lui imposant sa donnée structurale. Or, le rythme de la diction artaldienne est foncièrement discordant par rapport au rythme régulier de la prose française, fondé sur la phrase. L’unité rythmique du texte d’Artaud coïncide avec le mot, et correspond au souffle émané par le corps.

Cette modalité rythmique est en contradiction flagrante avec le registre qui prévaut dans les textes de Pour en finir…, c’est-à-dire l’argumentation. Le discours argumentatif se structure à partir de la phrase et du regroupement de phrases, activé par les connecteurs. Le mot n’y joue qu’un rôle subalterne : il énonce tout au plus des thèmes, n’ayant aucune fonction discursive. Mais c’est précisément sur les mots que trébuche l’argumentation d’Artaud : elle s’appuie sur un souffle saccadé qui finit par la suffoquer.

L’autre menace qui plane sur le discours artaldien est figurée par la voix de l’autre, qui s’introduit subrepticement dans le texte pour saccager la parole de l’auteur, en la menaçant d’extinction. Pour Artaud, la parole est une expérience de dépossession, dont la cause est à rechercher dans le « jugement de Dieu ».

Aussi est-il impératif pour Artaud de rechercher une parole qui lui soit propre, un idiolecte qui porte la trace de son propre corps. Mais cette recherche ne peut aboutir qu’à un acte de régression psychologique qui renie l’ordre de la scission symbolique pour remonter au stade sadique-anal, où le corps pouvait jouir de sa propre matière grâce à la rétention. Ce passage marque la réduction du lógos au skato-lógos et à la glossolalie.

Cependant, la glossolalie se définit toujours par rapport au lógos, du fait qu’elle s’inscrit dans un contexte discursif et qu’elle appelle une interprétation. Le mouvement de régression n’est donc pas sans retour : le texte d’Artaud trouve son origine et sa fin dans le lógos[26], et ce n’est que par rapport à lui, à travers un acte de dé/re-structuration, qu’on peut définir l’originalité de la « langue de Rodez », caractérisant la dernière phase de la production littéraire d’Artaud, successive à son internement psychiatrique en 1937.

Notes

[1] On trouve un écho de ce débat dans le dossier accompagnant l’édition de Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu dans l’ouvrage de référence : Antonin Artaud, “Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu (1947),” Œuvres complètes, vol. XIII (Paris: Gallimard, 1974): 322-41.

[2] De nombreux extraits sont désormais disponibles sur la Toile.

[3]Par exemple, la dernière phrase de « Tutuguri » présente une structure métrique « à sablier » : « Ayant achevé de tourner (8) / ils déplantent (4) / les croix de terre (4) /et l’homme nu (4) /sur le cheval (4) / arbore (2) / un immense fer à cheval (8) / qu’il a trempé dans une coupure de son sang (si l’on élide le e muet à l’hémistiche, ce vers est un alexandrin) » (79) ; les numéros de pages renvoient à l’ouvrage de référence cité en note 1.

[4] La chaîne France Culture vient de rééditer la performance radiophonique dans un coffret contenant deux disques compacts dont le premier reproduit l’émission originale de 1947, tandis que le deuxième contient une série de réorchestrations électroniques élaborée par Chalosse et intitulée « Artaud Remix » : Antonin Artaud, Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu (1947), Enregistrement sur 2 disques compacts, France Culture, Paris, 2001.

[5] Le cycle d’émissions diffusé par la radio avait pour titre Voix des poètes.

[6] La transsubstantiation annoncée par les paroles du prêtre ne peut être rangée dans le domaine de la fiction, de même que les paroles de l’halluciné n’ont rien de fictif.

[7] « Là où ça sent la merde / ça sent l’être. / L’homme aurait très bien pu ne pas chier, / ne pas ouvrir la poche anale, / mais il a choisi de chier / comme il aurait choisi de vivre /au lieu de consentir à vivre mort » (83).

[8] Cf. supra.

[9] Un mot « caché » sous un autre, repérable au moyen d’une modification ou d’une réduction phonétique.

[10] Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927) § 38: 175-80.

[11] Sigmund Freud, Trois essais sur la théorie de la sexualité (1905) (Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1923): 96-97.

[12] Jacques Lacan écrit à ce propos : « Le phallus […] est le signifiant destiné à désigner dans leur ensemble les effets du signifié, en tant que le signifiant les conditionne par sa présence de signifiant ». Et plus loin : « Que le phallus soit un signifiant, impose que ce soit à la place de l’Autre que le sujet y ait accès. Mais ce signifiant n’y étant que voilé et comme raison du désir de l’Autre, c’est ce désir de l’Autre comme tel qu’il est imposé au sujet de reconnaître » ; Jacques Lacan, “La signification du phallus (1958),” Écrits 2 (Paris: Seuil, 1971): 108-12.

[13] « [Dieu] n’est pas, mais comme le vide qui avance avec toutes ses formes… Je renie le baptême et la messe. » (86)

[14] « Ça parle dans l’Autre, disons-nous, en désignant par l’Autre le lieu même qu’évoque le recours à la parole dans toute relation où il intervient » ; Lacan, “La signification du phallus,” (1958): 108.

[15] Le Trésor de la langue française distingue deux domaines d’usage du terme ; l’un religieux, où il est définit comme un « Don surnaturel de parler spontanément une langue étrangère », ou encore comme une « Langue inintelligible que parlent les mystiques en début d’extase » ; l’autre médical, où il désigne le « Langage imaginaire de certains aliénés, fait d’onomatopées dont la relative fixité au point de vue de la syntaxe et du vocabulaire permet la compréhension dans une certaine mesure ». Cette dernière définition retiendra plus particulièrement mon attention.

[16] « La glossolalie est le reste, le rebut ou le déchet d’une théorie du langage » ; Antoine Compagnon, “La glossolalie, une affaire sans histoire ?,” Critique 35.387-388 (1979): 830.

[17] Lacan parle d’une « passion du signifiant [qui] devient une dimension nouvelle de la condition humaine en tant que ce n’est pas seulement l’homme qui parle, mais que dans l’homme et par l’homme ça parle, que sa nature devient tissée par des effets où se retrouve la structure du langage dont il devient la matière, et que par là résonne en lui, au-delà de tout ce qu’a pu concevoir la psychologie des idées, la relation de la parole » ; Lacan, “La signification du phallus” (1958): 107.

[18] Compagnon, “La glossolalie, une affaire sans histoire ?,” 836.

[19] Ibid.: 828.

[20] Ibid.: 838.

[21] Comme l’indique l’étymologie grecque du mot, composé de glôssa (langue) et laliá (bavardage, babil).

[22] « L’enthousiasme […] est une parole qu’un sujet tient à la place, au nom d’un autre, et plus précisément au nom de l’Autre » ; Compagnon, “La glossolalie, une affaire sans histoire ?,” 824.

[23] Cf. Laurent Jenny, La Terreur et les signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1982): 262. : « Les fragments glossolaliques s’appuient toujours sur une contextualité « en langage clair » qu’ils viennent relayer. »

[24] On remarquera par ailleurs l’allitération qui relie [CoCo] au mot thème [CaCa].

[25] Artaud commence à rédiger les textes de la performance radiophonique moins d’un an après sa sortie de l’asile de Rodez.

[26] « Si ça parle dans l’Autre, que le sujet l’entende ou non de son oreille, c’est que c’est là que le sujet, par une antériorité logique à tout éveil du signifié, trouve sa place signifiante. La découverte de ce qu’il articule à cette place, c’est-à-dire dans l’inconscient, nous permet de saisir au prix de quelle division (Spaltung) il s’est ainsi constitué » ; Lacan, “La signification du phallus” (1958): 108.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Artaud, Antonin. “Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu” (1947). Œuvres complètes. Vol. XIII. Paris: Gallimard, 1974.

—. Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu (1947). Enregistrement sur 2 disques compacts. France Culture, Paris, 2001.

Compagnon, Antoine. “La glossolalie, une affaire sans histoire ?” Critique 35.387-388 (1979): 324-38.

Freud, Sigmund. Trois essais sur la théorie de la sexualité (1905). Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1923.

Heidegger, Martin. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927.

Jenny, Laurent. La Terreur et les signes. Paris: Gallimard, 1982.

Lacan, Jacques. “La signification du phallus (1958).” Écrits 2. Paris: Seuil, 1971. 103-15.