Le Navigazioni e viaggi di Ramusio: spazi e luoghi in un progetto rinascimentale di mappatura del mondo

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Toni Veneri
University of Trieste

Il Rinascimento è stato ed è tuttora al centro di un’articolata mitologia dello spazio elaborata dalla storiografia occidentale: nella riflessione umanistica come nelle applicazioni tecniche, nelle arti figurative come nell’esercizio territoriale dell’autorità, nuovi paradigmi spaziali sembrano emergere in questo periodo modificando gli orizzonti delle scienze e dell’agire politico. La frattura epistemologica identificata con la modernità viene così fatta risalire all’apparizione fra Quattro e Cinquecento di nuove pratiche di spazio, cui sono possono essere ricondotti decisivi mutamenti nella produzione di testualità particolarmente interessate alla rappresentazione dello spazio geografico, come la cartografia e la letteratura di viaggio.

Nel primo caso, prima ancora di rivoluzione scientifica, ovvero nel senso indicato da Thomas S. Kuhn di adozione di un paradigma condiviso da parte di una particolare comunità scientifica (103), la storia della cartografia, a lungo vincolata alle narrazioni finalistiche della teleologia positivista, ha individuato nel Rinascimento un momento di emancipazione dai simbolismi religiosi delle mappae mundi medievali e di ingresso nel sapere umanistico dei procedimenti della tecnologia nautica. Nel secondo caso la critica[1]ha riconosciuto un simile processo di secolarizzazione in cui l’incontro con l’alterità conseguente alle scoperte avrebbe prodotto un nuovo discorso sul viaggio, sganciandolo sia dal modello comparativo sancito da Marco Polo, che riconduceva incessantemente l’estraneo al familiare, sia dal modello medievale del pellegrinaggio, viaggio tutto teso all’affermazione del già visto e non all’esplorazione del nuovo.

Contemporaneamente i due tipi di rappresentazioni tendono ad allontanarsi, secondo Michel de Certeau, il quale sovrappone rispettivamente alla mappa e al racconto di viaggio la distinzione fra luoghi e spazi, laddove il luogo implica una configurazione di posizioni, quindi stabilità e ordine, mentre lo spazio è un luogo praticato, animato dai movimenti che vi si svolgono, secondo un’opposizione simile a quella che in linguistica distingue la competenza dalla performance (173). Se precedentemente luoghi e spazi non erano dissociati e la mappa conservava i suoi descrittori di percorso, successivamente essa va incontro a un processo di formalizzazione e si autonomizza. La rappresentazione cioè tende a sganciarsi dalla pratica che l’ha posta in essere, tende a nasconderla. La letteratura di viaggio in questo si differenzia, nel mantenere in superficie la traccia delle operazioni materiali che hanno permesso la mappatura. La mappa in altre parole si è lentamente svincolata dagli itinerari che ne erano la condizione di possibilità e man mano che un discorso moderno di costruzione dello spazio si istituzionalizza e diventa egemone, la carta si spopola: la formalizzazione è infatti soprattutto una riduzione delle possibilità metaforiche della rappresentazione.

Solo essendo sempre più reticente sui procedimenti della propria creazione, la carta ha potuto costituirsi come uno degli emblemi del discorso scientifico, capace grazie a un sistema unico di proiezione di giustapporre in un insieme formale luoghi astratti eterogenei: luoghi trasmessi da una tradizione (Tolomeo) e luoghi prodotti dall’osservazione (i portolani) assemblati in un unico quadro totalizzante di esposizione del sapere geografico dal quale gli itinerari che l’hanno prodotto sono stati cancellati (179).

La tesi di Certeau è molto convincente e indispensabile alla riflessione sulla costruzione dello spazio in età rinascimentale, ma a patto di non irrigidire la polarizzazione: se è importante insistere sull’istituzione di classi separate di rappresentazione e sulle loro caratteristiche strutturali, è altrettanto rilevante individuare gli assunti retorici e mimetici comuni che, circolando da una zona culturalmente demarcata a un’altra, attraverso una complessa serie di negoziazioni, rivelano la dimensione sociale del potere della rappresentazione, quell’energia sociale che “si manifesta nella capacità propria di certe tracce verbali, auditive e visuali di produrre, modellare e organizzare le esperienze collettive di tipo fisico e mentale” (Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations 6), energia che è poi il presupposto della loro sopravvivenza estetica. Interpretare la carta geografica rinascimentale come prodotto di intenzioni collettive, a partire dalla sua leggibilità, significa inserirla in una storia delle rappresentazioni simboliche che renda conto dell’ingresso della mappa nella pubblica rappresentazione, dell’emergenza di configurazioni di potere che non possono essere scisse dalla rapida e formidabile espansione della cartografia a stampa e dell’editoria di soggetto geografico, dall’apparizione della mappa nell’iconografia del tempo, dalla diffusione domestica di carte come segno di distinzione sociale. Per esempio queste ultime, la cui apparizione è concomitante a quella dei quadri,

oltre a comunicare conoscenze – reali o meno – su luoghi ed eventi strani, simboleggiavano, attraverso una complessa iconografia, alcuni temi più elevati: la magia di afferrare il mondo come una singola immagine ordinata, la sostituzione del contenuto della geografia classica con una geografia “moderna” che incorporava le “nuove scoperte” e la secolarizzazione dell’immagine del mondo con il passaggio dalla raffigurazione dello spazio spirituale a quella dello spazio geometrico. (Woodward 103)

Il discorso sullo spazio che la mappa produce appare allora non soltanto il soggetto ideologico di un preciso genere ma anche il fondamento economico di numerose professioni e il movente politico di imprese coloniali, scambi commerciali e condizionamenti istituzionali. Mai quanto in quest’ordine di rappresentazioni appare chiaro come la mimesi sia un rapporto di produzione sociale. In questo senso potrei azzardare per la mappa moderna il termine ideologramma, sottolineando il carattere politico di una rappresentazione soprattutto grafica (gramma, in latino linea) – il reticolato cartografico – capace di analizzare e risolvere qualcosa che viene sentito come un problema (lo spazio), e allo stesso tempo depositaria di un’energia sociale che la sedimenta nel profondo delle coscienze; la parola stampata essendo anch’essa un diagramma risultato della stessa operazione scritturale che presiede alla compilazione di una carta, diventa stretta alleata della mappa: l’ideologramma diventa allora tanto cartografico quanto verbale.

Appare allora possibile interpretare la letteratura di viaggio rinascimentale come una testualità che oltre a contestare il principio d’ordine e stabilità della mappa trasforma invece incessantemente dei luoghi in spazi e degli spazi in luoghi. Questa polarità interna e non esterna assomiglia molto al tratto che Tzvetan Todorov assegna al racconto di viaggio così come lo immagina – inconsciamente – il lettore di oggi, ovvero “una certa tensione (o un certo equilibrio) tra il soggetto che osserva e l’oggetto osservato” (Le morali della storia 111), tra una narrazione personale che non si riduce a descrizione oggettiva, e il quadro delle circostanze esterne al soggetto, che viene fornito dal viaggio. Il racconto vive della compenetrazione reciproca e del conflitto fra scienza e autobiografia, con il rischio continuo di trapassare da un discorso all’altro. Ma questo rischio è strettamente legato alla dimensione estetico-letteraria che la letteratura di viaggio conosce soltanto a partire dalla fine del Settecento, ovvero quando da un lato si costituisce il patto autobiografico di cui parla Philippe Lejeune e dall’altro quando la demarcazione fra prassi e teoria dissolve il sistema umanistico delle lettere e delle arti. Risalendo invece al Cinquecento è possibile leggere la dinamica per nulla lineare attraverso cui la tensione fra luogo e spazio si è costituita, ma non ancora cristallizzata in discorsi autonomi e codificati.

Un quadro totalizzante

Il carattere inaugurale attribuito alla costruzione dello spazio geografico rinascimentale può essere dunque riletto in termini di fondazione di discorsività, piuttosto che di nascita o scoperta. Un testo cui potremmo attribuire questo ruolo di istitutore di discorsività è il progetto editoriale delle Navigazioni e viaggi, monumentale raccolta di materiale geografico compilata dal segretario della Serenissima Giovanni Battista Ramusio (1485-1557) e pubblicata da Tommaso Giunti a Venezia in tre imponenti volumi rispettivamente nel 1550, nel 1553 e nel 1559.[2]

Summa delle conoscenze acquisite in quei decenni di febbrile esplorazione oceanica congiunte alle relazioni dei più attenti e coraggiosi viaggiatori del passato, le Navigazioni innovano un genere fino allora instabile e governato dal criterio cronologico, sostituendovi un’organizzazione spaziale in cui trova posto materiale molto eterogeneo, dalle narrazioni di mercanti greci e cartaginesi, a quelle dei missionari medievali, dagli avvisi dei Gesuiti alle ambascerie veneziane, dalle lettere di Vespucci e Cortés ai diari di bordo dei piloti portoghesi, dal Milione di Marco Polo al viaggio di Leone Africano, dalle opere storiografiche di Pietro Martire e Oviedo alle relazioni sulle esplorazioni di Cartier e di Caboto. Complesse operazioni di reperimento, collezione, comparazione filologica, traduzione e uniformazione in una veste linguistica bembesca, assemblano così una sorta di atlante verbale della geografia cinquecentesca, le cui indicazioni di regia vengono esplicitate nei Discorsi che l’umanista premette alle relazioni o che riserva a dialoghi e trattazioni di questioni geografiche, fisiche, economiche e politiche.

Descrizione totalizzante del globo, osannata nel primo Novecento come straordinario e pionieristico saggio del metodo positivo e sperimentale in geografia (Del Piero 89; Grande 108), il disegno della raccolta ramusiana ha sollevato l’interesse della critica recente, che ha cominciato a riconoscervi un “progetto per l’unificazione del mondo” (Milanesi, Introduzione XXV), “una presa di possesso simbolica del mondo e delle cose” e “un progetto strategico” (Albertan-Coppola e Gomez-Géraud 61-9). I pochi studi realizzati concordano nel riconoscere che esso per primo e in maniera completa realizza il passaggio da una raccolta di relazioni di viaggi a una descrizione del mondo. Per comprendere l’evidente elemento di coerenza che governa allora la raccolta, suggerisco di analizzarla come progetto di “mappatura” del mondo, come operazione scritturale che articola una nuova pratica di spazio in formazione discorsiva.

La lettera dedicatoria a Girolamo Fracastoro che introduce il I volume delle Navigazioni (1: 3-6) fin da subito avverte della triplice ragione cartografica che presiede alla compilazione. Le carte ne sono la causa, il mezzo e il fine, non servono a Ramusio soltanto per coordinare i materiali archiviati, ma rappresentano una parte cospicua delle fonti, forniscono gli elementi per correggere i testi, i criteri per strutturare la distribuzione delle relazioni, i parametri per verificare l’attendibilità delle testimonianze, per farne una cernita e una selezione. Il movente della raccolta è quello dell’aggiornamento delle tavole tolemaiche, il fine è quello sia di soddisfare la sete di conoscenza degli studiosi sia di fornire ai governi che gestiscono il commercio internazionale e attuano progetti di colonizzazione un attendibile e agevole strumento di lavoro. Esigenze di un duplice e interrelato pubblico che non si arrestano alla semplice lettura ma implicano un’estrapolazione di dati finalizzata alla compilazione di nuove carte geografiche. La prescrizione della geografia tolemaica, lascia intendere lo stesso Ramusio, sarà completa e definitiva quando le carte nautiche dei portoghesi verranno integrate con la messe di informazioni di cui la letteratura di viaggio è depositaria. Così il raccoglitore si rivolge Alli studiosi di geografia, avvertendoli che le tre mappe d’accompagnamento al I volume – che portano comunque la firma del più noto cartografo italiano dell’epoca, Jacopo Gastaldi -sono ben poca cosa rispetto a quelle che si potrebbero trarre dal libro (1: 908).

Dunque il grande planisfero ramusiano nasce per contestare delle mappe, si forma attraverso la mediazione di mappe e propone la costruzione di nuove mappe. In questi tre diversi momenti, la mappa è un tema ossessivo dei Discorsi, ma è utile soffermarsi inizialmente sul manifesto programmatico di emendare Tolomeo.

Un modello anacronistico

Attraverso complesse vicende di trasmissione l’Istruzione geografica o Geografia di Tolomeo, la summa delle conoscenze sul mondo che la classicità aveva prodotto nel II secolo, era riapparsa in Europa, assieme alle tavole di Marino di Tiro, al principio del Quattrocento. È opportuno riflettere sulla consacrazione che il modello, nel momento stesso in cui viene contestato, trova nelle Navigazioni. Tolomeo è l’unico a fornire, in senso metaforico e in senso letterale, le coordinate per una descrizione sistematica e totalizzante del mondo. Tolomeo dà dei numeri, dei gradi, delle misure di longitudine e latitudine, che permettono di rappresentare sulla carta le località di tutta la terra. Rende finalmente utilizzabili ai cosmografi i dati delle carte nautiche, che prescindevano dalle coordinate astronomiche delle località, dalla loro posizione sulla superficie terrestre (Milanesi, Tolomeo 12). La compulsione “numerica” che Ramusio deriva da Tolomeo permette di riandare incessantemente dal testo classico a quello moderno, come si legge bene nel discorso che introduce la navigazione del mar Rosso attribuita allo storico greco Arriano (2: 500-13), le cui informazioni vengono continuamente paragonate con i gradi riportati da Tolomeo, da Marino di Tiro e dai navigatori portoghesi. Sulle contraddizioni degli antichi prevale l’estrema diligenza degli ultimi, per i quali Ramusio nutre profondo rispetto, giungendo addirittura a inventarsi un “pilotto portoghese che aveva cognizione de’ libri di Tolomeo” (2: 503) che corrobori e suggelli la sua opera di correzione, e dia un’impressione di empiria alla condanna delle fantasie tolemaiche sulla terra incognita. Un navigatore portoghese in carne e ossa assiste invece Ramusio nella ricostruzione dell’itinerario atlantico del cartaginese Annone: entrambi appaiono indaffarati a riconoscere nei citati nomi antichi quelli moderni, con l’aiuto dei dati tolemaici che si rivelano però subito inesatti, perché “tutti i gradi sono stati variati dal tempo e della negligenza degli scrittori. Ma li gradi che sono stati osservati dalli presenti marinari, per ordine dei suoi re, sono verissimi e giustissimi” (1: 559). Ramusio invoca di nuovo la conferma autoptica di un alter ego lusitano quando cerca di ritrovare sulla carta la rotta seguita da un altro mercante greco dell’antichità, Iambolo, e affermare che essa giunse addirittura fino a Sumatra; essendo la narrazione sprovvista di toponimi, le congetture abbisognano dell’avvallo della (fittizia) testimonianza oculare (1: 903-8).

Tolomeo offre così i rudimenti di un metodo cartografico destinato a sfruttare le acquisizioni tecnologiche della modernità, ma anche un quadro di sistemazione dei dati dal respiro totalizzante che può legittimare l’accumulo di letteratura odeporica. Così l’ammirazione di Ramusio per la diligenza nella raccolta portoghese dei dati matematici delle loro scoperte, cede presto il passo a un severo rimprovero per la mancanza di una storiografia e di una geografia che ai toponimi registrati sulle mappe desse vita. Il nome, per quanto puntualmente individuato dalle sue coordinate, rimane inerte, e quindi inutilizzabile, se non accompagnato da una contestualizzazione che sia anche commerciale, politica, storica: altrimenti, come osserva l’umanista, l’isola scoperta da Tristan da Cunha è destinata a rimanere un punto anonimo segnato in mezzo alla grande distesa atlantica (1: 599-601). L’appello che egli fa in nome della memoria geografica, affermando che in ragione di questa trascuratezza si è finora ignorata l’esistenza del Nuovo Mondo, non a caso non è diretto né ai navigatori, né ai cosmografi: sono i governi, finanziatori, promotori e gestori delle fonti del sapere geografico, che vanno sollecitati a gran voce e Ramusio si dichiara fiducioso dell’incidenza che le sue Navigazioni potranno avere sull’operato di questi vertici.

Se una geografia deve incaricarsi della sistemazione dei dati raccolti, ciò è necessario anche perché l’insieme del sapere scientifico necessita di una tale sintesi. Ramusio rimprovera Francisco Alvarez di non aver effettuato, durante il suo viaggio in Etiopia, le misurazioni che avrebbero contribuito alla definitiva risoluzione del dibattito scientifico sulle fonti e l’escrescenza del Nilo (cui è dedicato nelle pagine seguenti un dialogo con Fracastoro) (2: 79-80). Ma le conseguenze della disattenzione di Alvarez si riversano sul corpo intero della cartografia africana, che fa di lui una privilegiata fonte d’informazione. Ci troviamo di fronte a un aneddoto altamente rappresentativo del dialogo fra l’autorità tolemaica e la testimonianza autoptica: Alvarez infatti, ignaro di determinazioni astronomiche, riconosce nel lago Tana uno dei due laghi che il geografo alessandrino indicava come sorgenti del Nilo, provocando un colossale equivoco destinato a perdurare sulle carte geografiche dell’epoca.

Il positivismo ha magnificato il tributo portato da Fracastoro all’osservazione diretta, e ha visto nella collaborazione con Ramusio un triplice assalto all’autorità di Tolomeo, in campo astronomico, geografico e cartografico (Grande 100-1). L’edizione critica del testo greco della Geografia data da Erasmo da Rotterdam nel 1533, e la sua prima edizione in italiano, nel 1548, in cui la sproporzione fra le carte antiche (26) e quelle nuove (34, tutte opera di Gastaldi, il collaboratore di Ramusio) sembrano infatti sancire definitivamente l’obsolescenza di ciò che ormai è il monumento classico della geografia. Tuttavia l’emergenza del modello tolemaico non ha soltanto offerto una riserva di dati sul mondo conosciuto dagli antichi, ma, facendo letteralmente esplodere il matrimonio medievale fra geografia profana e storia sacra, ha fornito, proprio in forza del suo anacronismo, una possibilità di montaggio per le nuove scoperte, come commenta Frank Lestringant:

La terra si è ingrandita a suo dispetto, e l’ecumene che gli antichi limitavano a una porzione longitudinale dell’emisfero boreale si è ormai quadruplicata. Ora questo modello, apparentemente inadeguato, si è rivelato fecondo proprio in ragione del suo stesso anacronismo. Grazie al supporto per tre quarti vuoto che offriva ai moderni geografi, liberi d’inscrivervi i profili delle terre recentemente “inventate”, questa forma allo stesso tempo chiusa e aperta, piena e lacunosa, rappresentava la costruzione ideale ove ospitare, attraverso aggiunte approssimative e disparate, i “pezzi” di spazio che i navigatori riportavano dai loro lontani viaggi, dopo averli sommariamente consegnati alle loro carte nautiche e ai loro portolani. (18-9)

Solo un modello aperto e allo stesso tempo chiuso poteva registrare nelle Navigazioni il movimento centrifugo delle nuove scoperte e reggere alla risolutiva sanzione di finitezza della circumnavigazione magellanica. È in questo senso che la raccolta ramusiana rappresenta un’operazione di mappatura del mondo: la terra acquisisce una forma chiusa, il che significa per Ramusio che essa diventa cartografabile, che le terre incognite possono essere sottratte al mito e inserite come prioritarie nell’attuale programma di lavoro dei navigatori, dei monarchi e degli scienziati. La Geografia, che contiene in se stessa le ragioni del proprio aggiornamento (il lavoro di Tolomeo infatti corregge i dati di Marino di Tiro), autorizza così un’opera di montaggio geografico perfettibile e proiettata nel futuro, aperta e modulabile all’infinito. La sorte della raccolta ramusiana sarà invece diversa, analoga a quella del suo modello, ovvero l’ingresso in un canone monumentale del sapere geografico.

L’engramma tolemaico

Un’ipotesi affascinante che potrebbe spiegare in parte il successo della riesumazione di Tolomeo, che scavalca a piè pari lo spazio metonimico e sacrale del Medioevo, è quella che permette di considerare il suo reticolo cartografico come “engramma”. È questa una nozione che rinvia alla teoria della memoria sociale concepita da Aby Warburg, che presenta molte affinità con il concetto di energia sociale proposto da Greenblatt. Se è difficile disgiungerlo dalle idee di esperienza originaria dell’uomo primitivo da cui esso dipendeva nella psicologia storica di Warburg e di Richard Semon, l’engramma può tuttavia essere utile a interpretare la simbolicità del reticolo tolemaico e a interpretarne la trasmissione storica, allargandola a una dimensione collettiva. Lo studioso vedeva nel frammento di una ninfa, che sembrava riaffiorare, all’epoca degli scavi archeologici rinascimentali, assieme ai bassorilievi antichi come da un remoto e radicalmente altro passato, l’esempio di una categoria di immagini provenienti dalla classicità che provocavano una intensa esperienza emotiva, uno shock visivo inaudito. Queste Pathosformel esercitarono un’azione talmente formidabile, e che affondava nel più profondo della coscienza, che la storia dell’arte allora orientata verso il realismo fu bruscamente deviata verso il suo ben noto destino barocco. Il barocco aveva fatto la sua trionfale e precoce entrata nella storia con il ritrovamento del Laocoonte e col pathos che questo aveva impresso alla cultura estetica di un’intera civiltà. Ma questo potere improvviso e imprevisto di immagini che avevano la forza magica del simbolo non si poteva imputare a secoli di oblio e a una fortunata riscoperta: queste immagini si erano trasmesse ininterrottamente anche attraverso i “secoli bui” dell’età di mezzo. Come spiegare allora il loro fenomenale impatto quattrocentesco? Warburg cerca di farlo mutuando dalla psicologia sociale di Karl Lamprecht la nozione di corpo sociale come fascio di stimoli, e combinandola con la concezione di Semon della memoria come

capacità di reagire a un evento in un certo periodo di tempo; cioè una forma di immagazzinamento e di trasmissione dell’energia sconosciuta al mondo fisico. Ogni evento che influenza la materia vivente lascia una traccia che Semon chiama “engramma”. L’energia potenziale conservata in questi “engrammi” può, in circostanze adeguate, essere riattivata e scaricata. (Gombrich 210)

È possibile allora sul suo esempio immaginare il reticolo tolemaico non solo come un neutro ricettacolo di gradi e coordinate, ma piuttosto come un simbolo in cui si deposita l’energia impiegata nello sforzo non di effettuare i rilevamenti astronomici ma di possedere lo spazio in maniera totalizzante con uno unico sguardo ubiquista e onnipotente. Tale energia può sprigionarsi e rendere efficace il simbolo in maniera così formidabile solo al contatto con la “volontà selettiva” di uno storicamente determinato sistema culturale. Come il pathos classico che si degrada presto nella retorica del manierismo, similmente l’automaticità della lettura della mappa subentra all’entusiastica e miracolosa possibilità concessa all’uomo rinascimentale di scrivere sulla carta geografica un’esperienza dello spazio che improvvisamente sembrava risolversi in se stessa. L’atto quasi divino di abbracciare l’intero globo con un solo sguardo era meravigliosamente diventato alla portata di tutti. Ramusio sembra qui commentare il momento di trapasso dalla meraviglia alla normalizzazione. Tramonta l’engramma medievale delle mappae mundi, inerte e muto ormai per noi, ma che doveva essere stato capace, con un’irresistibile forza centripeta, di orientare lo spazio cristiano verso una Gerusalemme dove, con una metonimia verticale, il fedele veniva bruscamente innalzato ai domini della trascendenza che trasfiguravano il mondo in Creato. Qualcuno sostiene che i geografi cinquecenteschi procedessero alla raccolta e alla sistemazione di dati in maniera del tutto inconscia (Bevilacqua 356), anche se è difficile pensarlo per Ramusio, eppure è proprio in un margine di incoscienza che si può risalire al carattere simbolico, e non puramente scientifico, dell’incontro con Tolomeo. Questo incontro, lungi da costituire un mero rifornimento di dati numerici, è quello in cui si articolerà una visione dello spazio che circolerà in tutto il corpo sociale: il dialogo con gli antichi costituisce un evento che non è né predeterminato né così innocente, esattamente come

l’atteggiamento degli artisti di fronte alle immagini ereditate dalla tradizione non era … nemmeno pensabile in termini di scelta estetica né tantomeno di ricezione neutrale: si trattava di un confronto, mortale o vitale secondo i casi, con le tremende energie che si erano fissate in quelle immagini, che avevano in sé la possibilità di far regredire l’uomo in una sterile soggezione ovvero di orientarlo nel suo cammino verso la salvezza e la conoscenza. (Agamben 57)

Il fatto che esista una tensione fra luogo e spazio, non significa che la fondazione di questa tensione, come la fondazione di ordini e l’istituzione di discorsività (con i loro binarismi vero/falso, bene/male), ricada sotto questi stessi parametri binari. L’incontro con l’engramma tolemaico rimanda a un’esperienza dell’extra-ordinario, a un momento in cui viene tracciato un confine asimmetrico fra proprio ed estraneo, che non può essere ricostruito né recuperato, ma costringe a spostare l’attenzione dalla dimensione intenzionale a quella responsiva, a quel registro del pathos e della risposta al centro della fenomenologia dell’estraneità di Bernhard Waldenfels (39-64). La risposta conduce inevitabilmente a una riappropriazione finale da parte del proprio, tuttavia conta sottolinearne la limitatezza (non può mai esaurire l’estraneo a cui risponde), l’ineludibilità (anche il silenzio è una risposta), l’asimmetria (non c’è un luogo terzo di mediazione) e soprattutto la creatività (non si può elaborare una pratica definitiva dell’estraneo). In questo caso la riappropriazione dell’engramma da parte dell’episteme rinascimentale, caratterizzata secondo Michel Foucault da relazioni di somiglianza, dall’associazione fra parole e cose e dal linguaggio come scrittura materiale delle cose (Le parole e le cose 31-59), è avvenuta forse attraverso la categoria del microcosmo, che nella proiezione tolemaica poteva trovare un’ulteriore garanzia alle corrispondenze fra il Tutto e le sue parti. Allo stesso tempo la risposta a questo incontro è stata indubbiamente creativa, ha cioè inventato delle nuove soluzioni al problema della produzione di spazio nella modernità. Propongo allora di analizzare il caso ramusiano seguendo l’idea suggerita da Henri Lefebvre, secondo cui questa produzione si realizza nella simultaneità di tre operazioni: omogeneizzazione, frammentazione e gerarchizzazione.

Omogeneizzazione

L’omogeneità dello spazio moderno deriverebbe, secondo Lefebvre, dall’arte prospettica, che già aveva fondato la propria autorità sui “giochi di verità” delle scienze matematiche, propagando all’interno della società la visione euclidea (e più tardi cartesiana) dello spazio (XVII-XVIII). La prospettiva difatti è stata durante il secolo scorso al centro di molte riflessioni teoriche elaborate in antagonismo alla critica, condotta sulla base del naturalismo e mossa da preoccupazioni di mimesi, che veniva esercitata sul vasto insieme delle opere visive, dagli affreschi romani alle sculture rinascimentali, come agli atlanti di Mercatore. Si può ricordare l’ipotesi di Alois Riegl della totale alterità del sentimento e della resa spaziale antica rispetto alla costruzione rinascimentale (102-110) oppure la possibilità, offerta da Ernst Cassirer, di interpretare questo sentimento e questa resa come "forma simbolica" (Filosofia 175-199; Sostanza 145), possibilità praticata da Erwin Panofsky nel celebre saggio La prospettiva come forma simbolica, che forniva un’elaborazione teorica al metodo iconologico applicato da Aby Warburg e che si sarebbe sviluppata ulteriormente con Fritz Saxl in una Storia delle immagini.

Questo filone di studi teorici tende a suggerire come anche in pittura, architettura, scultura la prospettiva svolga funzioni analoghe a quelle della mappatura; come entrambe producano uno spazio che è vettore di cambiamenti sociali e politici; come spazio prospettico e spazio cartografico attuino incessanti transazioni con lo spazio teatrale e scenografico. Il tutto avviene effettivamente nella direzione di una “teatralizzazione” dell’individuo, cui viene attribuito con sempre maggiore autorità un ruolo definito dai suoi posizionamenti spaziali, all’interno di un comune spazio scenografico quale il mondo si va delineando nei prodotti della pittura, dell’architettura, della cartografia del Cinquecento. Il nuovo spazio affonda la sua universalità nella visibilità diversamente dal posizionamento dell’individuo medievale, che ne qualificava il ruolo sociale, ma all’interno di uno “spazio di localizzazione” (Foucault, Dits et Ecrits 753) gerarchico la cui universalità era sancita dalla sacralità della tradizione e dal privilegio dogmatico accordato alle classi dominanti. Non c’era bisogno di visualizzazioni - si pensi alle pratiche di visualizzazione prescritte dalla pedagogia gesuitica - per ricordare che l’abitante della villa era soggetto all’autorità dell’abitante del castello.

Brian Harley non esita a riconoscere in questo “nesso teatrale” un elemento fondante della nuova politica coloniale: “le metafore utilizzate dai cartografi per dare un nome alle loro produzioni rafforzano il sentimento d’irrealtà: la carta del mondo di Mercatore rappresenta la terra come un “Teatro” per l’attività umana, implicando che l’America è una scena per i suoi primi colonizzatori europei” (Relire les cartes 105). In questo senso è possibile allora leggere le Navigazioni in relazione all’“inaspettata teatralizzazione del soggetto che acquista coscienza della propria autonomia attraverso modi di posizionamento sviluppati all’interno di rappresentazioni, sia testuali che reticolate, della realtà” (Conley 2).

Mi piace dunque pensare che l’engramma tolemaico abbia ottenuto una risposta decisiva a metà Quattrocento in relazione anche all’elaborazione spaziale che avveniva in campo artistico (ne abbia incontrato la “volontà selettiva”), campo da cui la cartografia non si era ancora pienamente demarcata. Il continuum spaziale che occupa la totalità del quadro prospettico, invade la carta geografica. Le terrae incognitae, luogo privilegiato dello scacco alla presa di controllo del mappatore, in cui il Medioevo aveva rigettato l’incomprensibile e il meraviglioso, diventano per Ramusio l’oggetto privilegiato e urgente di un progetto che aspira a riempire le sagome lasciate vuote dalla cartografia nautica per i nuovi mondi o dalla geografia classica per quelli vecchi. Eloquente in proposito è l’immagine dell’“anonimo di Caffi”, alter ego del raccoglitore, suo fittizio interlocutore, che si piega sul mappamondo di Fracastoro e stila l’elenco delle zone ancora vergini del globo sulle quali l’attenzione dei principi dovrebbe dirigersi (2: 967-90).

Questo horror vacui, che può essere placato a suon di coordinate, nomi di località, descrizioni di corsi fluviali e di montagne, è anzitutto la turbata reazione al vuoto oceanico della fisica aristotelica. João de Castro, qualche anno prima di Ramusio, nel suo Tratado da sphera (1540), aveva dato voce allo stesso raccapriccio, svolgendo una chiara requisitoria contro la teoria del filosofo antico, che propugnava la prevalenza sulla superficie terrestre dell’elemento acqua sull’elemento terra.

L’affermazione teorica dell’omogeneità dello spazio geografico si traduce in Ramusio nella convinzione che la Terra sia conoscibile, praticabile e abitabile in ogni sua parte, e dà l’avvio a un serrato dibattito con la classicità, nel duplice binario della contestazione e della rilettura moderna delle fonti antiche. Numerosi passi dei Discorsi insistono sull’insostenibilità della teoria classica delle fasce climatiche: sotto l’equatore i paesi che Tolomeo qualificava terra incognita, e che i geografi antichi supponevano aridi e desolati, si sono rivelati fertili e ricchi di vegetazione (2: 503-4), come hanno dimostrato le navigazioni di Alvise da Mosto e Pero da Sintra contenute nel I volume (1: 469-71); ancora una volta, per la critica ramusiana l’errore degli antichi, che spopolava queste terre, discende da una fondamentale lacuna metodologica (2: 403-5). Nel II volume il viaggio di Pietro Quirino è solo un’anticipazione dell’opera di Olao Magno, che metterà definitivamente fuori discussione l’inabitabilità delle zone artiche e settentrionali (5: 7-9). Le imprese atlantiche a occidente, inaugurate da Colombo, risolvono infine una volta per tutte la questione dell’abitabilità della terra.

La conoscibilità e la praticabilità dello spazio mondiale, teorizzata dalla carta geografica, è per Ramusio strutturale, mentre i vincoli che le limitano sono sovrastrutturali, appartengono al dominio della movimentata storia dell’umanità. Non c’è dubbio che le nuove rotte e i nuovi itinerari, che disegnano i nostri geografi a villa Caffi, siano realizzabili: non è lo spazio a opporre resistenza a simili progetti, semmai essi devono inevitabilmente fare i conti con i finanziamenti e le limitazioni politiche. Da questo punto di vista gli antichi vengono ampiamente rivalutati: la stabilità e la sicurezza di cui godeva l’arte nautica sotto l’Impero Romano, devono fornire un modello e un esempio all’intraprendenza dei moderni e alle politiche estere dei governi (2: 967-90).

La coerenza di Ramusio lo spinge infine a interpretare le “favole” degli antichi come deliberate menzogne o allegorie, il cui significato potrebbe essere anche geografico oltre che morale. Così, la fantastica descrizione della costa africana tramandataci da Annone, può essere interpretata come una determinata scelta di conformarsi alla storiografia e al mito greci: se avesse riferito fedelmente la sua esperienza di quelle terre, avrebbe corso il rischio di non essere creduto (1: 551-61). Il mercante Iambolo, per dare veridicità al suo racconto, potrebbe averlo adeguato alle credenze del pubblico cui si rivolgeva, rincorrendo la poesia nel mescolare verità e meraviglia (1: 903-4). Ramusio riesce così a giustificare la sua selezione delle fonti antiche, ma va oltre e, per ribadire l’identità strutturale di spazio antico e moderno, per affermare che il mondo è sempre stato abitabile, praticabile e conoscibile, rilegge anche i monumenti poetici e filosofici dell’antichità in maniera del tutto particolare. Il giardino di Alcinoo, si rivela così in Omero uno stratagemma allegorico per descrivere la fertilità delle zone tropicali, e il mito platonico di Atlantide non altro che un’allusione al Nuovo Mondo (5: 6-7).

Frammentazione

L’iperbole cosmografica che Ramusio adotta impone la difficile scelta di una partizione dei materiali. I criteri della geografia fisica, se da un lato verrebbero incontro al desiderio di confermare l’omogeneità di uno spazio scorporabile in masse continentali, d’altra parte non renderebbero adeguatamente conto degli itinerari e delle rotte che collegano le diverse aree geografiche. Ramusio aspira invece a offrire contemporaneamente al quadro totalizzante d’impronta tolemaica, una guida commerciale che fornisca anche delle coordinate relazionali oltre che astronomiche. Per la stessa ragione l’operazione della mappatura non può risolversi attraverso i parametri cronologici di una storia delle scoperte, in cui si perderebbe al contrario il senso profondo di unità del planisfero ramusiano, se non laddove l’avanzata degli esploratori prosegue e modifica una medesima rotta (la saga portoghese da Alvise da Mosto fino ad Andrea Corsali). A Ramusio serve un criterio spaziale che rispetti tuttavia l’articolazione storica delle vie lungo le quali si svolgono le sue Navigazioni e viaggi. Da buon veneziano, cittadino di uno stato la cui “base territoriale” è stata per secoli anzitutto il Mare Adriatico, egli elabora una visione talassocentrica del globo, che pone il mare al proprio centro e in cui la disposizione delle terre emerse può essere affidata all’autonomia e all’omologia dei bacini di comunicazione su cui esse si affacciano. L’horror vacui di Ramusio non può più infatti ammettere l’opinione di Strabone secondo la quale un’immensa e solitaria distesa oceanica accerchiava le terre abitate, penetrandovi soltanto con quattro grandi insenature (il Mar Mediterraneo assieme al Mar Nero, il Mar Rosso, il Golfo Persico e il Mar Caspio):

E Strabone questi mari li chiama mediterranei, perciò che sono nel mezzo della terra. Ma nella età nostra, che si son fatte tante navigazioni d’ogni canto di questo globo della terra, s’è conosciuto chiaramente l’oppenione di detti antichi non esser vera, e che non vi è Oceano alcuno che la circondi tutta, ma che tutti i mari sono circondati dalla terra, e perciò possono ragionevolmente esser chiamati mediterranei. (2: 512)

La mediterraneità dei mari può dunque rispettare il continuum spaziale del mappamondo e isolare delle più piccole cornici geografiche in cui la narrazione storica dei viaggiatori possa essere completamente contenuta. Nella prima metà del Cinquecento la maggior parte dei sistemi economici e culturali, la cui unità è garantita dalla continuità delle comunicazioni, si raccoglie attorno a dei mari chiusi: il Mediterraneo, non ancora frantumato dagli scontri con l’Islam (il Turco), il Baltico, il Mare del Nord, l’Oceano Indiano (che Tolomeo chiude anche cartograficamente), il Mar dei Carabi dei primi insediamenti spagnoli. Questa concezione, non si limita tuttavia agli spazi marittimi, e anche i “viaggi” terrestri, oltre alle “navigazioni”, possono essere ricondotti a grandi vie carovaniere che collegano fra di loro civiltà urbane separate da smisurate estensioni desertiche.

Il Sahara di Leone Africano è un mediterraneo sulle cui rive meridionali si affacciano i regni del Sudan, dove confluiscono l’oro, l’avorio e gli schiavi delle foreste equatoriali acquistati in cambio di sale, e da dove ripartono sul dorso dei cammelli dei Beduini. Dopo la traversata del deserto interrotta solo da soste in oasi-isole, l’oro e le altre mercanzie raggiungono la sponda settentrionale dove si succedono i porti di Barberia, sede di commerci con i mercanti genovesi, veneziani, marsigliesi, turchi che offrono in cambio grano, corallo, tessuti, spezie e cavalli. L’oro in polvere, ormai entrato nei vivaci traffici del Mediterraneo, da Venezia e dall’Egitto defluisce verso Oriente, moneta di scambio necessaria all’acquisto delle spezie dell’Oceano Indiano. Questa via continentale dell’oro africano viene rapidamente scavalcata dalle tratte commerciali dei Portoghesi che la spostano lungo le coste atlantiche del continente. Perciò nel primo volume la descrizione di Leone può fare da premessa all’epopea marittima lusitana che si apre con Alvise da Mosto, ovvero con la temeraria politica marittima di Enrico il Navigatore.

La mobilità della dimensione politica delle Navigazioni contrassegna dunque fin dall’inizio la raccolta, ma la sostituzione di antiche con nuove vie commerciali non intende frantumare storicamente lo spazio in configurazioni passate ormai irrecuperabili: al contrario, il ventaglio di possibilità e percorribilità che esso offre all’intraprendenza umana ne rafforza la struttura omogenea e praticabile. Così l’ampia trattazione storica di Ramusio sul commercio delle spezie, in cui alla via egiziana dei traffici antichi si succede, dopo la fine dell’Impero romano, quella continentale dall’Indo al Mar Nero, poi quella del Golfo Persico e della Siria, poi ancora il ritorno alla precedente, insomma tutto questo alternarsi non scalfisce ma anzi incoraggia nuovi progetti. La tanto rivoluzionaria via portoghese del Capo, come il collegamento spagnolo fra Panama e le Molucche, sono destinati a esaurirsi, non perché la storia modifica irreparabilmente le possibilità di praticare lo spazio, ma anzi perché si può disegnare sulla carta una nuova e più comoda via settentrionale al Catai (2: 967-90).

Se nuove rotte possono essere inventate, le antiche possono risultarne ridimensionate, o perdere monopoli prima indiscussi; tuttavia, finché attorno a esse gravitano aree omogenee di occupazione umana, per Ramusio continuano a fornire un valido criterio organizzativo dei materiali. Così la via artica all’Estremo Oriente fantasticata dall’anonimo di Caffi sembra essere in competizione con quelle portoghesi dell’Oceano Indiano, piuttosto che con la via continentale della seta percorsa da Marco Polo. Essa potrebbe aprire un nuovo bacino settentrionale di navigazione, che non si fonderebbe con gli altri due, a loro volta ben distinti nella visione cartografica ramusiana. L’Asia non è un blocco unitario e per Ramusio, come per tanti altri, la Cina non è la grande entità monolitica che sulle nostre mappe sembra invadere l’intero continente: Cina per loro sono i porti meridionali di Canton e Macao, collegati a Malacca e a Goa dai traffici portoghesi, solidali con l’economia indiana e delle Molucche; a Nord, il Catai sembra appartenere a un altro sistema economico e culturale: non il pepe di Ludovico de Varthema, ma il reubarbaro di Chaggi Memet, e mercanzie molto diverse, animano commerci i cui attori sono anch’essi di diversa provenienza e di diversa qualità. Le città del Catai non si affacciano sulle rive di un oceano, ma occupano la sponda orientale di un immenso deserto, anch’esso “mediterraneo” come il Sahara, che le collega con la Persia e il Medio Oriente, un deserto che è stato solcato, un po’ come l’Atlantico dai conquistadores, da orde mongole il cui ricordo continua a impressionare Ramusio (3: 395).

I racconti di Marco Polo e di Hayton armeno che avevano solcato questo mare di sabbia, impresa ben superiore a quella di Colombo per fatica e temerarietà (3: 24), giustificano così la divisione straboniana dell’Asia secondo la direttrice est-ovest (3: 395): nel primo volume l’Asia meridionale, dall’Arabia alla Molucche, viene inglobata nel sistema dell’Oceano Indiano, cui partecipano anche l’Africa e addirittura l’Atlantico meridionale che lo unisce a Lisbona (con l’appoggio delle coste brasiliane); nel secondo volume l’Asia settentrionale forma invece un tutt’uno con la Persia, la Russia ma anche la Scandinavia, in virtù di un possibile affaccio del sistema desertico asiatico sul mare Artico. Il terzo volume sembra avallare l’autonomia del Nuovo Mondo spagnolo, che un mediterraneo atlantico unisce a Siviglia, ma il Perù di Pizarro resta sostanzialmente estraneo alle navigazioni americane di Vespucci e Magellano, dirette rispettivamente in Africa e alle Molucche. Il trattato di Tordesillas, che l’amico Pietro Bembo aveva descritto nella sua Istoria Viniziana, si ripercuote così anche sulla geografia di Ramusio.

All’isotopia dello spazio navigato, che conferisce unità al mondo rappresentato nella raccolta, non corrisponde dunque una perfetta isotropia delle navigazioni[3]: esse collaborano armonicamente alla mappatura del globo, ma la conoscenza scientifica che offrono nasconde moventi ideologici ed economici diversi, a seconda che gli attori siano spagnoli, portoghesi, francesi, veneziani.

Gerarchizzazione

Le Navigazioni di Ramusio costruiscono uno spazio a prima vista osmotico, in cui la continuità del mare sembra vanificare l’autorità delle lottizzazioni coloniali, considerate solo in quanto effettivi ostacoli materiali alla libera circolazione del navigatore e del mercante. Tuttavia la suddivisione in aree di attività umana viene a coincidere con la spartizione rinascimentale del commercio internazionale in precise sfere d’influenza. La visione talassocentrica, nel momento in cui si dimostra insofferente delle frontiere territoriali, ostacoli all’intraprendenza umana, si propone di celebrare questa intraprendenza, trasformando i propri capitoli geografici in documenti di un’azione politica, di una presa di possesso, delle nuove terre appena scoperte come di chi le abita e le popola.

In Meraviglia e possesso Greenblatt commenta il radicale cambiamento della retorica di appropriazione legata al viaggio e alla descrizione del mondo: mentre i Viaggi di Mandeville appartengono ancora totalmente al Medioevo, a un universo fondato sulla metonimia, e sono l’episodio emblematico di un uso non-appropriante della mappa, “un inno alla mobilità, un sogno di libero movimento” (Greenblatt 75), il mondo di Colombo viene esplorato e appropriato grazie a un formalismo che è caratteristico dell’emergente produzione di spazio cartografico. Il Rinascimento segna una rottura esattamente in questo: la mappa diventa un potentissimo strumento di possesso. Alle mappe sono sempre stati delegati compiti di organizzazione, oltre che territoriale, sociale e culturale, ma la strutturazione del controllo raggiunge in questo periodo un livello di astrazione sconosciuto in precedenza. Il potere imperiale, ritagliando lo spazio sulla carta, può esercitarsi ora arbitrariamente e dissociarsi con maggiore facilità dalle proprie responsabilità sociali. È il risultato della convergenza fra la sintassi euclidea dello spazio propagata dalla formidabile riscoperta delle coordinate tolemaiche e la disponibilità di nuovi territori su cui esercitare le variabili del desiderio di possesso. Il principio dell’occupazione fisica su cui si fondava il possesso nel diritto romano (che corrsiponde al posizionamento con cui Cristo si impadroniva del mondo nella cartografia medievale), grazie al discorso di verità della mappa, che oblitera continuamente le proprie qualità simboliche, si applica a uno spazio “libero” e agibile, rispetto a tutte le costrizioni che la pianificazione territoriale tradizionalmente prevedeva. Attraverso possibilità di manovra più ampie di quanto si possa intuire, i talismani dell’autorità che sono le carte attuano delle figure di stile (la più comune: l’omissione) che rafforzano gli obblighi legali e gli imperativi territoriali. “Una società senza carte … non sarebbe politicamente concepibile”, afferma Harley (Déconstruire la carte 81), la cui critica alla visione progressiva e cumulativa della storia della cartografia si è significativamente concentrata sulla rilettura della prima cartografia (euro)americana prodotta dopo il 1492, nei termini decisi di un “atto di decolonizzazione geografica” (Relire les cartes 88).

La scena dello sbarco, infinitamente riscritta, diventa allora il momento topico dell’incontro con il Nuovo Mondo formulato come presa di possesso, e lo diventa attraverso le lettere di Colombo e le carte geografiche che disegnano le nuove conquiste. Entrambe le trascrizioni dell’evento presentano caratteristiche comuni: il formalismo del rituale legale di appropriazione dà luogo al battesimo delle nuove isole, all’imposizione di nomi propri, che inventano un nuovo assetto geografico fissandone la presa di possesso, ma si rivolgono esclusivamente agli europei. Il genovese sembra agire internamente all’astrazione della carta: la superiorità degli europei sugli indigeni appare “naturale” nell’estromissione di questi da una dimensione reciproca inerente al linguaggio verbale ma anche cartografico.

La scena dello sbarco come atto di “mappatura” doveva essere estremamente significativa nella visione cartografica di Ramusio, che nella riscrittura dell’opera di Pietro Martire, effettuata assieme a Navagero nel 1534, e poi confluita nelle Navigazioni, viene anticipata e posta in apertura al testo. È probabile che il desiderio di prendere simbolicamente (scientificamente) possesso del mondo delle Navigazioni, il desiderio di dominio intellettuale sul mondo diffuso fra i principi e gli accademici dell’epoca, esigesse l’apertura del capitolo americano con un atto originale di appropriazione cartografabile, privilegiandolo rispetto alla scena di dialogo culturale prevista originariamente da Pietro Martire. Doveva essere l’inizio di una catalogazione di isole, coste, fiumi, montagne che si sarebbe dipanata nella storiografia di Oviedo e nelle relazioni dei conquistadores iberici. La mappatura del mondo segue dunque le successive prese di possesso degli esploratori e conquistatori e l’attuazione di politiche economiche e coloniali molto diverse, e di conseguenza rapporti altrettanto diversi con l’alterità. L’America spagnola è in mano a hidalgos assetati d’oro e miranti a costruirsi dei feudi personali nel nuovo continente: la polemica umanistica contro la cupidigia trova rinnovato slancio in Ramusio che condanna duramente non solo la superficialità della storiografia spagnola (eccetto Oviedo) ma anche la brutalità e ignoranza che caratterizzano le imprese di conquista. La scuola della politica estera veneziana da cui proviene il segretario è ben più in sintonia con la storia dell’impero portoghese che occupa il primo volume, quella della conquista di un monopolio mercantile piuttosto che di un dominio territoriale. Ramusio critica la severità della legislazione lusitana, che blocca ogni concorrenza, tuttavia il talassocentrismo portoghese è molto affine a quello veneziano, anche nella risoluzione (o meglio nell’emarginazione) del problema dell’altro. Il loro movente mercantile si trattiene sui profili costieri, dove vengono costruiti isolati punti d’appoggio e fortezze che non danno mai origine a vere e proprie colonie se non in piccole isole destinate alla coltivazione dello zucchero (San Tomé come Cipro). I Portoghesi “si sono insignoriti di tutti i mari orientali” (2: 978), costruendo un impero di porti, negoziando unicamente con i signori locali: il resto della popolazione viene rigettato nell’entroterra ed escluso dall’incontro, al massimo ridotto (nel caso degli africani) a merce di scambio, schiavi da impiegare come manodopera nelle Indie Occidentali. L’interesse mercantile in Ramusio prevale in questo caso sulle possibilità di dialogo culturale che il suo progetto di navigazione del Niger immaginava, aprendo alla conoscenza europea i così civili regni africani del Sudan descritti da Leone (1: 469-71).

Gli indigeni infatti scompaiono dalla mappa e trovano un ben misero posto nei lunghi elenchi di mercanzie che il raccoglitore redige, oppure fanno capolino sulla superficie del mappamondo come vuote pedine da giocare nella teoria delle corrispondenze fra gli antipodi, confutata dall’anonimo di Caffi, accompagnate da una generica distinzione fra barbarie e civiltà (2: 504-5). Anche quando quest’ultimo (ma è la voce di Ramusio che parla) si rivolge ai principi invitandoli a nuove imprese marittime, il tema della conoscenza degli stranieri è presto risolto in una frettolosa retorica coloniale che cede subito il passo al ben più interessante motivo mercantile che anima le discussioni degli interlocutori (2: 980). Unica significativa eccezione che sembra sottrarre gli indigeni americani al paternalismo culturale europeo è il vivo interesse che Ramusio dimostra riguardo la pratica peruviana della scrittura, i quippos camaios di cui Oviedo gli dà notizia (5: 11): motivo di nobiltà e di civiltà che però rimane inerte e non sembra stimolare ulteriori confronti.

Conclusione

Ramusio, ricapitolando, organizza, rielabora e commenta una vasta ed eterogenea selezione di scritture di viaggio guidato da un movente cartografico che, dopo la sanzione di finitezza del globo della circumnavigazione magellanica, autorizza una descrizione totalizzante del mondo attraverso un’operazione di mappatura. Operazione che produce uno spazio omogeneo, e quindi abitabile, praticabile e conoscibile in ogni sua parte, contro il dogma aristotelico: al vuoto oceanico subentra una visione veneziana talassocentrica che trasforma i mari e le masse continentali in un continuum spaziale paragonabile a quello prospettico e geometrico. Uno spazio frammentato dalle pratiche di divisione, non della geografia fisica, ma dell’attività umana che si articola in bacini mediterranei, teatri di imprese commerciali e coloniali. Uno spazio infine gerarchizzato dalle prese di possesso del territorio da parte dei viaggiatori, dei principi e dei geografi che vi inscrivono diversi regimi di alterità legati a flessibili superiorità di posizione.

L’adozione e la volontà di aggiornamento del modello aperto, secolarizzato e perfettibile fornito dalla Geografia tolemaica offre alle Navigazioni la straordinaria possibilità di uno sguardo ubiquista sul mondo, ma realizzato attraverso racconti di spazio questo stesso sguardo diventa mobile e instaura una continua tensione fra mappa e itinerario, fra luogo e spazio. Prima che la carta si sia definitivamente formalizzata, e la letteratura di viaggio sia condannata alla continua oscillazione fra i discorsi autonomi della scienza e dell’autobiografia, le Navigazioni e viaggi cercano nella mappa la chiave unificante d’accesso agli spazi della classicità come ai nuovi spazi delle scoperte. L’energia dell’engramma racchiuso nel reticolo tolemaico rivela la propria instabilità nel paradosso di un’opera di montaggio geografico concepita come un punto d’arrivo provvisorio, perfettibile e proiettato nel futuro, che però va incontro al proprio fallimento nel momento in cui viene consacrata come irripetibile monumento della tradizione geografica. Il primo tentativo organico di mappatura verbale del mondo di fatto avrà seguito unicamente nella formalizzazione degli atlanti, ma la difficoltà di stabilire (soprattutto in relazione a una confinistica disciplinare) se il lavoro Ramusio segni un inizio oppure una fine, rischia di distrarre dal suo ruolo nell’effettiva istituzione di un discorso moderno sullo spazio che si rafforza continuamente attraverso la forma simbolica della mappa (l’ideologramma) e e che nella presunzione della carta di sottrarsi alla propria qualità simbolica seppellisce il proprio inconscio politico.

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Greenblatt, Stephen. Meraviglia e possesso. Lo stupore di fronte al nuovo mondo. Trad.Giovanni Arganese e Marco Cupellaro. Bologna: il Mulino, 1994.

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Harley, John Brian. Déconstruire la carte. ”Le pouvoir des cartes. Brian Harley et lacartographie. Ed. Peter Gould e Antoine Bailly. Trad. Philippe de Lavergne. Paris:Anthropos, 1995. 61-85.

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Leed, Eric J. La mente del viaggiatore. Dall’Odissea al turismo globale. Trad. Erica JoyMannucci. Bologna: il Mulino, 1992.

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Panofsky, Erwin. La prospettiva come “forma simbolica” e altri scritti. Trad. EnricoFilippini. 4a ed. Milano: Feltrinelli, 1979.

Ramusio, Giovanni Battista. Navigationi et viaggi: Venice, 1563-1606. Ed. R. A. Skelton eGeorge B. Parks. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1967-70.

Ramusio, Giovanni Battista. Navigazioni e viaggi. 1550-59. Ed. Marica Milanesi. 6 vols. Torino:Einaudi, 1978 -1983.

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—. La conquista dell’America. Il problema dell’“altro”. Trad. Aldo Serafini. Torino: Einaudi,1984.

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Note

[1] Un’analisi dettagliata della “nascita di un discorso sul viaggio”, seppure ristretta alla produzione francese, si trova in Wolfzettel (35-120). La tematizazzione della “scoperta dell’altro” nella letteratura di viaggio relativa alle conquiste americane è stata studiata in particolar modo da Tzvetan Todorov, secondo cui tale “incontro non raggiungerà mai più una simile intensità” (La conquista dell’America 7) e da Stephen Greenblatt, per il quale esso, “col suo radicale sconvolgimento dell’ordinario, portò in prossimità della superficie di testi non letterari operazioni immaginative che sono normalmente sepolte in profondità” (Meraviglia e possesso 50). Eric J. Leed, in un quadro più generale, valorizza invece il momento della “proiezione della tradizione in una nuova dimensione spaziale” (193), riconoscendo, come già aveva fatto Federico Chabod (58-81), alla letteratura di viaggio un ruolo determinante nella fondazione dell’identità culturale europea.

[2] Le Navigationi et viaggi di Giovanni Battista Ramusio vennero pubblicate a Venezia da Tommaso Giunti in tre distinti volumi in folio. Il primo volume, dedicato all’Africa e all’Oceano Indiano, apparve nel 1550, comprendente 23 relazioni di viaggio, 12 discorsi introduttivi e due trattati autonomi del raccoglitore (sull’escrescenza del fiume Nilo, con risposta di Girolamo Fracastoro e sugli itinerari dei traffici delle spezie orientali). Venne ristampato dallo stesso editore cinque volte (1550; 1554; 1563; 1588; 1606; 1613), restando nella forma e nei contenuti il più stabile fra i volumi: l’edizione del 1554 aggiunge una nota dell’editore, un indice e tre nuovi articoli la cui scelta è ancora attribuibile a Ramusio (la narrazione del compagno di Duarte Barbosa, cinque lettere di missionari gesuiti dal Giappone e sei capitoli dall’Asia di João de Barros); nell’edizione del 1563 Tommaso Giunti inserisce una nota in cui rivela il nome del curatore della raccolta, che fino ad allora era rimasto anonimo. La prima edizione del secondo

volume (1559), successiva a quella del terzo, dedicata all’Asia continentale e settentrionale (compresa Russia e Scandinavia), comprende una nota dell’editore in cui si spiegano le ragioni della ritardata pubblicazione, 12 relazioni di viaggio e 5 discorsi introduttivi di Ramusio (di cui uno è una vera e propria narrazione storica della quarta crociata). Questo volume venne ristampato tre volte (1574; 1583; 1606), ed è quello che subisce i maggiori ampliamenti: l’edizione del 1574 aggiunge altre 5 relazioni (sempre riguardanti Russia, Persia e mar Artico), cui si accumulano altre tre nell’edizione del 1583; inserimenti che rivelano l’intenzione (non sempre premiata) di rispettare il disegno di Ramusio, e riconducibili alla collaborazione fra il figlio Paolo e Tommaso Giunti. Il terzo volume, dedicato alle spedizioni spagnole e francesi in America, viene pubblicato nel 1556 e comprende un discorso introduttivo di Ramusio all’intero volume, 5 piccoli discorsi introduttivi (copiati dalla storia di Gómara) e 22 relazioni di viaggio. Venne ristampato a Venezia soltanto due volte (1565; 1606): la pubblicazione del 1606 aggiunge due relazioni (su viaggi nelle Indie Orientali e spedizioni olandesi a Settentrione) che non rispondono più ai criteri geografici che guidavano l’organizzazione dei materiali di Ramusio. Un quarto volume, secondo le parole di Giunti, avrebbe dovuto seguire, dedicato alle zone australi e antartiche. L’opera completa non venne più pubblicata fino al 1970 quando uscì l’edizione anastatica (Ramusio, Navigationi), seguita dall’edizione Einaudi curata da Marica Milanesi (Ramusio, Navigazioni), cui si riferiscono le mie citazioni. Parti dei volumi vennero pubblicate separatamente nel Cinquecento (a Lione, Anversa, Zurigo, Londra, Leida), nell’Ottocento (a Venezia e a Londra) e nel Novecento (a Parigi).

[3] Prendo a prestito dalla semiologia, più che dalla fisica, il termine isotopia, nel suo significato diiterazione, in un enunciato, di unità significanti che conferisce unità all’enunciato stesso (in questo caso le porzioni di spazio delimitate dal reticolo cartografico rispetto al planisfero); mentre viene dalla fisica l’uso che faccio del termine isotropia, relativo a un fenomeno che presenta le stesse proprietà fisiche in tutte le direzioni, il che però nel caso delle navigazioni non avviene.

Bio

Retracing Heinrich Barth: A Slideshow

Retracing Heinrich Barth: A Slideshow



Artist’s Biography

Julia WincklerPhoto by John Fung

Julia Winckler is a German-Canadian artist based in the UK where she works as a photographer, community arts practitioner and senior lecturer at the University of Brighton. Her art projects have resulted in solo exhibitions including: Two Sisters at the Manx Museum (Douglas, Isle of Man, 2004) and the Médiathèque Francois Mitterrand (Poitiers, 2004); Leaving Atlantis (Taipei, Taiwan, 2004) and Retracing Heinrich Barth at the Brunei Gallery, SOAS (London,2008). Her recent publications include the essay ‘Acts of Embodiment: Explorations in Collaborative Phototherapy’ co-written with Stephanie Conway, which was published in Wild Fire: Art as Activism, Sumach Press, 2006. Her book His Majesty’s Loyal Internee: Fred Uhlman in Captivity, co-authored with Charmian Brinson and Anna Müller-Härlin, has just been published by Valentine Mitchell.

Tintellust Map

Tintellust Map

The 19th century German explorer Heinrich Barth was one of the first Europeans to recognise the significance and richness of African history and culture. Traveling under the Arabic name Abd el Kerim, he crossed the Sahara desert, over the Aïr Mountains and into Central Africa. He recorded his journey in the five-volume Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa; being a Journal of an Expedition undertaken under the auspices of H.B.M.’s government in the years 1849-1855.

Arriving in Agadez in 1850, Barth recorded in his journal “I would advise any traveller, who should hereafter visit this country, to make a long stay in this place.” Since the 15th century, Agadez had been a significant trading center for caravans traversing some of the oldest trading routes in the world. The expedition sponsors in the British Foreign Office envisaged a commercial outcome and the promotion of trade and trade agreements with African sultanates. In addition, Barth had asked for a principal task of the expedition to be the “exploration of Central Africa.”

Today Agadez (the Tuareg name for family) is the largest city in Northern Niger as well as the capital of the Aïr region. It is a city of some 150,000. It has become an important transit point for migrants wanting to travel to Europe on unsafe routes through the Sahara desert; many migrants become stranded there.

Inspired by Barth’s account and fired by tales of a mysterious room containing a trove of ancient artifacts connected to Barth’s expedition, Julia Winckler, artist and senior lecturer in photography at the University of Brighton, journeyed to Niger in 2005.

Retracing Barth’s footsteps and drawing on her combined interests in African studies, anthropology, a
nd photography, she has interwoven a narrative based on her encounters and impressions. Her artistic response features shifting viewpoints and addresses questions of identity and memory.

Heinrich Barth

Heinrich Barth

In 1850, Heinrich Barth visited Agadez and stayed in one of the homes that belonged to the Tuareg prince Annur (En-Noor), then one of the most influential leaders of the Kel Ewey Tuareg confederation. A small room has been preserved in memory of Barth’s visit by the extended family that now lives there. The room is part of a larger compound of one-story buildings with a shared courtyard, situated in the old quarters of the city.

Barth's Agadez Town Drawing

Barth Agadez Town Drawing

The Aïr region north of Agadez is a fascinating landscape of volcanic rock, granite, marble, slate, gravel, ridges, parched soil, valleys, and the Ténéré desert, one of the largest sand seas of the Sahara. Arlit to the north is a major base for uranium mining. It is also the regional home of Tuareg confederations and about 100,000 semi-nomadic desert Tuareg.

Tintellust Landscape

Tintellust Landscape

Niger has a strong oral tradition and it is common that anecdotes get passed on from one generation to the next. There is a local anecdote about Heinrich Barth’s stay in the Aïr Mountains. It is widely believed that Barth buried a treasure chest in Tintellust (also called Tchintoulous), a village in the Aïr, approximately 350 kilometers north of Agadez, when he resided there for three months in 1850. Fascinated by this legend, Julia Winckler traveled from Agadez to Tintellust with Sarhid Efes Hamadalher and Ahmed Mouta, two Tuareg men from Iferouane, to follow the threads of the story. In 1850 Barth had apparently shared the location of a buried treasure with the village chief, En-Noor Wandara, but had sworn him to secrecy. The chief never revealed the location, taking the secret to his grave.

Ibrahim Manzo Diallo, journalist and director of Aïr Info (a newspaper based in Agadez), shared the most beautiful version of this anecdote: “When I was a child growing up in the Aïr Mountains, my father told me about Barth’s treasure chest. One day, the elders told the village youth of Tintellust, who were a bit lazy, about this hidden treasure, and encouraged them to look for it. They were sent out with shovels and started digging. ‘While you are at work, you may as well sow a few seeds here and there,’ said the village elders. The youth continued digging for many days. Unfortunately, no treasure was found. The following year however, little plants started pushing through the arid soil, and over time, a small oasis containing fruit trees developed. ‘You found the treasure in the end,’ the elders said to the youth.”

Stories from Agadez: Life as it is now is a community photography project Julia Winckler facilitated in 2005. It captures the experiences and images of eight African non-professional photographers, most of whom recorded their own lives for the first time through photography. The resulting images document the hardships and achievements of a local community. Heinrich Barth’s approach to recording everyday experiences was discussed and the group then responded by taking photographs of their families, communities, work and pastimes. Their stories anchor Retracing Heinrich Barth in local experience.

Guardien Outside

Guardien Outside

Myriam

Myriam

Two Girls

Two Girls

Boy in Blue

Boy in Blue

Musicians

Musicians

Iferouane

Iferouane

Agadez 1

Agadez 1

Woman

Woman

One of the photographers, Sarhid Hamadalher explains: “I have taken pictures of the life that people live here. I hope that these photos will make you discover the beauty of this country and the fantastic potential it holds. I like photography because it allows us to relive the past and it is also a great passion of life.”

Exhibition Photo

Exhibition Photo

Agadez to Tintellust Text

Agadez to Tintellust Text

Exhibition Photo

Exhibition Photo

Exhibition Photo

Exhibition Photo

Retraicing Heinrich Barth: A Slideshow

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Passages of the Self: Georges Perec and the Infra-ordinary

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Author Bio

Alex Haber
Cornell University

“This reform of the self whose criterion is a nature – but a nature that was never given and has never appeared as such in the human individual, whatever his age – all naturally takes on the appearance of a stripping away of previous education, established habits, and the environment.”
– Michel Foucault,
The Hermeneutics of the Subject

“Questionnez vos petites cuillers.”
– Georges Perec, “Approches de quoi?”

De toute façon, je sais que si je classe, si j’inventorie, quelque part ailleurs il y aura des événements qui vont intervenir et brouiller cet ordre….Cela fait partie de cette opposition entre la vie et le mode d’emploi, entre la règle du jeu que l’on se donne et le paroxysme de la vie réelle qui submerge, qui détruit continuellement ce travail de mise en ordre, et heureusement d’ailleurs. (Perec 1990 90-91)

This tension between “life” and “user’s manual,” between the rules of the game and the aleatory nature of life itself, is one that floats beneath the surface of much of Perec’s work. But more than just being a necessary obstacle for a writer interested in exploring the role of constraint in literature, this tension allows for the emergence of an entirely different understanding not only of the text but of all the practices and players involved in its production, from the writer to the reader to those observed in Perec’s “sociological” mode.[1] This way of considering Perec’s work also makes clear its relation to what might otherwise seem to be a very distant concern for the care of the self, as elaborated in the work of Michel Foucault. It is in this tension between the rules one gives oneself and the paroxysms of real life that the self emerges, both in the classical Greek framework laid out by Foucault and in what I argue is the technology of the self elaborated and utilized by Perec. He manages to formulate a way of approaching the care of the self by coming at these practices from an important new angle vis-à-vis the everyday, or the infra-ordinary. By treating a key text of Perec’s, Tentative d’épuisement d’un lieu parisien, we will see that Perec’s method of literary production is also a method of self-production, a technology of the self in the contemporary moment, one that functions as such not only for him, but for us as well by extension in our role as readers and as observers and users of the world. In addition, the methods and subject matter Perec chooses to explore in the Tentative will begin to help us understand the impossibility of an ethic of the self today about which Foucault is so concerned.[2]

Before we can examine all of these connections in depth, we have to develop an understanding of how Perec plays with the tension he discussed in “Le Travail de la Mémoire” in his own works. Dominique Rabaté, in a recent article, gives a very convincing reading of this statement in relation to Perec’s Lieux, an uncompleted project in which he was to investigate twelve different Parisian places over the course of twelve years, one a month, with the aid of a mathematical algorithm. There were also to be two sorts of writings on each place: “Réels” (Realities) and “Souvenirs” (Memories). The goal of the project was to show the “three-fold aging process” of the places themselves, his memories, and his writing (Rabaté 82-83).  Although Perec eventually abandoned this project for a number of reasons, some interesting texts (primarily drawn from the “Réels” category) did emerge from it. Moreover, its failure proved to Perec the impossibility of over-programming his artistic output; it was precisely the aleatory events of real life that forced Perec’s hand in abandoning it.

This project, despite or perhaps due to its failure, also provides Rabaté with a backdrop on which to discuss the very tension that caused its demise, a tension which he places not in terms of “life” and “user’s manual,” but in terms of what he calls the “subject” and the “operator.” This dialectical pairing is parallel with Perec’s: the subject, for Rabaté, is “a wilful agent or creator,” whereas the operator is something entirely other: “Anyone who falls into step with a pre-set, inherently rule-based programme becomes a pure operator, a being whose sole function is to carry out the various instructions established in advance as defining the work to be done” (87). Rabaté argues that the move from subject to operator that Perec engaged in with the Lieux project, and that many others, and especially members of Oulipo, engage in as well, is both liberating, insofar as it frees the subject from the responsibility of creation, and self-destructive, insofar as it effaces the subject in the process. The problem with this understanding of programmatic aesthetic creation is that this effacement is never complete; it is impossible to reach a point where the operator completely overtakes the subject or, to bring it back to Perec’s terms, where the user’s manual overtakes life itself. Conversely, it is impossible for the subject to completely overtake the operator, impossible to live in the world or produce (oneself as) an aesthetic project without setting some practices one will follow and techniques one will use. If we draw the connection between subject and life and between operator and user’s manual, we can see that the dualistic nature of Oulipian, or at least Perecquian, literary production that Rabaté points out here is really just the local occurrence of the dualistic global phenomenon of the tension Perec elaborates in “Le Travail de la Mémoire.” The relationship between the two elements is not linear, but dialectical: there is a continual interplay of negation between them, and it precisely this interplay which produces not only the literary result of the project, as Rabaté seems to argue, but a new role for the creator as neither subject nor operator, but as self.

I am using the concept of the self here in the same context as Foucault in his discussions of the care of the self, and so its definition is, of course, historically contingent. The one I am working with, however, and the one that Foucault relates in one of his most substantial works on the subject, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, comes from his analysis of Plato’s Alcibiades dialogue, which was the first time, Foucault says, that the care of the self was substantially articulated. In this dialogue, Socrates makes the assertion that the self is equivalent to the soul, because it is only the soul that “really uses the body, its parts and organs, and which consequently uses tools and finally language” (55). Foucault then asks the obvious and imperative question: what is the soul? He says it would be a mistake to understand the soul in this context as a separate entity that has an “instrumental relationship” with the world or the body. Instead, the soul should be understood as

the subject’s singular, transcendent position, as it were, with regard to what surrounds him, to the objects available to him, but also to other people with whom he has a relationship, to his body itself, and finally to himself. We can say that when Plato employs this notion of khresis in order to seek the self one must take care of, it is not the soul-substance he discovers, but rather the soul-subject. (56-57)

The self is neither a divine intervention with the ability to manipulate the world nor a purely material, corporeal phenomenon, but an interplay between the two wherein it is precisely the self’s non-material character that allows it to act on the material world, and where, conversely, it is the material character of the world that allows for the existence of the self in the first place. The self is neither material nor immaterial, but it emerges when the two are put in contact with each other through the medium of the active subject, of the subject exercising khresis, or use. Foucault reformulates and expands on this same point in his seminar “Technologies of the Self”: “Alcibiades tries to find the self in a dialectical movement….The care of the self is the care of the activity and not the care of the soul-as-substance” (230-231). The important point here is the “dialectical movement” that Foucault highlights: the self is not a given, but rather produced through the subject’s care and cultivation of it. It is about critically engaging with and altering one’s activity. Foucault alternately terms these activities “practices,” “technologies,” and “techniques” of the self. It is through these technologies of the self that the subject trains to be able to act on itself and on the material world within a rule-based ethical framework. This happens through what Foucault terms “subjectivation,” the process by which a subject turns society-given norms and rules into ethically actionable modes of living; technologies of self aid this process. I have raised this issue of ethics and action here so as to highlight the parallel nature of the formation of the self and the tension between subject and operator. The subject, in both schemas, realizes its ability to act and create by settings rules and techniques and working them back on itself, becoming an operator. What Foucault helps us to see is that the process does not end there; it continues as the self emerges from this rule-setting, from this constant dialectical tension between subject and operator.

We can see then how the self occupies the space between subject and operator and, by extension, between life and the user’s manual. The self cannot be purely on the side of the subject or the “anarchy of the real,” as Rabaté puts it, because it has the ability to transcend these categories and act on them (92). On the other hand, the self cannot be purely on the side of the user’s manual or the operator because it is not just a cog in the gears of the rules of existence, but the originator of – at the very least – the implementation of those rules, if not the rules themselves. Only in the dialectical relationship between these two categories can the self be reasonably understood: it emerges in the heat of this tension, when the subject creates rules for itself, rules to live by, that it then acts back (as operator) upon and through itself as subject, a subject who is never fully capable of following all of them. It is for this reason that care of the self is a life-long enterprise, begun, as we see in the Alcibiades, as someone reaches maturity, and never complete afterwards. There can be no perfected self, only a self that emerges in the tension between life and its rules in a constant process of self-practice. It is these practices that concern Perec, both in the Tentative and in many of Perec’s other texts that fall under the framework of his exploration of the “infra-ordinaire,” or the “infra-ordinary.”

Perec elaborates this mode of thinking and observing in his short essay “Approches de quoi?”, written, like the Tentative, for Cause Commune. He has become tired, he says, of the extraordinary, of the fact that “les trains ne se mettent à exister que lorsqu’ils déraillent” (9). Instead of those events that stand out, we should focus instead, he argues, on that which has become so habitual we do not even think about it, a level of existence he refers to as the “infra-ordinary.” In order to understand and investigate this mode of being, we must question it the way we would question any extraordinary event, says Perec:

Interroger ce qui semble avoir cessé à jamais de nous étonner. Nous vivons, certes, nous respirons, certes; nous marchons, nous ouvrons des portes, nous descendons des escaliers, nous nous asseyons à une table pour manger, nous nous couchons dans un lit pour dormir. Comment? Où? Quand? Pourquoi? (12)

These sorts of habitual actions – the opening of doors and the descending of stairs – are precisely what Perec observes over the course of the Tentative. This mode of inquiry inevitably leads to a sort of reexamination of things taken for granted, and, therefore, a re-learning of habitual actions, a process that is very much tied up in the practice of the self. In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault speaks of an “unlearning” or a “reform of the self” that “takes on the appearance of a stripping away of previous education, established habits, and the environment” (95). This is precisely the project that Perec articulates in “Approches,” where he implores us to “interroger l’habituel,” the “established habits” of our daily lives, and he effectuates this project through the dual constraints of observation and writing in the Tentative.

Tentative d’épuisement d’un lieu parisien is a text produced during the course of, and as a record of, three days Perec spent in the Place Saint-Sulpice observing not the space itself, but the actions, happenings, or passings that took place there, or, as he says in his short introduction, “ce qui se passe quand il ne se passe rien” (12). An experiment in both writing and the everyday (a topic Perec was intensely interested in), it was published first as part of a series put together by Paul Virilio and Jean Duvignaud called Cause Commune, a journal dedicated to an investigation of everyday life. Over the course of these three days, Perec attempts, as his title implies, to “exhaust” the Place, to observe everything that can be observed and to write everything that can be written. In doing so, he works not only on the location but on himself as well, consistently aware of his own fatigue, hunger, thirst, and relation with that which he is observing. This last element finds its place not only in the body of the text, but in the fabric of the text itself, in the way it is approached and constructed by Perec. The dual acts of observing and writing, as well as the positions and relations they imply and necessitate, here function as constraints, allowing Perec to produce a text as a realization of the experience of his three days at the Place Saint-Sulpice. Neither of these acts, however, are fixed: Perec varies his modes of enunciation and his foci of observation throughout the three days, both due to personal preference and operational constraints.

Perec introduces his project before he records his first session at the Place Saint-Sulpice. He begins by listing all of those things that have already been extensively recorded and often noticed at the Place, from the church to the fountain, “et bien d’autres choses encore.” His project, he says, is not to further describe these elements, but rather to “décrire le reste: ce que l’on ne note généralement pas, ce qui ne se remarque pas, ce qui n’a pas d’importance: ce qui se passe quand il ne se passe rien, sinon du temps, des gens, des voitures, et des nuages” (12). Perec’s intent is not simply to observe and record every aspect of the Place, but to focus specifically on that which is forgotten by society, history, and our habitual patterns of recognition. In doing so, he hopes to approach an understanding of our experience of everyday life from a new angle, one that allows for a reconsideration of the very habits that render this life invisible. The dates and history of Saint-Sulpice (both church and man) have been well-recorded, as have all the other important landmarks, both large (“une fontaine que décorent les statues des quatres grands orateurs chrétiens”) and small (“un kiosque à journaux”), of the Place; stationary and unchanging, these are observable without any alteration in focus and, for Perec, remarked upon far too often (11-12). What he seeks to understand and record, rather, are those things that are fleeting, those things that pass, both in the spatial sense and the temporal sense (passer and se passer), and are quickly forgotten, if they are even noticed at all. We can say that Perec’s goal is not to give meaning to that which has been deemed meaningless, to monumentalize and render stationary that which is ephemeral and unfixed, but rather to bring to the fore those meaningless elements so they can be reconsidered precisely in their lack of importance and in the very nature of having passed.[3]

He has many foci in this vein, but one that recurs in almost perfect allegorical fashion throughout the text is the flock of pigeons that appears to inhabit the center of the Place. It is one of the first things Perec observes, in the opening section of the first session, “Esquisse d’un inventaire de quelques-unes des choses strictement visibles”: “Une nuée de pigeons qui s’abat soudain sur le terre-plein central, entre l’église et la fontaine” (14). This observation stands out from the rest of this litany of “strictly visible” things by its movement: whereas all the other elements on the list are stationary, or at least not defined as in motion – asphalt, the sky, a loaf of bread, people, vehicles, letters, numbers, and symbols, etc. –, the pigeons are defined by their sudden action of landing (“qui s’abat soudain”). They are also defined by their being in a group and moving together; rather than one pigeon or some pigeons, it is a flock of pigeons that Perec observes and records. As his observations and writing continue, Perec consistently refers to the pigeons in the plural, as a flock (except at one moment where he moves to the center of the Place specifically to observe them better). He makes his interest in the logic behind their actions evident:

De nouveau les pigeons font un tour de place. Qu’est-ce qui déclenche ce mouvement d’ensemble; il ne semble lié ni à un stimulus extérieur (explosion, détonation, changement de lumière, pluie, etc.) ni à une motivation particulière; cela ressemble à quelque chose de tout à fait gratuit. (26)

Why take such an interest in the movements of the pigeons if Perec’s focus in this work is on everyday life? The pigeons are certainly an essential part of the “Parisian place” that Perec is attempting to exhaust, but more importantly they provide a fitting allegory for the kinds of human practices he is attempting to observe and record. The apparent lack of motivation and “gratuitous” nature of their movements are analogous to the same features on the part of the human actions. This meaninglessness is precisely what Perec is attempting to bring out in assembling his observations of the Place Saint-Sulpice; he is looking to valorize those elements and actions that are traditionally devoid of meaning, “ce que l’on ne note généralement pas,” not by ascribing meaning to them but by holding them up in their very gratuitousness. In this way the pigeons serve as a simplified version of the complex web of interconnected practices that form everyday life, the habitual actions that are so ingrained in our daily activity that we are not even conscious of them, and which are deemed, therefore, to be without importance.

Perec focuses equally on anomalous practices in the Place, and the actions and objects associated with them, not on the level of the extraordinary (the train derailing) but rather on the level of the infra-ordinary, which we would never notice except for Perec’s constrained method of observation and writing.
One of the most obvious examples of this is on the second day, when Perec notices a man drawing on the sidewalk: “Juste en bordure du café, au pied de la vitrine et en trois emplacements différents, un homme, plutôt jeune, dessine à la craie sur le trottoir une sorte de ‘V’ à l’intérieur duquel s’ébauche une manière de point d’interrogation (land-art?)” (21). Interestingly, it is not on the fact that Perec noticed the art itself, the end-product, that this entire action hinges, but rather on the fact that he saw the action of the man drawing. In the observation of the infra-ordinary, it is the action of leaving the trace that counts as much as, if not more than, the trace itself, just as the care of the self is about a work on activity and not on a substance as such. As with the more regular events and traces, however, the reason behind the actions is unclear, and so Perec places a sort of narrativizing supposition about this man and his shape between parentheses: “(land-art?).” This leads to a whole string of questions and possible stories, not only about the man and his relation to his drawing, but also in the larger category of artistic creation. It is also a highly ironic aside (as are many of Perec’s – the girl and her kidnappers, for example). Land-art, as a genre, tends to be highly noticeable – or even extraordinary – in scale, using the earth itself, or natural elements, as a medium. To describe a small chalk mark with ambiguous meaning as land-art is certainly an overstatement, but in the context of Perec’s infra-ordinary observation, where extraordinary art happenings are not only unimportant but outside his field of vision, this repeated chalk mark becomes a sort of infra-ordinary type of land-art. It is a trend through its repetition, and it is tied to the land through its use of the sidewalk, which functions as the “earth” of this infra-ordinary scene. More importantly, though, its ambiguous meaning allows Perec to revalue it, to recontextualize it in the infra-ordinary and in his own creative work in the Tentative.

At the beginning of the second day, in an attempt to find this same sort of stand-out element in the rest of the scene he has been observing, as well as to find changes in his quest to identify forgotten and repetitive daily actions, Perec decides to catalog all the differences he can observe between the Place on the first and second day of his tentative. One of the differences is quite revealing, and leads to another area of habitual observations he also deals with: “Je bois un Vittel alors que hier je buvais un café (en quoi cela transforme-t-il la Place?)” (42). Other people’s habits and actions are not the only infra-ordinary elements that Perec chooses to observe; his own feelings and activities also serve as an integral part of his project and therefore of this text. He often records what he eats or drinks, as well as his thoughts of fatigue and weariness (lassitude). As Michael Sheringham points out in his book Everyday Life: Theories and Practices from Surrealism to the Present:

Perec is certainly sardonic when he asks whether drinking a Vittel rather than a coffee affects the way he sees the Place, but this does point to a crucial feature of his project, that its aim is not to arrive at abstract knowledge but to explore the lived experience of an individual subject seeking to apprehend a dimension of his own reality that is inseparable from his participation in the wider currents of the everyday. (271)

There is no way that Perec’s project could be complete if he chose not to take account of his own infra-ordinary existence. Just like the cars and buses and pigeons and pedestrians, Perec is a participant in and a user of the space of the Place Saint-Sulpice, and he never attempts to place himself outside of that role as something like an external observer. In the role of observer, he is already immediately implicated in the functioning of the Place, especially since, to others, he is only one of many people sitting at a table in a cafe with pen and paper in front of them. What matters is his attempt to think about his own actions within the context of both his aesthetic production and his everyday life. The only time Perec remarks that someone else notices his position as observer and recorder, he appears shocked, in an ironic and self-deprecating gesture on Perec’s part: “Un promeneur qui ressemble assez vaguement à Michel Mohrt repasse devant le café et semble s’étonner de me voir encore attablé devant un vittel et des feuillets” (43). Perec is consistently aware of his own role as writer and observer in the context of the Place; even though the passer-by presumably does not know Perec (he only vaguely looks like Michel Mohrt, a member of the Académie Française over twenty years Perec’s elder), he seems shocked to see him still sitting, as if he had seen him before. This may or may not be the case, but the fact that Perec chooses to relate this scene and phrase it in the way that he does shows his awareness of his own position as writer and user of the Place.

This Michel Mohrt lookalike is not the only doppelganger Perec sees during the course of the Tentative (at one point he sees someone who looks like Peter Sellers), nor is it the only person he recognizes or who recognizes him. Not only aware of his role as user of the Place, he actively engages with it as well, noticing or speaking to many people throughout the three days, including Paul Virilio and Jean Duvignaud (the editors of Cause Commune, for which he is writing this piece), as well as Geneviève Serreau, whom he calls over in order to say hello (24). Acquaintances also notice him: “Une lointaine connaissance (amie d’amie, amie d’amie d’amie) est passée dans la rue, est venue me dire bonjour, a pris un café” (45). These are the sorts of things that can happen to anyone in the street, and so Perec makes it clear that, though he may be an observer and recorder, he is not outside the infra-ordinary he is attempting to get at (nor could he be). This sort of self-awareness on his part also makes it clear that this relationship goes both ways: just as Perec as an observer is not above the everyday, neither does our role as participants in everyday life make us unable to observe it. Just as Perec’s unique role as observer is called into question by his observations, so too are other habits he believed were uniquely his own:

Sur le trottoir, il y a un homme secoué, mais pas encore ravagé, de tics (mouvement de l’épaule comme s’il éprouvait une démangeaison continuelle dans le cou); il tient sa cigarette de la même façon que moi (entre le medius et l’annulaire): c’est la première fois que je retrouve chez un autre cette habitude. (30)

Here Perec has found, through his unique cigarette-holding habit, his own doppelganger, afflicted by a continual itch and tic. In a work of “pure” fiction, it would be obvious that this character is a representation of the writer in the text, and his “itch” is in reality a representation of the author’s need to write, to continually move his hand across a page and make marks with a pen. But this is a work of observation and recording, and nothing more (or at least Perec’s stated constraints would have us believe). Recognizing himself in a stranger, or recognizing in a potential stranger someone he actually knows, Perec’s infra-ordinary practices and habits are connected to those of others, and thus to the rhythm of the Place. A unified picture of the infra-ordinary functioning of the Place Saint-Sulpice begins to emerge in this text, one that contains the organizing and repetitive passing of the buses, the regular movement of the pigeons, the various habits and practices of the many passers-by, Perec himself observing and writing, “et bien d’autres choses encore,” as Perec himself says in his introduction (12).

Despite this, however, the Place Saint-Sulpice is not yet épuisée, if it even ever could be. What would it even mean to exhaust the Place? Perec gives us some indication in the chapter on “The Street” in Espèces d’espaces, published in 1974, the same year the Tentative was written:

Continuer

Jusqu’à ce que le lieu devienne improbable

jusqu’à ressentir, pendant un très bref instant, l’impression d’être dans une ville étrangère. (105)

Towards the end of the Tentative, Perec reaches precisely this moment:

En ne regardant qu’un seul détail, par exemple la rue Férou, et pendant suffisamment de temps (une à deux minutes), on peut, sans aucune difficulté, s’imaginer que l’on est à Etampes ou à Bourges, ou même quelque part à Vienne (Autriche) où je n’ai d’ailleurs jamais été. (59)

In the moment of potential exhaustion, of complete anonymity and universality of the infra-ordinary life of the Place Saint-Sulpice, Perec is forced to acknowledge that one place he imagines he might be, lost in observation, is a place that he has never been – and that he could, therefore, be entirely wrong about the resemblance and the abstraction. The subject can never fully be transformed into operator, the user’s manual can never supersede life itself, the constraint can never overtake the writer’s own knowledge and ability; but in this impossibility there is something to be learned, something to be created that is formed in the attempt to accomplish the impossible: a self, constituted through its own actions, a self as actor in the larger context of his space and life. We saw this in Perec’s identification with the smoking man, and in a more oblique way throughout the Tentative, from his interest in the pigeons to his remarks on the “land-art.” And in this moment when the task seems nearest to completion, we find it again, hindering the absolute transformation from subject to operator and revealing, instead, the ongoing task of self-cultivation and the never-ending, impossible-to-exhaust march of infra-ordinary existence.

Subjective constraints on the part of Perec are not the only reason that the tentative d’épuisement of the Place Saint-Sulpice can never be an épuisement total; after this moment of potential exhaustion, the habitual actions of the users of the Place also continue, and Perec continues to record them. Perec himself notes the “rareté des accalmies totales: il y a toujours un passant au loin, ou une voiture qui passe” (60). Then, in the final two observations in the text, Perec recapitulates all the major elements of the Place he has observed over the past three days:

Les pigeons sont sur le terre-plein. Ils s’envolent tous en même temps.

Quatre enfants. Un chien. Un petit rayon de soleil. Le 96. Il est deux heures (60)

And this is how the text ends, repeating all that which we have seen throughout: passers-by, animals, the weather, buses, the time, and, of course, the pigeons. There is no period at the end of the last sentence (as, by the way, is the case throughout much of the Tentative), yet another indication that all the actions Perec observed over the past three days will continue for as long into the future as imaginable – at least in the context of the infra-ordinary. This is precisely why the title of this work is “Attempt to exhaust a place in Paris”: something will always happen, even when nothing is happening. This “something” happens, in Perec’s language, in the form of micro-events, those small actions, habitual or at least small enough that they would otherwise go unnoticed, but nevertheless disrupting the “background noise” that organizes the infra-ordinary, events that are deemed unimportant, forgotten by society. Perec first mentions this concept on the first day, at the beginning of his second observational session: “plusieurs dizaines, plusieurs centaines d’action simultanées, de micro-événements dont chacun implique des postures, des actes moteurs, des dépenses d’énergie spécifiques” (18). The flight of the pigeons, the passage of two nuns or a schoolboy, a crowd of people with umbrellas entering the church – these are all micro-events. They punctuate the fabric of the infra-ordinary, a fabric that is virtually impossible to see on its own, as Perec points out:

Cela suscite l’éveil, l’ironie, la participation de l’assistance: ne pas voir les seules déchirures, mais le tissu (mais comment voir le tissu si ce sont seulement les déchirures qui le font apparaître: personne ne voit jamais passer les autobus, sauf s’il en attend un, ou s’il attend quelqu’un qui va en descendre, ou si la R.A.T.P. l’appointe pour les dénombrer…) (46)

It is only through altering one’s method of focusing that one can see the fabric of the infra-ordinary, a fabric that is only rendered visible through the tears that appear in it, tears that take the form of micro-events. So while it is the movement from subject to operator in the realm of the infra-ordinary that creates the self through Perec’s constrained writing, it is the recuperation of meaningless micro-events that make this movement possible; the micro-event, as something that would otherwise go unnoticed, opens up a space for a practice of the self. Since the infra-ordinary itself cannot be observed directly, the tears in its fabric allow Perec to latch on, to obliquely approach the infra-ordinary and thus to effectuate his operational writing which is, in itself, a technology of the self.

These sorts of micro-events appear not just on the level of the infra-ordinary, but on the level of the written text as well, in the form of what Michael Sheringham, in an article on the subject, refers to as “stylistic micro-events”: “But just as he finds himself tuning into micro-events…so we become conscious of stylistic micro-events: shifts of register, phrase-structure, or sentence length which…create a field of difference where all at first seemed the same” (2000 197). These stylistic micro-events abound in the Tentative, from minor changes in the way Perec chooses to record time or the passage of a bus – “Le 96 va à la gare Montparnasse,” for example, and then later “Un 96 passe,” and then again “Passe un 96 plutôt plein” – and changes in register – the colloquial “J’ai envie de me changer les idées. Lire ‘le Monde’. Changer de crémerie” (33) versus the formal “La nuit, l’hiver: aspect irréel des passants” (38) – to poetic techniques such as alliteration – “Passe un papa poussant poussette” (35). They serve two functions: they implicate Perec’s writing in the infra-ordinary fabric that he is attempting to record, linking Perec-as-writer with Perec-as-observer, and they bring the reader into this rhythm of micro-events, making the experience of reading the Tentative as akin as possible to actually producing it. Again, Michael Sheringham (this time from Everyday Life):

The brilliance of TELP as a verbal artefact lies in the fact that all the points we can make about its language turn out to be points about the matter that this act of enunciation seeks to address. And the way we discover more and more in the text, when we read it again, matches the way observing the everyday brings about a transmutation of attention, making visible a thing that was, according to Perec, disguised by the narrowness of our habitual modes of seeing. (268)

In other words, through the stylistic micro-events that Perec includes in his text, the reader becomes engaged in the technology of the self that is his infra-ordinary observation, moving from subject to operator through the operational constraints of the practice of reading this text and thus participating in its imperative to self-care. The reader of the Tentative has no choice but to begin to observe her own actions and place in the infra-ordinary, to look at the tension between the user’s manual for her reading (and for her existence at large) and the paroxysms of her life itself. She connects with the micro-events of the people Perec observes – for example, the man who pulls the cafe door instead of pushing and is briefly unable to open it (who has not made that mistake at some point?) – and the enunciative micro-events embedded in the text itself. And just as Perec’s self-practice through observed micro-events becomes imbued in the body of the text through stylistic micro-events, so too does this technology of the self become imbued in the reader’s practice of reading (and, potentially, observing and living) through her attachment to certain micro-events in the text. In this way the text serves as the passage between varying practices of living, writing, reading, and observing, allowing for their transmission and the extension of the technologies of self they imply.

Though thoroughly modern in its substance, the form of this technology of the self is not so different from ones practiced during the golden age of the culture of the self that Foucault discusses in “Technologies of the Self,” specifically from the practice of epistolary self-cultivation:

The new care of the self involved a new experience of self… A relation developed between writing and vigilance. Attention was paid to nuances of life, mood, and reading, and the experience of self was intensified and widened by virtue of this act of writing. A whole field of experience opened which earlier was absent. (232-233)

Foucault then goes on to cite a letter of Marcus Aurelius in which he is concerned “with the details of daily life, with the movements of the spirit, [and] with self-analysis” (233). He speaks, much as Perec does, about his own rhythm for the day, what he spent his time doing, what he ate, and the thoughts he considered in conversation. While different in scope, the content of the letter greatly resembles the sort of focus on the ordinary and habitual that Perec takes on in the Tentative. Even though Marcus Aurelius is more concerned with his own actions than with those of others, the meticulous observation and writing, as well as the purposeful direction towards a reader, is strikingly similar. This parallel reveals the way that Perec’s constrained writing functions not only as a exploration of the infra-ordinary but as a technology of the self, one that, much like Marcus Aurelius’s letter, implicates both the practices of the writer and of the reader. For both Marcus Aurelius and Perec, as Foucault says in “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” “the self is not merely given but is constituted in relationship to itself as subject,” through, I would add, the user’s manual or the “règles du jeu” (280).

But this constant “vigilance,” both on the part of Perec and Marcus Aurelius, reveals a fundamental paradox: how does one shed light on that which goes unnoticed without rendering it all-too-observed, and thereby useless, itself? Perec achieves this task by sitting in the tension between foreground and background, between the fabric of the infra-ordinary and that which has been “décrites, inventoriées, photographiées, racontées ou recensées” (Perec 1975 12). While Perec uses many of these functions (description, inventory, and narrativization, to name a few), he always does so in the context of a “tentative,” an attempt, with the full knowledge that there cannot be a complete inventory, a realistically accurate description, or a story that truly portrays passages as they occurred. Even his opening list of that which has been all-too-often observed at the Place remains incomplete: “et bien d’autres choses encore” (12). As author and observer, Perec situates himself between background and foreground, reversing roles and revealing impossibilities: he attempts to remove himself from the scene, becoming merely a part of the background, but cannot help but record his own feelings and impressions, consistently failing to escape from his limited range of vision, which always forces some things to the fore. Rather than simply try to move the infra-ordinary into the realm of the ordinary, Perec shifts his focus (and the reader’s) in such a way that the integrity of both are called into question: neither can be fully accounted for or completely overtake the other. As with the operator/subject distinction with which we opened this exploration of the infra-ordinary self, Perec uses the vigilance of his position as observer/writer to play off the dialectical negation of background and foreground. This serves to open up the possibility of a self, like Marcus Aurelius’s, that emerges from this tension and can act back upon itself, precisely due to its oblique view of everyday life.

This parallel between Marcus Aurelius and Perec also reveals an essential distinction: everyday life was a fundamentally different phenomenon in the time of Marcus Aurelius than in the time of Perec. While both eat, drink, and experience their bodies, they each do so in different positions and with different external influences. According to Foucault, in his essay “The Subject and Power,” everyday life is the site of a certain form of power relations in the contemporary moment, one that functions specifically to shape identity and subjectivity:

This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects. (331)

In this framework power exercised in everyday life directly influences the formation of individuals as subjects. (Remember that Foucault defines the self as the “soul-subject.”) This implies another paradox about Perec’s project: in a world where power extends into the field of the everyday, and that power fashions subjectivities, how is it that Perec’s operational constraints on himself and his writing can be liberating? Foucault addresses this very issue in his thoughts on power and subject formation. As we saw through Foucault’s treatment of Alcibiades above, the self that emerges from its care is in the action and not in the substance; similarly, the subject fashioned through this type (and all types) of power relations is, as Foucault says, not a substance but “a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to itself” (Foucault 1997, 290).  While the subject/self is created in the heat of these power relations, it is not a static object, but a form that is to be filled and shaped by the many forces that act on it, including the subject itself.  In fact, the subject’s freedom to act is a fundamental aspect of Foucault’s understanding of power: “There is not a face-to-face confrontation of power and freedom as mutually exclusive facts (freedom disappearing everywhere power is exercised) but a much more complicated interplay. In this game, freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power” (2000, 342). Just as freedom can serve as the condition for the exercise of power, so too can power function as the condition for the exercise of freedom in Foucault’s model of subject formation. Referring again to the Greek model of self-care, Foucault relates that “being free means not being a slave to oneself and one’s appetites, which means that with respect to oneself one establishes a certain relationship of domination, of mastery, which was called arkhe, or power, command” (1997, 286). Only a free subject can be in a power relationship; only a subject on whom power is acted (by himself, in this case) can be truly free. Rather than adversarial forces, power and freedom work in constant (dialectical) interplay in this model, creating the subject in their wake.

When he constrains his actions and writing, Perec comes remarkably close to replicating the Greek model of power/freedom that Foucault outlines in his treatment of the self, which is, he says, “not a discovering of a truth hidden inside the self but an attempt to determine what one can and cannot do with one’s available freedom.” Foucault then goes on to describe a daily practice recommended by Epictetus, a great Greek thinker of self-care, in which one should, while walking in the city each morning, try to determine one’s motives and relationship with each thing (“a public official or an attractive woman,” Foucault adds here parenthetically, focusing not coincidentally on the figure of the passer-by). This exercise is meant to determine whether “one has sufficient self-mastery so as to be indifferent” (Foucault 1997 276). Perec enacts a similar constraint on himself, but takes the project one step further by calling it a “tentative,” by constantly expressing his own boredom and fatigue, by mocking himself through doppelgangers and surprised passers-by that marvel at his bizarre state as writer/observer, and by all the other gestures he makes towards the impossibility of his task. In sum, Perec relates these moments of failure so as to even more masterfully reside in the tension between power, in the form of constraint, and freedom, in the form of his own identity, relationships, and feelings; in other words, to reside between the operator and the subject, between the user’s manual and life itself. It is in this tension between rule setting and the impossibility of following through on these rules that the self, constituted in relation to itself as a subject with the ability to act both on itself and on the world around it, is formed and practiced in Perec’s work. Despite Foucault’s declaration that “we may have to suspect that we find it impossible today to constitute an ethic of the self,” such an ethic is proposed, albeit it in a different form, in Tentative d’épuisement d’un lieu parisien (Foucault 2005, 252). Through careful observation and recording of the micro-events that occur in the fabric of the infra-ordinary, Perec opens up a space for self-care that integrates his own actions, his text, and, therefore, his readers into the realm of the everyday.

Works Cited

De Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1984.

Foucault, Michel. “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom.” Ethics:   Subjectivity and Truth. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press, 1997. 281-301.

–––. The Hermeneutics of the Subject. New York: Picador, 2005.

–––. “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress.” Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press, 1997. 253-280.

–––. “The Subject and Power.” Power. Ed. James D. Faubion. New York: The New Press, 2000. 326-348.

–––. “Technologies of the Self.” Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: The    New Press, 1997. 223-251.

Perec, Georges. “Approches de quoi?” l’infra-ordinaire. Paris: Seuil, 1989. 9-13.

–––. Espèces d’espaces. Paris: Galilée, 2000.

–––. “Notes sur ce que je cherche.” Penser/Classer. Paris: Seuil, 2003. 9-12.

–––. Tentative d’épuisement d’un lieu parisien. Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1975.

–––. “Le travail de la mémoire.” Je suis né. Paris: Seuil, 1990. 81-93.

Rabaté, Dominique. “Programming and Play: Life Drive and Death Drive in the Work of Georges Perec, Roman Opalka and Jean-Benoît Buech.” The Art of the Project: Projects and Experiments in Modern French Culture. Eds. Johnnie Gratton and Michael   Sheringham. Oxford: Berghahn, 2005. 81-95.

Sheringham, Michael. Everyday Life: Theories and Practices from Surrealism to the Present. Oxford: OUP, 2006.

–––. “Attending to the Everyday: Blanchot, Lefebvre, Certeau, Perec.” French Studies. 54 (2000): 187-199.


[1] In his essay “Notes sur ce que je cherche” (Perec 2003), Perec says that all of his literary production fall into one (or usually more) or four categories: the sociological (relating to everyday life), the autobiographical, the ludic (relating to usually Oulipian constraints), and the novelistic.

[2] “I think we may have to suspect that we find it impossible today to constitute an ethic of the self, even though it may be an urgent, fundamental, and politically indispensable task” (Foucault 2005, 252).

[3] Perec is not the first person to attempt to bring the background passages/practices to the foreground of our attention; Michel de Certeau, in The Practice of Everyday Life, sets out quite a similar agenda, one that includes explicit references to Foucault’s thought: “one can analyze the microbe-like, singular and plural practices which an urbanistic system was supposed to administer or suppress, but which have outlived its decay; one can follow the warming activity of these procedures that, far from being regulated or eliminated by panoptic administration, have reinforced themselves in a proliferating illegitimacy…to the point of constituting everyday regulations and surreptitious creativities that are merely concealed by the frantic mechanisms and discourses of the observational organization” (96).

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Alex Haber

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Altered Spaces: Calvino, Fenoglio and the Odyssey of the Italian Partisan

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Barry Ryan
University College Cork

The central argument of Italo Calvino’s brief 1946 essay “Omero antimilitarista”[i] is “the Marxist line that the Iliad represents the criticism of the troops against the officers arrogant quarrels, and the Odyssey portrays the problematic return that awaits all soldiers and partisans” (McLaughlin 30). Of equal interest, however, especially when read in terms of Calvino’s own Resistance literature, are his attempts to place the partisan war that had just finished in the context of his reading of Homer, and in particular, the Odyssey. He describes the Odyssey as “la storia degli otto settembre, […] la storia di tutti gli otto settembre della Storia” (Calvino, Saggi 2118). It is, Calvino explains, “il mito del ritorno a casa nato nei lunghi anni di «naja» dai soldati portati a combattere lontano” (2118), and he highlights in particular the difficulty of returning home “su mezzi di fortuna, per paesi irti di nemici” (2118), “la preoccupazione per la fedeltà della moglie” (2118) and “il problema del reduce che torna stracciato e dimenticato da tutti” (2118).

In this paper, therefore, I discuss the way in which Calvino (1923-1985) and his contemporary Beppe Fenoglio (1922-1963) present the theme of the return home from war to a changed dwelling space in their Resistance writing and assess how it compares to the Homeric version of the same trope found in the Odyssey.[ii]

The comparison I wish to draw between the Odyssey and Italian Resistance literature is a rather straightforward one. A particular feature of Odysseus return is the way in which his home at Ithaca has changed in his absence, as an array of suitors wait there, petitioning for his wife Penelope’s hand. He encounters a dwelling space that is physically the same as the one he left behind twenty years earlier, yet psychologically, he now experiences it in a different way. His perception is altered by time, absence and the vagaries of memory; this experience of the return from war to a dwelling that has been transformed (either physically or psychologically) is a theme repeated in the novels of Calvino and Fenoglio, albeit perhaps not as an intentional reference to Homer. Unlike Calvino’s use of Ariosto as a model or Fenoglio’s evocation of the Yorkshire of Wuthering Heights, the overtones of the Odyssey in the texts are not quite as explicit, but rather are perhaps an example of Kristeva’s vision of intertextuality, namely the idea that intertextuality is “[the] transposition of one (or several) sign-systems into another” (Kristeva 111). In this context, the “sign-system” of the Odyssean return, and in particular, the phenomenon of the altered dwelling space, is transposed into the context of the Resistenza. Thus, the focus of this paper is not so much on identifying precise and intentional allusion to specific lines from Homer in the Resistance texts, but rather on investigating how a spatial paradigm from the dawn of martial literature comes to be depicted and altered in the neorealist period. To this end, I begin by analysing Pin’s return in Calvino’s Il sentiero dei nidi di ragno (1947), before offering a reading of the returns of Fenoglio’s partisan protagonists Johnny and Milton in Il partigiano Johnny (1968) and Una questione privata (1964) respectively, examining how each author depicts his character’s “failed” Odysseys. Jurij Lotman writes that “the structure of the space of a text becomes the model of the structure of the space of the universe” (Lotman 217), and so in this particular context, the fluctuating spaces of the partisans home are perhaps emblematic of the altered social and political circumstances triggered by the Resistenza.

It is interesting to note that, in spite of his underlining of the importance of the otto settembre, this event does not feature in Calvino’s literature. His focus is instead on the return of the partisan, rather than the return of troops conscripted to the Italian Army following the Armistice of September 8th, 1943. Indeed, his child hero Pin was never a soldier, nor even a bona fide partigiano, but nonetheless, his return to his home in San Remo[iii] bears many Homeric overtones. In his 1964 preface to Il sentiero dei nidi di ragno, Calvino explains that he began writing without a precise plot in mind, but that the story itself “imponeva soluzioni quasi obbligatorie” (Romanzi e racconti I 1194). Indeed, there is a sense of inevitability about Pin’s return to his original dwelling in the novels finale, and this trope of the ineluctable return is something Calvino notes in his own reading of the Odyssey in the essay “Le Odissee nell’Odissea”,[iv] saying that “[q]uesto ritorno-racconto è qualcosa che c’è già, prima d’essere compiuto” (Saggi 889), and so, in this context, it is worthwhile to compare the two characters’ homecomings.

There is, of course, an immediate and obvious difference between the figures awaiting the returning hero in each of the texts – Penelope is Odysseus’ wife, while Rina is Pin’s older sister. In Odysseus’ prolonged absence, while Penelope is besieged by an array of suitors who feast at her home in Ithaca, waiting for her to choose one of them as her husband, her steadfast refusal to yield to their request denotes her as a paragon of fidelity, while in contrast, Rina is a prostitute who sleeps with German soldiers. Their respective dwelling spaces indeed reflect the differences between them. As Penelope awaits Odysseus’ return, she seems to domesticate her space by undertaking the rather “feminine” task of weaving a shroud for her father-in-law Laertes (albeit as a ruse to delay her response to the suitors (Odyssey II 103-109)). Meanwhile, the prostitute Rina lives in squalor in the alleys of San Remo, and on entering her room, one is struck by “quell’odore di maschio e femmina che dà subito alle narici” (Romanzi e racconti I 17), for the creaking floorboards and bed (18) have strong connotations of decay, and the darkness of the room (16) lends it a certain sense of foreboding. It seems as though Calvino uses the open and accessible nature of Rinas dwelling to depict her as something of an exhibitionist; hence, at the beginning of the novel, she is depicted shouting from her window into the alley below (9) and is viewed through cracks in the partition by Pin (15). In short, the squalid nature of her home is used to show her in as undignified a light as possible and thus her dwelling is what Mieke Bal would term a “thematized” space; that is to say, the dwelling space is “an object of presentation in itself, for its own sake” (Bal 95). It is “an acting space rather than the place of action” (95), reiterating its occupants profession. Thus, even on Pin’s return to the house at the novel’s end, when Rina treats him kindly in an attempt to curry favour, the narrator ironically comments that “[l]a Nera fa la materna” (Romanzi e racconti I 142), strongly implying that she cannot evade the archetype of the “whore” that he has bestowed upon her, thanks largely to his very specific and deliberate spatialising of her room as a brothel rather than as a home.

In spite of these differences between Penelope and Rina, however, it is interesting to note that each character solicits gifts from her male admirers, and the discrepancy between the reactions of the returning male protagonists to these gifts illustrates how Il sentiero can be read as presenting a “failed” Odyssey. Penelope tells the suitors that it is expected of them to prepare “a banquet for the friends of the bride, and give to her glorious gifts” (XVIII 279-280), and similarly, the prostitute Rina has received gifts from her German “suitors”, as she offers Pin “una cioccolata tedesca fatta di nocciole” (142) and “marmellata tedesca” (142), tokens of her collaboration with the occupiers. However, Pin’s pointed comment of “[t]i trattano bene, vedo” (142) contrasts with Odysseus being “glad” (XVIII 281) to see his wife trick her suitors, since “he values the economic gains, which will help replenish the household. As a tactician himself, he respects her tactics” (Felson-Rubin 174). This is not the case in the Resistance Italy of Calvino’s novel, in which items received from an enemy, however valuable the economic gain to be derived from them, are symbolic of treachery to the Resistance cause. Thus, while each dwelling space has been transformed by the presence of unwanted guests in the hero’s absence, it seems from Odysseus’ obvious trust in Penelopes motives that his will be an altogether more successful homecoming than that of Pin.

Other crucial stages of the Odyssean return are the heros disguise and subsequent revelation, and both of these features are found in Il sentiero. Like Odysseus, who is transfigured by the goddess Athena and disguised as an aged beggar, Pin is similarly unkempt. He is “infagottato in strani vestiti, con un cespuglio di capelli più grande delle spalle, sporco, stracciato, scalcagnato, con guance impastate di polvere e lacrime” (142), just as Odysseus’ eyes are “dimmed” (XIII 433) and he wears “a vile ragged cloak” (434). Unlike the wily Odysseus, however, Pin’s appearance is not a deliberate ruse, but rather a consequence of the realities of the war that he has experienced. Similarly, while Odysseus homecoming is almost like a game, marked by a series of feats of cunning on his part, such as his decision to reveal his identity in stages, first to his son Telemachus (XVI 213-215), then to the suitors (XXII 35-41) and finally to Penelope (XXIV 205-209), Pin’s revelation is rather less carefully construed, as he simply demands of his sister to open the door – “Apri, Rina, sono tuo fratello Pin” (Calvino, Romanzi e racconti I 142).

The fact that Odysseus must exercise his full repertoire of subterfuge and wiliness in order to enter his own home suggests that his domestic space is a protective one, made up of a number of layers that even he must penetrate before gaining full access, and again this is in contrast with Pin’s rather more open and less shielded dwelling space, which he can enter and leave freely. Furthermore, — and again unlike Odysseus — Pin’s return home is not so much a chance to exhibit his cunning, or any sort of newfound maturity, but rather is an act of desperation, as he despairingly seeks shelter in the dwelling of his childhood, both from the demands of the war and from his miscomprehension of the adult world. Unlike the Homeric hero, who avenges the changes inflicted on his home in his absence by slaying the suitors using his “great bow” (XXI 314), Pin avenges his changed dwelling by inadvertently facilitating the killing of his sister, by first taking the prized P. 38 pistol (which itself has passed from character to character in the text, more or less following Pin’s circular journey) from her and threatening her with it (Romanzi e racconti I 143), before passing it on to her eventual killer Cugino (146). In short, Pin’s is a completely failed readjustment to his original home after his time at war. This is a break from the template of Odysseus. 

The Odyssean return is similarly in evidence in Beppe Fenoglio’s writing. Unlike Calvino, Fenoglio offers brief descriptions of the otto settembre itself, as his older protagonists desert the Italian Army to join the Resistenza. In both Il partigiano Johnny and Una questione privata, for instance, both Johnny and Milton recall their returns home from Rome in September 1943, and in Primavera di bellezza, Johnny’s travails in reaching Piedmont unscathed are detailed. However, the protagonist’s actual return to his house is not described in any of the three texts and instead, in Fenoglio, as in Calvino, it is the return of the partisan to his dwelling space after his time in combat that provides us with a point of comparison with the Homeric rendering of the trope. In Il partigiano Johnny, the protagonist makes one brief return home during his time in the Resistenza, and once again, it is fascinating to observe the relative “failure” of the Odyssean homecoming in the Resistance context. Johnny’s return occurs during the partisan occupation of Alba in October 1944, and the inauspicious nature of his arrival is sign-posted by the way in which he is scolded by a neighbour for not having visited sooner: “[o]re ed ore la tua povera madre è stata al balcone, chiamando giù i partigiani per chiedere di te” (Fenoglio, Romanzi e racconti 1560). This contrasts with the welcome the disguised Odysseus receives from the swineherd Eumaeus on his arrival at Ithaca (Odyssey XIV), who gives him food and shelter.

Similarly, the returned Johnny seems somewhat unfamiliar with his dwelling space on a physical level, reflecting the great change that he has experienced in his absence. In the darkness of the evening, he attempts to climb the steps towards his house by memory, “tentando il suo vecchio passo di pace di allora” (Fenoglio, Romanzi e racconti 1560), but finds that “gli scalini parevano rimbombare con un alieno passo” (1560). At this point Johnny has been away for less than a year, yet his sense of alienation from his own childhood home is striking, and this suggests that the hills of the Langhe that he inhabits as a partisan are now his natural locus (rather than the town of Alba in which he grew up). This failure to remember his home space in turn illustrates the change that Johnny has undertaken over the course of the novel, from the passive to the active life, from the urban student he was before the outbreak of war to the hilltop partisan he is now.

In any case, Johnny’s return compares unfavourably with the way in which Odysseus, after a much longer absence, is still able to use his memory of the physical layout of his home to his advantage, such as when he hides the arms of the suitors “inside the storeroom”  (Odyssey XIX 17), or when he convinces Penelope of his identity by recalling how he built their bedroom around a tree – “Round about this I built my chamber, till I had finished it, with close-set stones” (XXIII 192-193). Johnny’s unsteady progress up the steps to his home also goes against the thrust of Bachelard’s argument that

over and beyond our memories, the house we were born in is physically inscribed in us. It is a group of organic habits. After twenty years, in spite of all the other anonymous stairways, we would recapture the reflexes of the “first stairway,” we would not stumble on that rather high step” (14-15).

In effect, it is as if Johnny, during his time in the Resistance, has not only been transformed but indeed reborn as a partisan. The house in which the student Johnny was born is now unfamiliar to him, the space is no longer inscribed in his psyche after an absence of under a year, and the episode appears to illustrate Giorgio Boccas point on the relationship between the partisans and the hill, which he describes as “casa e madre del ribelle” (Bocca 83). The hills of the Langhe now provide the partisan Johnny with his familiar space, and his unease in his own family home is proof of this conversion from callow youth to hardened partisan.

Inside the house itself, the unsuccessful nature of Johnny’s homecoming, in contrast to the ultimately glorious return of Odysseus, is confirmed. Although Johnny is able to sit calmly in his parents’ kitchen, untroubled by their new dog that “ha conosciuto il sangue” (Fenoglio, Romanzi e racconti 1561), and although he is reunited with his father, just as Odysseus and Laertes are at the end of the Odyssey, his is only a fleeting visit (in spite of his mother’ds hopes to the contrary). Johnny explains that the partisans will not hold Alba for much more than two weeks and refuses to spend even one night at home in his bed as “poi sarebbe una dannosissima riabitudinazione” (1561), suggesting that the acting space of the home still carries considerable agency, even if it has been altered in his absence. After taking some jumpers to wear while on patrol outside Alba, Johnny disappears into the “sovrannaturale immobilità e desertità della città” (1563), rather than finding, as Odysseus does, a lasting “refuge from tribulation” (XXIII 284).

The short-lived homecoming of Johnny, therefore, is in contrast to the more definite return of Odysseus. Although the character of Johnny can be said to constitute “una sorta di Ulisse cristiano” (Beccaria, 2001 149), who is “in lotta con la natura ostile” (149) and “vaga sulle colline in lungo viaggio irto di ostacoli, verso una salvezza” (150), unlike the Homeric hero he is incapable of a definitive homecoming as his town, if not his house, has been seemingly irrevocably changed in his absence. While Odysseus travelled to distant Troy to fight his war before returning home, Johnny is not only already fighting on home territory, but the Nazi-fascist enemy has displaced him from his town and occupied it. So it is perhaps inevitable that it will have changed in a more dramatic way than Odysseus’ Ithaca.

Fenoglio’s Milton of Una questione privata is another character whose return to the initial dwelling space of his text offers a “failed” version of the Odyssey, although in his case he is not returning to his own home, but to the villa of his beloved, Fulvia. In any case, it is worth noting that in each of the three Resistance texts, as in the Odyssey, the domestic dwelling to which the hero returns is strongly linked to a female character, be she a wife, sister, mother or — in Milton’s case — object of unrequited love. This is in keeping with much of the spatial configuration of Resistance literature at large, wherein the archetype of private space being a female preserve and public space a male one is reinforced.[v] The marine imagery prevalent in the novel only emphasises the Odyssean undertones to Milton’s journey[vi] back towards his pre-war life. He undertakes an epic voyage from his public duty of Resistance “homewards” across the Langhe to his private concern of his love for Fulvia, just as Odysseus sails from his duty at the walls of Troy home to Ithaca. However, while Odysseus returns to Ithaca to his faithful wife Penelope, there is no such neat conclusion to Una questione privata. Unlike Penelope, Fulvia is not waiting for Milton at her villa, nor, would it seem, has she forsaken all other suitors. Milton’s return to the villa is unsuccessful, and, as has been noted by Saccone (1988 140), this is sign-posted by the trembling cherry trees, the considerable ageing of the housekeeper and the way Fulvia leaves the books given to her by Milton behind, as well as by the housekeeper comparing the villa to a tomb: “Non sembra d’entrare in una tomba?” (Fenoglio Romanzi e racconti 1019). In the novel’s closing chapter, when Milton returns once again to the villa in order to discover the truth about Fulvia and his friend Giorgio’s liaison, the difference between his experience and that of Odysseus is emphasised. While Odysseus, with the aid of Telemachus and Eumaeus, kills the suitors in Book XXII of the Odyssey, Milton is instead pursued and ultimately killed by “una cinquantina” (1124) of soldiers who are spread across the hill below Fulvia’s villa.

In both Calvino and Fenoglio’s narrative, therefore, the return of the partisan to his original dwelling space seems to be considerably less successful than that of Odysseus. The house, while physically the same as before, has typically undergone some sort of transformation in the absence of the protagonist and, thus, it appears that the works cited seem to present failed versions of the model of the Odyssean return. In Calvino and Fenoglio’s novels, while the physical spaces of the house are the same, it is configured differently in the recesses of the hero’s mind, and thus becomes somehow inaccessible. The reasons for this are manifold, but perhaps the most obvious and simplistic difference between the return to the dwelling space in Fenoglio and Calvino’s writing and the return of the Homeric hero is that unlike the Trojan War, the Resistenza is still ongoing when Pin, Johnny and Milton seek out their original homes. Thus, it is to be expected that their attempts to return to their private lives from their public duty will be unsuccessful. This is encapsulated in Una questione privata by the partisan Ivan’s statement on observing Milton return to Fulvia’s villa – “è sicuro che era una cosa della vita di prima, e tornare su queste cose fa più male che bene […] Le cose di prima a dopo, a dopo!” (Fenoglio Romanzi e racconti 1028). 

The difficulty partisans faced in readapting to civilian life after the war is hinted at by their ambiguous re-entry into their homes and hometowns in these texts, and indeed Fenoglio explicitly tackles this issue elsewhere, such as in the short story “Ettore va al lavoro”, in which the former partisan Ettore cannot bring himself to take up a mundane job as a clerk, and instead opts to make a living threatening and blackmailing ex-facists for his former colleague Bianco. In effect, these partisans’ failures to readapt to their own home space predicts a failure to readjust to civilian life after their time in the Resistenza.

This in turn is characteristic of Lotman’s theory on space in literature. I have already alluded to the way in which he relates textual space to the “space of the universe” (217), and continues to reiterate this stance when he writes that “the spatial order of the world [in a text] becomes an organizing element around which its non-spatial features are also constructed” (220). In effect, Lotman suggests that the way in which a writer orders his or her space tells the reader much about the text as a whole, and so it is in Calvino and Fenoglio’s Resistance writing, where the uneasiness of the partisan in what ought to be a welcoming domestic space prefigures a reintegration into post-war society that will prove to be problematic, in spite of the fact that he is supposedly on the victorious side of the conflict.

By extension, the incomplete or unsuccessful homecomings of Pin, Johnny and Milton also carry with them an implicit commentary on the state of Italy as a whole at the conclusion of the Resistenza. The “failure” of the Odyssean return in the Resistance novel (due to the fact that the war is not yet over) is perhaps emblematic of the cultural context in which the texts were written, a post-war Italy in which the political fault lines etched out by the partisan struggle became ever more distinct, and would go on to define the political landscape of the country for the following half-century. In short, the ambiguous homecomings of the partisans of Fenoglio and Calvino’s texts reflect the ambiguous nature of their takes on the Resistance, which is very different from the “romanticismo rivoluzionario” (Pedullà 263) of an author such as Renata Viganò; their objective is clearly not to glorify the conflict, but rather, as Calvino puts it in his 1964 preface “lanciare una sfida ai detrattori della Resistenza e nello stesso tempo ai sacerdoti d’una Resistenza agiografica ed edulcorata” (Romanzi e racconti I 1202).

It seems to be the case, therefore, that the return of the partisan as outlined in Calvino and Fenoglio’s writing is something of a “failed” Odyssey, certainly when read in comparison to Homer. However, as important as the return of Odysseus itself are the episodes he experiences along the way, and this is something Calvino notes in his reading of the Odyssey. If, having overcome numerous obstacles and learnt many lessons between Troy and Ithaca, Odysseus had forgotten everything, it would be worse than if he had never reached home at all – “la sua perdita sarebbe stata ben più grave: non trarre alcuna esperienza da quanto ha sofferto, alcun senso da quel che ha vissuto” (Calvino, Saggi 889) – and one can certainly say the same of the Resistance experiences of Pin, Johnny and Milton. Similarly important is the structure that the possibility of return lends to Homer’s poem. Odysseus’ desire for Ithaca underpins the entire Odyssey, much like in Fenoglio’s writing, wherein Alba becomes “una immagine assoluta, precostruita, l’immagine di Itaca per Ulisse” (Falaschi 10).[vii] The journey across the “oceano pauroso della guerra” (Fenoglio, Romanzi e racconti 1038), with its possibility of return just as Odysseus returned to Ithaca, therefore, defines the structure of both the spaces of Fenoglio’s novels and of the texts themselves, just as Pin’s journey in Il sentiero is, like that of Odysseus, circular. Thus, even though the homecoming of the Resistance hero in Calvino and Fenoglio’s writing is incomplete, the authors’ reworking of the paradigm of the partisan returning to his original dwelling space is nonetheless hugely significant. Meanwhile, the ultimate failure of the return itself suggests that tropes hewn from legend do not transfer readily to the realities of World War II. Thus, through the personal odysseys of their protagonists, and their ultimate discomfort in ostensibly familiar spaces, Calvino and Fenoglio subtly question some of the myths of the Resistenza.

Notes



[i] Omero antimilitarista” was first published in L’Unità on 15 September 1946, and is reproduced in Calvino’s Saggi, 2118-2119.

[ii] The case has been convincingly made for the advent of the twentieth century marking a “shift from the Iliad to the Odyssey” (Zajko 313) as the quintessential Homeric text, testified by its influence on modernist writers such as Joyce and T.S. Eliot.

[iii] The urban centre of Il sentiero is “already an ambiguous place, with its familiar maze of alleys and streets, the (precarious) safety of homes, and the (treacherous) warmth to be found in the havens of small-time vice, the bar and a young prositute’s hovel” (Jeannet 138).

[iv] The essay “Sarà sempre Odissea” was first published in La Repubblica on 21 October 1981, and is now reproduced as “Le Odissee nell’Odissea” in Calvino’s Saggi, 888-896.

[v] Sarti notes this archetype when she writes of “i confini tra sfera privata (femminile) e sfera pubblica (maschile)” (Sarti 25).

[vi] Similarities can also be drawn between Milton’s experiences in the ocean of the Resistance and Dante’s conception of Odysseus/Ulysses. Unlike the Homeric version, in which the hero is reunited with his family at Ithaca, the ambitions of Dante’s Ulysses “a divenir del mondo esperto” (Dante, Inferno, XXVI, 98) cannot be sated by the love of his family, and instead he sets off for “l’alto mare aperto” (100), travelling beyond the known world “per seguir virtute e canoscenza” (120). His “folle volo” (125) eventually brings him to the shores of Purgatory, where “un turbo nacque” (137), and Ulysses and his remaining companions are drowned. Rather than accept that he cannot find out the truth regarding Fulvia while he is partaking in the Resistance, Milton instead neglects what should be his principal duty and goes in search of knowledge, just as Ulysses does. Like Ulysses, Milton’s impossible search, his muddling of his questione privata with his questione pubblica, leads to his eventual demise, metaphorically drowning in the stormy waters of the war.

[vii] The epic overtones of Fenoglio’s work are not drawn only from the Odyssey, however. For instance, in Il partigiano Johnny Fenoglio describes the partisans’ envy of the communist commissioner Némega’s English-manufactured sten gun in terms of the Iliad, imagining that on his death “ci sarebbe stato un omerico carosello intorno al suo cadavere nient’affatto achilleo, a giudicare dalla visiva cupidigia di tutti per quello sten” (Fenoglio, Romanzi e racconti, 491). Similarly, the dead Tito is likened to “un greco ucciso dai Persiani due millenni avanti” (526), while Johnny compares seeing a German flare to “veder pendere la bilancia di Giove” (545). Meanwhile, for Jacomuzzi the immutability of the Milton of Una questione privata serves to align him “con gli eroi del poema epico” (Jacomuzzi 162), while comparisons have also been drawn between the tragic, entwined destines of Milton and Giorgio and those of Nissus and Euryalus in Book IX of the Aeneid (Guglielminetti 156). In any case, “l’epica classica e i suoi eroi rivivono sulle colline grazie a Fenoglio” (Vaccaneo 105).

Works Cited:

Bachelard, Gaston. The Poetics of Space, translated by Jolas, Maria. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

Bal, Mieke. Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, Christine Van Boheemen, trans. Toronto: University of Toronto P, 1985.

Beccaria, Gian Luigi. Le forme della lontananza. La variazione e l’identico nella letteratura colta e popolare. Poesia del Novecento, fiaba, canto e romanzo. Milan: Garzanti, 2001.

Bocca, Giorgio. Storia dell’Italia partigiana: settembre 1943 - maggio 1945. Milan: Mondadori, 1995.

Calvino, Italo. Romanzi e racconti, edited by Barenghi, Mario and Falchetto, Bruno. Milan: Mondadori, 1991.

––––. Saggi, edited by Barenghi, Mario. Milan: Mondadori, 1995.

Dante. Tutte le opere. Rome: Newton & Compton, 1993.

Falaschi, Giovanni. “L’isola, il calendario, i due libri maestri” pp. 9-22 of Rizzo, Gino, ed. Fenoglio a Lecce: Atti dell’incontro di studio su Beppe Fenoglio (Lecce 25-26 novembre 1983). Florence: Olschki Editore, 1984.

Felson-Rubin, Nancy. “Penelope’s Perspective: Character from Plot”, pp. 163-183 of Schein, Seth L, ed. Reading the Odyssey: Selected Interpretive Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Fenoglio, Beppe. Romanzi e racconti, edited by Isella, Dante. Turin: Einaudi-Gallimard, 1992.

Guglielminetti, Marziano. “Milton al plurale”, pp. 150-157 of Beppe Fenoglio oggi, edited by Ioli, Giovanna. Milan: Mursia, 1991.

Homer. The Odyssey, translated by A.T. Murray, revised by George E. Dimock. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Jacomuzzi, Angelo. “Osservazioni in margine a Una questione privata”, pp. 158-164 of Beppe Fenoglio oggi, edited by Ioli, Giovanna. Milan: Mursia, 1991.

Jeannet, Angela M. Under the Radiant Sun and the Crescent Moon. Italo Calvino’s Storytelling. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.

Kristeva, Julie. The Kristeva Reader, edited by Moi, Toril. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

Lotman, Jurij. The Structure of the Artistic Text. Trans. Gail Lenhoff and Ronald Vroon. Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan P, 1977.

McLaughlin, Martin. Italo Calvino. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998.

Pedullà, Gabriele, ed. Racconti della Resistenza. Turin: Einaudi, 2006.

Saccone, Eduardo. Fenoglio. I testi, l’opera. Turin: Einaudi, 1988.

Sarti, Raffaella. “Spazi domestici e identità di genere tra età moderna e contemporanea”, pp. 13-41 of Donne e spazio. Nel processo di modernizzazione. Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 1995.

Vaccaneo, Franco. “Testimonianza”, pp. 103-108 of Non fatelo con Fenoglio. Langhe: luogo letterario incontaminato? Gallo, Ivana and Bosca, Donato, eds. Cuneo: Araba Fenice, 2003.

Viganò, Renata. L’Agnese va a morire. Turin: Einaudi, 1994.

Virgil. Aeneid, Day Lewis, C, trans. Oxford: University Press, 1986.

Zajko, Vanda. “Homer and Ulysses”, pp. 311-323 of Fowler, Robert, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Homer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Bio

Barry Ryan

Barry Ryan graduated from University College Cork, Ireland with a BA in Italian and English in 2004. He has recently completed a PhD in Italian literature at the same institution, entitled “Spatializing the Italian Resistance in Calvino, Fenoglio and Viganò”. He has also taught Italian language and literature at UCC.

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For a New Poetics of the Site [i]

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Author Bio

Bruno Bosteels
Cornell University

On two very different occasions, Gilles Deleuze offered an evaluation of the philosophy of Alain Badiou as it is summed up in Being and Event. The first of these evaluations covers two dense pages of What Is Philosophy?, written in collaboration with Félix Guattari. Here, long before Deleuze and Badiou would engage in a notoriously polemical correspondence, Badiou’s work is labeled a “particularly interesting undertaking,” even though, after a rather idiosyncratic summary, Deleuze and Guattari move on to a rather scathing criticism, arguing that Badiou actually proposes “the return, in the guise of the multiple, to an old conception of the higher philosophy,” which projects situations, states of situations, and events onto a vertical or transcendent line, no matter how “errant” or “indiscernible,” instead of placing two types of multiplicity, one actual and the other virtual, one beside the other, on a single plane of immanence. Besides, they add in parenthesis, “even mathematics has had enough of set-theoreticism.”[ii] Badiou himself responded to this criticism by expressing his bafflement at the “strange” nature of Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation. “I say strange, rather than false or incorrect. I do not register any incorrections in this text, only a bizarre torsion, an impracticable vantage point that makes it impossible to understand what is at stake or what we are dealing with,” Badiou writes, before addressing his reader with an open invitation: “I would be grateful to anyone who could clarify this textual fragment for me, and explain what relation it bears to Being and Event. This is a genuine invitation, wholly devoid of irony.”[iii]

However, there had been also another occasion, this time private, on which Deleuze seems to have responded somewhat differently to Badiou’s work. As Badiou told me in an interview, Deleuze wrote to him right before the publication of Being and Event in order to express his appreciation for what he considered to be the major conceptual innovation of the manuscript, namely, the concept of the event-site or evental site, site événementiel in French: “It was Deleuze who, very early on, even before our correspondence, at the time when Being and Event was about to appear, told me that the heart of my philosophy was the theory of the site of the event. It was this theory, he told me, that explained why one is not in immanence, which he regretted a lot, but neither is one in transcendence. The site is that which would diagonally cross the opposition of immanence and transcendence.”[iv] It is somewhat surprising, to say the least, that this evaluation of the significance of the evental site for Badiou’s overall philosophical project does not make it into the actual note dedicated to Being and Event in What Is Philosophy? After all, did not Deleuze and Guattari also devote a long section of this book to what they call “geophilosophy,” arguing for an understanding of the philosophical concept not in terms of representation of objects by subjects but rather in terms of the relation of thought to territory and the earth? As they write: “Subject and object give a poor approximation of thought. Thinking is neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around the other. Rather, thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth.”[v] And, incidentally, did not Deleuze and Guattari quote the text “What is a Site?” by Marcel Détienne, the historian of ancient Greece, as a major point of reference for their geophilosophy?

What I would like to propose today, then, is an elaboration of the concept of the site as a possible contribution not just to geophilosophy but to a literary and poetic investigation as well. The aim is to come to an understanding of the question “What is a Site?” in dialogue with Badiou’s philosophy, both in Being and Event and, to a lesser extent, in the recently published follow-up, Logics of Worlds, which is subtitled Being and Event, 2.

In fact, I would like to trace three different itineraries in search of a definition of the site. Thus, before turning to Badiou’s philosophy in some detail, I will begin by sketching out a broad map of post-1968 French thought so as to situate the notion of the site at the pivot of the most important theoretical and ideological traditions in this field. This genealogical sketch will be followed by a conceptual and to some extent fairly technical exposé on the shifting uses of the site in Badiou’s two volumes. Finally, I will end by bringing this debate home, both by leading us back in the direction of literature—poetry to be precise—and by turning from Europe to the far reaches of South America, with the discussion of a poem from Residencia en la tierra by Pablo Neruda.

2

Genealogically speaking, I would argue that the site can be located at the heart of post-1968 thought. What were, after all, the dominant trends of those years toward the end of the sixties and the early seventies, which we in the USA identify more broadly with the birth of so-called “French theory”? As Badiou suggests, in Peut-on penser la politique? (Can Politics Be Thought?), the last founding moment in this tradition was the polemic between Jean-Paul Sartre and Louis Althusser, or if you prefer, between the Situationists such as Guy Debord and the psychoanalytical theory of Jacques Lacan. This is the debate between humanism and structuralism, or between humanist Marxism and structuralist Marxism. In a nice pun, Badiou describes this polemic as the conflict of the Cause against the cause: “The last debate in this matter opposed the tenants of liberty, as founding reflective transparency, to the tenants of the structure, as prescription of a regime of causality. Sartre against Althusser: this meant, at bottom, the Cause against the cause.”[vi] Any Sartrean commitment to some ideological Cause would thus be put into crisis by the Althusserian investigation of the structures of social causality.

If we scrutinize this classical debate a bit more closely, however, even in some of the most canonical texts of the tradition such as Sartre’s In Search of Method or Althusser’s For Marx, we might very well come away with a completely unorthodox conclusion. In Althusser’s case, for instance, the investigation of the structure in actual fact is always meant to lead to moments of internal deadlock and impasse—most notably through the concepts of over- and underdetermination, which are analogous to the category of the weakest link in Lenin’s analysis of the causes behind the October Revolution. Structuralism, in other words, never really amounts to producing a flat grid or diagram from which to read off a fixed set of symbolic effects; instead, already at its height, French structuralism aimed to pinpoint how sense is produced from a kernel of nonsense, senselessness or ab-sense. As Deleuze would write most eloquently in a 1967 text, “A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?” (“How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” which was not published until 1971), among its defining features structuralism always seeks to place an empty square or an empty place (une case vide) at the center of the structure. Of course, this means, as you can clearly see, that all true structuralism is already a poststructuralism, if we take the latter to refer to the fact that the structure’s center is empty or absent, with an absence that nonetheless holds the structure together through various effects of displacement and condensation.[vii] A far cry, for sure, from textbook presentations about the flat scientificism of so-called structuralists—the kind of image I grew up with when I studied narratology as an undergraduate in Leuven, before coming to Penn, with Gérard Genette’s Figures III as the Bible under our armpits.

Now, on the other end of the spectrum, things do not necessarily draw up a much more comforting or familiar picture. Thus, even in his analysis of historical collectives or groups, in Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre repeatedly hits upon elements of what he calls the practico-inert, that is, resilient forces that are not so much foreign or external to the subject as much as they are immanent obstacles that always seem to work against the intended finality of the subject’s own actions. This logic of counterfinality, in other words, always throws a wrench into the logic of the supposed freedom and transparency of the subject. We might also say that the practico-inert marks the point where structural constraints inscribe themselves at the heart of even the purest revolutionary group, splitting it from within between that part of it that is engaged in a type of “fusion” and that part that breaks up this movement with an inevitable effect of objective and institutional “inertia.” Again, we are far removed from the simplistic image of praxis as the self-positing activity of a collective ensemble or set (Sartre’s work is after all subtitled an ontology of historic sets or ensembles, in an unexplored mathematical sense that Badiou will pick up on), let alone as the identical subject-object of history, familiar from Western Marxism after Lukács.

It is precisely at this point that the dialectic of structure and subject reveals the site where both intersect. This is not to say that the structure, brought to the point of inner deadlock, and the subject, divided from within by the effects of counterfinality, can be integrated into a neat relation of synthesis or complementarity. To the contrary, the two mutually presuppose one another only at the point of their inner breakdown.

3

Thus, the key development for the theory of the event as it takes shape in the late sixties in France as elsewhere can be said to lie in the notion that the impasse of the structure becomes visible only thanks to the retroactive effect of a subjective intervention.

This is precisely how Badiou sums up the entire trajectory of his major work, Being and Event: “The impasse of being, which causes the quantitative excess of the state to err without measure, is in truth the pass of the Subject.”[viii] We now understand this better, given our genealogical itinerary, just as it becomes easier to understand the importance of the fact that Badiou describes himself as having been marked by the influence of three “masters” or “teachers” (maîtres): Sartre, Althusser, and Lacan.

Finally, the reason why the event-site is the most original conceptual creation of Being and Event should have become clearer as well. It is precisely because an event is always anchored in a specific situation by way of its symptomatic site that it is neither transcendent (it is not “beyond” the situation at hand) nor immanent (it is not “already” lying dormant, virtually or potentially, within the situation as we know it). Badiou thus describes the site in highly metaphorical language—we are after all moving in the direction of a poetics—as laying aux bords du vide, or on the edges of the void. More specifically, he defines the site as follows: “I will term evental site an entirely abnormal multiple: that is, a multiple such that none of its elements are presented in the situation,” and he goes on to explain his own use of such highly poetic language:

It becomes clearer why an evental site can be said to be “on the edge of the void” when we remember that from the perspective of the situation this multiple is made up exclusively of non-presented multiples. Just “beneath” this multiple—if we consider the multiples from which it is composed—there is nothing, because none of its terms are themselves counted-as-one. A site is therefore the minimal effect of structure which can be conceived; it is such that it belongs to the situation, whilst what belongs to it in turn does not.[ix]

Before turning to an example, I would like to insist on the crucial importance of the notion of the site for the entire conceptual edifice of Being and Event. Without this notion, in fact, another criticism or objection, raised against Badiou’s philosophy far more frequently than Deleuze’s charge, would hold true, that is, the objection not so much of his presenting a transcendent or higher philosophy, but of falling in a rigid or even dogmatic, undialectical dichotomy of pure being, on the one hand, and the event as pure miracle, on the other.

The site, by locating an event within a minimal structural deadlock in the order of representation, is precisely that which diagonally crosses out this dualism, all the while articulating the structure of what is (being) with what happens (event), through the retroactive intervention of a subject.

As Badiou writes in the short and pivotal “Meditation Seventeen: The Matheme of the Event,” the site is what makes that an event is an event for a given situation: “The event is attached, in its very definition, to the places, to the point, in which the historicity of the situation is concentrated. Every event has a site which can be singularized in a historical situation.”[x] This does not mean that the existence of a site is a sufficient condition for an event to occur. “This site is only ever a condition of being for the event,” Badiou adds: “It is always possible that no event actually occur. Strictly speaking, a site is only ‘evental’ insofar as it is retroactively qualified as such by the occurrence of an event.”[xi]

One of the principal effects of the concept of the evental site in Being and Event, in my eyes at least, thus consists in prohibiting any interpretation of the event in the miraculous or decisionistic terms of pure self-belonging. Admittedly, the second volume of Being and Event, Logics of Worlds, might be confusing in this regard, insofar as it deploys a very different understanding of the site, which is not to be confused with the evental site in the original volume of Being and Event. What the recent book calls “site,” in fact, is once again closer, in terms of self-referentiality, to an understanding of the event as an autonomous, pure, or even miraculous occurrence, which is how the event in the earlier volume is often read once it is cut off of the “evental site” as its anchoring in the situation at hand. “Site” in Logics of Worlds thus refers to a moment where an entity of a given world makes its very being appear within its own regime of appearing:

Take any world whatsoever. A multiple which is an object of this world—whose elements are indexed on the transcendental of the world—is a “site” if it happens to count itself in the referential field of its own indexing. Or: a site is a multiple which happens to behave in the world in the same way with regard to itself as it does with regard to its elements, so that it is the ontological support of its own appearance. Even if the idea is still obscure, its content is plain: a site supports the possible of a singularity, because it summons its being in the appearing of its own multiple composition. It makes itself, in the world, the being-there of its own being.[xii]

One of the most important defining features of the “site” as defined in Logics of Worlds, therefore, is its self-referentiality or reflexivity: “A site is a reflexive multiplicity, which belongs to itself and thereby transgresses the laws of being.”[xiii] This transgressive or subversive quality of self-referentiality, though, would seem to be precisely the feature that assimilates the “site” most closely to the understanding of the “event” in Being and Event, whereas “evental site” in this older work has very much the function of puncturing the autonomy of the event by tying it down to the point where the situation’s historicity is concentrated in a symptomatic fashion.

Could we not say, then, that from “evental site” in Being and Event to “site” in Logics of Worlds, the theory of the event loses precisely the historical anchorage provided by the earlier concept? Not quite, but to understand this shift we would have to turn to another concept, that of the inexistent, which only seems to be new while in actual fact it is one of the many concepts in Logics of Worlds that hearken back to Badiou’s Theory of the Subject. Thus, even in Logics of Worlds, an event is obviously tied to the situation or “world” for which it is an event, but now the nodal point where this tying-together of world and event occurs is depicted as the “inexistent” proper to this world. In fact, an event is only an event properly speaking, that is, a strong singularity, if it gives maximal existence to that which previously was inexistent: “The strong singularity can thus be recognized by the fact that its consequence in the world is to make exist within it the proper inexistent of the object-site.”[xiv]

The shift from “evental site” to “site” or even “event-site,” in other words, may very well be one of those places where the two volumes of Being and Event and Logics of Worlds present problems of compatibility. This is something Badiou himself admits: “I have not taken care to guarantee at every point a continuity between the two projects,” he writes in the Preface to Logics of Worlds: “Problems of connection and continuity do remain, namely, between ‘generic procedure’ and ‘intra-worldly consequences of the existence of the inexistent.’ I leave them for another time, or for others to solve.”[xv]

Rather than continuing a strictly technical debate, however, I would like to draw your attention to a missing chapter, or a meditation that was originally scheduled to become part of Being and Event, even though in the end it was published only in the newsletter Le Perroquet of Badiou’s militant group Organisation Politique. This “missing meditation,” so to speak, is titled “The Factory as Event-Site,” and it will appear in a collection of Political Writings to be published by Columbia University Press. In it, Badiou makes the following bold claim: “The factory is, today, the event-site par excellence,” a claim whose apparent orthodoxy allows him to conclude by affirming: “This is why we can still legitimately call ourselves Marxist.”[xvi]

Now, it would not be difficult to speculate as to why Badiou decided to omit this Meditation from the published version of Being and Event—even though he was not averse to its publication altogether. One reason might be that there were lingering doubts with regard to the orthodoxy of the proclaimed continuity of Marxism and its legitimacy today. Another, more intriguing reason might be related to the difficult position that the inclusion of this particular meditation in Being and Event would have created for Badiou as a political activist, as opposed to his role as a philosopher more strictly speaking. Indeed, many of you no doubt know that one of the main principles behind Badiou’s proposal for a metapolitics, as opposed to yet another version of traditional political philosophy, lies in the notion that philosophy itself does not produce any truths, whether political or otherwise. If Badiou the philosopher were to adopt a prescriptive register in order to tell his fellow militants what is to be done, however, he could very well end up having troubles with his own organization.

Some of these doubts survive even the official reason, which Badiou recently gave me for excluding the meditation on the factory from Being and Event, namely, the fact that originally he had planned to add concrete historical meditations to each section of the book, dealing with each one of the four truth procedures that are art, science, love, and politics. “The Factory as Event-Site” was meant to be one such illustrative meditation. But then the book would have ended up being nearly unmanageable, with four times as many meditations than the current number of thirty-seven!

In the end, though, I am more interested in the quasi-poetic effects of the exclusion of the meditation on the factory from the final version of Being and Event than in the reasons behind its omission per se. Indeed, it is almost as if this exclusion were to be read as a performative instantiation—the meditation on the site becoming itself a site for the situation called Being and Event. There is a play of absence and presence at work in this omission, a play of impresentation and presentation, which is not unlike the effects of the metaphorical constellation that talks of multiples “on the edge of the void,” or of the “errancy” and “phantom-like” nature of the void, and of nonbeing within being. This is, after all, another defining feature of the “site” according to Logics of Worlds as well: “Because it carries out a transitory cancellation of the gap between being and being-there, a site is the instantaneous revelation of the void that haunts multiplicities.”[xvii]

4

It should not come as a surprise, therefore, to find a similar grammar of haunting impresentation at work in poetry itself, and it is even less surprising in the case of metapoetry, such as Pablo Neruda’s “Arte poética” written around 1929 and included in Residencia en la tierra. In fact, this poem opens with what I consider to be one of the most striking grammatical and metaphorical images for the site, here not so much situated “on the edge of the void” so much as “between shadow and space,” entre sombra y espacio. Anyone would of course be hard pressed to locate this space or nonplace. To do so would require the gesture of a minimal separation, if not a cut: the introduction of a distance between shadow and the place or space on which this shadow casts itself. (In another poem from Residencia en la tierra, “Galope muerto,” Neruda offers an equivalent image for time: entre la noche y el tiempo, “between night and time.”)

By definition, this poem written in the tradition of an “ars poética,” demands a type of reading which I have sometimes accused Badiou of performing, namely, a reading whereby the poem ends up presenting the theory of what is a poem, what is an event, or what is a site, a subject, and so on—in this case, a poetic event, a poetic subject, and a poetic site.

In Residencia en la tierra, such a reading can follow the guideposts provided above all by pure syntax. We should thus be on the lookout for the alternation between what there is, or what appears (Hay…, including in the phonetically indistinguishable ay, “alas,” which adds a note of anguish, lament, or loss to the appearing) and what happens, including on the level of subjectivization, as the effect of an event-like exception, usually marked by a “but” (pero, sin embargo, or ahora bien):

Arte poética
Entre sombra y espacio, entre guarniciones y doncellas,
dotado de corazón singular y sueños funestos,
precipitadamente pálido, marchito en la frente,
y con luto de viudo furioso por cada día de vida,
ay, para cada agua invisible que bebo soñolientamente,
y de todo sonido que acojo temblando,
tengo la misma sed ausente y la misma fiebre fría,
un oído que nace, una angustia indirecta,
como si llegaran ladrones o fantasmas,
y en una cáscara de extensión fija y profunda,
como un camarero humillado, como una campana un poco ronca,
como un espejo viejo, como un olor de casa sola,
en la que los huéspedes entran de noche perdidamente ebrios,
y hay un olor de ropa tirada al suelo, y una ausencia de flores,
posiblemente de otro modo aún menos melancólico,
pero, la verdad, de pronto, el viento que azota mi pecho,
las noches de substancia infinita caídas en mi dormitorio,
el ruido de un día que arde con sacrificio,
me piden lo profético que hay en mí, con melancolía,
y un golpe de objetos que llaman sin ser respondidos
hay, y un movimiento sin tregua, y un nombre confuso.

[Between shadow and space, between garrisons and maidens, endowed with a singular heart and mournful dreams, precipitately pale, withered the face and with the mourning of a widower furious for each day of life, alas, for each invisible water that I drink sleepily and for every sound that I grasp trembling, I have the absent thirst and the same cold fewer, an ear that is born, an indirect anguish, as if thieves or ghosts were arriving, and in a shell of a fixed and profound extension, like a humiliated waiter, like a bell a bit cracked, like an old mirror, like the smell of a solitary house in which the roomers enter at night losingly drunk, and there is a smell of clothing tossed to the floor, and an absence of flowers, possibly in some other way even less melancholic, but, the truth suddernly, the wind the strikes my chest, the nights of infinite substance dropped in my bedroom, the hoise of a day that burns with sacrifice they demand what is prophetic in me, with melancholy, and a crashing of objects which call without being answered there is, and a movement without pause, and a confused name.][xviii]

For a long time I dreamt of one day writing a “grammar of utopia,” in which these poems by Neruda, together with classical texts from Vallejo and other Spanish American poets, would figure prominently. The task would be to define the grammar of exception by which a purely fictive extension (como si llegaran ladrones o fantasmas) can be added onto the existing situation (aquello que hay) so as all of a sudden to bring forth a truth (pero, la verdad, de pronto) which not only interpellates the subject (me piden lo profético que hay en mí, without ever being allowed to occupy the grammatical subject-position) but also produces a new constellation of objects, that is, a new regime of appearing (hay) with its own ceaseless movement (un movimiento sin tregua), and a new but still confused name (un nombre confuso).

Neruda’s “Arte poética” thus gives us a poetic theory of the site of poetry, that is, a metapoetic description of the very place or nonplace, between shadow and place, where the invention of metaphors and metonymies produces poetry as a previously inexistent truth.



[i] The present text transcribes my handwritten notes for the keynote lecture at “Traversing Geographies: New Poetics of Space,” a conference organized by the Graduate Romanic Association of the University of Pennsylvania (March 22, 2008). I have kept all changes to a strict minimum—mostly just providing the missing references, without trying to omit the traces of the original oral presentation and without attempting to reconstruct the occasional improvisations. I would like to thank the conference’s organizers and the editors of the proceedings for their generosity and patience.

 

[ii] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Antiphilosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 152.

 

[iii] Alain Badiou, “One, Multiple, Multiplicities,” Theoretical Writings, ed. and trans. Alberto Toscano and Ray Brassier (London-New York: Continuum, 2004), 245-246 n. 3.

 

[iv] Bruno Bosteels, “Can Change Be Thought? A Dialogue with Alain Badiou,” Alain Badiou: Philosophy and Its Conditions, ed. Gabriel Riera (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), 254.

 

[v] Deleuze and Guattari, ibid., 85.

 

[vi] Badiou, Peut-on penser la politique? (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1985), 10.

 

[vii] For a more detailed discussion of structuralism and poststructuralism from the point of view of site, place, and nonplace, see my article “Nonplaces: An Anecdoted Topography of Contemporary French Theory,” New Coordinates: Spatial Mappings, National Trajectories, ed. Robert Davidson and Joan Ramon Resina, diacritics 33.3-4 (2003): 117-139.

 

[viii] Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London-New York: Continuum, 2005), 429.

 

[ix] Ibid., 175.

 

[x] Ibid., 178-179.

 

[xi] Ibid., 179.

 

[xii] Badiou, Logics of Worlds: Being and Event, 2, trans. Alberto Toscano (London-New York: Continuum, 2009), 363.

 

[xiii] Ibid., 369.

 

[xiv] Ibid., 377. For Badiou’s earlier view of this concept, see “The Inexistent,” Theory of the Subject, trans. Bruno Bosteels (London-New York: Continuum, 2009).

 

[xv] Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 39.

 

[xvi] Badiou, “The Factory as Event-Site,” trans. Alberto Toscano and Nina Powers (unpublished manuscript). Originally, this text was published as “L’usine comme site événementiel,” Le Perroquet: Quinzomadaire d’opinion 62-63 (1986).

 

[xvii] Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 369.

 

[xviii] Pablo Neruda, “Arte poética,” Residencia en la tierra, ed. Hernán Loyola (Madrid: Cátedra, 2006). I borrow the English translation from René de Costa, The Poetry of Pablo Neruda (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 69-70.

Bio

 

Bruno Bosteels

Bruno Bosteels is Associate Professor of Romance Studies at Cornell University. He received his PhD in Romance Languages and Literatures from the University of Pennsylvania (1995; MA 1992) and his BA in Romance Philology from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium (1989). Previously, he held positions as an assistant professor at Harvard University and at Columbia University. He is the author of Badiou o el recomienzo del materialismo dialéctico (2007), Badiou and Politics (2009) and Marx and Freud in Latin America (2010). He is currently preparing a manuscript entitled After Borges: Literature and Antiphilosophy. He is also the translator of several books by Alain Badiou: Theory of the Subject (Continuum, 2009), Can Politics Be Thought? followed by An Obscure Disaster: On the End of the Truth of State, and What Is Antiphilosophy? Writings on Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Lacan (both for Duke University Press). He currently serves as the general editor of Diacritics.

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Haussmannization and the Conquest of Place: Configuring Parisian Global Influence in the Second Empire (1852-1870)

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Niamh Sweeney
University College Cork

Paris of the Second Empire, habitually characterized as a site of transition where the unsettling of social, cultural and spatial boundaries announces the tensions of early modernity, is irrevocably associated with the process of urban renovation known, after Engels, as Haussmannization (1:559). Indeed, this process, whose influence exceeds the temporal parameters of the empire, establishes Paris as a paradigm of urban planning for other major Western cities throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century. Beyond the objective to render the city more “legible,” facilitating movement of goods and populace as well as addressing the dearth in supply of much-needed sources of waste disposal and water provision, Haussmannization was undoubtedly motivated by a self-conscious and systematic agenda of capital-building, formulated as the necessary means by which France might avoid an otherwise seemingly inevitable decline as an imperial and colonial world power, eclipsed by British global supremacy.

In this article it will be argued, with reference initially to Victor Hugo’s political reflections of the 1830s, how the perception of its secondary status as a colonial power spurs France of the mid-nineteenth century to devise a compelling case for its global significance in a way which will confidently distinguish it from the British model. Through the transformations of the Second Empire particularly, Paris is charged with offsetting that deficit, becoming a proxy for colonial expansion. However, as is evident in Haussmann’s writings, the justification for the transformation of “Vieux Paris” into a universal capital requires a problematization of the pre-transformation city which is shown to be on the verge of decline, and which can be salvaged only through a total othering of its features. As will be argued, in both his discourse and through the actual transformation of Paris itself, Haussmann elaborates a highly problematic vision of Parisian capitalness which foregrounds its uniqueness as a privileged locus for specific practices, whilst removing specific loci and practices from the map of Paris in a process which enacts a form of colonization at the very heart of the empire.

Claire Hancock, in her insightful analysis of Second Empire Paris, has already signaled the regime’s concerted endeavor to divest the city of its inherited revolutionary (and thus republican) symbolism and recast Paris as a monumental imperial capital in deference to the Roman model (66). Writing in the second volume of his memoirs in 1890, Haussmann himself gushingly retraces the ceremonial arrival of the emperor into Paris, his “entrée triomphale,” as he terms it, from the success at Solferino in the Italian campaign of 1859:

Je n’oublierai jamais l’entrée vraiment triomphale de l’Armée dans Paris, l’Empereur en tête, par la Barrière du Trône, le Faubourg Saint-Antoine, la ligne des boulevards, et l’émouvant défilé des drapeaux et des canons enlevés à l’ennemi; des prisonniers faits sur le champ de bataille, devant son Auguste Chef à cheval, Place Vendôme, en face de la Colonne portant la statue de Napoléon 1er. (2:576)

Haussmann’s retrospective re-appropriation of what are by 1890 (albeit contentious) lieux de mémoire of the republican left, underscores the tentative grounds on which the tenure of the symbolic representation of the city lay. As Hancock states, “Imperial Paris became a highly contested notion as those with conflicting political ideals fought for symbolic ownership of urban space and representation” (64). For the Second Empire, Paris becomes arguably the single most significant agent in the expression of its absolutist and centralizing power. As is often remarked, the Second Empire travaux seemed to occasion the exteriorization of the city: the erstwhile capital of private entertainment housed in the galeries and panoramas spills on to the street; or rather onto the tree-lined boulevard with its refurbished vespassiennes,[1] kiosks, lamps, benches, and particularly cafés – for this is primarily an externalization of bourgeois leisure habits.[2] The International Expositions of 1855 and 1867 further endow the Parisian spectacle, and provide a showcase as much of the city as of its imperial outspread, opening up the capital, it has been argued, less to its some 1.7 million inhabitants than to the wealthy foreign visitor.[3]

But this putative externalization of the city seems to occur in tandem with an internalization of the regime’s imperialist focus, most notably through the reinforcement of its centralist political ethos. Unlike other imperial capitals, such as Amsterdam or Brussels, for instance, Paris is not only the commercial, industrial and cultural hub of an empire but furthermore its political and administrative center. The erstwhile particularity of its street-based traditions is superseded by a seemingly more universal variety of uniqueness: “Tout vient aboutir à Paris: Grandes Routes, Chemins de Fer, Télégraphes. Tout en part: Lois, Décrets, Décisions, Ordres, Agents. …Paris est la Centralisation même” (2:557). Paris is presented as the sum of all cultural and political achievement – the identifiable center of law and culture – which is taken to be its defining quality as a locus, and indeed its specific condition of its status as a capital. “À Paris se rencontrent en même temps et se développent, par un mutuel contact, toutes les intelligences, toutes les activités de la nation: c’est … le foyer des Lettres, des Sciences, des Arts” (2:557). The consequences of this centralization, where municipal and state powers are, if not interchangeable, then to some extent overlapping, is a tendency to over-invest in the symbolic, capital potential of the city. Paul Valéry would much later remark in similar but more equivocal terms on this concentration of attributes and functions within Paris, a legacy which can be largely dated to the policies of the Second Empire:

Etre à soi seul la capitale politique, littéraire, scientifique, financière, commerciale, voluptuaire et somptuaire d’un grand pays; en représenter toute l’histoire, en absorber et en concentrer toute la substance pensante aussi bien que tout le crédit et presque toutes les facultés et disponibilités d’argent, et tout ceci bon ou mauvais, pour la nation qu’elle couronne, c’est par quoi se distingue, entre toutes les villes géantes, la ville de Paris. (141)

In his reading of Valéry’s essay, Derrida infers an “insistent ambiguity” in such an evaluation, noting that, “Ce qui distingue, ce qui se distingue est toujours le plus menacé, le meilleur au plus proche du pire. Le privilège est par définition une délicatesse en danger. Ce danger vient de l’étranger” (92, original emphasis). Thus distinction and privilege, following Derrida, are meaningful only as a configuration in light of an imminent threat external to it. When Haussmann stridently declares his objective to “faire une capitale digne de la France” (2:598, emphasis added), what comes across is that the city’s privileged status is by no means an inherited given, indeed that the securing of this state of distinction seems an outstanding concern yet to be delivered because the stakes have been raised, it might be surmised, on the global, rather than simply, local scale.

The early historical musings and later political essays of Victor Hugo are a fruitful source in this regard, not least for their temporal breadth which covers the period from the beginning of the second phase of French colonial expansion after 1830 through to the post-commune period, but also because the author’s convinced idiom provides an incisive example of how the city of Paris is fundamental to the reconfiguration of French influence in the shadow of British supremacy. Although France amassed considerable colonial possessions during the Second Napoleonic Empire – particularly in Asia – its material outspread was nevertheless overwhelmed by the success of the British model.[4] Hugo’s searching reflections on the balance of power in Europe comprise a resolute attempt to redress the fallout of British colonial superiority by way of strategizing a differentiated (and thus distinct) status for France on the global imperial scene, prefiguring somewhat the aspirations of the Second Empire. Instead he attempts to make a virtue of the seeming lag in French colonialism, and distinguishes the notion of global influence from the purely colonial. The secondary status of France emerges rather as the successor model, the inevitable second phase proceeding from and thus rendering redundant the sway of British imperialism: “La France … saura mal coloniser et n’y reussira qu’avec peine… L’Angleterre …coloniser[a] le monde barbare; la France civilisera le monde colonisé” (42:429). The alternative paradigm is one cast as a corrective, or rather a negation of the “esprit commercial” (42:375) of British colonialism: “S’enrichir n’est pas son object exclusif; s’agrandir n’est pas son ambition supreme. Éclairer pour améliorer, voilà son but” (42:375). In terms which draw from long-running debates concerning France’s mission civilisatrice,[5] Hugo formulates French imperialism instead as a disinterested bestowal outwards beyond itself in the name of civilization rather than a voracious drawing inwards through colonization. Thus, he attempts to create the circumstances, if not the space, for a new need or moral immunity for France within the colonial sphere in which the idea of improvement, or more particularly, civilization is itself colonized a specifically French virtue. This counter-model is reactive rather than innovative, a rhetorical retrieval of lost ground. His retort to the perception of British supremacy is, however, revealing: “Les îles sont faites pour servir les continents, non pour les dominer; les navires sont faits pour servir les villes, qui sont le premier chef-d’oeuvre de l’homme; le navire n’est que le second” (42:429, emphasis added). Besides the reduction of Britain to a position of subservience to France (effectively enacting a reversal of the actual circumstances at the time), whereby the island must serve the continent, the overwhelming opposition drawn is between two conflicting impulses: the British impetus to take possession and to settle other lands, which is contrary to the spirit of the French mission civilisatrice which requires movement to impart its message but where settlement is not the primary goal. However, it is the implied reduction of the two opposing imperial models to the respective metonyms of the ship and city which then strikes a problematic if not contradictory tone: as Hancock also notes, unlike London, Paris, at some 400km from the English Channel, is not a natural sea-port because of the difficulty of berthing of large sea-faring vessels (66). Thus, on the basis of mundane infrastructural shortcomings alone, the city constitutes an unlikely hub of a vast colonial empire. Yet Hugo, in terms which are later echoed by Haussmann, as quoted above, will still insist upon the global influence of France in specifically dynamic terms: “Ce qui inquiète étrangment les couronnes c’est que la France par cette puissance de dilation … tend à répandre au dehors sa liberté” (42:412, emphasis added). If the sea-vessel, as the emblem of British global expansion,[6] as Hugo sees it, is foregone as a means of guaranteeing world dominance, it is because the superiority of France resides in its capacity to diffuse outwards from a central point, and it is less the means than the a priori fact of dilation which is emphasized. Thus “la ville” here takes on the role of a “fleet in being” of sorts, forestalling the rival’s advance, keeping it literally at sea, through a disquieting potential dynamism. Where French imperialism might otherwise capitulate, instead, after Hugo’s model, it capitalizes through the privileging of the role of the city, or more precisely, one city: colonization of the far is substituted by a re-imagining of the influential possibilities of the near.

Through a similar insistence upon the at once continent and dilatory virtues of Paris, its immanence and transcendence, Haussmann’s model will further elaborate what might be termed the agonistic nature of this capitalization, where contraction operates a simultaneous expansive counteraction. The identity of the capital, as it is envisioned in the course of the Second Empire travaux, seems a volatile configuration of the supreme attributes of place on the one hand – uniqueness, particularity – and the space-affirming features of extension and universality on the other. To paraphrase Edward Casey in The Disappearance of Place: if place is to be understood as site-based, and linked to the specificities and traditions of a given locus, and privileging the place of the body within it, then in the modern age of exploration and the scientific affirmation of the infinite nature of space, how can that specificity of placeness hold its own and continue to be meaningful against potential dilution or abstraction enforced by the un-endingness of “outer” space? (134). Haussmannization actualizes this dilemma, insofar as the city’s potential for dilution and abstraction is enacted at the very level of its specificity, rather than out there in some inchoate beyond.

Much has been made of the regime’s blithe indifference to the “specialness” of Parisian topographical heritage (although Haussmann will go to certain lengths to dispute this in his memoirs[7]), and to the integrity of the commune-like distinction of its quartiers. Reviewing the first réseau of renovations undertaken between 1855 and 1859, and particularly the “dégagement complet des abords de l’Hotel de Ville” (810), Haussmann, as if to face down his critics, puts it bluntly and somewhat provocatively:

Devant l’Hotel de Ville, dans l’intérvalle qui séparait l’ancienne Place du Chatelet de l’espace irrégulier qualifié Place de Grève, l’oeil était affligé par d’horribles cloaques, nommés rue de la Tannerie, de la Vieille-Tannerie, de la Vannerie, de la vielle Place aux Veaux, Saint-Jérome, de la Vieille-Lanterne, de la Tuerie, des Teinturiers, etc., etc. …Que nos percements, ‘nos prétendus embellissements’ aient doté vieux et nouveaux quartiers d’espace, d’air, de lumière … en un mot de ce qui dispense de la salubrité, tout en réjouissant les yeux, la belle affaire! (3:810)

The apparent unconcern for the preservation of “Vieux Paris” reveals a more fundamental anxiety at work. In the heterogeneity of place, in its qualitative facets, Haussmann sees only a random and imprecise geometry, which offends and perturbs a spatially coherent visual appropriation. Light and air seem less bearers of salubrity than attributes of a post-enlightenment privileging of homogeneous, expansive space. It is a concern primarily with a quasi-mathematical correctness towards a vectorial apprehension of space — articulated as an aspiration towards the facilitation of movement and communication — which is frequently repeated in his memoirs: “C’était l’éventrement du vieux Paris…ce dédale presque impraticable, accosté…de communications transversales”(3:825), and again, “l’éventrement des quartiers de ce centre de ville aux rues enchevetrées, presque impraticables à la circulation des voitures”(2:589).

Haussmann was of course by no means the first urban observer of modern Paris to problematize by recourse to ideals of coherent dimensionality. One of the many more notable was the Fourierist disciple Considérant who, in his 1840 Déscription du Phalanstère, likened the old center to a “spectacle de désordre qui … frappe … vos yeux, enumerating the many “murs qui se dépassent, s’entrechoquent, se mêlent, se heurtent sous mille formes bizarres; des toitures de toutes inclinaisons qui se surhaussent et s’attaquent” (cited in Choay, 107). Extant urban placeness, in the utopian imagining, similarly epitomizes the haphazard, and thus hazardous chaos prior to an ordering spatialization. What is more, when he writes, “Le Verbe de la Creation a retenti sur le Chaos; et l’Ordre s’est fait” (cited in Choay, 109, emphasis added), it might be ventured that if the ideal of legibility will be favored, it is only because the spectator fails to read the city by the pre-existing terms of place.

But whereas the création of the Fourierist counter-model of the phalanstère is predicated on an abandonment rather than on a transformation of the modern city, following the trajectory of colonization to a purer elsewhere beyond it, Haussmannization necessarily confines its application of the tabula rasa to the city itself. Thus the vehement terminology of remedial urbanization – “éventrement,” “percement,” “assainissement,” “alignement,” “nivellement” (803-810) – if not actually coined by Haussmann is still given a wholesale and unprecedented realization, as if to bestow material expression onto Kant’s observation that “we can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think of it as empty of objects” (cited in Casey, 198). Indeed, as it is suggested particularly by Haussmann’s procedural use of the now stock term of urban renewal (“dégagement”), it is primarily space, above “salubrité,” which will be liberated through the elimination of place (807-810). He goes on: “L’achèvement ultérieur de la rue de Turbigo fit disparaître la rue Transnonain de la carte de Paris!” (825).[8] Thus, the notorious déplacement of the working-class peuple is the consequence of a literal de-placing of extant locales, a de-figuration prior to a “transfiguration” of the city, as he terms the travaux at one point, into an ostensibly consistent spatial whole through which pre-existing place must undergo a wholesale “suppression” (824-825).

Perhaps more than an imperial capital then, Haussmannization, in its deterritorialization and denaturing of place, transfigures Paris into an archetypal colonized city. Haussmann would seem to suggest as much in his assertion, after the many “vifs débats” prior to the final acceptance of his proposals for renovation, that: “je me sentis fermement en selle, pour aller à la conquête du vieux Paris” (589 emphasis added). Aside from the posturing in Haussmann’s unashamed analogy with the Emperor’s “entrée triomphale” from Italy, there can be inferred a necessary distanciation in relation to the city, analogous to the abstraction fundamental to colonial expansion to remote territories, such that the Second-Empire will to colonization would similarly seem to be subject to the over-riding imperative of centralization. This distanciation is particularly evident in Haussmann’s virtual crystallization of the opposition between space and place in his evaluation of the differing provenance and characteristics of the commune and départment:

La Commune est presque aussi ancienne que la Famille. Ce n’est pas seulement une division territoriale; c’est une collection de personnes liées par des intérêts tout à la fois moraux et matériels, présents à l’esprit et aux yeux de chacun. C’est le principe, le point de départ de toute organisation sociale; c’est l’élément constitutif des empires.

Au contraire, le Département, de création relativement récente, est surtout une circonscription administrative, n’ayant en rien le caractère …de nos anciennes provinces. Ses limites peuvent être arbitrairement étendues ou restreintes. (701)

What is most striking here is that while Haussmann acknowledges the virtues of the commune as a preliminary place-type and as the chief constituent of an empire, it is only in order to then foreground its obsolescence and inadequacy to the demands of progressive modernity. The almost primordial, holistic nature of the commune-place facilitates a collectivity that is dependent on non-linear, experiential networks, “communications transversales,” as it were, which resist easy quantification. Conversely, the “département” constitutes an arbitrary designation which has neither a substantive presence as place nor bears any material relation to it: it is an administrative transposition which supersedes and circumvents the qualitative limits of the commune, in order to sanction spatial expansion or reduction at will. In short, the département facilitates the total spatial abstraction of urban morphology: “Paris n’est pas une Commune; c’est la Capitale de l’Empire, la propriété collective du Pays entier, la Cité de tous les Français” (2:701). Haussmann is here underscoring that in Paris, above all other possible places, the designation of commune is entirely inappropriate because the state of being a capital, or rather the process of capitalization, must be based on more spatially flexible criteria. The absorption of several outer communes into Paris, after the loi d’annexation of 1859, extended the city beyond Thiers’s fortifications by a seemingly negligible 250 meters. However, this extension signals that the perception of an unbreachable city limit, designating the city’s beginning and end, is nonetheless under question, and thus a stable spatial definition of how the position and form of Paris is to be conceived is similarly tenuous and variable.

Ironically, this measure of uncertainty concerning the city’s morphology is arguably the outcome of a drive for increased precision in the drafting of urban plans. Although it is an inconvenient irony that after the devastation of the Hôtel de Ville during the Commune of 1871, no cartographic evidence remains of the survey projections undertaken prior to the delineation of the various réseaux for renovation, there are ample references to Haussmann’s methodology, his employment of a team of géometres under the supervision of Eugène Deschamps, le Chef du Service du Plan de la Ville de Paris, and particularly to their innovative use of the “triangulation” method in the drafting of their planswhich permitted, as he puts it, “la vérification minitieuse de toutes les parties de cette opération capitale.” This meticulous procedure allows the city of “rues enchevetrées” to conform to principles of mathematical accuracy: “ [O]n leva le plan détaillé des espaces, bâtis ou non, circonscrit par les cotés de chaque triangle, c’est-à-dire des maisons, terrains et voies publiques que son périmètre embrassait” (3:802). It is important nonetheless to point out that the drafting of geometrically exact maps is in no way a pioneering development of the nineteenth century, much less of Haussmannization. They can be dated to at least the seventeenth century where, as Casey notes, increasingly “the earth is construed as a global scene of sites of discovery and exploitation” (201). An analogous development occurs in urban cartography around this time: the picturesque “city portrait” of earlier cartographic forms, a figurative and allegorical representation of the city, which gives, as Daniel Roche puts it, a birds-eye “perspective rendering of the high points of the city, when the map maker was working in two dimensions, reveal[ed] an ideal of urban culture in which the concrete spectacle was more important than the abstract image” (12). This allegorical representation is superseded by the new geometric map which, as Roche explains, “imposed the imperatives of measurement and planning; [where] space was rendered in its totality, empty, waiting to be filled, controllable, the city thus measured was no longer the living organism adorned with all the prestige of culture and originality”(13).

The emphasis thus gradually moved from the aesthetically pleasing representation of the “bâti” to a proportionately correct “voirie.” It can be said that Haussmann had to an extent availed of a cartographic method which had been developed in the late 17th century. Where Haussmannization’s originality lay, however, was in its indiscriminate reliance on and commitment to the exigencies of the two-dimensional, graphic medium above those of the “living organism” which inspired it. In one remarkably telling recollection of the use to which these plans were put, Haussmann writes:

La juxtaposition et l’entoilage de ces nombreuses feuilles dans un cadre porté par des montants sur pieds à roulettes, et placé bien en vue au milieu de mon cabinet de travail, y constituait derrière le fauteuil de mon bureau un immense paravent, où je pouvais, à toute minute, en me retournant, chercher un détail, contrôler certaines indications, et reconnaître les corrélations topographiques des arrondissements et quartiers de Paris entre eux. (3:802-803)

Haussmann’s vision is a superlative abstraction of the city of Paris in which the blank map is waiting not just to be filled, as Roche described, but whose application in practice will result in an unprecedented alteration of the city’s form and features. The seeming neutral facsimile of topographical truths, proffered as an authentic acquiescence between the requirements of the two-dimensional medium and the material realities of the built environment, becomes an arena of play and anticipation; a geometrical grid in which places, quartiers are reduced to moveable “indications,” meaningful only in their correlation with other points on this unpeopled, compliant canvas.

In his 1938 essay, “The Age of the World Picture”, Heidegger wrote that in the modern conception of space, “every place is equal to every other” (119). These terms would seem to encapsulate the Haussmannized vision of space, inasmuch as this method constituted more than the mere rationalization of the city, as has often been commented, it comprised the total relativization of place. It is this facet which betrays the fundamental tension at the core of this process of capitalization: in both Haussmann and Valéry’s claims we saw the wish for Paris to be at once a unique place identifiable for specific practices – cultural, political, social – and a world capital which disinterestedly normalizes and universalizes those practices, thus transcending the specificity of place. Just as liberté, for Hugo, cannot be contained as a site-specific attribute, so too does the Haussmannian aspiration to ubiquity nullify the relevancy of any one locus, and thus perhaps particularity or placeness as a viable feature of capitalness.



[1] A street urinal whose name is derived from the Roman Emperor Vespassian. For a brief but useful explanation of the history of the vespassienne see Jones, 457-460.

[2] See Benjamin, 146-149.

[3] See Greenhalgh, 54-67; Hussey, 276; Jones, 372.

[4] Second Empire imperial expansion had its greatest successes in Australasia. New Caledonia was annexed in 1853. Throughout the 1850s inroads were made into Indochina, and in 1863 Cambodia became a protectorate. For a comprehensive overview of French modern colonial history, see particularly Aldrich.

[5] To a certain extent, Hugo appropriates the major themes of this discourse which had originally emerged from late eighteenth-century debates on liberty, progress and revolution. Jennifer Pitts’s A Turn to Empire provides an enlightening evaluation of this shift in concepts of colonialism and empire. She argues how intellectuals, such as Condorcet, initiated a rethinking of the implications of conquest and colonialism as potentially progressive and salutary forces, which might spread the revolutionary message, civilizing supposedly primitive societies (168-171). Hugo’s contemporary, Alexis de Tocqueville, was a foremost proponent of the concept in the mid-19th century. As Pitts argues, for Tocqueville national glory was intertwined with the idea of conquest of the other lands (193-194). Moreover, as Pitts shows, he cautioned against the pitfalls of Parisian centralization (214). Hugo, on the other hand, developed a contrary vision of the mission civilisatrice, in which centralization, for which the city is a physical representation, is fundamental to its success.

[6] The three-mast ship is the actual crest of the city of Paris.

[7] See particularly Haussmann 2:595, 3:810, 3:954-956.

[8] That Rue Transnonain was the site, in April 1834, of a bloody massacre of civilians by Louis Philippe’s forces, gives Haussmann’s words a further charge: insofar as it might be said that the removal of a site of republican significance constitutes an endeavor to redraft collective political memory.

Bibliography

Aldrich, Robert. Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion.

Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991.

Benjamin, Walter. “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century.” Reflections. Trans. Edmond

Jephcott. New York, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.

Casey, Edward S. The Disappearance of Place. Berkley; Los Angeles: California

University Press, 1998.

Clark, Timothy J. The Absolute Bourgeois: Artist and Politics in France 1848-1851.

London: Thames and Hudson, 1982.

Considérant, Victor. “La Déscription du Phalanstère” in Françoise Choay.

L’Urbanisme, utopies et réalités: Une anthologie. Paris: Seuil, 1965.

Derrida, Jacques. L’Autre Cap: suivi de La Démocratie ajournée. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1991

Engels, Fredrick. “The Housing Question.” Marx, Karl. and Fredrick Engels. Selected Works.

Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955.

Greenhalgh, Paul. Ephemeral Vistas: The Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and

Worlds Fairs, 1851-1939. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.

Hancock, Claire. “Capitale du Plaisir.” Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display, Identity.

Ed. Driver, Felix.and David Gilbert. New York: St Martins Press, 1999.

Haussmann, Eugène. Mémoires. Ed. Françoise Choay. Paris: Seuil, 2000.

Heidegger, Martin. “The Age of the World Picture.” The Question Concerning Technology and

Other Essays. Ed. and Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Torch Books, 1977, 115-154.

Hugo, Victor. Oeuvres Complètes.Vol.42. Paris, 1884.

Hussey, Andrew. Paris: The Secret History. London, Viking: 2006.

Jones, Colin. Paris: Biography of a City London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2005.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. N.K. Smith.

New York: Humanities Press, 1960.

Pitts, Jennifer. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Roche, Daniel. The People of Paris: An Essay in Popular Culture in the 18th Century.

Trans. Evans, Marie. and Gwynne Lewis. Leamingtom Spa: Berg Publications Ltd., 1999.

Saalman, Howard. Haussmann: Paris Transformed. Braziller, 1971.

Tester, Keith. The Flâneur. London; New York: Routledge ,1994. .

Valéry, Paul. “La Fonction de Paris.” Regards sur le monde actuel et autres essais.

Paris: Gallimard, 1945, 139-143.

Bio

Niamh Sweeney

Niamh Sweeney is a PhD candidate at the Dept. of French, University College Cork. Her research interests include modern and contemporary French culture and thought, critical theory, art history, and the city. Her MA thesis focused on representations of the Eiffel Tower, and she has published work on Baudelaire. In 2002, she was awarded the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) Government of Ireland Scholarship to fund her doctoral research. She was also a recipient of the Chryss O’Reilly Ireland Fund for France bursary on the completion of her BA in French. She is completing her dissertation on the notion of Parisian decline.

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« La vraie liberté, c’est de pouvoir se passer d’autrui » : fraternité et forme dans les Scènes de la vie de bohème de Murger

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Lucy Swanson
University of Pennsylvania

Les Scènes de la vie de bohème1, l’ouvrage d’Henry Murger, a créé un mythe bohémien qui perdure jusqu’à nos jours grâce aux adaptations dramatiques de l’histoire, mais le texte reste peu considéré dans des cercles académiques, et aucun critique n’a examiné l’importance de la fraternité qui en forme le socle. Pourtant, entre ceux qui ont redécouvert les Scènes, Sandrine Berthelot écrit que « [l’]on pourrait avancer l’idée que la bohème marque le passage du romantisme au réalisme, en même temps qu’elle est l’indice d’une prolétarisation et une démocratisation de l’art au milieu du siècle »2, tandis que Elizabeth Wilson voit dans cette représentation de la bohème son rapport avec son audience bourgeoise, à la fois choquée et fascinée par la vie bohémienne3. Jerrold Seigel voit dans les Scènes l’expression de sa théorie qui rapproche bourgeois et bohème, ce dernier étant une expression chez le premier des tensions inhérentes dans son identité sociale4. Le livre consiste de vingt-trois chapitres, dont vingt ont été publiés originellement en feuilleton dans le Corsaire-Satan entre 1845 et 1849, qui exposent la formation d’une organisation fraternelle et bohémienne par quatre jeunes artistes ou intellectuels (Rodolphe, Marcel, Schaunard, et Gustave Colline), et de leurs problèmes subséquents d’amour et d’argent. Au fur et à mesure, il se révèle une tension formelle et thématique entre les chapitres écrits pour sa parution originelle en feuilleton, et les trois chapitres rédigés pour la première édition en 1851. Il est difficile de dire avec assurance si cette dernière est une étude de mœurs—comme Murger atteste dans le premier chapitre5—ou bien un roman-feuilleton à une chronologie plus ou moins expérimentale, étant donné la multiplicité d’intrigues et la temporalité souvent vague due en partie à la relation ambiguë entre elles. Sur cette question se superpose celle de la fraternité, telle qu’elle est représentée et ensuite désagrégée dans les deux catégories de chapitres, feuilleton ou non. A cet égard il est essentiel d’engager le concept freudien du « roman familial »6. Cette fantaisie d’un individu qui s’imagine un lignage amélioré, ou exclusif de ses frères ou sœurs, a été réinterprétée à diverses fins par de nombreux critiques, comme Christine van Boheemen-Saaf qui comprend l’intérêt contemporain pour le roman familial comme l’expression de l’importance des origines7. Il est également nécessaire de s’interroger sur le sens politique du terme « fraternité » à l’époque, même s’il est rarement question de politique dans les Scènes, car la devise « Liberté, égalité, fraternité » qui a figuré dans la révolution de 1789 réapparaît lors de la révolution de 1848, mais elle n’a certainement plus le même sens après soixante ans, la chute de la Première République, un empire et deux monarchies.

Dès le début des Scènes, il est possible de voir l’importance de la métaphore familiale, qui révèle la tension inhérente à la vie de bohème entre le désir du renom et la marginalité qui est une source d’authenticité8. Dans la préface écrite par Murger pour la première édition en 1851, l’auteur construit une généalogie bohémienne9, et malgré le fait que la conceptualisation de la « Bohème » tel qu’il la conçoit ne date que des années 183010, il raconte leurs racines artistiques de la période antique des grecs jusqu’aux précurseurs du 18e siècle comme Rousseau, et explique que « La Bohème dont il s’agit dans ce livre n’est point une race née d’aujourd’hui, elle a existé de tout temps et partout, et peut revendiquer d’illustres origines » (29). Les termes « généalogie » et « aïeux » qui apparaissent dans le même paragraphe, ainsi qu’une référence à la « grande famille d’artistes pauvre » (35), ne font qu’augmenter le sens que cette introduction est un « roman familial »11. Pourtant, si ce terme désigne une réécriture de l’arbre généalogique chez Freud, car il explique que l’enfant cherche à renier ses parents à cause de sa désillusion envers eux, chez Murger la préface est une écriture initiale, une tentative d’établir une histoire qui n’a pas encore été écrite. Les bohémiens sont peut-être des orphelins artistiques, cherchant à reconstruire ou à rêver la parenté qu’ils ignorent, ou plutôt des enfants bâtards qui révèlent (ou inventent) leurs origines, jusqu’alors cachées, aux autres.

Cette généalogie bohémienne fonctionne aussi comme un redressement des préjugés que le lecteur (bourgeois) pourrait avoir envers ces artistes. Murger met le lecteur en garde contre les images des bohémiens que « les dramaturges du boulevard ont fait les synonymes de filous et d’assassins » (29), et il explique au « bourgeois timoré » que « La Bohème, c’est le stage de la vie artistique »12 (34) ; aussi se distancie-t-il du lecteur, en établissant une opposition entre l’artiste bohémien et le lectorat largement bourgeois. La vie de bohème étant donc une période de production—de l’artiste, qui doit passer par cette initiation, ainsi que de ses œuvres—elle trouve ses propres origines dans sa complémentarité avec la vie bourgeoise13. Pour Seigel, cette opposition souvent faite entre le bourgeois et le bohémien14 atteste moins de leur différence que de leur interdépendance, un point de vue qui se trouverait validé déjà dans la relation établie par Murger entre artiste et consommateur d’art. Mais Seigel pousse le rapport encore plus loin quand il écrit « [Bohemia is] the appropriation of marginal life-styles by young and not so young bourgeois, for the dramatization of ambivalence toward their own social identities and destinies », alors effectivement tout bohémien est d’emblée bourgeois (11). Son interprétation de ce dernier terme rend pourtant la question plus compliquée. Car à l’époque, remarque Seigel, « bourgeois » est aussi flou que « bohème », malgré les connotations d’avarice, de vieillesse, et de conformisme. Il est possible néanmoins d’exclure le prolétaire et l’ancienne noblesse de cette catégorie, quoiqu’il reste alors une grande partie de la population qui peut se dire « bourgeois », des marchands jusqu’à la haute bourgeoisie (8-9). Murger admet en quelque sorte cette ambiguïté : dans sa préface il écrit que certains « fils de famille », cette expression qui connote richesse et respectabilité, font partie de la « Bohème ignorée », mais que n’ayant ni l’art comme but ultime ni l’intelligence qu’il faut pour survivre sans argent, seulement un désir d’aventure, ces bourgeois sont exclus de la vraie bohème dont ils sont incapables de faire partie (40). Pour sa part, les vrais bohémiens ont la modestie d’origine qui leur donne l’intelligence pratique qu’il faut pour survivre à la pauvreté extrême. S’il existe un « roman familial » fantasmé par l’individu bohémien autour de sa parenté (au sens propre du terme), ce n’est pas un mythe d’ascension sociale, mais plutôt une revendication de ses humbles origines ; pour le bourgeois bohémien, le roman familial est la construction de ses humbles origines artistiques, sa « misère d’artiste » comme Murger l’appelle.

La construction d’une famille ou d’un lignage imaginés n’est pas limitée à la préface, au contraire ce qui distingue les bohèmes des bourgeois dans les Scènes est leur « association fraternelle », ce groupe fondé par les quatre amis protagonistes. Mais le lignage hiérarchique et chronologique présenté dans la préface, et la fraternité égalitaire qui est une partie intégrale des Scènes, sont très différents : dans le chapitre « Donec gratus », le narrateur dit que « pendant six mois [la] plus loyale fraternité se pratiquait sans emphase dans ce cénacle, où tout était à tous et se partageait en entrant, bonne ou mauvaise fortune » (237). Cependant, le concept de fraternité, toujours problématique puisque ce mot qui connote l’amour égalitaire s’emploie souvent sans l’idée de la rivalité entre frères, le devient encore davantage au 19e siècle, quand il devient un tiers de la devise révolutionnaire « Liberté, égalité, fraternité ».

Dans son livre The Family Romance of the French Revolution, Lynn Hunt révise le concept du roman familial pour la raccommoder à l’inconscient politique des français autour de la Première Révolution15 (12-13). Plus spécifiquement, Hunt établit un parallèle entre la bande de frères dans Totem et tabou de Freud16, dont elle appelle le meurtre du père et l’usurpation de sa position « le premier roman familial », et de la Révolution où les Français établissent une fraternité républicaine en exécutant le roi, leur patriarche. En dépit de la violence du moment historique, Hunt écrit que le concept était envisagé tour à tour comme menaçant ou innocent. Son étude de La Philosophie dans le boudoir révèle jusqu’à quel point l’imagination de Sade a poussé les idées de « République » et de « fraternité ». D’un côté, le pamphlet à l’intérieur du texte prône la sodomie et l’inceste comme une source de solidarité entre les frères républicains, de l’autre, il explique qu’il faut tolérer le meurtre dans une république. Si les liens fraternels chez Murger ne sont point violents, ils ne sont pas inclusifs non plus17. Les bohémiens sont égalitaires entre eux, mais souvent à l’exclusion d’autres. Quand Carolus Barbemuche veut devenir le cinquième membre du cénacle dans « Un café de la bohème », il doit passer par une période de bizutage avant d’être admis. Par ailleurs, les femmes qui sont si importantes aux bohémiens restent toujours moins importantes que leurs frères artistiques18 ; le genre même des femmes les exclut de la fraternité. Un autre groupe important est exclu (à l’exception peut-être de Carolus) de ce « clan bohème »—dont le nom même rappelle les frères de Freud—c’est-à-dire les bourgeois, qui sont d’ailleurs souvent associés avec la paternité par titre (le père Médicis qui achète la peinture de Marcel), par extension des relations familiales normales (l’oncle Monetti) (81), ou parce qu’ils sont de vrais pères, comme le « père de famille » qui tient compte des décès pour la mairie et exprime son désir à Rodolphe pour « [u]n journal qui dirait tout simplement la santé du roi et les biens de la terre », un marque du peu d’importance qu’il attribue à la politique et à l’art qui paraît dans les journaux sous forme de feuilleton ou de critique (71).

Il est possible alors de lire le texte de Murger à travers la théorie de Hunt, mais avant il faut l’accommoder à la période historique pendant laquelle les Scènes sont publiées en feuilleton ; c’est-à-dire à la fin de la monarchie de juillet, au moment de la Révolution de 1848, et pendant la Deuxième République. La fraternité égoïste que Sade présente comme une alternative à l’idéal anticipe mieux la perception du terme en 1848 quand l’idéalisme de la première révolution a été largement diminué par les multiples changements politiques de la cinquantaine d’années précédentes. Mona Ozouf note que la présence de la devise révolutionnaire n’est que superficielle en ce moment, car « la Constitution de 1848 […] en a conservé les mots plus que les idées, tant elle s’est préoccupé d’en amortir le tranchant et d’en assourdir l’écho ».19 Les souvenirs de « la fraternité-fraternisation de 1793, la fraternité-terreur, élection et exclusion mêlées » étaient trop vifs (610). La monarchie n’est plus absolue, Louis-Philippe est « le roi bourgeois » (Graña 10), et le fait qu’il partage son pouvoir avec les bourgeois20 est une explication possible pour leur présence paternelle dans les Scènes. Néanmoins, ce paternalisme, quoique souvent ridiculisé, est indispensable pour les bohèmes. Ils sont souvent une source d’argent, comme le père Médicis qui offre des choses matérielles, « des cigares contre un plan de feuilleton, des pantoufles contre un sonnet, de la marée fraîche contre des paradoxes » ; mais son rôle en tant qu’intermédiaire entre artiste et public est essentiel (247). Quand Marcel apprend que ce bourgeois a vendu sa peinture à un « marchand de comestibles » et que l’on avait ajouté un bateau à son tableau, il n’est pas déçu, au contraire il est « ravi de ce triomphe, et murmura : La voix du peuple, c’est la voix de Dieu » (253). Curieusement, cette citation, aussi pleine d’humour qu’elle soit, est peut-être le meilleur exemple d’un sentiment presque fraternel d’un bohème pour des individus à l’extérieur de son « clan ».

Dans le chapitre « Épilogue des amours de Rodolphe et de Mimi », Marcel dit « on renverse une dynastie plus facilement qu’un usage, fût-il même ridicule » (375), et de son côté, apparemment Murger partageait cet ambivalence envers l’idéalisme républicain, ou ressentait même une hostilité envers la révolution.21 Cette ambivalence envers la politique peut se lire dans les Scènes malgré le succès de la fraternité chez les protagonistes, notamment dans un feuilleton qui a paru dans la première édition, mais effacé pour la deuxième (apparemment pas pour des raisons politiques malgré sa coïncidence avec le coup d’état de 1851)22 : dans « Son Excellence Gustave Colline », ce dernier gagne un poste d’ambassadeur en jouant aux billes, tandis que dans « Comment fut institué le cénacle de la bohème », le concierge est payé à annoncer la date et le gouvernement chaque matin, une réponse ludique aux fréquents changements politiques que les bohémiens ont subi. Comme le dit César Graña, après tant de tumulte, il est normal de réagir avec humour.23

En contraste avec la précision des dates données par le concierge est la temporalité généralement indéterminée des Scènes. Si la chronologie devrait être claire, puisque chaque chapitre de l’oeuvre commence par une indication temporelle, ces indices sont généralement vagues, comme par exemple « Les Amours de carême » qui commence « Un soir de carême Rodolphe rentra chez lui avec l’intention de travailler » ( 91) ; sinon, elles font référence à un autre événement non daté.24 Les quelques scènes qui donnent une indication temporelle précise sont soit dans le premier chapitre, écrit pour l’édition en volume et donc impliqué avec la romanisation des Scènes, soit ayant une relation importante avec l’argent :

C’était le 19 mars… Et dût-il atteindre l’âge avancé de M. Raoul-Rochette, qui a vu bâtir Ninive, Rodolphe n’oubliera jamais cette date, car ce fut ce jour-la même, jour de Saint-Joseph, à trois heures de relevée, que notre ami sortait de chez un banquier, où il venait de toucher une somme de cinq cents francs en espèces sonnantes et ayant cours. (128)25

La précision temporelle de cette citation démontre combien l’argent, devenu une nouvelle religion, est rare mais puissant chez les bohémiens, car ce moment prend un ton même religieux par la référence au « jour de Saint-Joseph », la figure paternelle terrestre pour Jésus-Christ et un patriarche important au Torah (ainsi qu’un personnage dans Cinq-Mars de Vigny). Ces dates exactes sont liées au pouvoir politico-paternel aussi, comme celle qui est annoncée par le concierge, le père Durand : « c’est aujourd’hui le neuf avril mil huit cent quarante… il y a de la boue dans les rues, et S. M. Louis-Philippe est toujours roi de France et de Navarre » (77). Mais la qualité concrète de la date est éclipsée par l’inconstance politique de l’époque, car cet exemple est un commentaire ludique sur le caractère éphémère du gouvernement. Il est nécessaire de préciser qui est roi puisque le sceptre peut changer de main à n’importe quel moment ; d’ailleurs, le chapitre d’où cette scène est tirée est écrit par Murger pour la première édition des Scènes, donc après la révolution de 1848 (Robb 439). Même les dates qui paraissent précises peuvent mettre en relief l’incertitude de la période historique.

L’instabilité politique n’est pas la seule source de cette qualité vague, qui est due en grande partie à la forme originelle des Scènes en feuilleton. Chez Murger, l’aboutissement de cette publication en feuilleton est un livre plus ouvert où les éléments peuvent se lire tous seuls, mais qui en même temps coexistent dans les Scènes comme les bohémiens, c’est-à-dire en égalité et avec une certaine continuité malgré leur indépendance.26 Dans les Scènes, le narrateur rappelle parfois au lecteur des détails qu’il aurait oubliés. Par exemple, le chapitre « Les fantaisies de Musette » commence « On se rappelle peut-être comment le peintre Marcel vendit au juif Médicis son fameux tableau du Passage de la mer Rouge » (301). Le format même du feuilleton exige ce style d’écriture, qui rend chaque publication accessible au plus grand lectorat. Maria Adamowicz-Hariasz écrit que le roman-feuilleton était construit de parts distinctes à cause de la mode de consommation, et que cette innovation permettait aux écrivains d’introduire des personnages ou des intrigues supplémentaires.27 Berthelot note un phénomène similaire chez Murger mais sans pourtant les attribuer au roman-feuilleton : « Faisant fi des règles, Murger rend flous les contours du roman—d’ailleurs s’agit-il d’un roman ?—, mélange les genres en insérant, par exemple, dans le texte des chansons, varie les tons en faisant coexister des histoires légères et divertissantes avec d’autres récits franchement pathétiques » (226). Si ces détails ajoutent une certaine insouciance, mêlée bien sûr d’une part de regret, ils vont de pair avec la chronologie également libre. Pourtant, les dates absentes peuvent indiquer quelque chose de plus grave. Sandrine Berthelot voit dans « Le cap des tempêtes » un écho avec la politique, quand Rodolphe essaie d’assister à un banquet qui est fermé : « Ce banquet, quoique volontairement non daté, n’est pas sans rappeler, bien sur, les banquets interdits de 1847 qui entraînent l’insurrection de 1848 » (222). Si la date originelle de sa publication, juillet 1846, pourrait affirmer cette thèse, il est possible que Murger ait altéré le texte pour son édition en 1851. En tout cas, il faut noter que Rodolphe s’intéresse davantage à manger qu’à faire la révolution.

La relation entre politique et littérature n’est pas limitée aux pages du feuilleton ; le développement de cette mode de transmission est dû en partie aux changements tumultueux de régime. La modération de Louis-Philippe envers la presse n’a rien de surprenant28, comme il est souvent supposé que la censure a eu une grande influence sur la révolution de 1830 et le détrônement de son frère Charles X (Graña 7). En interprétant l’avènement au pouvoir de Louis-Philippe à travers Totem et tabou, ce « roman familial originel » d’après Hunt (6), il est possible de voir le roi bourgeois comme « père déifié », c’est-à-dire un père symbolique qui restaure l’ordre patriarcal après le parricide originel, sans pourtant dérober les frères des libertés qu’ils ont gagné (Freud 185). Évidemment, une de ces licences est celle de la presse, dont le développement est de plus en plus lié à la littérature. Lise Queffélec explique que « la libéralisation du régime de la presse après la Révolution de Juillet (plus de censure, seul un cautionnement est nécessaire pour fonder un journal), provoqua une expansion dans laquelle le roman feuilleton jouera un rôle, et non des moindres : il permet d’abaisser le prix de l’abonnement en augmentant la clientèle » (11). Cette réduction des prix désigne une plus grande accessibilité qui est un de plusieurs indices de la démocratisation croissante de la presse et de la lecture plus généralement pendant la monarchie de Juillet, une autre étant la loi Guizot de 1833, qui donne accès libre à une éducation primaire à tous les enfants mâles (Adamowicz-Hariasz 161-2). Tous les Français ne sont pas contents de cette transition vers une littérature produite et distribuée en masse : pendant cette période, le roman-feuilleton est critiqué pour indécence par certains critiques cherchant à blâmer les bourgeois au pouvoir du gouvernement29, et impliqué dans la révolution de 1848, s’il est difficile de prouver ce fait (35-6). Mais la Deuxième République, dont la forme gouvernementale est en principe plus démocratique, censure davantage la presse que sous le roi Louis-Philippe (Adamowicz-Hariasz 177).

Pour Murger, ces changements sont probablement synonymes de travail, car la quantité de journaux a haussé largement entre la fin du premier quart de siècle et la vingtaine d’années suivantes, les abonnements multipliés par quatre entre 1824 et 1846, quoique ce chiffre représente bien sûr une augmentation chez les grands journaux ainsi que la création de nouveaux journaux (161).   Il n’est pas seulement une question de chiffres : le nouveau style qui est entraîné par le feuilleton provoque alors une transformation chez l’écrivain, qui doit alors plaire au public. Si le feuilleton représentait un moyen pour l’écrivain moins connu30, peut-être bohémien comme Murger, de trouver une audience ainsi qu’une source de revenu plutôt stable, tandis que des écrivains établis comme Balzac ont lutté avec le format (avant d’avoir un grand succès et de devenir « le grand ancêtre » des feuilletonistes qui le suivent), qui avait donc d’autres exigences que le roman publié dans un format classique (Queffélec 23-4).

Chez Murger, cette tension formelle se révèle pleinement dans les Scènes de la vie de bohème, dont la troisième édition paraît en 1852. La multitude de personnages, le va-et-vient des intrigues cycliques qui tournent autour de l’argent ou des femmes, tout ce qui va à l’encontre d’une histoire cohérente et linéaire, demeure dans les chapitres venant des feuilletons, mais ils sont encadrés par trois chapitres qui imposent un bouclage romanesque au texte. Dans l’avant-dernier chapitre, Marcel proclame qu’il voudrait avoir soixante ans : « nous avons fait notre temps de jeunesse, d’insouciance et de paradoxe. Tout cela est très beau, on en ferait un joli roman ; mais […] tout cela doit avoir un dénouement » (375). Ironiquement, ce chapitre commence le « dénouement » dont Marcel parle. La vie de bohème, que Murger a proclamé, dans la préface, « la préface de l’Académie, de l’Hôtel-Dieu ou de la Morgue » (34), est devenue la matière de tout un roman, mais elle n’est plus propre à vivre. Si le personnage secondaire Jacques a pris le chemin de la Morgue dans le chapitre « Le Manchon de Francine », les protagonistes choisiront la stabilité économique, sous forme de succès artistique (Rodolphe, Marcel, et Schaunard) ou par héritage (Gustave Colline). Marcel conclut son monologue : « La vraie liberté, c’est de pouvoir se passer d’autrui et d’exister par soi-même ». Les anciens bohémiens quittent la fraternité pour cette nouvelle liberté qui est économique plutôt que sociale ou politique, et où la vie commune cède la place à l’autosuffisance. Il pourrait paraître que l’ordre littéraire (le roman) et l’ordre paternel (l’indépendance économique, la reconnaissance artistique) s’imposent au même moment de l’histoire. Pourtant, il n’y a rien qui marque les anciens bohémiens comme paternels, sauf peut-être Gustave Colline, dont l’héritage et le mariage signalent sa continuation d’un lignage. Ce dénouement est étonnant justement parce qu’il est conventionnel, tandis que le titre (Scènes) indique que Murger n’essaie pas de faire un roman, plutôt des nouvelles individuelles. En outre, le narrateur dit en guise de conclusion du premier chapitre que « [t]els sont les principaux personnages qu’on verra reparaître dans les petites histoires dont se compose ce volume, qui n’est pas un roman, […] car les Scènes de la vie de bohème ne sont en effet que des études de moeurs » (Murger 82). Si Murger ne modifie pas les feuilletons « pour les couler dans un classique moule romanesque », comme Loïc Chotard indique31, toutefois il crée autour d’eux un cadre plus ordonné (ordonnant ?).

Le produit final est un roman, mais un roman-feuilleton, dont les « contours flous », tels que Berthelot les décrivent, correspondent aux innovations romanesques expliquées par Adamowicz-Hariasz (autonomie des feuilletons, possibilités d’élargir les limites du roman en ajoutant des personnages ou des intrigues secondaires). Cependant, au lieu de « transcender l’hétérogénéité de son livre » ou de témoigner d’une nouvelle sorte d’unité, comme Chotard le comprend, en changeant peu les feuilletons originaux, les Scènes révèlent une rupture, celle des bohémiens de leur ancienne fraternité, de la jeunesse, mais aussi de la pauvreté.  Seigel voit la bohème comme une expression de l’ambivalence de certains bourgeois envers leur identité sociale ; la forme et le dénouement des Scènes mettent en scène l’ambivalence de l’ancien bohémien envers son passé. Le dernier cri de Marcel, « Je suis un corrompu. Je n’aime plus que ce qui est bon ! » (397), montre jusqu’à quel point cette société consommatrice a pénétré la vie de ces artistes, dont autrefois « [l’existence] de chaque jour [était] une œuvre de génie » tant il manquaient les biens nécessaires à vivre (41). La fraternité du cénacle bohémien s’avère alors aussi dépassé que la fraternité républicaine. Malgré la révolution de 1848, l’espoir politique et social de la devise « Liberté, égalité, fraternité » est transformé en un espoir de liberté économique dans les Scènes et d’une plus grande égalité sur le marché littéraire due à la démocratisation de la presse pour Murger, d’autres écrivains et beaucoup de lecteurs aussi. Quant à la fraternité, elle est échangée contre l’individualisme, qui a une plus grande valeur sur le marché capitaliste.

1 Désormais, je ferai référence aux Scènes de la vie de bohème par l’abréviation Scènes. Murger a écrit d’autres Scènes, les Scènes de la vie de jeunesse, mais elles ne figurent point ici.

2 Dans L’Esthétique de la dérision dans les romans de la période réaliste en France (1850-1870) : Genèse, épanouissement et sens du grotesque (Paris : Honoré Champion, 2004), p. 204.

3 Bohemians: the Glamorous Outcasts (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000), p. 222. Elle constate: « From Murger’s sentimental tales onwards, Bohemia became the material for popular journalism, best-selling novels, illustrated magazines, salon paintings and films. In the mutual attraction/repulsion of bohemian and bourgeois, mass culture acted as go-between, presenting tales of bohemian life to give the bourgeois public a vicarious thrill ».

4 Jerrold Seigel, Bohemian Paris: Culture, Politics, and the Boundaries of Bourgeois Life, 1830-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), p. 11.

5 Scènes de la vie de bohème (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 82.

6 Sigmund Freud, « Family Romances ». Trad. James Strachey. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London : The Hogarth Press, 1959), pp. 237-41.

7 The Novel as Family Romance: Language, Gender, and Authority from Fielding to Joyce (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1987). Elle explique: « “family romance” has gained general currency among literary and critical theorists. Their use of it is founded on the realization that Freud’s insight into the constructed nature of the stories his patients told is not limited to fantasy, but applies in some sense to all stories that designate identity in terms of a relation to origin—be the origin literary, philosophical, sociological, religious, or historical. », p. ix.

8 Voir César Graña, Bohemian versus Bourgeois: French Society and the French Man of Letters in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 71-2.

9 Pour le rapport entre le roman familial et la relation entre écrivains, voir Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (New York: Oxford UP, 1973).

10 Seigel écrit: « written references to Bohemia as a special, identifiable kind of life appear only in the nineteenth century. It was in the 1830s and 1840s, to begin with in France, that the terms “Bohemia,” “la Bohème,” and “Bohemian” first appear in this sense », p. 5.

11 Freud explique que l’enfant transforme ses sentiments négatifs envers ses parents ainsi : « the child’s imagination becomes engaged in the task of getting free from the parents of whom he now has a low opinion and of replacing them by others, who, as a rule, are of higher social standing » (239).

12 Cette citation montre que la Bohème est aux origines même de l’artiste, sa période d’apprentissage.

13 Seigel constate: « From the start, Bohemianism took shape by contrast with the image with which it was commonly paired : bourgeois life » (5).

14 Par exemple, le titre du livre de César Graña, Bohemian versus Bourgeois.

15 « The ideology of absolutism [in eighteenth century Europe] explicitly tied royal government to the patriarchal family, and the use of the term fraternity during the French Revolution implied a break with this prior model » (xiv).

16 Voir Sigmund Freud, trad. James Strachey, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics (New York: Norton, 1989), p. 182-200.

17 Au contraire de la constatation de Hunt que « In the early years of the Revolution, fraternity had a large and confident meaning because almost everyone could be imagined as participating in the community » (12).

18 Comme le narrateur indique : « ils s’agenouillaient souvent devant les plus futiles caprices de leurs maîtresses, mais pas un d’eux n’eût hésité un instant entre la femme et l’ami » (237).

19 « Liberté, égalité, fraternité ». Lieux de Mémoire, Tôme III : Les France. Dir. Pierre Nora. (Paris : Gallimard, 1992), p. 610.

20 Seigel examine « [t]he fact that the regime produced by the French Revolution of 1830 acquired the name “Bourgeois Monarchy,” frightening many aristocrats out of politics and excluding manual workers » (7).

21 Voir Robert Baldick, The First Bohemian : The Life of Henri Murger (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961): « To him, a revolution simply meant an irritating interruption in his desperate struggle to earn a living; and with his scepticism [sic] as to the virtues of republicanism or to any other political creed, he tended to favor the retention of the existing order of things » (Baldick 105).

22 Voir Graham Robb, « Histoire du texte », Scènes de la vie de bohème par Henry Murger (Paris : Gallimard, 1988) p. 440.

23 « After two generations of revolution, war, propaganda, and countless panaceas, there were those who could only respond with exhaustion, hilarity, and contempt, or seek the respite of new forms of imagination. » (78).

24 On voit la même qualité vague du temps dans ces chapitres : « Rodolphe vivait depuis quelque temps plus errant que les nuages [ …] » (VI, 100), « Vers la fin du mois de décembre […] » (V, 110), « En ce temps-là, Rodolphe était très amoureux de sa cousine Angèle […] » (IX, 151), « Ceci se passait quelque temps après la mise en ménage du poète Rodolphe avec la jeune mademoiselle Mimi […] » (XIII, 203), « Depuis cinq ou six ans […] » (XVI, 244).

25 Un autre exemple : « Il y a dans les mois qui commencent chaque nouvelle saison des époques terribles : le 1er et le 15 ordinairement […] Or, le matin d’un 15 avril, Rodolphe dormait fort paisiblement… et rêvait qu’un de ses oncles lui léguait par testament toute une province du Pérou, les Péruviennes avec » (X, 161).

26 D’autres critiques ont fait le rapport entre généalogie et textualité, dont Janet Beizer, qui établit un rapport entre roman et figure paternel dans le roman de Balzac (Family Plots: Balzac’s Narrative Generations (New Haven: Yale UP, 1986), p. 4.) ; et Patricia Dreschel Tobin, pour qui le narratif réaliste suit la « manifestation linéaire du destin généalogique des événements » (linear manifestation of the genealogical destiny of events) (Time and the Novel: The Genealogical Imperative (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1978), p. 7.).

27 Maria Adamowicz-Hariasz « From Opinion to Information: The Roman-Feuilleton and the transformation of the Nineteenth-Century French Press ». Making the News: Modernity and the Mass Press in Nineteenth-Century France (Amherst: U of Massachusetts Press, 1999), p. 165. « The chapters of a serial novel, written for immediate consumption, tended to be entities in and of themselves, resembling often sensational short stories. Open-ended and somewhat independent in relation to the text as a whole, they allowed (when necessary) for new developments of secondary plots and multiplication of characters. The fragmentary style of the roman-feuilleton reflected the novelty-oriented content and the look of the new press and further strengthened their symbiotic connection ».

28 Voir Lise Queffélec, Le roman-feuilleton français au XIXe siècle (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France (Que sais-je ?), 1989), p. 11.

29 « La légitimiste Gazette de France, par la plume de son critique littéraire Nettement, ne laisse pas passer l’occasion de souligner malignement l’immortalité de ces pages auxquelles l’organe de la bourgeoisie au pouvoir donne asile » (Queféllec 15).

30 Queffélec écrit « [à] coté de ces maîtres du roman-feuilleton fourmille toute une foule bruissante de feuilletonistes qui eurent un moment de vogue » (24).

31 Loïc Chotard, Préface. Scènes de la vie de bohème (Paris : Gallimard, 1988), p. 20.

Bio

Ciúme e soterramento em Ressurreição

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Author Bio

Amanda Rios Herane
University of São Paulo

Pequeno panorama crítico
Ressurreição, primeiro romance de Machado de Assis, de 1872, é uma obra que ainda hoje atrai poucos olhares críticos brasileiros, muito em função da maneira como se inscreveu na tradição crítica do país. Do século XIX ao XX, as leituras de Ressurreição identificaram no livro um descompasso, que foi atribuído ao longo do tempo a diferentes fatores.

De modo geral, a crítica do século XIX relacionou as dissonâncias percebidas na obra a falhas de execução da narrativa. No século XX, o livro foi visto como dissonante, grosso modo, menos no que tange ao seu desenvolvimento textual do que em relação às publicações machadianas a partir de Memórias Póstumas de Brás Cubas: para muitos críticos, a produção do autor anterior a esse romance, no que se inclui Ressurreição, estaria filiada a preceitos românticos, ao passo que as publicações desde esse livro vincular-se-iam a parâmetros realistas. Tal noção fundamentou, para parte da crítica, o entendimento de que a obra machadiana estaria dividida em duas fases.

Ainda no século XX, essa idéia de ruptura foi questionada, com base no argumento de que os textos considerados de “primeira fase” continham já elementos realistas. No século XXI, Hélio de Seixas Guimarães, em seu livro Os leitores de Machado de Assis: o romance machadiano e o público do século 19, defendeu que os primeiros romances machadianos, dentre os quais Ressurreição, quebravam as expectativas dos leitores românticos, preparando-os para novos parâmetros identificados aos realistas. Diante disso, percebemos que hoje já se flexibiliza a concepção de que as obras iniciais do autor seriam dissonantes em relação às demais (suposto que contribuiu, no século XX, para que parecessem menos atraentes à crítica); no entanto, continuam raros os estudos que se dediquem a leituras mais aprofundadas delas.

O narrador de Ressurreição
Ressurreição é a história de Félix, caracterizado pelo narrador como um dândi que, embora amado pela linda e rica viúva Lívia, a quem, no mínimo, não é indiferente, recusa-se a se casar com ela, baseado em uma carta – possivelmente escrita pelo vilão Dr. Luís Batista – segundo a qual Lívia teria sido uma fonte de sofrimentos para o “outro” (presume-se que seu antigo marido) e provavelmente o seria também para Félix. A história é contada em terceira pessoa, por um narrador que se arroga conhecimento pleno das ações e pensamentos das personagens, aparentando onisciência:

[a propósito de Félix]: Ao ciúme que o devorava, veio misturar-se o despeito; complicou-se a dor com o orgulho ofendido. Lívia apareceu-lhe com todos os caracteres de uma loureira vulgar, e loureira não traduz bem o pensamento do moço (61).

[a respeito dos pensamentos de Lívia sobre Raquel, filha do coronel Morais, também apaixonada por Félix]: Lívia quis então referir-lhe tudo, o verdadeiro objeto do seu amor e o próximo casamento; mas, posto que a idade não as separasse muito, Lívia considerava-a ainda criança e reprimiu o seu primeiro impulso (81).

Esse narrador, num primeiro momento, parece se aproximar daquilo que na tipologia de Norman Friedman é denominado “autor onisciente intruso”, na medida em que não só nos fornece os pensamentos, sentimentos e percepções das personagens, como tem por traço a intrusão, de forma a também julgá-las (Friedman 172-4): [sobre Félix] “Aquele era apenas um rapaz vadio e desambicioso” (Assis, Ressurreição 17). Entretanto, apesar de parecer dominantemente onisciente no romance, esse narrador deixa escapar algum desconhecimento daqueles que figuram em sua história:

[acerca das impressões que o dia de ano-bom pode evocar]: Tudo nos parece melhor e mais belo – fruto da nossa ilusão –, e alegres com vermos o ano que desponta, não reparamos que ele é também um passo para a morte.

Teria esta última idéia entrado no espírito de Félix, ao contemplar a magnificência do céu e os esplendores da luz? Certo é que uma nuvem ligeira pareceu toldar-lhe a fronte. Félix embebeu os olhos no horizonte e ficou largo tempo imóvel e absorto, como se interrogasse o futuro ou revolvesse o passado. Depois, fez um gesto de tédio, e parecendo envergonhado de se ter entregue à contemplação interior de alguma quimera, desceu rapidamente à prosa, acendeu um charuto, e esperou tranqüilamente a hora do almoço (Assis, Ressurreição 17, grifo nosso).

Não é de se ignorar que este trecho esteja na primeira página do romance. Logo de início, portanto, o narrador revela algum nível de desconhecimento: ele não sabe exatamente tudo o que Félix pensa, criando suposições expressas inclusive em termos imprecisos (o verbo ter no futuro do pretérito, o verbo parecer, o pronome indefinido alguma associado ao objeto sobre o qual Félix refletiria, mostrando não saber qual é o preciso objeto).

Diz Silviano Santiago que, se “o romance pós-flaubertiano tenta abranger o ciclo da vida humana (nascimento, experiência e morte), o primeiro romance de Machado apreende o desenvolvimento total de uma idéia (…) Nada se sabe a respeito da infância e da adolescência de Félix, ou de Lívia, por exemplo” (443). Se isto ocorre, podemos pensar que fica abalada a crença do leitor na onisciência do narrador, na medida em que acreditar em seu pleno conhecimento e capacidade de julgamento pressupõe que ele nos forneça dados a partir dos quais nos convençamos de que esse narrador pode nos dar uma visão global das personagens – dentre eles os dados que não aparecem na narrativa sobre a história de vida de Félix e de Lívia. Por outro lado, conforme Santiago, subsistiria uma apreensão total: a de uma idéia.

Depreende-se que a idéia em questão é a de que a dúvida nos faz perder um bem pelo receio de o buscar, tal como está expressa no prefácio (por um pensamento de Shakespeare que lhe serve de mote) e como é retomada pelo narrador ao final. Essa idéia é posta em movimento, no romance, pelo contraste de duas personagens, uma crédula (Meneses) e a outra não (Félix), com aparente triunfo efetivo da primeira. Meneses, que gostava de Lívia, e Raquel, que gostava de Félix, unem-se pela “piedade” (ambos foram “rejeitados”), mas essa união acaba por fazê-los “amados e venturosos” (130). Félix, por sua vez, ainda que dispondo “de todos os meios que o podiam fazer venturoso, segundo a sociedade” (recebeu uma herança que lhe permitiu viver como um dândi, era amado por Lívia e por Raquel), “é essencialmente infeliz” (132). Tal é o balanço que, passados dez anos desde o dia de ano-bom, ponto a partir do qual a história começa a ser contada, dá-nos o narrador. No entanto, temos motivos para desconfiar desse narrador. Poderíamos até crer na felicidade de Meneses, mas uma passagem anterior é capaz de lançar-nos dúvida:

Meneses era uma boa alma, compassiva e generosa. Tinha em flor todas as ilusões da juventude; era entusiasta e sincero; estava totalmente limpo da menor eiva de cálculo. Podia ser que com os anos perdesse algumas das suas qualidades nativas, que nem todos resistem a estes dois terríveis dissolventes: os lances da fortuna e o atrito dos caracteres. Mas naquele tempo ainda não era assim (26, grifo nosso).

Igualmente, podemos desconfiar da sentença sobre Félix. Para o narrador, o espírito desse personagem “só engendrava receios e dúvidas” (Assis, Ressurreição 77), e esse argumento de caráter explicaria por que Félix era infeliz: seu “espírito”o tornaria propenso à dúvida e o impediria de “buscar o bem” (a felicidade), ao passo que Meneses, de caráter “propenso a fantasias cor-de-rosa”, permitir-se-ia ser feliz. Porém, alguns dados da vida de Félix – cremos que propositalmente marginais no romance – levam-nos a questionar se o ciúme do personagem em relação a Lívia (que o faz tomar por verdade a verossimilhança da carta de Batista, afastando-o da chance de ser feliz ao lado dela) tem substrato apenas em seu caráter desconfiado:

Félix entrava então nos seus trinta e seis anos, idade em que muitos já são pais de família, e alguns homens de Estado. Aquele era apenas um rapaz vadio e desambicioso. A sua vida tinha sido uma singular mistura de elegia e melodrama; passara os primeiros anos da mocidade a suspirar por coisas fugitivas, e na ocasião em que parecia esquecido de Deus e dos homens, caiu-lhe nas mãos uma inesperada herança, que o levantou da pobreza. Só a Providência possui o segredo de não aborrecer com lances tão estafados no teatro (17-8).

Desse trecho, podemos depreender que Félix teria motivos concretos de desconfiança: estava “esquecido de Deus e dos homens” quando ganhou uma herança, a partir da qual passou a viver no luxo e, presume-se, conseguiu ter acesso à casa do coronel Morais, circulando nos mesmos ambientes freqüentados por Lívia. Ou seja, foi só a partir da aquisição de bens materiais que teve meios para se fazer venturoso, pois antes, quando pobre, “parecia esquecido de Deus e dos homens”. Dessa circunstância, pode emergir uma dúvida filosófica com um fundo econômico: ser amado só é possível mediante a condicional “ter dinheiro”? Ou ter dinheiro não foi determinante para que Félix pudesse ser amado, sendo apenas uma das circunstâncias possíveis? No lugar de reconhecer essa dúvida, o narrador supõe que o que perturba Félix e lhe impede a felicidade seja apenas uma questão de caráter, no que se identifica a uma certa visão expressa pelo próprio Félix, que abafa seu drama num mito sobre si mesmo: [ao explicar para Meneses sua separação, logo no início do livro, da amante Cecília]: “(…) os meus amores são todos semestrais; duram mais que as rosas, duram duas estações. Para o meu coração um ano é a eternidade (…)” (25).

Nesse sentido, o narrador, ao inserir apenas marginalmente dados que pudessem basear a desconfiança de Félix, e ao tratar a desconfiança, traduzida em ciúme, como um elemento da natureza do personagem, compactua com Félix no soterramento da dúvida filosófica que o próprio personagem, em seu mito pessoal, precisa esconder: o que constitui o homem, o seu caráter? Em que medida esse caráter é calcado no material? É possível um amor que transcenda as circunstâncias e remeta a uma essência? É somente numa leitura a contrapelo, a partir da desconfiança em relação ao narrador, que podemos reativar essa dúvida, de cuja vivência devastadora o narrador tenta poupar o leitor, e Félix, sem sucesso, tenta poupar a si mesmo.

A força dessa dúvida vem sobretudo de seu poder contaminador: ela pode dominar Félix, Meneses, o narrador, o leitor. Se atribuímos à infelicidade de Félix, e à felicidade de Meneses, uma disposição inata de caráter, temos uma explicação integral da vida, algo que talvez Félix, de acordo com nossa argumentação, desconfie não ser possível, uma vez que questiona justamente o que constitui esse caráter. Mas o narrador insiste na atribuição de natureza, negligenciando do leitor os elementos concretos da vida de Félix que pudessem fundar sua desconfiança, e fiando-se em que sua explicação seja suficiente, dada sua onisciência – o que podemos considerar uma formulação de certa forma autoritária. Ele tenta assegurar que não procuremos mais informações: basta saber que Félix é um vadio, o que automaticamente desmereceria o personagem e sua desconfiança. Félix julga-se inconstante, o narrador julga-o um mero dândi, e o leitor, se convencido, não procura maiores explanações, de modo que a dúvida, nos três sujeitos, pode ficar contida.

Num primeiro momento, também Meneses está livre dela. No entanto, ao contrastarmos os caracteres, o que sugere o próprio Machado no prefácio (“tentei o esboço de uma situação e o contraste de caracteres”) – para o que contribui o narrador, ao especificar quais personagens deviam ser contrastadas (Assis, Ressurreição 77) – chegamos a passagens que nos colocam uma interrogação sobre o argumento de caráter, como aquela já mencionada em que Meneses ainda não havia sido dissolvido pelo “contraste dos caracteres” e pelos “lances da fortuna”. Se alguns não resistem ao primeiro termo, também nós não resistimos, porque, ao colocá-lo em movimento, como proposto neste artigo, chegamos à dissolução de uma explicação integral. Ao se contrastar com Félix, Meneses poderia também ser uma “vítima”, porque, ao fazê-lo, talvez passasse do contraste, passível de harmonia, ao atrito gerado pela problematização: seria mesmo o seu caráter que o diferenciaria de Félix, ou seriam as circunstâncias? O que faz dele o que pensa ser, ou o que os outros pensam que ele é (provavelmente um homem de boa alma, entusiasta e sincero, na definição do narrador)?

Se tomarmos o segundo termo, “lances da fortuna”, no caso de Félix, como a herança recebida por ele, temos que a herança pode ser vista como um fator dissolvente. Pelo prisma do narrador, esse dinheiro que Félix ganhou está associado à Providência, como visto no já citado trecho: “caiu-lhe nas mãos uma inesperada herança (…) Só a Providência possui o segredo de não aborrecer com esses lances tão estafados no teatro” (Assis, Ressurreição 18). Mas se foi a Providência que deu a Félix esse caminho de felicidade, por que Félix não foi feliz? Ainda pela ótica do narrador, foi a disposição interna de Félix que não lhe permitiu agarrar-se a essa fortuna, ao passo que Meneses, mesmo em condições adversas (não era amado por Lívia), conseguiu ser feliz (uniu-se a Raquel e encontrou um novo amor). Sendo assim, por que o lance da fortuna seria, em si, um dissolvente? Caso Félix tivesse um caráter semelhante ao de Meneses, não teria colocado a fortuna a seu favor? Aliás, nesse ponto, podemos nos fazer uma outra questão: será que a natureza de Félix de fato nunca fora como a de Meneses? Se, como diz o narrador ao final do livro, seu coração “ressurgiu” por alguns dias, mas logo “esqueceu na sepultura o sentimento da confiança e a memória das ilusões” (Assis, Ressurreição 132), é porque talvez nem sempre Félix tenha sido como o romance o pinta, de modo que sua reação à herança pode não ter sido fruto de um caráter desconfiado.

Percebemos, assim, que a retórica do narrador é desmontável sob muitos aspectos: embora ele se esforce por garantir seu discurso de caráter, há brechas que relativizam a autoridade arrogada por ele, permitindo-nos não só discuti-la, como procurar outras amarrações para o enredo, a partir das lacunas da narrativa. Tal insuficiência provoca uma dissonância no texto.

O tratamento das “dissonâncias” em Ressurreição
Desde o princípio, as críticas a Ressurreição perceberam que o livro provoca certa desestabilização no leitor, que atribuímos a esse descompasso entre a insistência, por parte do narrador, em garantir um fechamento à história, e sua efetiva possibilidade de garantia. A crítica contemporânea à publicação do romance, por sua vez, entende o desconcerto provocado pelo livro em outros termos. Uma das “falhas” de Ressurreição mais apontadas pelos críticos do século XIX é a noção de que ele seria um romance de costumes, embora se pretenda o esboço de uma situação, como sugerido na advertência da primeira edição. A idéia de que Machado seria frio ao descrever paixões, assim como a inconsistência do título em relação ao desenvolvimento da narrativa, são também dos “problemas” mais criticados no romance (apud. Guimarães).

Esses apontamentos, dentre outros, têm em geral por base uma leitura da obra segundo a qual Félix e Lívia são as personagens principais da narrativa, configurando dois tipos num universo de romance de costumes. Numa tal moldura, Félix é o tipo do desconfiado, cheio de fraquezas morais, em contraste com Lívia, tipo da mulher fervorosa e apaixonada, ambos vivenciando um embate amoroso que tem como fundo a sociedade carioca em fins do século XIX. No desfecho do romance, Félix mantém-se um rapaz cheio de dúvidas, o que impossibilitaria a “ressurreição” indicada no título do romance. Esse e outros “buracos” atribuídos ao livro pelos primeiros críticos, bem como o julgamento de Félix como um personagem de caráter frouxo, ressoaram também em leituras posteriores de Ressurreição, para as quais o livro é quebradiço, à semelhança de outros romances considerados como pertencentes à primeira fase de Machado de Assis. No entanto, emboraa noção de que as primeiras produções machadianas seriam “inconsistentes” tenha sido um dos critérios que levou parte da crítica do século XX a dividir as obras do autor em duas fases, o fundamento central dessa cisão reside em que os críticos do período associavam as publicações anteriores a Memórias Póstumas de Brás Cubas a parâmetros românticos, e as produções a partir desse romance a parâmetros realistas.

Mas essa divisão das obras machadianas pela crítica do século XIX em fases não é consensual. Alberto Bagby discutiu a classificação a partir da idéia de que o realismo presente em obras posteriores de Machado já se manifestaria nos primeiros romances do autor, de modo que Bagby enfatiza uma continuidade das obras, e não a descontinuidade que fundamenta a teoria das fases. Também Hélio de Seixas Guimarães, já no século XXI, relacionou. Ressurreição a padrões realistas: para ele, o narrador desse romance quereria desmascarar o padrão ficcional romântico, preparando os leitores para novos parâmetros identificados ao que hoje entendemos por realismo. Conforme esse escopo, as “falhas” enxergadas em Ressurreição pelos primeiros críticos podem ter raiz em um descompasso entre a expectativa dos leitores, baseadas em códigos românticos, e o projeto do narrador.

Hélio Guimarães apresenta uma série de expectativas dos leitores românticos que são referidas mas frustradas em Ressurreição, a começar do entrecho do livro que, embora seja romântico, não apresenta obstáculos externos no desenvolvimento da trama, como ficara estabelecido no romance romântico: o obstáculo seria antes interno, identificando-se aos ciúmes de Félix. Ainda no que se refere ao enredo, o desfecho de Ressurreição abala os preceitos do romance romântico, na medida em que não resolve os conflitos fora da esfera humana ou social (a morte ou o claustro). Segundo Guimarães, é característico do narrador desse romance revelar os artifícios românticos, ao antecipar as expectativas do leitor para, em seguida, desmenti-las. Podemos depreender que a autoridade do narrador, questionada neste artigo, é fundamental nesse processo, pois lhe permite responder às dúvidas por ele mesmo inoculadas e, mais do que isso, propicia-lhe dar um acabamento ao romance, que terminaria, na visão de Guimarães, em nota edificante: sem confiança não há felicidade.

Entretanto, talvez a subversão do universo romântico, promovida com o auxílio da autoridade do narrador, seja justamente o ponto que fragiliza sua autoridade: preparar-se para novos parâmetros, tendo por guia esse narrador, pressupõe saber observar artifícios e questioná-los, o que pode levar ao questionamento dos próprios expedientes do condutor. Embora ele não prescinda de sua autoridade, deixa brechas na narrativa, as quais, num movimento crítico do leitor, podem ser preenchidas, o que relativiza a autoridade do narrador e, por conseguinte, sua “amarração” da história. De toda forma, Ressurreição põe em xeque os códigos românticos, tornando proveitosa a comparação do romance com Armance, de Stendhal, que se desenvolve a partir desses códigos e cujo enredo é semelhante ao de Ressurreição. Essa comparação já foi estabelecida, em outros termos, por Karina Pedreira de Freitas Ceribelli..Em sua dissertação. de mestrado, ela defende que a força motriz das duas narrativas é o amor-paixão, que impõe obstáculos para a união do par central de ambas as histórias. Um dos objetivos principais. de seu argumento é questionar se o tema da impossibilidade amorosa, para ela presente nos dois romances, segue ou não padrões românticos, concluindo que esse tratamento está contemplado em Armance, mas não em Ressurreição. Também neste artigo. se questiona em que medida as convenções românticas participam da construção da obra machadiana, mas não em termos de uma tipologia do amor.

Convenções românticas em Ressurreição e Armance
Em Armance, Octave é um jovem aristocrata, que se torna um “bom partido” para o casamento quando tem restituída parte dos bens perdidos de sua família. Sua jovem prima, Armance de Zohiloff, parece ser a única moça a não se impressionar com a fortuna de Octave, o que desperta a atenção do rapaz. Ambos se apaixonam, mas dois obstáculos impedem sua união: Octave fizera um juramento de que jamais amaria, resistindo a confessar seu amor pela prima, ao mesmo tempo em que Armance também refuta a confissão, na medida em que, órfã e pobre, teme a maledicência da sociedade em relação a seu amor por um homem de outra classe social. Ao longo da narrativa, esses obstáculos iniciais são eliminados; no entanto, o amor deles estava condenado pela sociedade, como assume o narrador onisciente da obra.

A princípio, o que abala o romance entre Armance e Octave é uma seqüência de desconfianças do casal, que se torna terreno fértil para que a sociedade desenvolva sua vingança através de uma carta falsa produzida por dois “agentes-vilões”. É, assim, um obstáculo externo que propicia a dissolução do romance entre os primos. Até mesmo as dúvidas de ambos têm como premissa uma oposição entre indivíduo e sociedade, configurando-se mais como obstáculo externo do que interno: a sociedade só visa ao dinheiro, ao passo que Armance e Octave são seres singulares, pois, dentre outros fatores, vivem um amor fora das convenções. Na medida em que o casal estabelece uma relação de confiança, consegue afastar-se da perfídia social; no entanto, Octave teme que a possibilidade de Armance não se interessar pelo dinheiro, ao contrário de todos os demais, seja ilusória, e Armance, por sua vez, teme que Octave sucumba à maledicência social. Essa desconfiança das. personagens só se compõe a partir de um a priori segundo o qual a sociedade, exterioridade radical, é um obstáculo para a plena realização do sujeito.

Temos, assim, que em Armance o mal é externo, derivado de uma extrema cisão entre o indivíduo e a sociedade que leva ao aniquilamento ou ao exílio daquele que não segue as normas sociais: Octave se suicida e Armance refugia-se num convento. O próprio narrador assevera essa cisão ao confirmar que Octave e Armance são seres singulares, pois efetivamente não sucumbiram aos ditames sociais, o que acaba resultando em morte e solidão para o casal. Nesse quadro, Armance não deixa de obedecer os preceitos românticos do obstáculo externo, do desfecho que conduz os heróis para fora da esfera humana, de um ritmo narrativo que condiz com o ritmo de uma observação externa dos acontecimentos, e de um narrador que garante sua posição.

Em Ressurreição, embora também esteja presente a idéia de uma desconfiança atrelada à solidão e à infelicidade, ela não é gerada, na visão do narrador, por nenhum entrave social, nenhum dado externo: é o caráter de Félix que o faz desconfiar. No entanto, numa leitura do texto a partir das brechas desse narrador “autoritário” (no sentido de que intenta garantir seu argumento de caráter), podemos entrever que a dúvida de Félix talvez não advenha de seu caráter – embora o próprio personagem corrobore verbalmente com essa versão – mas da experiência: Félix preenche dados externos – dentre os quais a herança que recebera – atribuindo-lhes um significado que se traduz na dúvida sobre a existência de um amor que transcenda as circunstâncias. Nessa perspectiva, os obstáculos presentes na trama de Ressurreição não são nem apenas externos nem apenas internos, constituindo-se antes a partir de uma construção do mundo pela observação do sujeito, o que põe termo à dicotomia romântica do interno x externo.

Ainda conforme essa leitura, é coerente que o desfecho do romance não leve as personagens para fora da esfera humana, porque, diferentemente do que acontece em Armance, não há uma cisão entre o sujeito e algo que esteja fora dele (na obra de Stendhal, a sociedade), mas sim um sujeito (Félix) cuja dúvida se constitui na medida de seu próprio olhar sobre a sociedade. Mesmo que o narrador, e até Félix, tentem sistematicamente encobrir esse olhar, atribuindo a desconfiança do personagem a um dado imutável (o caráter), é na própria narrativa que podemos encontrá-lo através das lacunas do narrador. Esse recurso, além de possibilitar o aparecimento, para o leitor, de discursos ocultos na fala do narrador e do próprio Félix, não deixa de ser incoerente com a postura de observador e de juiz dos acontecimentos que o narrador assume, provocando uma dissonância a partir da qual o leitor pode desmascarar sua autoridade.

Desmascarar essa autoridade é perceber a incapacidade do narrador em oferecer garantias. Em não havendo garantias, é conseqüente pensarmos que não haja a possibilidade de se provar uma “verdade” preexistente ao sujeito, mas podemos pensar que há no romance um sujeito preenchedor do mundo a partir das “verossimilhanças”, as quais toma por verdade. Esse é o movimento do narrador, pois é apenas verossímil que o comportamento de Félix possa ser preenchido a partir de um argumento essencialista, embora ele assuma essa interpretação como uma verdade objetiva. No entanto, as “pontas soltas” da narrativa apontam para o caráter subjetivo de seu julgamento.

Uma problemática semelhante se faz presente em Dom Casmurro, romance posterior de Machado de Assis que atualmente é lido a contrapelo do narrador, como proposto para Ressurreição. Embora Bento, o narrador de Dom Casmurro, queira assegurar a traição da personagem Capitu, ele deixa “brechas” nas quais o leitor pode duvidar desse seu julgamento. Uma diferença fundamental nos dois romances é a de que, em Dom Casmurro, o narrador é também personagem da trama, de modo que podemos mapear sua história e conferir uma identidade ao ponto de vista desse sujeito – o que não ocorre em Ressurreição, cujo narrador é um observador inapreensível. Ambos, entretanto, arrogam-se autoridade por essas razões mesmas: Bento vivenciou a história, estando portanto em posição de um relato fiel, ao passo que o narrador de Ressurreição possui a objetividade do distanciamento. Esse paradoxo só vem a pôr em foco os artifícios de que esses narradores machadianos se valem para conferirem à sua visão um caráter de “verdade”, e não de “verossimilhança”. Algo diferente ocorre em Armance, em que os expedientes do narrador ficam menos visíveis, pois as amarrações da narrativa deixam menos brechas para o leitor, aparentando assim serem mais objetivas, mais “verdadeiras”.

Ciúmes como soterramento
Nesse quadro, se entendemos que o narrador de Ressurreição não pode oferecer uma “verdade”, uma garantia, torna-se ainda mais duvidoso seu insistente argumento decaráter, o que se soma às reflexões aqui expostas para pensarmos que a infelicidade de Félix, atribuída à desconfiança na forma do ciúme, não é resultado puramente do caráter, mas da dúvida sobre o que o constitui, desentranhada da problematização do amor como sentimento transcendente ou circunstancial. O ciúme de Félix é, assim, apenas um fator que permite a ele descartar o amor, sob o risco de colocá-lo em questão.

Silviano Santiago também vê o ciúme em Machado como algo mais complexo do que o adultério. Para ele, nas obras machadianas, “Amar é casar, é comprar título de propriedade” (Santiago 438). De acordo com Santiago, o receio da dissimulação feminina, incorporado ao ciúme, teria um fundo social brasileiro: o homem recorreria à razão (casamento) para restringir a liberdade da mulher, que se libertaria agarrando-se ao sentimento (amor), arriscando-se com isso ao deslize (438). No entanto, no caso de Ressurreição, o narrador confirmaria a autoria de Luís Batista para a carta que lançariadúvidas sobre Lívia (Santiago 444) – do que, depreendemos, diminuiria a complexidade do .ciúme, ao fazer uma assertiva diante das desconfianças de Félix. – e daria ao protagonistaum só caráter (apesar de anunciar o oposto), fazendo do personagem um possível tipo de ciumento (Santiago 449) – como na leitura dos primeiros críticos – o que, podemos supor, retira igualmente do tema do ciúme a sua potencialidade. Uma das passagens que permitem a Santiago dizer que o narrador promete para Félix uma dualidade está logo no princípio do livro: “Duas faces tinha o seu espírito, e conquanto formassem um só rosto, era, todavia, diversas entre si, uma natural e espontânea, outra calculada e sistemática” (Assis, Ressurreição 18). Mas talvez essa afirmação só venha a tornar o narrador novamente frágil, pois seria contraditória na medida em que a dualidade indica tensão, e não o caráter unívoco sugerido no fechamento do romance. Não seria esse mais um indício de que não devemos procurar em Félix apenas as motivações de caráter que o narrador empresta ao personagem?

Assim como para Santiago, para Roberto Schwarz o problema de Félix tem por base sua relação com o casamento: faltaria a ele a “energia necessária para constituir família”, de modo que o personagem acaba não realizando um casamento “bom para todos” devido a seus “ciúmes infundados” (88). Para o crítico, Machado de Assis, em seus primeiros romances, “insiste no respeito e no decoro com que os conflitos se devem solucionar” (Schwarz 93), sendo a constituição da família – a que Félix se recusa – uma solução de caráter conformista.

À semelhança de Santiago e de Schwarz, Helen Caldwell não atribui ao ciúme de Félix uma causa factual, pois ele independe das ações de Lívia, sendo antes engendrado pela desconfiança que, ao que depreendemos, ela traduz como “disposição de suspeita”. O ciúme seria, assim, um componente de natureza, ao que ela associa a relação do personagem ciumento com a mãe, mais especificamente em Dom Casmurro, mas também em Ressurreição de forma en passant: para ela, haveria indícios no livro da relação de Félix com a mãe, seja na comoção do personagem ao descobrir que Lívia tem um filho, seja na jovialidade que Félix adquire ao entrar em contato com esse filho.

De toda forma, os três críticos fundamentam-se numa leitura que é conforme à perspectiva do narrador, na medida em que identificam o ciúme de Félix a sua natureza (quer por ser um tipo de ciumento; quer por lhe faltar “energia”, o que o leva a ter “ciúmes infundados”; quer por ter “disposição de suspeita”). Em contrapartida, aqui está proposta uma leitura a contrapelo do narrador, em que o ciúme em Ressurreição não é apenas uma questão de caráter, mas forma de soterrar uma dúvida filosófica, transformando o conflito em negação. Numa breve comparação, percebemos que também em Dom Casmurro o ciúme leva a uma negação: o narrador coloca Capitu como ré e culpada, numa tentativa de reduzi-la a seu campo de visão, de dar a versão final da história – o que é afim da mentalidade da classe proprietária de terras do Segundo Reinado, da qual Casmurro é representante – negando a palavra à esposa. Lido a contrapelo (como propusemos para Ressurreição), o romance lança dúvidas sobre o narrador, fazendo-nos pensar se suas sentenças sobre Capitu, cuja fidelidade é posta em causa pelo ciúme, não seriam uma forma de calar o outro. Assim, tanto em Ressurreição quanto em Dom Casmurro, o ciúme apareceria como expressão de soterramento – quer de uma dúvida filosófica, quer da versão .de um outro –. por obra de um narrador num certo sentido autoritário, ocupe ele a posição de observador (em Ressurreição) ou de personagem (em Dom Casmurro).

Obras citadas

Assis, Joaquim Maria Machado de. Dom Casmurro. São Paulo: Ática, 2006.

———. Ressurreição. São Paulo: Martin Claret, 2005.

Bagby Jr., Alberto I. Machado de Assis e seus primeiros romances. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 1993.

Caldwell, Helen. O Otelo brasileiro de Machado de Assis: um estudo de Dom Casmurro. São Paulo: Ateliê Editorial, 2002.

Ceribelli, Karina Pedreira de Freitas. “O tema da impossibilidade amorosa em Armance de Stendhal e Ressurreição de Machado de Assis.” Diss. Universidade de São Paulo, 2004.

Friedman, Norman. “O ponto de vista na ficção: o desenvolvimento de um conceito crítico.” Revista USP 53 (2002): 166-82.

Grieco, Agripino. Machado de Assis. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1959.

Guimarães, Hélio de Seixas. Os leitores de Machado de Assis: o romance machadiano e o público do século 19. São Paulo: Nankin/EDUSP, 2004.

Pujol, Alfredo. Machado de Assis: Conferências. São Paulo: Typographia Levi, 1917.

Santiago, Silviano. “Jano, Janeiro.” TERESA - revista de literatura brasileira 6/7 (2006): 429-52.

Schwarz, Roberto. “Forma literária e processo social nos inícios do romance brasileiro.” In: Ao vencedor as batatas. São Paulo: Duas cidades, 1992, 83-94.

Stendhal. Armance, ou, Algumas cenas de um salão parisiense em 1827. São Paulo: Estação Liberdade, 2003.

Bio

The Pleasures of Violence: Irony and Post-testimonial Discourse in Cidade de Deus by Paulo Lins.

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Author Bio

Aaron Lorenz
Tulane University

“Only intellectuals enjoy poverty. (Quem gosta de miseria é intelectual)” Joãozinha Trinta. Quoted in “Traficando Informação.” MV Bill

The novel, Cidade de Deus (1997), by Paulo Lins, can be seen as a landmark in the shift towards a new aesthetics of poverty in Brazil and marks the massive entry of a range of major and minor protagonists from the favela in Brazilian literature.1 The author has a long relationship with Cidade de Deus. In addition to growing up in Cidade de Deus, Lins also worked for many years with the anthropologist Alba Zaluar interviewing Cidade de Deus’ gangsters. Critics of the novel have invariably framed their interpretations of the novel within the extra-literary context of the author’s relationship to Cidade de Deus. In response to this pervasive critical approach to the novel, the current essay looks at the critical reception of the novel Cidade de Deus in the context of testimonio literature. 2

Paulo Lins, alongside numerous critics like João Cesar de Castro Rocha, Roberto Schwartz, and others, have linked Cidade de Deus to naturalism with Aluisio Azevedo’s O Cortiço, to social realism with Jorge Amado’s Capitães de Areia and José Lins do Rego’s Fogo Morto, to autobiography with Cuarto de Despejo by Menina Carolina de Jesus and to Brutalism with Ruben Fonseca’s O Cobrador. While this is the first essay that looks at Lins’s novel in the context of testimonios in Spanish, de Jesus’ Cuarto de Despejo has been examined in that context in ways that parallel and precede my interpretation of Cidade de Deus. Else Vieira, Eva Paulino Bueno, and Steven Hunsaker have respectively discussed Menina Carolina de Jesus’s diary in the context of testimonio literature. Rarely considered in testimonio criticism, Bueno complains that the absence of Cuarto de Despejo from the canon indicates a prejudice on the part of testimonio critics who are uninterested in the book because it doesn’t correspond to their ideas of a transparent and noble subject. Steven Hunsaker argues that Cuarto de Despejo exceeds many of the parameters of testimonio through Maria Lugones’s notion of “thickness.”3 Rather, De Jesus’s conflictive approach to her neighbors makes her unique and unrepresentative of the community. In fact, much of her discourse is a determined negation of the cruel hypocrisy of “the apparent act of charity” such as the “donation” of rotting food to the favela(Hunsaker 44).

Similarly, Cidade de Deus’s use of irony exceeds notions of a unified subject who could represent and imagine a coherent community. While Lins’s novel and de Jesus’s autobiography make no claims to representing the community “truthfully,” as did testimonio literature, they were nevertheless received as such by critics and readers in interesting ways. Just as feature films have been experimenting with documentary film traditions within an economy of suspense, so too does Lins’s social realist novel make use of a number of qualities of testimonio literature and of anthropological description, though for different effects. In this respect, the novel’s numerous points of contact with testimonio justify the use of the term post-testimonial discourse. In fact, the novel’s insistent irony places it squarely within Elzbieta Sklowdowska notion of the term. She argues that “post-testimonial discourse… is in reality a metadiscourse that through parody, demystifies the contradictions of testimonio that critics have not yet been able to catalogue” (Sklowdoska, 1992: 101. Trans. A.L.).

Despite Cidade de Deus’s obvious use of parody, the novel and testimonio’s most obvious similarities can be found in the critical discourses surrounding them. Like the criticism of Cidade de Deus, the criticism of testimonio literature suggested that in texts like The Autobiography of a Runaway Slave, and I, Rigoberta Menchú: an Indian Woman in Guatemala, a new type of literature was emerging which would give voice to oppressed, subaltern groups who have historically been silenced. For instance, in their essay, “Voices for the Voiceless: Testimonial Literature in Latin America,” Georg Gugelberger and Michael Kearney affirm that “people who were taken as objects are now insisting on being subjects, the distinction between them being that whereas the former are spoken about, the latter speak for themselves. This breakdown of what was the firmly structured distinction between subject and object reveals the deeply politically and culturally constructed nature not only of anthropology but also of the ‘knowledge’ that it produces” (1991: 7).

The criticism of testimonio literature and Cidade de Deus celebrate the transformation of objects of anthropological study into the subjects of new texts where they speak directly to an audience without the filter of anthropological framing. This new voice in testimonio is structured as a collective voice whereby the “witness” speaks in the name of a community. “Whereas the Western writer is definitely an author, the “protagonist” who gives testimony is a speaker who does not conceive of him/herself as extraordinary but instead as an allegory of the many, the people (1991: 8). Cidade de Deus too provides an allegory of the people, but the hundreds of minor protagonists and narrators leads to a different kind of collective subject made of competing and conflictive voices. Testimonio also has a specific political objective of “denunciation” in relationship to official ideology, and acts as a way of “exorcising and setting aright history.” The theoretically complex use of realism also effectively checked the discourse of post-modernism and led to the creation of a new terminology to describe the phenomenon in relationship to other literary forms. “John Beverly called it a post fictional discourse (1989: 11-12), and George Yúdice has correctly placed it in the mode of writing which arms itself against the increasing postmodernist attempts to abolish representational discourse for a ludic discourse… Barbara Harlow has characterized it as ‘Resistance Literature’” (Gugelberger, 1991, 10-11). In the context of Cidade de Deus, a similar move can be seen in João Cesar de Castro Rocha’s argument for the use of the term “aesthetics of marginality,” to define what he perceived of as an emerging genre.

The criticism of Cidade de Deus can be summarized in two trends. The dominant trend essentially follows the paths laid by Roberto Schwarz’s pioneering essay.4 Schwarz argued that Cidade de Deus is an “event” in Brazilian literature that marked the arrival of previously excluded subjects from literature. The other trend, sustained by Wilson Bueno, Germana Sousa and Luis Felipe Miguel, claims that that the novel is clumsy in its narrational styles. In addition, Miguel complains that it is only Schwartz’s bullying essay that convinced critics and popular audiences of the novel’s value. Interestingly, both trends suggest that Lins is the voice of the favela and that Cidade de Deus is something more than a novel. His origin as a favela resident and his anthropological research with Alba Zaluar form a contextual frame that establishes the dual credentials of his critiques of the structure of the favela. As confirmation of this hypothesis, Lins frequently appeared in the press as a public intellectual representing the favela in numerous contexts. The confusion over the “real” and artistic elements in the novel further extended into Lins’s life after the success of the film unleashed a lawsuit by angry residents who claimed that Lins misrepresented their stories when he chose to maintain their real names.

In fact, many critics of Cidade de Deus were influenced by their desire to find a realer truth reserved for the favela resident and ignored the novel’s nagging doubt as to the power of language to correct injustices. Elzbieta Sklodowska has suggested that testimonio criticism’s desire to celebrate the act of subaltern speech was perhaps influenced by “testimonio-seeing” eyes that overlooked literary effect in favor of naive notions of authenticity and truth. She writes, “if definitions of testimonio are indeed symptomatic of what we look for when we read with testimonio-seeing eyes, this brief re-reading of The Autobiography of a Runaway Slave tells us also what we tend to overlook. Yúdice, Beverly, and Zimmerman find testimonio’s authenticity in the voice of the victim, who has the unquestioned power to “summon truth,” “denounce,” “exorcise,” and “set aright.” But they also tend to overcompensate for the internal discord we may find in specific texts, and they direct our attention away from the problematic inscription of the differend. For these critics, the testimonial word that emerges from oppression is perceived as natural, pure, uniquely insightful, and immune to ideological blindness (Sklodowska 1996: 97). In other words, the focus on the act of enunciation in the testimonial overlooks the silences.

As a framework for understanding Cidade de Deus in the context of testimonio, it would be useful to revisit François Lyotard’s notion of the differend. He writes that “in the differend, something ‘asks’ to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong of not being able to put into phrases right away. This is when the human beings who thought they could use language as an instrument of communication learn through the feeling of pain which accompanies silence (and of pleasure which accompanies the invention of a new idiom), that they are summoned by language, not to augment to their profit the quantity of information communicable through existing idioms, but to recognize that what remains to be phrased exceeds what they can presently phrase, and that they must be allowed to institute idioms which do not exist” (Lyotard 1988: 13, cited in Sklodowska 1996: 97). In response to the uncritical approach towards the use of persuasion and literary license by the editors/transcribers/authors, Elizabeth Burgos Debray and Miguel Barnet, Elzbieta Sklodowska and Doris Sommer have insightfully analyzed the ways in which Burgos-Debray and Barnet’s texts are aesthetically constructed to create a realist discourse of truth that “hides” its rhetorical strategies. In Sklodowska’s analysis of Esteban Montejo’s rhetorical strategies, she reveals an internal system of self-questioning whereby Montejo “inoculates” his story against external critique”(95). Sommer’s essay, “Rigoberta’s Secrets” similarly examines the ways in which rhetorical silences are used to emphasize the power of the speaker to withhold information, thereby feeding the desire to “know” her story on the part of the reader.

The majority of the critics of Cidade de Deus similarly approached the novel with “truth-seeking” eyes that draw attention away from the silences the book theorizes. Just as the emergence of speech by historically silenced subjects is by no means guaranteed and necessitates a reordering of literary priorities, the urgency of poverty and urban violence theoretically frames the novel in terms of speech and its alternative, violence: “speech balks: the bullet talks” (Lins: 11). Lins radicalizes the relationship between enunciation and silence and indicates an understanding of violence as a nonverbal communication that comes to inhabit the space of the differend in favelas like Cidade de Deus. Violence has none of the redemptive qualities of a guerrilla struggle that they have in Menchú’s narratives where there was a clear system of oppression constituted by the landowning elite and the government’s oppression of local indigenous communities through systems of sharecropping, dispossession, relocation, and conscription policies. Rather, in Cidade de Deus, violence substitutes speech, whereby the witnesses and protagonists are helpless to stop the systematic slaughter of the community’s youth. The novel further complicates the ethical stance of the reader by contextualizing the actions of murderers and executioners (both the police and the gangsters) within the hardships endured during childhood and the struggle for survival and dignity.

In her analysis of Lyotard in the context of testimonio literature, Elzbieta Sklowdowska suggests that a number of steps are necessary in order to understand testimonial narrative’s mediation of reality and truth.

Four premises are needed, according to Lyotard, to constitute a phrase universe of testimonial contract as a truth-believing paradigm, First. an addressee – someone not only willing to listen and accept the reality of the referent, but also worthy of being spoken to. Then there is an addressor, a witness who refuses to remain silent. Third, a language capable of signifying the referent. Then there is a “case" or the referent itself that "asks to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right away" (Lyotard 1988, 13). The referent, continues Lyotard, may be obliterated if silence results from the denial of one or several of the preceding three instances (14). In other words, testimony takes place only if the reality of a referent is established and in order for this to happen all silent negations must be withdrawn and the authority of the witness, addressee’s competence, and language’s ability to signify must be assured (Sklowdoska 1996: 97.)

Sklodowska highlights the leaps of faith necessary for a relationship of solidarity between reader and speaker to be successful. The relationships outlined by Lyotard suggest a number of links in a chain of knowledge and which include the eyewitness quality of a speaker who has been wronged, a sympathetic addressee willing to listen and who has some power to correct the problem, and the belief that language can communicate reality objectively. As Sklodowska remarks, testimonio also adds another link in the form of the editor who faithfully transmits and shapes the speaker’s story according to aesthetic and literary criteria. The failure of any of these conditions “obliterates” the speaker and transforms them from witnesses into “victims.”

While the urgency of the wrong perpetrated against residents parallels the truth-speaking paradigm, Cidade de Deus calls attention to the failure and breakdown of testimony in other ways. Not only is the narration undermined by irony, the status of the protagonists as criminals erodes their credibility as speaking subjects. If in the classic example of I, Rigoberta Menchú: an Indian Woman in Guatemala, the indigenous Mayans are conscious agents in a political and military struggle for change against a repressive state apparatus, the gangsters in Cidade de Deus occupy a more ambiguous relationship to the state. They are not witnesses but violent agents of a variety of different crimes including armed robbery, rape, and murder. They actively suborn and corrupt the police, and are in turn victimized by corrupt cops and forced to pay bribes to operate their illegal business. Rather, the gangsters in Cidade de Deus lack a political awareness that would allow them to fully understand their subordinate relationship to the city as second-class citizens. In fact, their violent acts are a determined negation of subaltern status in their struggle to be both feared and famous.

Another difference between Cidade de Deus and testimonio literature is the author’s corrosive irony and a nagging doubt about language’s ability to faithfully communicate the truth of an entire community that has been historically stigmatized as the locus of crime. Cidade de Deus stands in direct relationship to Brazilian crime TV programs like Linha Direita and Cidade Alerta as a kind of parodic commentary on the “moral panic created in the press,” and as a way of contextualizing violence beyond the perversity of a few deranged individuals.5 Cidade de Deus denounces the historical presentation of a reality preconfigured by hegemonic discourse as marginal, and through this denunciation, it reframes the favela as central. In this way, the novel calls attention to the way language frames truth through its depiction of the news and mass media. On the one hand, the news frames the way Cidade de Deus is understood by the larger city as part of a “crime” problem. However, the news and the mass media are also consumed and interpreted by favela residents, thereby complicating the relationship between the community and the tools used to understand them. This reframing of the media in the novel and film calls attention to the power and the limitations of the media, as well as the potential of fiction as a corrective and denunciatory tool. The author’s use of irony also corrodes the over-dramatized and sensationalistic calls of the press for more repression in the favela.

Rather than a naive presentation of the truth as a call to action, the use of irony as a rhetorical tool in the narrative adds another filter through which truth is understood. The novel claims that truth is always mediated, and what is understood as “truth” in the narrative of the novel, is really the consciousness of the mediative power of language and silence. Unlike testimonio discourse, which posits a witness seeking retribution and a counter discourse that corrects official accounts, Cidade de Deus displaces the locus of truth towards a multiplicity of competing voices locked in a struggle to contest geographic and symbolic space. As testimonio invokes the many through the single story, seamlessly transcribed such that editor and speaker become one, Cidade de Deus too presents the multitude, but corrosively fragments the unitary discourse of a single narrator, discipline or genre capable of describing the totality of the favela.

Finally, Cidade de Deus casts doubt on the readers’ sympathy towards the favela. The novel calls attention to the readers’ fascination with crime by adopting the frame used to stigmatize the favela, and turning it inside out in numerous ways. For example, in the opening pages, the narrator presents numerous children’s games that animate the early years of the government project. Suddenly, in one of the few moments that the narrator addresses the reader, it is to remind him or her that “the subject here is crime. That’s why I am here.” In other words, the narrator has been summoned to talk about crime – not childrens’ games, implying that that is what the reader wants. Lins indeed gives them crime, but presented in unexpected ways.

Cidade de Deus then is an odd mirror of testimonio. Because secrecy and informing are such central security concerns to these gangsters living in semi-clandestine conditions, the notion of testifying in a juridical sense against state injustices loses its transparency amidst the criminal practices of numerous individuals and groups within the favela. Rather, to return to Lugones’s notion of “thickness,” the opaque relation to truth is emphasized in the novel through the ironic oscillation between narrational registers as well as in the parody of genres and discourses. As Roberto Schwarz suggested at the novel’s publication, Lins’s novel rearticulates anthropology, social realism and naturalism, the historical novel, the press, samba, and police discourses in “a discursive web that has no final word; and that operates, in turn, as an element in a wider mystery, formed by the huge business of crime, with its amorphous boundaries, and by the laws of motion and contemporary society – on whose effective shape such explanations have nothing to report” (Schwarz: 2005:10).

Cidade de Deus is both a historical document and a subversion of popular entertainment. First, the novel documents the evolution of a government project on the west side of Rio de Janeiro from the perspective of its gangsters and youth in a tradition of “social inquiry” (Schwarz: 2005: 9). Featuring hundreds of protagonists, the novel portrays a dense network of informal economic practices ranging from street vending to armed robbery. Following a pattern developed by naturalism and social realism in Brazil, the novel diverges from these approaches through its anthropophagic approach to popular language, the mass media, and academic discourse. The novel also works on a register of suspense that makes it a page-turner, while maintaining an unconventional approach to the plot development. The gangsters indeed die as the reader fears, but “before the projected climax, from adventitious hands, for half-forgotten reasons” (Schwarz: 2005:11).

The novel is structurally divided into three sections that historically mark the favela: the 1960’s, the early 1970’s, and the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Each period corresponds to a single gangster that forms the locus of the action despite the participation of hundreds of discrete characters. The first section relates the establishment of the project as a moment of idyllic hope for hundreds of working class black and northeastern families who had been displaced by drought, floods, and arson. At its foundation, Rio de Janeiro’s natural beauty frames the government project and animates the children’s games, the gangsters daring surprise hold-ups, and the cultural traditions that the residents bring with them to their new neighborhood. The second section, “A Historia de Bené,” introduces the theme of drug trafficking as Bené and his partner Zé Pequeno take over the local drug trade. This section documents the consolidation of their power as they settle old scores and take over another favela with the help of soldiers from the local barracks. The operations of the drug trade are explained and documented as the new standard for gangsters who had historically survived through armed robbery. The final section, “A Historia de Zé Pequeno,” documents the transformation of the government project into a “neo-favela.” The consolidation of military and economic power leads to a protracted war between neighboring gangs. The rape of Mané Galinha’s girlfriend by Zé Pequeno unleashes the conflict, but soon the causes of the war are forgotten as the main protagonists die, are arrested, or are forced into hiding and their lieutenants take over the management of the operations.

Following through on some of the many directions that Roberto Schwarz indicated in his original review, Wellington Augusto da Silva has thoroughly analyzed the use of the narrator in the novel to create a range of distances and registers through which the reader identifies with the protagonists. The novel accomplishes the shift in the readers’ perspective through the oscillation between a “malandro narrator,” seen in the indirect free speech of the gangsters and a “refined narrator,” seen in the indirect discourse used in the descriptions. As Silva has demonstrated concisely, the novel achieves a powerful alienation effect through the tension in the narration between refined and street discourse. Cinematically, the internal monologues of the gangsters act like a close-up or voice-over, while the “refined” and lyrical descriptions by a more traditional third person omniscient narrator act like pans to reveal the interconnections between the characters and the overlapping spheres of influence. Each of these techniques introduces critical distance, as the indirect free speech of the gangsters is parodied to reveal particularly ridiculous beliefs, or as the indirect speech parodies anthropological protocols or the division of labor into legal and illegal activities, when the majority of residents participate in the informal economy.

Lins uses the dynamic tension between narrational styles to reveal the gangsters’ incipient racial and class-consciousness, as well as to critique the gangsters’ misogynist attitudes. These incipient and variable layers of consciousness reproduce what Raymond Williams refers to as the division between “official” and “practical consciousness.” As Williams writes,

Practical consciousness is almost always different from official consciousness, and this is not only a matter of relative freedom or control. For practical consciousness is what is actually lived, and not only what is thought is being lived. Yet the actual alternative to the received and profound fixed forms is not silence: not the absence, the unconscious, which bourgeois culture has mythicized. It is a kind of feeling and thinking which is indeed social and material, but each in embryonic phase before it can become fully articulate and defined exchange. Its relations with the already articulate and defined are then exceptionally complex. (130-131)

The novel employs a number of interesting strategies to document the “practical consciousness” of the gangsters and favela youth. The malandro narrators place the reader in the shoes of the gangsters, often speaking in their words, and permitting the reader a window into their thoughts. The refined narrators create ironic distance and historical context, and parody the “official consciousness,” the press, anthropology, crime fiction, westerns, and other mass media texts. In fact, if testimonio builds up its narrators into truth speakers, Cidade de Deus actively casts doubt on its narrators’ ability to perceive the world beyond their subjective experience.

Silva also notes the importance of the character Busca-Pé as an internal narrator who historically frames the first two sections of the novel. His failure in straight jobs and in crime affirms his choice of photography in a doubling of the author’s own artistic choices. Busca-Pé’s disappearance in the final third of the novel indicates the irony through which the author self-reflexively views the potential of art to redeem favela youth in the systemic proliferation of violence. Just as violence sensationally rivets TV viewers, it forms the underlying logic of the novel that determines the focus of the narration. In fact, in one of the only times the narrator addresses the reader, the narrator ends a long digression about Busca-Pé’s childhood games in the forest and rivers surrounding Cidade de Deus by reminding the reader of their joint purpose: “the subject here is crime – that’s why I’m here.” The narrator’s interjection can be interpreted as a momentary flash into another relationship between the reader and the text. Like an anthropological or police informant, the narrator is summoned to reveal the favela to the reader. Just as TV viewers watch sensationalist press, the novel too fulfills this function of stimulating the audience by partially confirming their voyeuristic desire to read violence and crime. Because of the complex relationship between reader and narrators, many critics were falsely cued into a contextual reading of the novel that saw it as the emergence of an unmitigated favela voice, forgetting that Busca-Pé’s choice is ironically framed in the novel as a digression from the focus of violence. This choice indicates the author’s doubt at the limitations of literature/photography to effect change and deter urban violence.

The author’s doubt as to the power of art is inverted by an enthusiastic critical reception that elevates Paulo Lins to the triumphant status of an emblem of the favela. Critically, there is a general acceptance that the novel speaks a reality which had until then been denied about the Brazilian ghetto. This course would be followed by proponents and opponents of the novel and would soon frame Lins as an organic intellectual in affairs relating to the favela and urban violence. According to Schwarz, Cidade de Deus represents the fictionalization of Alba Zaluar’s study, “from the perspective of the objects of study – and (without promoting any political illusions) with a corresponding activation of a different class’s point of view” (Schwarz, 2001: 109). Rocha echoes this perspective when he suggests: “an important point to remember is the complexity and ambiguity of the narrator [of Cidade de Deus], who does not convey a particular viewpoint, but rather tries to embody the many layers, which comprise the fabric of the shantytown itself. Lins’s text is not the expression of his particular voice, but rather the articulation of a social stratum, which implicates Brazilian society as a whole” (62).

The link between anthropology and literature is often brought to the fore in the criticism of the novel. Lacerda writes that “perhaps this book is the very first ethnographic novel of Brazilian literature” (Lacerda. Trans. A.L.). Jagaribe also suggests that the dual role of former resident and researcher was a truly novel situation in Brazilian literature. “As Zaluar’s research assistant and as a resident of the favela, Lins acquired a dual role as anthropological researcher-informant and as a community member. Both the legitimacy of his authorship and the subject matter of a new, radically violent drug culture within the favela offered middle-class readers an insider’s view of an unknown terrain”(333). Beatriz Resende also champions this approach when she suggests that a new current of literature is emerging in Brazil that would speak from the perspective “of the excluded.” As opposed to earlier approaches such as Clarice Lispector’s Hora da Estrela, that poeticized poverty, “what seems new is that in literature, the poor now appears not only as a socio-economic condition, but as a subjectivity, an alternative position to be revindicated (Resende: 29. Trans. A.L.). In Resende’s opinion, Cidade de Deus is the paradigmatic example of this new current: “the strongest expression of what it is to formulate one’s own discourse, without external mediators in our recent cultural production. And the story of poverty, created from ‘within,’ emerges in a new form, much different from the one created by ‘realist’ narrators and their powerful omniscient voices, sure of themselves and neutral” (Resende: 33. Trans. A.L. Italics hers).

The excitement generated by the emergence of a subaltern voice in Brazilian literature puzzled some critics. Luis Felipe Miguel, for instance, claims that it was only its reception as the voice of the favela that accounted for its critical success – despite its formal flaws.

For someone with Paulo Lins’s background, who is not an innate member of the cultural elite, the rise to literary success is extremely difficult. But there is always the possibility to invert the parameters, presenting as an advantage what was once a handicap. And that is what the author of Cidade de Deus does. As a favela resident, he would have access to a realer reality, from which middle class intellectuals have been barred… Paulo Lins does not want, however, to be read as a deposition about the favela. He wants to be a novelist, not a Carolina Menina de Jesus in pants… For that reason, he mixes the codes of the literary and the ‘authentic.’ (Miguel 8. Trans. A.L. Italics his).

In Miguel’s opinion, Paulo Lins’s success is the result of bad faith: namely, his ability to invert the rules of the game by trading on his origins for critical recognition. His naive desire to become a novelist is expressed through his mixture of literary references and street slang. This condescending approach to the novel exclusively attributes Cidade de Deus’s almost instant success to Roberto Schwarz’s glowing essay. He sardonically remarks, “by investing his prestige, in the way that he did, in a work with so many defects and that so obviously deviates from the standard of good taste, Roberto Schwarz shows his influence” (8. Trans. A.L.). Germana Sousa also takes this direction in her critique of the novel when she suggests that Lins’s lyrical pretensions were falsely understood as the legitimate voice of the favela. She sarcastically remarks,

The master of the voice, the one who juggles erudite discourse, who tries to poeticize grammar – “kill… a verb requiring a bloody object’ — is the suspect/subject Paulo Lins, resident of Cidade de Deus, voice of the periphery who makes himself heard in the media. And that is the reason the novel justifies itself and finds its place – as the spokesperson for this pain. Now, we simply need to discuss the authenticity of the voice. Where, for example, are the other components of this complex web of relationships from the favela? Paulo Maluco, as he was called by his friends, becomes a writer, but gives little voice to the working class and women (2 Trans. A.L. Italics mine).

In the italicized examples above, Sousa’s sarcastic critique implies that the “dono da voz” that “tries,” and fails, to poeticize grammar is the “the subject,” Paulo Lins. “Sujeito,” which can be translated into “subject” as well as “suspect” doubles with its meaning in Portuguese police jargon, often referring to criminals. The use of the reflexive to indicate that the author “se faz ouvir” and that the novel “se justifica” also removes the agency from both and rather situates the novel in a passive relationship with the literary establishment rather than as an intervention in literary theory. The condescension is paralleled through Sousa’s reference to Paulo Maluco, Lins’s nickname and poetic pen name, who “vira escritor,” as though in a kind of lottery.

In the context of Wellington Augusto da Silva and Lívia Lémos Duarte’s analysis of the innovational use of narration, Sousa and Miguel’s condescending critique of Lins’s use of indirect free speech in the narration as an accidental flaw can be summarily discarded. The often times jarring mix of lyricism and street slang is in fact one of the main innovations of the novel alongside its pastiche of literary and extra-literary references and parodies. Nevertheless, Sousa and Miguel rightfully question the triumphant reception of Lins as an “authentic” voice of the favela.

This question of “authenticity” is one of the most riveting points of contact with testimonio literature. Doris Sommers and Elzbieta Sklowdoska have insightfully addressed this question with regard to testimonio collaboration and the literary and rhetorical techniques that form the basis of the book’s “reality effects.”6 Yet, with Cidade de Deus, a book that purports to be a novel (on the cover), the notion of authenticity reemerges uncritically. As mentioned earlier, the notion of the book’s authenticity is based on Lins’s own prior experience as a resident and the dozens of interviews Lins conducted as a research assistant to anthropologist, Alba Zaluar. This leads to a kind of doubling of Lins’s role as author: on the one hand, he is an eyewitness; on the other hand, he is the editor and compiler of the many interviews, which he synthesizes in the novel. Obviously, his experience interviewing gangsters for anthropologist Alba Zaluar informs the novel in ways similar to testimonial discourse and makes it a kind of historical document. Yet, the novel exceeds and contests the ability of anthropological description to document “practical consciousness.”

The breakdown of the anthropological paradigm can be seen in Alba Zaluar’s reflections on her project with Paulo Lins in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. In her account, there is an erosion of the anthropological model that she employs, due to the realization of the insurmountable chasm between herself and her subjects, and which necessitated her utilization of Lins and other assistants to act as her prostheses, cultural guides, interpreters, and informants.

In the second [series of interviews], completed in the last years of the decade, the barriers were so strong that the facts could no longer be understood and I was faced with lies (Zaluar: 1992). I returned here, and there, I left research assistants… I dodged the lies, but the passage between here and there was restricted to the ear that listened to the recordings of the interviews made by another, or to the eye that read the texts of others (Zaluar 2004: 11. Trans. A.L.).

Zaluar’s description of her role as an anthropologist divorced from her objects of study by an incommunicable gulf becomes one of compiler, mediator, and translator. Through the prostheses of her assistants, Zaluar is able to ask questions, probe answers, without revealing her irreducible difference from the subjects being interviewed. She describes difference in geographical terms: in the “here” and “there” which depend on the absoluteness of difference. The anthropologist dodges the “lies” through these prostheses, tricking her subjects into revealing the other truth, the one reserved for other young black men from the ghetto, as opposed to the lie which is reserved for the white, middle-class woman anthropologist.

The thorniness of Zaluar’s dilemma is located in the obscurity which separates these two locations so far from Gilberto Freyre’s vision of a unified Brazil7 – where combinations of power, race, gender, class and legal distinctions determine which side is which and that complicate a traditional anthropological approach through the lens of culture. Rather, she imagines a new role for the anthropologist in this post-Freyrean universe: as a mediator able to break down discriminatory stereotypes and translate opposing positions that erase one another and that feed hatred and resentment.

After the first interviews in which obstacles created a discourse addressed to someone from the outside, from superior race and class, of the opposite sex, that is, me, but also in a lying discourse, since in it, the relationship between the speaker and the act of speech was not sincere. This became clear in the last interview I did with a boy who told me that he had not committed any of the crimes of which he was accused by the neighborhood and the police, which made me believe that I was faced with excellent material to denounce the injustice present in our institutions. As always, in this second interview, I was accompanied by assistants; young university students who were residents of the area and who had known some of the gangsters since they were kids. When we left, and I expressed my enthusiasm over the interview, one of my assistants said: “but he was lying the whole time!” From then on, the hermeneutics of distrust in relation to the interviews we had already completed was so great that I was simply prohibited from using any of the information in them and concluded that, given the research conditions surrounding the targets of extreme and continuous repression, associated with illegal practices that must remain secret in order to maintain material and symbolic privileges, the communication with the researcher from the outside was seriously damaged. Later, from one of my assistants who lived there, I discovered that I had also almost been raped in one of the visits to the house of a young man with whom I thought I had made friends in the first stage of the research (Zaluar 2004: 11 – 12. Trans. A.L.).

Zaluar’s attempt at a political alliance between the misguided captains of Cidade de Deus stumbles across other less convenient desires: those of criminals determined to utilize discourse to advocate for themselves on their own terms – and which Zaluar is able to identify through the translation of Lins and her other “assistants” as lies. A great interview is revealed as fiction by a native interpreter, transforming an attempt at epic discourse into one of comedic failure. The interviewer becomes a puppet of her object, a naive advocate, taken in by a bunch of lies, intended to shield the interviewee from potential persecution. In addition, we have the complete reversal of the anthropological paradigm, something akin to the anthropophagic moment in Nelson Pereira dos Santos’s film Como Era Gostoso o Meu Francês (1971) when the anthropologist who has gone native is eaten at the end of the film. Here, Zaluar is informed retrospectively of her vulnerability to rape by her interviewees.

These assistants are then more than assistants. In addition to administering structured and unstructured interviews with street and prison gangs, they also act as witnesses of the veracity or mendacity of the interviewees’ statements. Despite Zaluar’s obfuscation of the identities of these important collaborators in her scholarly work, it is quite clear from Zaluar’s statements the absolutely fundamental role of these assistants as collaborators, and vice versa. There are a number of interesting points of contact between Zaluar and Lins’s respective projects that relate to questions of adaptation, translation and anonymity. In Zaluar’s project, the interviews that form the basis of her work are alimented by a statistical analysis, translated into a terminology foreign to its emergence, and applied to a discussion of larger issues of violence, criminality, and security. With Cidade de Deus, as well as Paulo Lins’s later work in film and TV, there is a shift to the literary and cinematic even when an anthropological and sociological framework is retained within the structure of the narrative. While Zaluar denies naming even her assistants, cloaking them as well as her subjects under the guise of anthropological anonymity of informants, Lins employs the real identities of subjects like Zé Pequeno, who are historic local figures, as well as the dozens of secondary characters that form the tableaux vivant of Cidade de Deus.

Part of the anthropological dilemma that Cidade de Deus poses involves the depiction of a fragmented and plural notion of citizenship in relation to the lived experience of historical race and class inequality. Retrospectively, Lins evokes the dissident political ramifications of the novel in ways that refer back to Bahktin’s notion of the political function of the novel.

My commitment as a writer was to look for the imaginary of those who were socially segregated. And for the sake of verisimilitude, it was to call attention to the appalling inequities of income distribution in Brazil, to spur the creation of forums about racism, to reprove the abandonment of aged people, to rebuke the government’s continuous disregard of children, pervasive violence, police arbitrariness and corruption, and to challenge the lack of public, social and cultural policies (Lins: 2005: 129).

Despite his idealism, Lins often expresses doubt over the vehicle of literature to affect change and the class composition of his potential audience. The intended favela audience is illiterate and the middle class audience consumes the novel without understanding it. In a joint interview with the author Ferréz, Lins claims “our books are published and nothing will come of it. Maybe one or two read them. But there are millions that don’t even read the newspaper. They only watch TV, which is commercial (Paiva: 2000. Trans. A.L.).

Minimizing the novel’s status as a best-seller, Lins instead focuses on the absence of favela readers, who are only exposed to commercial TV. In other interviews, he compares cinema and literature as vehicles for reaching a favela audience. In response to the question, “Cancino – and do you think that favela residents will go see the film, Cidade de Deus? Lins – the film, yes. Film, even with its limited reach, has more than literature. No one bothered to read the book” (Cancino. Trans. A.L.). Cidade de Deus residents expressed confusion during the writing of the novel as well, often imagining that Lins was working on a film. “I had a film club there. And because of that, when I started interviewing the guys, the real gangsters, for the book, they would invariably say: ‘You’re going to make a great film!’ No one saw the book when they spoke with me, just a film” (Lins and Buarque de Holanda. Trans. A.L.). In fact, the use of real names of residents and historical figures from Cidade de Deus is a key element of the confusing blurring of fact and fiction. For example, prior to the lawsuit, there is a kind of festive attitude to Lins’s role as favela griot. In an interview shortly after the publication of the novel, Lins remarks “the main character of my book ended up being poverty, the favela,” while his interviewer, Paulo Roberto Pires, narrates that Lins is “constantly being interrupted by acquaintances, and speaking to all about the long anticipated book of which they are the protagonists" (Pires, Trans. A.L.).

The film adaptation of the novel acted as a watershed that drastically changed Lins in relationship to the community of Cidade de Deus. Ironically confirming Lins’s rumination that literature had almost no impact in the favela, a lawsuit was filed by residents after the success of the film. Alba Zaluar for example, was among the numerous critics of the veracity of the film. She affirms that, "in my research, I never saw school children with a gun. And it wasn’t Zé Pequeno who killed all those people in the motel. It was another one we interviewed" (Folha 1/13/2003. Trans. A.L.). Dona Bá claimed that the use of her name in the novel was a form of defamation. A member of the lawsuit against Lins, she declares, "I found nine pages saying I was a prostitute and the manager of a brothel. I’ve done many things wrong, but I’ve never been a prostitute" (Folha 1/13/2003. Trans. A.L.). Given the title of the first edition of the novel, Cidade de Deus, Romance (novel), it is odd that Lins would have to explain the difference between novel and reality: “I wrote a narrative based on reality. But it is not reality” (Folha 1/13/2003. Trans. A.L.). The case was ultimately dismissed in 2005 on the grounds that Lins’s novel was obviously a work of fiction and not a biography, and that the distinguishing characteristics of the character, “Bá,” were quite commonplace (Erdelyi).

In retrospect, Lins reminisced about the causes of the lawsuit and attributed them to his own naïveté. He claimed,

There were some names that I put that were true. But they weren’t those people. I was in a very silly situation. I love books and wanted the community to read. So, this guy comes up and said, ‘OK Paulo Lins, you’re going to write a book, but no one reads here.’ ‘And what if I put some of their names in it?’ and he answered: ‘yea, put some of their names in it.’ I said: ‘but its not that person, I created a character.’ ‘Put the names, put the names, so that they read it.’ The guy is a reader, a writer, a lawyer, believing that people would read it… I don’t want people to just read Cidade de Deus, that they only read leftist books, I want them to read Fernando Pessoa, Machado de Assis, Maiakóvsky, Baudelaire, Heidegger… but no one read it, it didn’t get us anything, just the lawsuit (Lins and Amaral et al: 35. Trans. A.L.).

There is a profound ambiguity in Lins’s responses towards his role as cultural ambassador of the favela to the middle classes. In many ways, Lins’s interviews and his malandro narrator approaches Paul Gilroy’s redeployment of W.E.B. Dubois’ notion of “double consciousness.” As Gilroy puts it, “striving to be both European and black requires some specific forms of double consciousness… where racist, nationalist, or ethnically absolutist discourse orchestrate political relationships so that these identities appear mutually exclusive, occupying the space between them or trying to demonstrate their continuity has been viewed as a provocative and even oppositional act of political subordination”(1). Dubois saw this as the emergence of Black Americans as a “world-historic” people: “the negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second sight in the American world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (Dubois: 3, cited in Gilroy: 134). Given the novel’s frequent portraits of gangsters who are conscious of racial and class discrimination directed against them, their criminal activities are often reframed as vengeance in a class and race war. In numerous provocative interviews, Lins challenged the relationship between the favela and the larger city in terms of the causalities suffered by the favela and exemplified by his mother’s death.

Marina Amaral – But do you think that Marcinho VP is a potential revolutionary with that political performance of his or do you think it is all a lie?

Paulo Lins – No. Marcinho is my friend.

Marina Amaral – Do you think that movement of his was real?

Paulo Lins – I think so. Marcinho VP is a person who spoke of society with a very great clarity, and there are a lot of angry people out there. There was some shooting just now at two hotels in Gloria and at the Meridien, and I saw an interview with the head of a hotel chain saying that Rio de Janeiro had lost 30 million. Where was this money going? To the ones shooting? To the favela residents? Not likely, therefore, my friend, the man/black man is indignant and outraged and I think that it is justifiable to rob and kidnap, the conditions in which people live, hunger justifies the shots…

Ferréz – Do you think it is justifiable to rob the rich?

Paulo Lins – I think so.

Natalia Viana – And kill?

Paulo Lins – I think so. I am saying something politically incorrect. The bastards will attack me for this and I know it. And I won’t answer. But that’s the way it is. Go to the public hospital! My mom died for lack of medical attention, she went to the hospital and made an appointment for one or two years later and died of a heart attack. They gave those generic pills to her in two minutes and sent her home. There is no medical care, there is no food, there is no dignity whatsoever, and there are no houses, there is nothing.

Natalia Viana – And weren’t you angry? Did you think about killing?

Paulo Lins – I did. I wrote Cidade de Deus. (Lins, Amaral, et al.: 34 Trans. A.L. Italics mine).

In the above interview, Lins defends armed robbery and murder on the part of the poor as legitimate survival strategies in the context of absolute poverty, yet maintains his own choice of using literature as a vehicle of change, despite the death of his mother. Lins’s strategy ironically doubles that of the narration in Cidade de Deus, oscillating between a refined and a malandro discourse. Responding to a barbed question referring to Marcinho VP, the protagonist of numerous police operations, gang wars, and also of the novel Abusado, O Dono do Morro by Caco Barcellos, Lins completely changes the tone of the question by first stating that he is Marcinho’s friend.8 The response checks the tone of the question, making it clear that Lins won’t speak badly of a friend, and then continues to explain the positive contributions of Marcinho VP in the conceptualization of Rio de Janeiro’s drug wars in a context of desperate poverty. The rhetorical question, “para onde ia esse dinheiro?” is answered in a twist towards Rio’s malandro street slang and the provocative assertion that armed robbery and murder are legitimate tactics in a class and race war, “nego está revoltado, e acho que é de direito o sujeito pegar e seqüestrar, a situação que o sujeito vive, que passa fome, é de direito o cara dar tiro.” Finally, in another reversal, Lins refers back to his mother’s death as a way of justifying murder and kidnapping as the poor’s response to prior injustice.

Paulo Lins’s provocative literary and rhetorical strategies have successfully transformed Lins into a complex representative of the favela. Since the publication of the novel, Lins has worked on numerous government literacy projects, co-directed the award-winning music video clip, A Minha Alma, by the Hip-Hop Reggae fusion group O Rappa, and has co-directed two episodes of the award-winning TV series, Cidade dos Homens. He appears in the press as a dissenting and critical voice towards government repression in favelas, and even advised Cacá Diegues unfortunate remake of Orféu. His artistic choices since the publication of Cidade de Deus have confirmed Lins’s view as to the limitations of literature as a vehicle for a broader audience that would include the favela. Thus, Cidade de Deus addresses the central dilemma at the heart of the testimonio narrative: its readership. It is for this reason that the narrative of Cidade de Deus makes such effective use of suspense and the literary adaptation of cinematic techniques in a naive attempt to engage a broader audience that is only semi-literate even in audio-visual technology.

To conclude, Cidade de Deus and testimonio literature share numerous points of contact. First of all, these texts have focused national and international attention on the relationship between poverty, unemployment, and systemic violence of which, the poor are the primary victims. Second, these texts employ a realist discourse of truth and authenticity that are manifested through literary and rhetorical strategies. Finally, the criticism of these texts has understood them contextually and politically as the emergence of unmitigated subaltern voices in the literary sphere.

Despite these parallels, Cidade de Deus exceeds the already uncertain contours of testimonio through its use of pastiche, irony, and an unconventional approach to the dramatic suspense of popular entertainment in ways that make it post-testimonial. These techniques have the effect of undermining a unitary discourse that could speak for the favela and rather point to an erosion of the potential for witnessing in cases of chronic and systemic violence and poverty. Part of this is due to the position of the protagonists in Cidade de Deus and the necessity of creating empathy between the reader and extremely violent subjects. Just as Zaluar confronts the “lies” of the ghetto, so too Cidade de Deus corrodes its own discourses, calling attention to the inability to understand the “practical consciousness” that guides the actions of Cidade de Deus’s residents. Like the “practical consciousness” of the gangsters, Cidade de Deus calls attention to and elaborates Lyotard’s notion of the differend in such a way that violence is reconceptualized as a form of nonverbal speech.

Cidade de Deus’s floating narrator constantly displaces and shifts the relationship between the reader and the text across disciplines and genres. Like the uncanny moment when the eight year old Filé com Fritas boasts, “’look man, I smoke, I snort coke, I bin beggin’ since I was a baby, I’ve washed car windows, shined shoes, killed, stolen… I’m not a kid. I’m a man!’”(Lins 2006: 334), the reader and the narrator are only partial allies, consumed by a logic of mistrust that places the reader simultaneously in the shoes of the victims and the assailants. The masterful quality of the narrative lies in its ability to incite the desire of the reader to understand crime from the perspective of the criminals, thereby denying his or her own position as a potential victim of crime. The hermeneutics of suspicion that the novel encrypts between reader and narrator is paralleled in Lins’s interviews where he provocatively reframes violence in terms of desperate poverty and class warfare, even to the point of justifying kidnapping and murder.

Lins’s complex rhetorical and literary strategies betray his skepticism over the possibility of a testimonial contract in a context where the favela is consistently stigmatized. The solidarity necessary for such a contract to take place and for victims to become “witnesses” would require a complete re-evaluation of criminality and poverty. Lins’s statements constitute a challenge to the reader to confront his or her own prejudices about the favela. For instance, Rigoberta Menchú’s story hinges on the readers’ positive vision of indigenous Mayans. While Elizabeth Burgos-Debray minimizes differences between her and Rigoberta Menchú’s respective positions and emphasizes the equivalence of Rigoberta Menchú’s story with other Mayans, Cidade de Deus calls attention to race and class difference through the multiplication of varying forms of practical consciousness that simultaneously implicate the reader in uncomfortable and pleasurable ways.

Another point of failure in Lyotard’s contract occurs on the level of the transmission of truth through language. Just as Zaluar is unable to distinguish truth from lies, language ceases to be a neutral referent, but interacts with gender, class, race and power. Cidade de Deus rehearses this on numerous levels, in each case revealing a limitation of each discourse it employs in an elaborate and subtle parody. In this way, Cidade de Deus is far more self-reflexive about the limitations and potential of discourse to convince or effect change than testimonio narrative. It actively casts doubt on its own discourses of “truth” and questions the ability of any academic discipline or artistic medium to fully do justice to a representation of the favela.

To end, I would like to question the relationship between testimonio and Cidade de Deus as messianic and utopian texts. In this regard, Rigoberta Menchú’s work as a peasant union organizer and liberation theologist forms the basis for her testimony. The text itself becomes another tool in her fight for social justice. Esteban Montejo too must be understood in the context of post-revolutionary Cuba where an ex-slave could now speak and be celebrated by the post-revolutionary literary establishment. Cidade de Deus occupies a much different place with regard to popular movements. While it could be said that Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s Lula’s presidential victory was accomplished through a cultural shift that valued investment in education and poverty eradication, goals that Lins shares, the novel’s publication in 1997 briefly punctuated an escalating war between paramilitary self defense groups, two major criminal gangs and prison syndicates, and official state forces. Like MV Bill’s song “Traficando Informação,” Cidade de Deus doesn’t present the reader with transparent or noble heroes. The world is just too complicated for nobility or heroism. Rather the gangsters struggle against a system designed to destroy them, often choosing perverse and cruel paths. The chaotic gunfire effectively pulverizes a notion of unitary discourse, particularly due to the behind the scenes collaborations and alliances between the above groups. It is therefore essentially a distopian universe that is characterized by apocalyptic violence, with a minor current of utopian hope, expressed in the children’s games, in the rich reservoir of Afro-Brazilian culture, and in the character of Busca-Pé. This tension between different poles can be seen in the final pages of the novel. After Zé Pequeno’s death in a singularly anti-climatic scene, the novel presents an image of hope in the resiliency of a child’s kite flying.

 

Notes

1 To the confusion of critics, in response to a lawsuit filed by Sebastiana Geralda da Silva that alleged that her name was defamed by the novel’s depiction of the character “Bá,”, the 2002 edition of Cidade de Deus and the 2006 English translation, in addition to being significantly shorter, change the names of the majority of the characters. Marreco, Cabeleira and Alicate become Tutuca (Squirt), Inferninho (Hellraiser), and Martelo (Hammer). The police Cabeção and Touro are renamed Cabeça de Nós Todo (Boss of Us All) and Bezelbu (Beezlebub). Dadinho, Zé Pequeno, and Bené are changed to Inho (Pipsqueak), Zé Miudo (Zé Pequeno) and Pardalzinho (Sparrow). In addition to the name changes of major characters, numerous smaller characters and place names are changed, such as the bar owners, samba musicians, minor gangsters. Too avoid confusion, I refer to the characters by the names of the original 1997 edition. Excerpts from the novel are from the 2006 English edition, translated by Alison Entrekin.

2 As Elzbieta Sklowdowska has insightfully shown, the borders of testimonio are amorphous and may include a number of related genres such as autobiography, diaries, “new journalism” and anthropology (Sklowdoska, 1992: 7-51). It is not my intention to employ a rigid definition of testimonio literature. Rather, I focus on some common characteristics of canonical testimonio texts like I, Rigoberta Menchú: an Indian Woman in Guatemala, by Rigoberta Menchú and edited by Elizabeth Burgos Debray and The Autobiography of a Runaway Slave by Esteban Montejo and edited by Miguel Barnet such as the use of the tape recorder to register oral voices from a subaltern community, the urgency of their struggle, and a sympathetic and international middle class audience.

3 Hunsaker here employs Maria Lugones’ notion of “thickness”: “Thickness and transparency are group relative. Individuals are transparent with respect to their group if they perceive their needs, interests, ways, as those of the group and if this perception becomes dominant or hegemonical in the group. Individuals are thick if they are aware of their otherness in the group, of their needs, interests, ways being relegated to the margins in the politics of intragroup contestation. So as transparent, one becomes unaware of one’s difference from other members of the group” (“Purity,” 474. Cited in Hunsaker: 34).

4 Schwarz also helped publish one of Paulo Lins’s poems in the magazine, Novos Estudos. He was also one of the first readers of the manuscript and encouraged the author to apply for a “Bolsa Vitae de Artes” in order to finish the novel (Mello: 126).

5 For a more thorough discussion of the press’s construction of violence in Rio de Janeiro, see Leu (2004) and Hirschman (2000).

6 Roland Barthes coined this term in his collection of essays, The Rustle of Language. Barthes argues that novels employ detail as a form of persuasion, convincing the reader of their veracity through the attention to incidental detail.

7 Gilberto Freyre’s landmark book Casa Grande e Senzala: formação da familia brasilieira sob o regime de economia patriarcal argues that Brazilian slavery fostered more harmonious racial relationships than in the United States. Freyre’s influence led to the adoption of his vision as official ideology, in ways that have been criticized by Abdias de Nascimento as an attempt to block legislation that would protect the rights of Brazil’s black population. Recently, Freyreanism has been enjoying a new vogue through the support of intellectuals like Yvonne Maggie and Antonio Riserio who have returned to Freyre’s celebration of “mestiçagem” in order to justify their rejection of the institutionalization of affirmative action programs in federal universities.

8 For more on the fascinating story of Marcinho VP and his collaboration with Spike Lee, João Moreira Salles, and the author Caco Barcellos, see João Camilo Penna’s insightful article, “Marcinho VP (um estudo sobre a construção do personagem).”

 

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Bio

Um começo e uma origem - pela poesia de Nicolas Behr

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Author Bio

Laíse Ribas Bastos
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Quando todos já tiverem contemplado a nobre criatura, vestígio de alguma época já maldita, uns indiferentes, pois não terão possuído a força de compreender, mas outros, aflitos, e a pálpebra úmida de lágrimas resignadas se contemplarão, enquanto que os poetas desses tempos, sentindo reacenderem-se olhos amortecidos, seguirão para sua lâmpada, ébrio o cérebro, por um instante, de uma glória obscura, tomados pelo Ritmo e no olvido de existir numa época que sobreviveu à beleza.

Stéphane Mallarmé. " O Fenômeno Futuro"

Das margens às origens
Um primeiro contato com o texto de Nicolas Behr permite ao leitor um mergulho na cena urbana da cidade de Brasília - desde 1977, ano em que lança um de seus primeiros livros produzidos artesanalmente. Com uma pausa de aproximadamente 10 anos em sua produção, no início da década de 1990 o autor volta ao cenário poético nacional. Ainda pelas "beiradas", fora dos círculos de valoração e crítica. Nesse retorno, seu texto altera-se. Não se trata apenas de crítica social e de passeios pela arquitetura da cidade de Brasília. O poeta inicia um outro movimento e passa a reinventar aquele cenário anteriormente já desgastado. O poema é o instrumento de retorno ao passado, partida ao futuro e atestado do presente a fim de encontrar rastros para uma memória perdida, e saídas para o sufocamento urbano.

O foco deste trabalho é a arquitetura da língua, da poesia e dos universos produzidos no procedimento poético, com o objetivo de desvendar os "lugares" criados pelo poeta: Lugar de origem e de começo na poesia de Nicolas Behr, um poeta à margem - da editoras e dos circuitos culturais, que aos poucos é assimilado pela cena poética contemporânea brasileira.

Pensando essa trajetória, o trabalho propõe uma abordagem da poesia de Behr a partir da leitura operada por Silviano Santiago acerca dos mitos de origem e de começo para a poesia de Carlos Drummond de Andrade. Além disso, visa ainda, pensar a escritura do poeta de Brasília sob dois pólos de apoio propostos pela crítica de Silviano Santiago: Marx e Proust. A fim de entendermos melhor a dicção poética assumida pelo poeta, faz-se necessário também um olhar sobre o contexto inicial de produção, período da chamada "poesia marginal", na década de 1970 no Brasil.

O momento "marginal"
O pólo periférico de que falamos aqui - o Brasil - sofre as conseqüências de um desenvolvimento cultural tardio e, quase sempre preso aos valores estabelecidos pelas forças centralizadoras. Portanto, é possível perceber que, após a década de 1920, mesmo para uma arte que se propõe de ruptura e esteticamente autônoma, ainda para as vanguardas, o desenvolvimento artístico no Brasil nasce através do contato com movimentos artísticos predominantemente europeus. Em O entre-lugar do discurso latino-americano, Silviano Santiago ("Uma literatura nos trópicos" 18) questiona a atitude do escritor em um país subordinado às leis impostas pela superioridade econômica de outros países, de maneira que a obra entra nesse ciclo e, ao escritor, não resta saída a não ser importar modelos pré-fabricados, sem desenvolver elementos de diferença no código artístico. A atitude do artista fica presa ao peso da "latinamericanidade" que carrega sobre os ombros. Sob esse raciocínio, o autor define esse tipo de obra como "parasita" (20), uma vida incapaz de acrescentar algo de próprio ao modelo inicial.

Embora não possa impedir o processo de invasão estrangeira, o artista latino-americano deve fugir do silêncio, para que não seja engolido pelo desejo imperialista e, dessa maneira, cabe ser vanguarda (se for para não desaparecer e fugir da passividade), cabe contestar, ser agressivo na expressão, reagir e fingir uma obediência. "Falar, escrever, significa: falar contra, escrever contra" (19). Isto é, assimilar criticamente a influência exterior. Na década de 1960, viu-se de fato necessário reagir e assinalar diferenças. O movimento artístico entrava em ebulição e contraculturalismo era a palavra de ordem ou, se preferirmos, de desordem, naquele momento.

A juventude urbana da década de 1960 aplicava suas forças em qualquer movimento capaz de conter as agruras e a racionalidade operante da ditadura militar estabelecida no país naquela década. A idéia era contestar a modernização e o mercado autoritário impostos pelo governo centralizador. Sob esse viés, a contracultura caracterizou-se, segundo o poeta e antropólogo Antonio Risério, como um movimento "estético-psicopassional" (25) no qual a transformação interior, bem como da conduta cotidiana de um ser, estabeleceriam uma nova cultura e uma nova moral – um novo modo de viver. A idéia era buscar meios para sair do sistema e do modo de vida burguês e "careta", fugir do "pensamento acadêmico, da estrada sinalizada, do intelectual tradicional." Para o autor:

(…) a disposição contraculturalista foi acabar desembocando no processo de desrecalque das múltiplas personalidades que nos compõem e no reconhecimento pleno da pluralidade cultural brasileira. É assim que podemos falar da contribuição da contracultura para o alargamento e o aprofundamento da consciência e da sensibilidade antropológicas no Brasil, produzindo rachaduras irreparáveis no superego europeu de nossa cultura. (31)

A arte dita então "marginal" entendeu o recado e a necessidade de afirmar uma arte própria, capaz de marcar as diferenças através de um novo código artístico e fugir às normas institucionalizadas. Além disso, uma nova geração de leitores e receptores da obra de arte fazia-se presente e exigente de mudança, de literatura para ser consumida, curtida1, deleitada – sem erudições e percorrendo as margens do sistema estabelecido.

Compreende-se, então, como a periferia latino-americana, nesse caso, o Brasil, instaura, durante a década de 1970, um pólo centralizador político e social e cria suas próprias margens, das quais o "movimento marginal", fenômeno fechado e datado, é apenas um exemplo. A marginalidade literária instaura-se pelas mãos da crítica, para que seja possível abranger sob um mesmo nome todas as formas de manifestações artísticas que não estejam devidamente adaptadas aos cânones vigentes na época, inclusive àqueles de ruptura, como as vanguardas brasileiras da década de 1950 e 1960.

Esse rótulo expansivo pelo qual foram denominados os poetas de uma "nova" poesia, dizia respeito, categoricamente, ao fato de esses artistas empenharem-se em burlar o mercado editorial e, através de tal atitude (que, sob esse viés, é mais política do que literária), a radical modernização/tecnicismo operante nesse mercado. Os livros eram produzidos artesanalmente, datilografados (em sua maioria) e mimeografados, para serem distribuídos a baixos preços nas portas dos cinemas, dos museus, dos bares e dos teatros. Apesar da atitude, convenientemente política e, até certo ponto, radical em relação à produção e distribuição de seus livros, nem todos os artistas utilizavam-se da máscara de marginal em suas publicações. O lançamento do livro 26 Poetas hoje, coleção de poemas marginais de autoria de Heloísa Buarque de Hollanda, colaborou para a institucionalização de um grupo de escritores que não queria ser institucionalizado pela crítica:

Chacal - Ser marginal não é uma opção, não. Ser marginal é impossibilidade de produção em larga escala […].

Xico Chaves - Quem tá colocando a gente na condição de marginal são as editoras. Porque não existe na verdade poesia marginal, música marginal. Existe poesia, existe música […]. Quando falaram em malditos da música brasileira era no mesmio sentido de marginalizar um tipo de música ou seja: "Não, essa música não é para consumo." […] Então o problema está no sistema, marginal ninguém é.

(Chacal; Chico Chaves. Entrevista concedida a Astolfo Araújo e Wladyr Nader. "Escrita". 07)

Defesa de uma marginalidade em relação à crítica e aos círculos acadêmicos. Ser marginal, na acepção daqueles poetas da década de 1970 não pressupunha a desvinculação do mercado. Pelo contrário, o objetivo era fugir da academia, do intelectualismo e da biblioteca e, assim, atingir grande parte da população. Meta alcançada, mas mesmo pelas beiradas e involuntariamente talvez, o artista marginal da década de 1970 selecionava seu público leitor e consumidor da obra de arte. Quem mais poderia ter acesso aos livros (tão facilmente distribuídos) além daqueles parados nas filas ou nas portas dos eventos artísticos na época? Se o livro precisava sair da biblioteca e o código poético abarcar a vida do jovem citadino (como de fato o fez), por que restringir o público apenas ao público cult? Prova do interesse em vender é o fato de que muitos desses escritores foram absorvidos por editoras ao longo de suas carreiras. É o caso de Chacal, Francisco Alvim, Cacaso, e outros.

Percebe-se que, além de selecionar apenas o público cult como consumidor da nova poesia, o que realmente a fazia diferente e quase passa despercebido é o fato de esse outro dizer artístico rastrear as margens dos antigos códigos literários e não adaptar-se às normas, mesmo veladamente, estabelecidas. A mudança de postura política veio de mãos dadas com a mudança dos valores literários. Os conflitos do cotidiano, a rotina e o engajamento político do jovem citadino, a vida e os percalços da metrópole foram aplicados a um novo código poético, através de uma linguagem menos elevada e mais coloquial, pouco erudita e mais pública. Digo "pública" na medida em que o novo dizer tentava dar conta de um novo universo: o da vida urbana. O espaço poético: eis, portanto, o lugar onde de fato pode-se falar em mudança e dificuldade de adaptação, não por parte do público leitor e, sim, por parte da academia, da crítica literária, do regime de governo autoritário e das vanguardas remanescentes das décadas anteriores.

Escritores como Francisco Alvim, Chacal, Charles, Cacaso, Bernardo Vilhena, Eudoro Augusto, Carlos Saldanha, Luiz Olavo Fontes, Nicolas Behr e tantos outros, fizeram sua trajetória via ativismo artístico-cultural, um ativismo que não deixava de procurar criar efeitos no sistema político e ser incômodo. Pelo trabalho lingüístico próprio a cada escritor, formas muito distintas de manifestações poéticas foram colocadas sob um mesmo rótulo. É pelo uso da linguagem, portanto, que a poesia marginal estabelece novos cânones e centros dentro do seu próprio círculo. A atitude era comum a todos (ou quase todos), mas a maneira de lidar com a linguagem e desenvolver um novo código poético fez-se muito particular para cada artista. Isso se deve especialmente ao fato de eles terem influências, formações e perspectivas diferentes em relação ao fazer poético.

A nova poesia foi tachada de ruim por muitos daqueles que defendiam uma transcendência poética ou uma dicção mais hermética - e, se não hermética, pouco tangível pelo público, que se tornava então mais restrito ainda. Por isso, as vanguardas, em especial a concretista, foram tão questionadas pelos novos poetas. Não que eles não fizessem poemas de estética vanguardista também; mas a postura assumida diante da prática exercida (a recusa por adotar um programa, um projeto poético e, para a época, portanto, político) e a linguagem utilizada, fugiam aos rigores pré-estabelecidos. Não foi por acaso que bem usufruíram do estereótipo de "marginais". Porém, infelizmente, não alcançaram o objetivo final: sair do círculo universitário, largar mão do público cult e atingir a grande parte da população, conforme relatado pelos poetas Chacal, Chico Chaves, Bernardo Vilhena e Charles em entrevista concedida à revista Escrita de abril de 1977 a propósito da "poesia por linhas transversas" produzida naquele período.

Eis o que se pode apreender da estrutura artística da década de 1970, na qual o movimento de literatura "marginal", mesmo por caminhos alternativos, estabelece seus próprios cânones e cria movimentos de força com outras instâncias de poder. Sob essa perspectiva, o que se depreende da situação é que, quando há fuga de um pólo de autoridade centralizadora e um novo pólo dotador de sentido é estabelecido às margens, passando a determinar novas normas a serem acatadas (conforme já ilustrado aqui), ele vira centro-marginal dentro do centro. Para Nelly Richard, a tensão entre as instituições de centro e as de periferia dissolve-se em micro-enfrentamentos de poderes e resistências locais e geram, na própria periferia, figuras de centro (58) – aquelas instâncias canônicas. Além disso, as práticas culturais da periferia e as teorias radicais do centro fazem com que o antes divergente, alternativo e minoritário, passível de ser colocado sob a máscara de margem/marginal, perca seu caráter e valor polêmico.

Marx e Proust – Começo e Origem
A poesia dita marginal na década de 1970 se desfez. No entanto, alguns de seus ativistas continuaram a publicar seus livros. Alguns seguiram na insistência da livre poesia, enquanto outros foram absorvidos pelas editoras. Nicolas Behr transita entre os dois grupos, mas a maioria de seus livros, inclusive aqueles lançados a partir da década de 1990, é independente. Nesse sentido, a marginalidade poética fora deixada parcialmente de lado, pois na indecisão ou impossibilidade de escolher uma editora, o escritor publica seus livros por conta
própria.

Na poesia de Behr é possível encontrar, diluidamente, os movimentos de origem e começo que podem ser ilustrados aqui a partir dos livros: Menino Diamantino (2003) – possível referência ao livro Menino Antigo, de Carlos Drummond de Andrade; Poesília pau-brasíla (2002); Primeira Pessoa (2005) e Braxília Revisitada (2004). Para pensarmos a poesia em questão sob a perspectiva de origem e começo, será estabelecido, primeiramente, dois pólos de força desenvolvidos também a partir da crítica de Silviano Santiago: Marx e Proust.

Entre Marx e Proust. Marx porque se quer revolução e se pensa as ruas, a cidade, a vida desmascarada. Marx, porque somos seres de vida em sociedade, em busca de uma maneira adequada para nela se locomover.

Proust porque é memória. Proust porque é passado, porque mesmo presente, quer-se passado, quer-se futuro no passado. Proust porque escreveu A la recherche du temps perdu e foi capaz de mexer nas reminiscências extraviadas na memória de seus personagens ou de cada um que o lê. Ou de cada um que pensa a poesia como possibilidade de originar e começar.

Eis a questão, e eis a tensão. Os contrapontos são tomados, neste trabalho, a partir de dois campos de força estabelecidos pela crítica de Silviano Santiago. Um, mais memorialista, e outro, mais social. É no ensaio escrito para a Folha de São Paulo, que Silviano Santiago toma, definitivamente, partido em relação a essa questão. Naquele espaço destinava-se a escrever sobre Carlos Drummond de Andrade e a tratar da poesia do autor. E o faz, arrastando o poeta pelo século adentro. Drummond, para Silviano é o poeta que nasce com o século XX e com ele divide as angústias, as mudanças, as memórias, as saudades e lembranças, e a ânsia de (re) começar ("Entre Marx e Proust" 4).

Apesar de Silviano Santiago reivindicar a abertura e a descentralização das manifestações literárias, em especial da poesia, o autor não escapa de uma polarização em torno de Carlos Drummond de Andrade – considerando-o e apontando-o ao longo de sua crítica como um dos "grandes" poetas brasileiros do século XX:

O sucesso de público de Drummond, a validade do seu texto em termos estéticos, históricos e sociológicos, a unanimidade em torno da escolha da sua obra como a mais significativa do Modernismo, tudo isso advém do fato de que a sua poesia dramatiza de forma original e complexa a oposição e a contradição entre Marx e Proust, entre a revolução político-social instauradora de uma Nova Ordem Universal, e o gosto pelos valores tradicionais do clã familiar dos Andrades, seus valores sócio-econômicos e culturais (4).

Nessa passagem, o crítico já adianta toda a sua perspectiva. Ao tomar por base os campos formados por "Marx" e "Proust", o crítico reconhece na obra de Drummond dois mitos portadores dessas duas correntes: mito do começo e mito da origem. O primeiro diz respeito à vontade do homem em inaugurar uma nova sociedade, negando os valores do passado e do seu clã (clã oligárquico rural dos Andrades, no caso de Carlos Drummond de Andrade). Para isso, faz-se necessário desfazer os laços familiares, para que se rompa também com o passado; munir-se de rebeldia e individualismo e focar-se no tempo presente. É por essa razão que Silviano enxerga no personagem Robinson Crusoé a representação moderna e ocidental desse mito, uma vez que o personagem vê-se afastado da civilização européia, sozinho em uma ilha. É lá onde tem de recomeçar e restabelecer todos os traços culturais do homem e, então, descobrir o outro e retornar à vida social. Assim, Silviano reconhece que o sujeito drummoniano experimenta a exclusão da vida em família para incluir-se no universo do livro e da leitura e, a partir daí, descobrir (-se) (n)o outro – o personagem de Robinson Crusoé. O poeta cria, então, suas próprias ilhas: a ilha da leitura, onde habita e refugia-se o menino leitor; e a ilha da escritura, a qual habita o poeta, tece seu texto e sua história do marco zero, inaugurando sua vida. O mito do começo é também mito da inauguração.

O segundo mito (da origem) está no pólo oposto ao primeiro, na medida em que, conforme Silviano, refere-se ao gosto e interesse pelos valores sócio-econômicos e culturais familiares, isto é, pressupõe o desejo do homem de "se inscrever numa ordem sócio-cultural que o ultrapasse e em que os valores individuais perdem a sua razão de ser, pois são indícios de mera e passageira insubordinação ou rebeldia" (Santiago, "Entre Marx e Proust" 5). Nesse mito, o conhecimento já não corresponde mais a uma busca de aventuras e de inauguração de um novo mundo para si e para a sociedade, mas está, sim, arraigado nos antepassados. Assim, o indíviduo só passa a existir na identificação com suas origens familiares ou, no caso de Drummond, seu clã.

Se o mito do começo pressupõe perda do sentimento de pertencimento a uma forma de coletividade para que se faça possível recomeçar e, portanto, pressupõe também sentimento de rebeldia e ruptura, ele relaciona-se ao campo de forças criado por "Marx". Já o segundo, o mito da origem, o qual permite ao individuo definir-se como pertencente a um conjunto de valores sociais atrelados ao clã familiar e a valores patriarcais e cristãos, para que exista enquanto ser e seja capaz de transcender o próprio tempo de sua vida, relaciona-se com o campo formado por "Proust," o centramento do sujeito e os valores memorialistas que permitem um movimento de retorno aos códigos de tradição.

Mitos às margens: espaços de origem, começo e recomeço
Destaco aqui um dos pontos de contato entre os movimentos de origem e de começo apontados por Silviano Santiago em Drummond e os mesmos movimentos apontados aqui para o texto de Nicolas Behr. Como Drummond (e muitas vezes à cópia e maneira deste), Behr joga com as palavras para nelas expressar a irredutibilidade do tempo que por vezes o prende e, por outras, o distancia do passado memorialista. Através de uma linguagem coloquial e, em alguns casos, quase falada, o jogo de palavras cria uma máscara no poema capaz de cair somente no fim de cada texto, tornando a dicção poética mais enxuta, clara e precisa. A rápida e fácil apreensão de seus poemas curtos deve-se ao fato de o texto buscar, prioritariamente, uma proximidade maior com o público. Em nossos dias, esse leitor perde-se na rotina da sociedade de consumo, encontra pouco – ou nenhum – tempo para a leitura de poesia e, além disso, é um leitor com outra sensibilidade quanto à forma de abarcar esse dizer. Sobre o assunto, e ainda a propósito da "poesia marginal" da década de 1970, Silviano Santiago afirma:

Essa necessidade de ter o produto poético consumido fez com que os poetas jovens se dedicassem mais e mais a um poema que pudesse ser facilmente digerido pelo leitor comum. Assim como nas artes plásticas, depois da exaustão das vanguardas, fala-se de um retorno ao suporte-quadro, na poesia há um retorno ao suporte-verso. Verso que se acha no entanto descompromissado da linguagem poética e dos ritmos tradicionais. Versos para um leitor que se encontra despreparado culturalmente para as grandes investidas livrescas e eruditas da vanguarda. Um leitor que tem poucas leituras e um parco conhecimento literário, pois aquelas e este se encontram circunscritos a determinados valores que são os da juventude das grandes metrópoles. A biblioteca deixa de ser o lugar por excelência do poeta e o seu país é o mass media" (188).

Apesar de os livros do escritor Nicolas Behr mencionados neste estudo terem sido lançados após o ano 2000, é possível perceber resíduos de uma linguagem que ainda prima pela coloquialidade, objetividade e clareza de dizer. Além disso, sua produção atual pressupõe um outro olhar e uma solução para questões e problemas antigos, como sua relação com a cidade de Brasília ou com seu lugar de origem (Diamantino, estado de Mato Grosso, Brasil). Sua poesia transforma-se, e se antes tinha olhos apenas para o presente, agora, transita entre os tempos e espaços: ora é a infância perdida na memória do poeta, ora a cidade de Brasília que se desfaz no corpo do poema, para que Braxília (um outro universo) tome forma.

A infância
é a camada
fértil da vida

depois da camada
fértil, vem o
cascalho,
a pedra, a camada
adulta, estéril, dura,
impermeável, esta

(Behr, " Menino Diamantino" 13)

Daqui vejo a casa da fazenda
em ruínas, sempre em ruínas
[…]
Será mesmo preciso voltar lá?

Pela imaginação não vale?
Tem que ir lá tocar,
Pegar, chorar, sofrer?

Daqui vejo tudo
Daqui imagino tudo
Daqui sinto tudo

Não preciso voltar (13).

A infância é apresentada como camada fértil, o passado que está latente na lembrança do sujeito. Já o presente, ou seja, "esta" realidade, trazida no texto, é o cascalho, pedra dura, impermeável e estéril, não-frutífero, impassível de reprodução. A fertilidade da infância passada, guardada nas imagens da fazenda retorna na consciência do sujeito, que admite suas recordações em ruínas e, portanto, causadoras de sofrimento. A memória é o esconderijo do sujeito para não sofrer, uma vez que atesta a impossibilidade de retorno e o estado apenas latente da infância. Na medida em que o sujeito encontra-se preso nas memórias da infância, é na realidade de um tempo passado que ele busca a identificação com uma coletividade hoje perdida. O sujeito do tempo presente é cindido, desfeito em escombros, ruínas, uma superfície degradada pelo tempo que passou e não carregou consigo os valores familiares e tradicionais do espaço-casa nomeado por ele "infância": "demoliram minha infância/ e eu desmoronei/ junto com o velho casarão/ emparedado/ entre os escombros de mim" (Behr," Menino Diamantino" 30). O mito da origem toma forma na idéia de regresso, a qual pressupõe o reconhecimento dos valores e figuras familiares, nesse caso, abandonadas pelo menino diamantino.

No entanto, o sujeito reconhece na aventura poética, realizada pelo exercício da linguagem, a maneira de "inaugurar" e descobrir um novo mundo: "… E lá íamos eu e este poema/ Conquistar o mundo" (Behr, " Menino Diamantino" 45). Em outras palavras, ele percebe a necessidade de sair de um espaço (o de suas origens) para entrar em um local de exílio, longe de suas raízes. O presente é exílio que mantém o sujeito refém de um futuro desconhecido:


menino: destino: exílio

longe da pátria diamantina
longe da infância

refém do amanhã
rumo ao desconhecido
(Behr, " Menino Diamantino" 49).

Assim, institui-se o ponto de inoperância do sujeito entre a origem e o começo. O poema, enquanto meio de projeção imaginária, faz-se o único espaço viável para presentificar o passado – preso e isolado no escudo memorialista e, portanto, inacabado. A identificação com os valores sociais, históricos e culturais de sua origem são a tentativa de o sujeito reconhecer os acontecimentos do passado; a consciência presente regressa ao passado para tentar abarcar um futuro que se quer, ainda, no passado. Perdido entre os arquivos da memória passada e a vida presente, o sujeito desconhece a si mesmo. A memória são as imagens atualizadas na lembrança do eu lírico, isto é, aquilo que o sujeito precisa ativar para reconhecer-se no que passou e que está inacabado, eternamente.


Aqui estou, exposto,
Deposto, quase nu
Ferida cicatrizada
(quer que eu abra, quer?)

Aqui estou,
Infância inacabada
(Behr, " Menino Diamantino" 79)

Inaugurando espaços
Para que se faça um começo, de fato, o presente estéril é materializado na cidade de Brasília: "Quando será inaugurada em mim esta cidade?" (Behr, "Braxília Revisitada" 3). O reconhecimento de um espaço urbano de concreto, uma realidade excessivamente dura, estéril (onde nada frutifica) e vazia, para corresponder a um presente áspero, seco e improdutivo. Brasília é reduzida a espaço sem vida, de blocos, edifícios
e ruas (quadras e superquadras) que escondem um sujeito desajustado:

A cidade é isso
mesmo que você
está vendo mesmo
que você não
esteja vendo nada (9).

brasília é a incapacidade
do contato afetivo
entre a laje
e o concreto (37).

a superquadra nada mais é
do que a solidão
dividida em blocos (75).
blocos,
eixos,
quadras

senhores,
esta cidade
é uma
aula
de geometria
("Poesília: poesia pau – brasília" 86).

Para que o ato de começar aconteça definitivamente, o sujeito exclui-se da vida familiar, para incluir-se no universo da poesia. Em um movimento próximo ao de Drummond, que foge para a ilha robinsoniana, o sujeito da poesia de Nicolas Behr foge para Brasília, onde tenta, frustradamente, embora cheio de rebeldia, reconhecer-se e estabelecer uma nova ordem sócio-cultural. Se, pelo dizer poético de Nicolas Behr, o presente faz-se exílio, o universo espaçosamente sufocante de Brasília não é suficiente para que ele rompa de fato com o passado confortante das lembranças do "menino diamantino". Indo além do movimento feito por Drummond e impossibilitado de cumprir sua missão, o sujeito exila-se no "arquipélago da imaginação" (Behr, "Braxília Revisitada" 88) e constrói "Braxília", escrita com "X", a letra que, a propósito da palavra "exílio", exila o sujeito das memórias do passado, afasta-o dos eixos que cortam Brasília e permite que o presente se faça menos seco, menos áspero e doloroso. Mito de recomeçar.

Com efeito, Brasília desmorona sobre o sujeito: "ontem desabaram sobre mim/ duas superquadras inteiras" (63). A cidade vira ruína e é por ele engolida: "Eu engoli brasília" (Behr, "Poesília: poesia pau-brasília" 26), afirma a voz no poema, para que fique em paz e para que se faça, então, uma nova configuração social: "Braxília".

logo depois – impossível
não notar – estão as
ruínas de brasília
(Behr, "Braxília revisitada" 13).

imagine brasília
não-capital
não-poder
não-brasília
assim é braxília
("Primeira Pessoa" 12).

brasília já teve
de mim o pedaço que queria

o pedaço fedia

(agora é a vez de braxília) (10).

As memórias de Brasília são apagadas após o soterramento dessa cidade-presente-vazia. "Braxília" é o local em que, finalmente, o sujeito vê-se capaz de inaugurar um espaço de vida próximo ao que se tinha na infância passada e perdida. No entanto, o universo agora é urbano, o mundo rural ficou no futuro inacabado do passado diamantino, mas a sensação do sujeito, antes fragmentado na amargura do presente, é de vida urbana e pulsante.

Mitos: Atos de magia pela palavra
Os atos mágicos de começar e originar não são lineares na forma de abarcar o tempo, e são cíclicos, pois se repetem, de formas variadas e, por vezes, indiretas, e permitem ao sujeito desconhecer-se ou conhecer-se nas imagens que cria. No infinito do tempo, essa voz poética movimenta-se para transcender a infância, ser ultrapassado por valores presos ao passado e superiores a qualquer ordem sócio-cultural pré-estabelecida e identificar-se na coletividade não mais existente; ou ainda, faz o movimento contrário, enchendo-se de rebeldia, individualismo e vontade de instaurar novos valores. Mitos (ou atos) de começo e origem.

Sob essa perspectiva, percebo no mito de começo, a capacidade de libertação de um tempo e uma realidade que não se quer mais, bem como a supressão de uma condição sócio-histórica e culturalmente imposta, para que se inaugure outra. No mito da origem, percebo o resgate e a imposição de um tempo e valores, extraviados na memória e superiores ao indivíduo. E a imagem do poeta, via linguagem – e árduo exercício da palavra poética – permite ao sujeito do poema esse eterno retorno ao que já foi e ainda estava por vir ou um (re)começo daquilo que, de fato, ainda pode ser. Isto é, um sujeito cindido. Ora em regresso, ora com olhos atentos para o presente e o futuro possível – a potência que se quer e é construída no texto.

Portanto, é possível perceber ao longo deste trabalho que, se um primeiro contato com o texto de Nicolas Behr permite mergulhar na cena urbana de Brasília, um olhar sobre sua produção mais recente possibilita outras leituras. Agora, é o universo de Braxília que se faz presente, ou as escavações arqueológicas para encontrar os restos de Brasília ou os restos de infância. Na estratégia poética há ainda o laço com a tradição no traço lingüístico que mantém a ironia, os poemas curtos, a linguagem contundente.

Entre "Marx" e "Proust", ou ainda, entre a magia de começar e originar, o texto de Nicolas Behr transita pelos dois campos. Opta, entretanto, pela vida efervescente nas ruas de uma cidade fértil e capaz de dar força ao poeta na sua infinita trajetória de recomeçar no mundo criado por suas mãos – a cidade de "Braxília", uma vez que "o poema/ é área pública/ invadida pela/ imaginação" ("Braxília revisitada" 23). Nessa opção, não há necessidade de encontrar origens ou mitos fundacionais. Há apenas a possibilidade de vida pulsante, de trânsito e de revolução. Marx. Começo, inauguração. Reviravolta do poeta no poema.

Notas

1 Curtição é o termo utilizado por Silviano Santiago, no ensaio Os abutres, no livro Uma literatura nos trópicos (1978) para definir uma nova forma de apreensão do objeto artístico pela nova geração que ganha força a partir da década de 1960; curtição, segundo o autor, pressupõe prazer, fruição, deleite.

Obras citadas

Behr. Nicolas. Poesília: Poesia Pau - Brasília. Brasília: LGE, 2002.

———. Primeira Pessoa. Brasília: LGE, 2005.

———. Braxília Revisitada. Brasília: LGE, 2005. Vol.I.

———. Menino Diamantino. Brasília, 2003.

Hollanda, Heloísa Buarque de. Impressões de Viagem. São Paulo: Abril Educação, 1982.

Mauss, Marcel. Sociologia e Antropologia. Trad. Paulo Neves. São Paulo: Cosac Naify, 2003.

Pereira, Carlos Alberto Messeder. Retrato de Época. Poesia Marginal Anos 70. Rio de Janeiro: FUNARTE, 1981.

"Poesia por vias transversas". Escrita. Revista mensal de Literatura. São Paulo, abril 1977: 3-14. Entrevista concedida a Astolfo Araújo e Wladyr Nader.

Richard, Nelly. "La Condición Centro-Marginal Póst-Moderna". Travessia. 29/30 (1997): 55-59.

Santiago, Silviano. Uma Literatura nos Trópicos: ensaios de dependência cultural. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1978.

———. "Entre Marx e Proust. Folhetim". Folha de São Paulo. São Paulo, 21 junho 1981

———. Carlos Drummond de Andrade. Petrópolis, RJ : Vozes, 1976.

———. As raízes e o labirinto da América Latina. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2006.

Sevcenko. Nicolau, et al. Anos 70: trajetórias. São Paulo: Iluminuras: Itaú Cultural, 2005.

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